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Abstract
Derrida’s Daughter: A Dialogue Postmortem
On Love
Heather D. Zias
As the illegitimate daughter of one of the twentieth century’s most intriguing
philosophers, at least to literary folk affiliated with universities of some repute, the
author’s life has been suspended in the interstices of celebrity and ignominy, erudition
and erethism, Stanford University Press and Sinclair Community College, and so much
so, that her life seemed to be nothing but this conjunction, that is—and. Unwilling to cite
her famous father (who, though absent, was nevertheless present to her mind as a wish or
a hope) so that she might make her own name, the author moved about incognito in
literary circles and suffered the typical abuses meted to no-accounts. Her university
learning was nothing but the learning of her father, and all spoke in his name, though his
name was to her, always (though secretly) more than a name.
Her father died. She heard of it, as she had heard of him all her life—second-hand. And
then she heard no more of him; it was as if, in death, he had become like her—a person of
no account, a person literary folk were now willing to pass by. Enraged that what she had
sought all her life was so readily discarded by those who formerly professed devotion,
she pronounced herself her father’s heir and substituted his name for hers. Her act was, at
first, an act of justice, of seeking it for herself, of administering it upon those who had
disowned her—including her father. It was an act of and, an act of one caught between
subversion and fidelity, judgment and mercy, the past and the future, and thus it was an
act which mirrored the acts of her father, acts of literature and of religion, in perfect
symmetry. By declaring the and bequeathed to her by her father, she also declared its deconjunction, its capacity, as her father had always claimed, to become other than and—
something that is its own, and that the author, in the end, has called love.
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on the one hand, for seekers of justice
and
on the other hand . . .
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I have come in my Father’s name, and you do not accept me;
but if someone else comes in his own name, you will accept him.
~John 5:43, New International Version
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Zias 1
Introduction
Jacques Derrida is dead. And we have grown bored. Or, perhaps it is that we who
were so confident in the rightness of a paradigm, so committed to its transformative
potential that we taught it to our students, published essays and books in-its-name, staked
our scholarly reputation on the reputation of another, have now with the death of that
another been forced to admit that it was never about rightness or transformation, never
about belief or commitment—it was about him, and he has left us orphans. He has stolen
from us what all masters steal when they die: our ability to use him for our advancement.
We did advance while he lived—you can be sure of that. Speaking in his name
was, in the words of one, “professionally sexy”; it was a way “to enter the literary
profession as a player,” to exist, finally, as somebody worthy of citation oneself because
one had cited him (Tompkins 114; 104). We could say we knew him, could say we had
touched the wound in his side and in turn had felt his eyes, those penetrating eyes,
touching us “as if they were fingers” (Apter et. al. 480). And he did not turn away from
our devotion or publication by Stanford University Press; he was the epitome of
somebody-ness, the evidence that the center always holds because we want it to be filled.
We have, appropriately, mourned; have shed our public tears in signifiers worthy
of him who taught us to doubt them, twist them, bend them this way and that for the
purposes of . . . feeling much better about ourselves. That was the opinion of one of his
disciples; you see, murmurings began even while Derrida lived that the poststructuralist
paradigm was nothing but “wishful theory” or “feel-good theory,” “a theory in which
human freedom is emphatically denied, only to be endlessly replayed in intellectual
fantasies of subversion.” It is a theory that, for all its show of self-deprecating irony is
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nevertheless “self-exonerating,” and what is self-exonerating cannot fundamentally be
self-transforming let alone world-changing (Dollimore, “Shakespeare” 269). And our
goal as literary scholars is to change the world—and for the better. For “‘tis the talent of
our English nation, / Still to be plotting some new reformation” (Dryden 9-10).
Thus, it is only in the interests of changing the world for the better that we now
concede it has not really changed. Not because we were wrong about how to change it,
and not because we never really believed in the principles we espoused and never put
them into practice, but because with all the advancements in technology, some
instruments for the purposes of change lose, like cassette tapes, their use value.
Therefore, we could argue that Derrida’s death was, in defiance of his own theories of
time, rather timely, for it spared us the embarrassment of hinting to him that he should
have long ago retired. “The poststructuralist paradigm is now exhausted,” we are now
free to say. “We are living through an era of ‘crisis,’ [. . .] an era in which the old is dying
[or dead] and the new has not yet been born [. . .]” (Moi, “I Am” 1735). This “theoretical
doxa” “no longer has anything new to say,” for it—or he—is dead, and we yearn, in the
interests of reformation, for something new, for someone somewhere to understand that
we are bored, that we need a new master to speak in-the-name-of (1735).
As editor of this volume of scholarship, I am writing this introduction to testify
that the new has come—the one we have been waiting for is here. Crisis averted. We can
be confident in speaking in-her-name, for we will not have to risk the credentials we
amassed for ourselves in the prior dispensation, for the one in whose name we can speak
is none other than Derrida’s daughter. She has, in my opinion, been silent too long, but
she was silent only because as a woman “coming to intellectual maturity at the tail end of
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poststructuralism,” she had “to struggle free of the legacy of an intellectual tradition that
has been fully explored” and found wanting, and by those who taught it to her, urging her
to believe in it (Moi, “I Am” 1735). It is no easy task to struggle free when what is found
wanting is not just another scholar one can toss in the trash at one’s convenience but is
one’s father, is he who gave you life.
But I can attest that she has succeeded, and the struggle, the journey she
documents for us in these pages is one I know we can not only follow, but embrace with
all the conviction we formerly failed to amass as we were amassing our credentials.
Derrida’s daughter shows us, first and foremost, what it means to profess and what it
means to believe. In making this distinction she is, as she herself would say, a prodigal,
but then again, most children are.
“We won’t get a fresh and freshly convincing analysis of [social problems],” a
former Derridean feminist has said, “until we find new theoretical paradigms,” until we
“rethink” yet again, since it is our livelihood, our “fundamental assumptions about
language and meaning, the relation between language and power, language and human
community, the body and the soul (or whatever we want to call the inner life)” (Moi, “I
Am” 1740, 1735). Note: she does not want to risk naming the inner life for herself, as it
is written:
Of all this Servile Herd the worst is He
That in proud Dulness joins with Quality,
A constant Critick at the Great-man’s Board,
To fetch and carry Nonsense for my Lord. (Pope 414-417)
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To this, I can only repeat what Derrida’s daughter said to me, that first moment if we can
call it that when I looked into her eyes, those touching eyes, and watched her watching
me: fear not, my little faithless children, I am still with thee.
H.D.Z.
Of a University of Some Repute
January 20, 2009
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Prologue
The Philosophy of Nevertheless
This work will present itself gradually. I cannot therefore justify it by way of
anticipation and preface. Let us nevertheless attempt an overture.
(Derrida, Grammatology 97)
Once upon a time (I cite tradition), I aspired to be a literary scholar. That was
back when I enjoyed reading books—novels mostly—Gone With the Wind and Rebecca
were my favorites. I knew nothing about Margaret Mitchell or Daphne du Maurier; the
point of reading their books wasn’t to discover anything about them. In retrospect, I think
I loved to read novels because I loved the anticipation, the discovery of how the story
would end, and the best stories were always the ones that when I closed the book, I knew
I’d been wrong. Of course I’d made guesses about the end, I’d followed many paths, but I
always resisted skipping ahead to see if I was on the right one, for that was the only way
the end could surprise me. I wanted to be surprised. I still smile, remembering all this.
It’s sad to me that I can only remember these feelings. Some day I hope to recover
them, but after ten years of slowly forgetting how to feel, or only being allowed to feel a
very narrow spectrum of emotions, I’m just happy I can remember. I don’t know if my
experience is that of every aspiring scholar, but given that I’ve found so little happiness
and so few happy people in academia, sometimes I wonder. I don’t know how students in
the sciences would describe their experience—if they’d say they used to love learning
that x + y = z, but after sitting hour after hour listening to their professors, now despise
math. I can only speak of the humanities, English departments especially, and if I could
identify succinctly the source of the unhappiness I’ve encountered there, I’d have to say it
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is that my professors hate books.
They would deny this. But then they don’t have to listen to themselves talk about
books. That’s the duty of the student. And in ten years as a student, I learned that when I
was asked to “think critically” about the book we were reading, that meant I had to find
something wrong with it. In fact, in my too-long sojourn, I heard precious little positive
commentary from my teachers on any of the novels, poetry, or plays we studied. They did
not respect, nor admire; there was no gratitude—only criticism.
And criticism means I heard more than I cared to about what was bigoted in a
poem, what was chauvinistic about a novel, what was homophobic about a play, or what
was superstitious, oppressive, dimwitted, or just plain stupid. Going to class was like
going to church where you learn everybody is damned, except I never got the sense from
my professors that salvation is allowed, for if it were, it’d be much harder to spot all that
is incorrect; it’d be much less obvious that the point of reading is to learn (for repetition
aids learning) the same damn thing from every damned book. Salvation, according to my
professors, is just to know everything is damnable.
You can only find something wrong in what you love for so long, and then you
begin to hate. Sometimes I imagine talking to my husband the way I’ve been taught to
talk about books: “Dear, you’re getting a little paunchy, and you might want to consider
disassociating yourself from most of the members of your idiotic family, and could you
please learn to speak with a little more sense, and while you’re up, could you get me a
cup of tea, and don’t forget how much I love you!”
The uniformity of my professors’ perspective became so wearisome to me and so
predictable that I stopped reading; I didn’t see the point anymore. I read solely to prepare
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for class, to answer a question perhaps, but that soon grew tiresome, for I knew that even
if I liked a novel, even if the ending surprised me, we were going to talk about why none
of that mattered. Instead of bothering to read, I began to study: “How explain the anger of
the professors? Why were they angry?” (Woolf 1942). Why so bitter, so prone to sarcasm
and cynicism and so bent on proving to me that my enjoyment of a story was naïve?
The book I’m writing is the result of my study. The answer I can now articulate is
quite simple, and in articulating it I no doubt will be accused of being reductive, the one
thing literary scholars are not allowed to be. No, everything must be so nuanced, for the
world is so complex, so diverse, there are no easy answers, and we must always be
seeking, “[w]andering between two worlds, one dead, / The other powerless to be born, /
With nowhere yet to rest [one’s] head” (Arnold 85-87). Perhaps because I no longer
consider myself a literary scholar and have no desire to be one I’ll be forgiven, or what is
more likely, I’ll be swept into the trash in order that others may disavow the great failures
of a liberal education.
The answer is that my professors are obsessed with justice. This means they seek
it constantly—for others, of course—but most assuredly for themselves. In seeking
justice they imagine themselves righting innumerable wrongs, and as such the wrongs
must be innumerable. Injustice must be everywhere if the goal is always justice. I don’t
write this book to say absurdly that there is no injustice in the world or none represented
in books one might read, but I do write it to assert that it is just as absurd to say there is
injustice everywhere in the world and in every book one might read. I find disturbing a
political agenda that must manufacture and foment feelings of injustice in order to
position itself as the only source of deliverance.
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I also find disturbing that the quest never to admit the occurrence of salvation
(for that would be the end of a literary scholar’s raison d’être) is championed as
salvation, or as a form of love. My professors, of course, were only trying to help me—
they insisted over and over ad nauseam that what they were teaching me was all for my
own good, and for the good of the world really, for they are so humble, and that therefore
because their intentions were pure, they could only be acting (for what other reason could
there be) out of love. Given, however, that their attempt to save me from myself left me
with a thorough distaste for reading, not to mention distaste for institutions of learning
and learned people, I wonder how they can so easily equate justice with love.
I’m sure by now you’ve detected an irony. That is, that though I’ve lost my love
of reading, I’m writing a book I have to read and for an audience of blasted learned
people, of whom I am chief. That, of course, is the principle pleasure for a learned
person, the pleasure of irony. It’s the one pleasure that escapes the charge of naivety. I
mentioned that my professors are unvaryingly cynics and speak sarcastically. Their
countenances express world-weariness, and their ever-present complaints of being
overworked and underappreciated monetarily and otherwise reveal to me that though
their rhetoric is that of the revolutionary, their material circumstances are that of a paperpushing middle-manager. “I’m just a stooge for the profession,” one of my professors
said to me, with a wink in his eye, of course.
Living the reality that the heroic righting of wrongs must be concurrent with the
righting of a student’s poorly placed comma does tend to make one rather jaded, as I can
testify. In attempting to bequeath to me this reality, my professors proved that though
they want to be evangelists, they have not, as their first-century counterparts did,
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accepted the difference between open-air preaching and waiting on tables.1 My professors
embody contradiction and they know they do; they speak of it as just the-way-of-theworld, though their irony implies that living comfortably with incongruities is an
achievement. This was impressed upon me when one of my professors told a group of us
aspiring scholars that we ought to publish our work so we could ascend the ranks and
become people who matter:
Let me put it to you this way—what it comes down to is this: there are four kinds
of people in this world. First, there are those who occupy the inner circle;
secondly, there are those trying to gain access to the inner circle; thirdly, there are
those who think they’re in, but really aren’t; and lastly, there are those who are
simply out. Now, I shouldn’t have to tell you that being in the inner circle is
where you want to be. Publishing is a way in, and from my experience, I can
testify that those who are in are generally the happiest, most satisfied and
successful people. It’s that simple.
So much for nuance. Oh, but I’m getting to that, for this is also the professor whose
professional organization, the Group for Early Modern Cultural Studies declares its intent
“to de-hierarchize as much as possible the relationships among graduate students, parttime instructors, independent scholars, assistant professors, and tenured types,” in an
overt denial that publishing is the creation of that very hierarchy (Markley viii).
In short, my education in English has been one long and tedious mixed message.
Ostensibly, we study literature because we love books, though in our study we only talk
about what there is to hate. We are to pursue the very important work of social justice as
well as the drudgery of grading papers. We are to invest in the lives of our students and
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help them to discover all they can be, and we are to hope our next promotion will give
us a lighter teaching load so we don’t really have to teach at all. We are to publish our
scholarly work for the noble pursuit of an idea and to participate in their free exchange,
and we are to do so because if we have the right politics, we can get that professorship
at Duke where we can amass greater intellectual capital by harping about academia’s
rigid feudal class structure.
You might think that in identifying my professors’ attachment to contradiction
and irony, I’ve strayed from my charge that they’re obsessed with justice. I’ve
suddenly introduced complexity where before I begged forgiveness for simplicity. But
really I have not; I’m only introducing another equation my professors have made. In the
first instance, they equated justice with love; here they equate justice with irony. This
particular marriage is the more difficult of the two to understand, at least it was for me.
Growing up I knew when my parents punished me, they still loved me; I sensed even in
rebellion that there is a kind of justice that is compatible with love and that the former
need not cancel out or render powerless the other. But how can irony be justice?
Let me return to my former love of reading; it will be an illustration. In a few
pages, I’ll begin a literary analysis of Geoffrey Chaucer’s poem, House of Fame, but I
won’t begin, as I might have before I knew better, by describing how it’s beautifully
written, embodies true artistic genius, and speaks to the deepest fears or hopes of the
human spirit. Instead, I’ll begin by explaining that, first of all, Chaucer has victimized
me. Though long returned to dust, he did something terrible to me, something I’ll try
really hard to be upset about: as my ancestor of Western European descent, he imparted
to me my imperialist notions of beautifully written, artistic genius, and human spirit
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which I, (and here’s the part where I’ll flagellate myself) in my naïve and insensitive
way, have turned against some marginalized outcast like Danielle Steel, exhibiting in the
process, because she is a woman, my own insidious self-hatred. With Chaucer as my
vehicle, I’ll prove myself to be both victim and persecutor, innocent and guilty.
Why I might want to do this is the same reason someone would say: “You
wouldn’t hit a person with glasses, would you?” Contemporary literary criticism is
basically a variation of this question. It begs not to be kicked because it’s already thrown
itself to the curb. It begs to escape judgment because it’s already, better than anyone else
could, judged itself. Irony is the mode of this self-judgment; it is the mode which prods
one out of one’s (presumably) fat and happy existence as an insensitive clod who doesn’t
know collecting beautiful books on one’s shelf necessitates discrimination, and deposits
one into a (presumably) still fat but now unhappy existence in which one will perpetually
wish one’s bookshelf was bigger so as to eliminate exclusion and therefore one’s guilt.
I jest, when there is so much real and heart-rending rape and pillage in the world—how
dare I? An unfortunate byproduct of irony, I’m afraid—a dull and deadening seriousness.
Don’t think by irony I mean joy.
The daily doses of irony I had to swallow in my years as a student were given to
me, therefore, as medicine; it was like being forced to go to the gym to master my
obstinate clay, or cellulite in this case. Irony is a double state of mind and only in being
double—aware that one enjoys every advantage and that therefore one is culpable—is
justice at last accomplished. The third equation, therefore, my professors have made is
that justice equals confession, the acknowledgment of one’s complicity with evil. The
confession of one’s sins seems worthy, especially since it’s based in a rejection of the
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idea that one’s good can only come at the expense of another’s good. However, such
confession turns unjust when, in the very act of rejecting this idea, those who confess to
have done so apply it absolutely by accusing all who experience success, gain, wealth, or
joy of having gotten it by stealing it from others. Confession in this case is quite
self-exonerating; it is a way to legitimate one’s right to judge others, to prove one has the
authority to be “a brisk little somebody, / Critic and whippersnapper, [come] in a rage /
To set things right” (Browning 22).
If you’ve wondered, as I often did as a student, why my professors don’t forsake
their contradictoriness by chucking their academic careers in favor of social work or
community organizing or by selling their possessions to give to poor adjuncts, or by
volunteering to decline pay increases and the promotion at Harvard to take a lectureship
at Sinclair Community College in a cornfield in Ohio, you’d be told by them that your
wondering is simplistic. You haven’t yet learned that nothing in academia is so simple,
so either-or, for it’s precisely such either-or thinking which has caused all the injustices
they care so much about. Then they’ll hand you a book like the one I quoted from at the
beginning of this prologue, and there you’ll read, passing over it without alarm because it
seems so innocuous: “This work will present itself gradually. I cannot therefore justify it
by way of anticipation and preface. Let us nevertheless attempt an overture.”
The difficulty of challenging my professors with what used to be called hypocrisy
is that they just don’t care. They lack, as one academic self-help writer acknowledged
(but only parenthetically in the interests of his usefulness) the desire for difference (Hall
28). You can’t hope to enlighten intellectuals; there’s nothing you can say that they
haven’t already considered—knowledge isn’t their problem. They’ll probably even
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apologize to you for their duplicity, say they know very well their “iconoclastic approach
[. . .] carries within it the seeds of an orthodoxy that, given time, will reproduce the very
conditions which provoked the initial shattering of idols” (Markley ix). Then they’ll wink
at you as my professor did when he told me he knew darn well he was just a stooge. After
this, they’ll be very un-stooge-like and demand you get your act together and write
scholarship in the way everybody else does, which means with a bow to nevertheless.
Nevertheless is the literary scholar’s master signifier; it’s the one word which still
can be cited as an explanation for all else. My professors don’t care about their hypocrisy
and have no will to change because to them a double standard, when it works in their
favor, is a virtue; it is a sign of their power and sophistication, and with the help of
Jacques Derrida, they can even justify the deployment of duplicity politically and
philosophically. I’ll have much more to say of Derrida’s politics throughout this book,
but if I could distil his thought to its essence, it would be thus: on the one hand . . .
on the other hand . . . . Fill in the ellipses as you will:
On the one hand, it might have been murder; on the other hand, it might not.
On the one hand, it would be right to forgive; on the other hand, it would not.
On the one hand, God doesn’t exist; on the other hand, God certainly does.
On the one hand, Derrida said new things; on the other hand, it was all the same.
The seesaw structure is intended to turn words against themselves so that their meanings
remain open-ended. So the point of inquiring if one ought to forgive isn’t really to forgive
but to question what forgiveness is and to suspend one’s assumptions that one already
knows and can go-and-do in the way one believes. Similarly, whether or not God exists
must remain open, for to say God does or doesn’t is to foreclose the possibility that what-

Zias 14
we-call-God could happen, the structure of happening being in Derrida’s philosophy,
God. Committing oneself to Pure Happening, whatever that might be, is of course rather
esoteric, but that’s the point—abstraction is specificity’s liberation. By suspending, as
much as one can, all one’s received ideas about God, one can be open to receiving
whatever God will be.
Generally, Derrida took concepts he believed had become (or, more accurately,
had always been) stale, narrow, and oppressive—like hospitality, forgiveness, friendship,
religion—and via appeal to the irreducible structure of language, a structure he said is an
an effect of a fundamental disunity and disjunction of being, tried to free such concepts to
become what they will be, without expressly saying what they will be, although he
could never quite hide that he had an idea of what they should be. He hinted at the
should-be through negation, explaining why what they have been shouldn’t-be. For to
name what will-be, that great Unknown, is once again to become what shouldn’t-be, that
is, stale, narrow, and oppressive. You see, happening must be safeguarded to prevent
occurrences of injustice to Unknowability as such.
If you’ve spotted a contradiction in Derrida’s philosophy—that we must be open
to what we can’t name only by naming what has already come—you’ve spotted the
eternal engine driving the advent of the New. You spotted a contradiction because in
this way of thinking, contradiction is king; it is purposeful and strategic, for it’s thought
to be the locale of a possibility, of one of those happenings that will (no doubt) be much
more to our liking and convenience than our past or current life experience.
This is also, of course, a way of reading, of finding whatever it is in a text that
prohibits happening. Usually, what Derrida blamed as prohibitive is either-or logic, black
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or white, which in their banal, binary configuration suppresses all the other colors.
Supposedly, if one read everything this way, ever-new-interpretations of books would
either be the happening or produce it, but more accurately would be both, since we must
resist all either-ors. I can attest that readings along these lines can be quite colorful. One
defender of the great unknown once argued that in House of Fame, the poem I’ll discuss
shortly, Chaucer, because he happens to include an eagle as a speaking character, must be
raising questions “about the exclusivity of a constructed ‘human’ subjectivity” and
“human-dominated forms of truth.” Apparently, we are to take Chaucer literally and
avoid “attempts to confine [his text] to simplistic human-centered allegorization,” “a
hermeneutic habit from a centuries-old smug hegemony and metaphysics that we now
must examine” (Kordecki 53, 61). I’m not sure championing eagle truths and eagle
subjectivity represents Pure Happening so much as the Disneyfication of scholarship.
In any case, I can see why many a shabby, white Westerner such as myself would
look to the unknown for salvation, would see in happening, whatever that is, a new way
of thinking quite liberating, especially if one really believed in one’s own shabbiness, for
that could never be unknown, that we can name as much and as often as you please. I
certainly was tempted to believe in my shabbiness; it was unavoidable, year after year for
ten years being told I was what was wrong with the world, me and my silly love of
reading beautiful books. You see, the book I’m writing isn’t just about books but about
me; in advising me, via irony, to hate books, my professors were also asking me to
hate myself as a lover of books. A colleague advised me recently, “Don’t make this so
personal; after all, your credentials are at stake.” But making this personal is the point, for
it’s very easy to forget that when one blithely refers to “systems,” “cultures,” “the West,”
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and “Christendom,” one is referring not to abstractions but to people, some of them not
yet dust though one might like them to be, some who may be sitting in the room listening.
I’m writing this book because I have a personal grievance. I used to love reading
novels and now I don’t and someone is to blame. I used to like myself a lot more and now
I don’t and someone is to blame. Someone, though it’d be easier for me to claim the
injustice I feel I’ve experienced is institutional or systemic. That’s exactly the way my
professors taught me to understand injustice, conveniently, I’d say, for them. And it
might very well sooth my stings, give me a sense of empowerment to say my hurt is so
diffuse, or make the solution to my problem seem both more doable and more radical
then it really would be—my professors will have to let me know. What I do know is that
it is this person I despise, that person I cannot forgive; they are all people who taught me
to think and speak a certain way and all for my own good. They’re people, who for some
reason, since it’s impossible, I once tried to please.2
But I’m also writing this book because I don’t wish to have a personal grievance;
it’s quite dreary and restrictive believing oneself to be a victim. I’m writing this book
because I want to opt out of justice; I’m writing it because if I’m ever to love books or
myself again, I know I have to train myself to read anew, and as I won’t read anything
I’m not also writing, I know my love can be found again no other way. To find a way out
of justice, I’ve decided to tackle the three equivalencies I’ve just mentioned (justice =
love, irony, the confession of sin) and so I intend that the succeeding sections of this book
will represent my efforts at de-equation. My professors’ justice must try to pass for what
it isn’t because it must hide something it can never and will never openly say. But I will
say it: “Within this holy leisure we [do not]/ Live innocently” (Marvell 97-98).
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I’m writing this book principally for myself and secondly for an audience of
literary scholars familiar with contemporary philosophies and theories of literature.
However, as I sense that the trajectory of this book will ultimately aim away from this
audience, you need not be a literary scholar, know much about Derrida, Chaucer,
Shakespeare, Aphra Behn, John Donne, Madonna, or any of the other people I intend to
talk about. I write to be understood, for part of the point is to understand why I have
lingered so long in unhappiness; therefore, I will resist jargon as much as possible,
though I’ve been taught by my professors that clarity is one of those many tyrannies we
must guard against. In addition, the injustices I will identify in academia aren’t confined
there; they are, as my professors have argued to the point of exhaustion, the same
injustices in all ages and cultures—and all books—though we must, nevertheless, be
sensitive to diversity, of course. If you care to, since I am, as you are, guilty, you’ll be
sure to find some injustices in this book, and probably a few poorly placed commas.
One more explanation on the organization of the book: the literary works I’ll
discuss I’ve chosen partly for convenience, because when I aspired to be a scholar, I
studied English literature and these are samplings of the plays or poems I read. I’ve also
chosen them because these are texts I remember enjoying; they’re texts that in some way
are searching for the same thing I’m searching for—a way out of justice; they’re all
also, in different ways, about love. I intend to use the literary works in three ways: 1.) to
illustrate Derrida’s philosophy of nevertheless, its contradictions, its agenda, its injustices
2.) to establish continuity between contemporary approaches to dilemmas of ethics and
action and prior attempts to solve the same, and 3.) to argue that nevertheless isn’t new
and won’t produce newness because it’s a very old and unbearably arrogant attitude.
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Finally, although I tried not to write this book, I discovered I had to because I
couldn’t run away from a problem that’s a part of me. When I tried running away, I
realized the problem was running along beside me because I was always running with
myself. Therefore, though I despise reading and wouldn’t encourage an enemy to be a
literary scholar, I’ve decided to read and write literary scholarship for the sake of this
book. In the writing, I hope to go as far as I can into the so-called complexities of theory
and politics so that I might come out again, come up for air. From the start I’ve thought
of this book not as my way into the ranks of the Harvard-bound hopeful, but as my way
out. And because I didn’t run away, I hope I’ll leave my bitterness where it’ll find more
friends. We’ll see.
Chaucer’s House of Fame: Beginnings and Ends
Ne kan I not to yow devyse—
My wit ne may me not suffise.
But, natheles . . . (1179-1181)
As I suspected they would be, my professor-editors aren’t satisfied. After
perusing the above section they insist I confess, reveal where exactly I’m headed. I try to
acquiesce, but ultimately I can’t. Not because I don’t know where I need to go—I’m
looking for love—but because the insistence that one be told the end before there is a
beginning is the sort of undue vigilance and precipitate judgment under which love
withers. When the assumption is that one’s priority ought to be judgment, that one ought
first, before one does anything else, look for deficiency, love has already fled.
just adj 1: having a basis in or conforming to fact or reason; reasonable
(~ comment) 2: correct, proper (~ proportions) 3: morally or legally right (a ~
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title) 4: deserved, merited (~ punishment) – Syn. UPRIGHT, HONORABLE,
CONSCIENTIOUS, HONEST – just-ly adv – just-ness n
And when one’s priority is conformity to one’s sense of propriety, of obligation, of
tradition, then bringing offenders to account isn’t far behind. Literary scholars are, first
and foremost, formality prudes.
jus-tice n 1: the administration of what is just (as by assigning merited rewards or
punishments) 2: JUDGE 3: the administration of law 4: FAIRNESS; also :
RIGHTEOUSNESS 3
In short, when one’s priority is justice, one’s purpose is to bring the other to heel.
I suspect my professors also want everything explained in the introduction
because they’re very busy people burdened by deadlines and don’t want to read my entire
book in order to make their counter-argument. Thus, though I’ve just defined what I
mean by just and justice, they’d now wish for me to define what I mean by love. In this
they ask the impossible, because while I’ve been becoming so intimate with justice these
last ten years, love has become a stranger. And then love, I believe, unlike justice, needs
a little time to be and thrive, for “[a] man must serve his time to every trade / Save
censure—critics all are ready made” (Byron 63-64). Certainly, it was my love of the
unknown end and the time involved in getting there that made reading formerly delightful
to me. In short, I believe love must develop.
Demanding to have a map before one begins a journey is, naturally, very
practical, very common sense. Which is why my professors’ request to know the end is
so unaccountable; it’s so foreign to the spirit of nevertheless, which is the suspicion of all
things common or easy. Wouldn’t it be harder, add greater complexity to get somewhere
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without ever asking for directions? Many women forced to ride shotgun with their
husbands would say resolutely, “yes.” In addition, on Derrida’s word the end must, for
there to be justice, remain fundamentally unknown. To ask for the end now implies it’s
rather easy to begin, so easy that the beginning and how one begins don’t really matter.
The beginning, which must state the end, becomes just the end prior to the end, another
form of ending. Therefore, there isn’t a beginning at all, but just one big, fat end.
When it’s a matter of finding a way out of justice, not a way in, the beginning
rather than the end is the sticking point. Where should I begin? The philosopher of
nevertheless, Derrida, has said that when one wants to find a new way, what’s needed
first is to circle, to become aware that one is encircled, “besieged,” I believe was the term
(Given Time 7, 8). “Injustice is everywhere—I get it,” I often wanted to say to my
professors. So perhaps I must begin here, where I am, in injustice, in my sense of being
oppressed. Something I love has been not just lost as though I were negligent, but stolen,
my love has been stolen, and if I begin here, with this premise, will I get it back? I must
begin not with what has been lost, but with the very structure of the theft, a structure
which Derrida claimed creates the illusion that there was this thing which really existed
and that I’ve called love. Perhaps I’ve been mistaken. Or maybe, as Derrida said, what
I’ve called love had to be sacrificed for the promise of a new-love-to-come, the good
given up for the best, which is the unknown.
I begin with the structure of a theft; I begin by reading not just as I’ve been
taught, but as I’ve been read, and by Derrida, a man I never met and never will meet for
he’s dead, a man who never met me—although, yes, I am his daughter. There, I have
confessed it. Tit-for-tat. I begin with Chaucer, my enemy, the one who, if not for him, I
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might’ve been somebody I could love. But he, the one I must blame, isn’t really there—
not because he’s dead but because he never was, even if I’d met him, even if he’d
whispered to me directly, for there is no such thing as direct or a father, even a famous
one, but nevertheless: “Here’s what you must believe about beautifully written; now go
oppress others.” The poet we call Chaucer is here and there, but as an after-image, as our
talk of him, and I can speak of him only by the talk of another, so many others.
All begins in indirection—this is the philosophy of nevertheless; so I must begin
not with Chaucer or House of Fame but with the talk of him, talk I also heard indirectly,
talk I read in a journal which publishes scholarly talk from people trying to matter, and
directly. Laurel Amtower and Katherine H. Terrell are the ones who matter here, though I
don’t really know if they matter, for I’ve never heard anything of them as I’ve heard of
Derrida. But so much the better if they don’t matter, for it means they’ve missed the mark
and exist in indirection. The face is oppressive anyway, which means facelessness makes
criticism easier, like my mother always said when she berated my absent dad. I’ve chosen
to talk about Amtower and Terrell behind their backs because it’s convenient; in fact,
they’re a mere conveyance, a means to get me somewhere else; it is the-way-of-all-talk,
and they themselves are text. I will refer to them hereafter by their last names as
convention demands; it is meant to connote respect, always remember that.
Amtower’s essay about Chaucer is called “Authorizing the Reader in Chaucer’s
House of Fame” and Terrell’s is called “Reallocation of Hermeneutic Authority in
Chaucer’s House of Fame.” These essays, as the titles suggest, are similar; both explore
the question of what makes a reading just. To answer this question, both scholars assert
that Chaucer’s de-centering of textual authority in his poem is liberating for readers. By
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experiencing the narrator Geffrey’s dream-journey from the Temple of Venus to Lady
Fame and the House of Rumor, and by confronting the ambiguous, unfinished state of the
poem in which an unknown, nameless man of authority is introduced, readers learn along
with Geffrey that the interrelationship between the spoken and written word is unstable
and are thereby empowered to be independent judges of texts. According to Amtower and
Terrell, Chaucer wishes to impress upon readers the importance of assuming the
responsibility for criticizing famous authors, for to resist this burden means being
“drowned among the multitudes of conflicting [authorial] voices,” arrested in a state of
“insurmountable indecision” (Terrell 289). When texts don’t agree, readers must emulate
Geffrey and become their own writers, they must, as it were, venture into the unknown.
This is my own thesis. On the one hand, it’s my weakness because like my idea of
beautifully written, it can be argued that what I’ve written isn’t mine at all but represents
the coalescence of disparate and contingent discursive forces which have created the
illusion of “my” when there are countless others, like Chaucer for instance, through
whom this “my” has passed. On the other hand, my thesis is my power, for there’s no
other way to be heard, no other way to ascend, as my professor said, within the ranks of
academia except to declare my membership, to prove I too can spot an injustice and in
the spotting, affect it, and for the better (Bourdieu, Cultural 42). And there’s no better
place to declare myself, to make an effect, than in the space of someone else’s weakness
(thesis). I must tear into it, must “seek discontinuity, rupture, difference, revolution” in
order to make my mark, to make my difference. To “‘make one’s name’” is to “produce
existence in a world in which the only way to be is to be different” (42, 106). To
announce one’s difference is to expose another as more of the same. A great irony, that
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the necessity of declaring one’s asymmetry ensures that the declarer will be different only
in the same way as everyone else, for all others, for the sake of being known, must also
declare their difference. But this is the philosophy of nevertheless.
Maybe Amtower and Terrell, if we do ever meet face to face, if there is such a
thing, will forgive me for my criticisms. I don’t have anything against them; it’s just the
way it must go; at some juncture, we all must claim, if we are to be known, the right to
judge. Anyway, it could be a moot point because my professors never indicated to me
that forgiveness is allowed.4 Eye for eye and tooth for tooth. Being the-first-kind-of
person, one who’s risen to the height of the inner circle by pointing one’s finger out,
requires, upon principle, the exclusion of mercy. It won’t do to say Amtower and Terrell
are right and move on, for then I render myself superfluous and will never be published.
As an aspiring literary scholar I must claim the right to be heard, must believe, no matter
how many times I prove so-and-so isn’t, and no matter how many times Derrida tells
me it isn’t so, that there is a “master critic” somewhere I speak in-the-name-of. I can’t be
indifferent to this Master, whoever he or she is, and many claim (illegitimately, of course,
like my illegitimacy) to be It (Sosnoski 83, 84).
Someone has said that to identify with a Master Judge, like Derrida for instance,
is a sure sign one is an intellectual. At the feet of this One, in the “‘hot center,’” “ideas
have the greatest sacredness,” and thus it’s only there that one might “attach one’s own
identity to such ideas so that one’s ideas are circulated widely through the conversation,
and one’s personal reputation with it” (Collins 30-31). An intellectual’s ideas, his or her
very being, is nothing without this circulation, and the Master is the source setting all in
motion. Finding a Master who will circulate you is the chief goal of all aspiring literary
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scholars. I recall when I was writing my dissertation and asked a particular professor to
be on my committee, his first response was, “By the time you’re ready for the job market,
I’ll have a book published.” Later, when I told him I didn’t want him on my committee
anymore because I knew he didn’t give a damn about anything except his damn book, he
took offense; I had not ritualistically appreciated his accruing cachet, the fact that he was
becoming a scholar one could cite.
The activity of literary scholars is devoutly religious; it is the citing of proper
authorities. And the citations are rituals of justice, of seeking it, of administering it, like I
can now by tattling about another’s trespass, and in-the-name-of, let us say, but only
indirectly, of Derrida. In her essay, Amtower celebrates justice by arguing that in House
of Fame, Chaucer’s intent is “to expose the tyranny of tradition and to dislocate it from
the iron grasp of authority” (289). I speak of Chaucer, though he is dust, in the present
tense. It’s a mark of respect, always remember that, a way of recalling that he and his
many sins are still with us, and directly. Chaucer, bless him, this time, however, was
trying not to sin—that’s Amtower’s opinion, that Chaucer is like her, for like her, he tells
no one what to do but implies in his poem that the responsibility for judging texts is up to
the reader. Readers shouldn’t depend on writers to judge for them, nor should they put
their faith in tradition, the random process which canonizes only certain books.
Given the fickleness of tradition (or Fame), readers shouldn’t be confident that the
texts they read are truthful or offer good patterns of moral behavior or are even the best
examples of literacy. In Amtower’s view, Chaucer is worried that the values exemplified
in canonized texts go unquestioned and that the attitudes or behaviors represented therein
(such as Aeneas’s abandonment of Dido for a “higher purpose”) are idealized and
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imitated without thought. Readers’ minds are blank slates waiting to be inscribed with a
reductive moral that ignores the fine distinctions in a story such as Aeneas’s. Fame
problematically places a book and the values the book promotes “beyond scrutiny,” and
Chaucer’s poem is a call for readers to open their minds, to return to the texts and
scrutinize the famous authors for themselves in order “to remain distant from the
entrapment of discourse and ideology” (281, 298).
Amtower, in her praise of Chaucer’s fourteenth-century enlightenment, is after a
new ethic, an ethic of skepticism, as if all by default are believers. In her view, an ethical
reader would be like the narrator of Chaucer’s poem, Geffrey, who judges for himself
without citing an authority. Unlike the critical Geffrey who in Book I questions the
validity of Aeneas’s abandonment of Dido, the readers and writers in the House of
Rumor in Book III are “unethical” because they’re “transmitting without censure or
forethought the various portions of speech they encounter” (278-279). “Skeptical
reading,” however, “identifies in textual traditions those questionable pursuits that should
be isolated for judgment” (287). Being “ethical” as a reader means not shirking one’s
responsibility “for sifting through material seemingly verified by tradition” (283); it
means “receiving texts and utterances not passively, but actively,” for after all, “the point
of this dream vision is to prove that the basis and founding measure of all our practices
and ideals should be not the ‘authorities,’ but the self” (289, 275). According to
Amtower, Geffrey illustrates this ethic when he denies desiring Fame:
Sufficeth me, as I were dede,
That no wight have my name in honde.
I wote my self best how y stoned—
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For, what I drye or what I thynke,
I wol my selfe alle hyt drynke,
Certeyn, for the more parte,
As ferforthe as I kan myn arte. (1876-1882)
Like Geffrey, we all should know best how we stand, assuming that this knowledge will
also give us the strength to stand. We never weary from rhetorical sleights of hand.
That this should be my next point, is, given Amtower’s own ethic, inevitable.
Where she’s created symmetry, I must assert disjunction. Where she has, in the interests
of the new, truncated, elided, contextualized, and in so doing, excluded, I must, also in
the interests of the new, retrieve the dust that has been swept away. This is the philosophy
of nevertheless. So although on the one hand, I can say Amtower’s ethic does justice
to the reader by acknowledging their right to read how they will, and that in reading her I
too am reading how I will, on the other I must contend that her ethic does no such thing
because it assumes people, me included, are stupid and inclined to believe whatever we
read. As if every Democrat who scans the New York Times really thinks there’s no other
news fit to print. Who reads this way? Who isn’t allowed to be just as inclined to doubt as
to believe? Only the ignorant, unreflective masses of which Amtower isn’t a member;
unlike them, she doesn’t believe, she isn’t “entrapped” by ideology, she’s a good skeptic,
sort of: Don’t take my word for it, but we must all emulate Geffrey. We shouldn’t
overlook the irony that her reduction of readers to the same and my reduction of her to
one of her readers are both made in the name of inaugurating new interpretations, of
“opening up a space” as the lingo goes, for each to interpret.
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You see, when I try to begin, let alone end, I find myself circling; I find myself
playing this game of tit-for-tat, and it’s a very, very old game. Amtower tries to save
Chaucer by making him like her, as if she requires no salvation. But if we only ever read
how we will, we will only ever read the same. And I want to read differently. I can be
charged with all the failings I attribute to Amtower and what will come of that? Just
another charge made by another other of the same failings, also in the interests of the new
and of the desire to matter. There will be multiplication of accusation, and each will be a
mirror to the other. Reading differently to me means breaking out of this endless
doubling, this endless citation of this same structure of a theft. Enter Katherine H. Terrell.
She also praises Chaucer, agrees with Amtower that the problem in House of
Fame is the “proper allocation of authority” (279). However, her view considers not the
poem’s content but its form. She asserts that Chaucer’s subversive displacement of
authority is written into the poem’s structure because he plays with the conventions of
dream poetry. For instance, Geffrey’s vision doesn’t occur at the right time of year, and
he isn’t much of a lover. But Chaucer’s most significant break with the dream-vision
genre is, according to Terrell, his “fifty-eight lines devoted to discrediting dreams as
sources of valid information” (280).
In the proem, the narrator Geffrey admits his wariness of dreams because, though
they seem to be incursions from beyond, they might just be symptoms of indigestion,
“Prison, stewe or grete distresse” (26). In any case, we can only be agnostic, for “oure
flessh ne hath no might / To understonde hyt aright” (49-50). While Geffrey’s admissions
can support Amtower’s view that he’s engaging in healthy skepticism worthy of our
(unquestioning) imitation, they also open him up to the accusation he later records of
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Homer: that he’s just “made lyes, / Feynynge in hys poetries” (1477-1478). To Amtower,
Chaucer privileges the individual vision of Geffrey (as manifested in his dream) over any
objective reality that would impinge upon his perceptions, but by drawing our attention to
objective factors like indigestion which may have caused Geffrey’s dream, Chaucer has
also provided us with the means for dismissing Geffrey’s viewpoint (Terrell 283).
What is Geffrey’s motive? Ostensibly, though he’s sort of a second-rate lover
who only loves second-hand through books, Geffrey wants to tell us about love. That’s
why the eagle descends to take him to see Lady Fame, because there the eagle says he’ll
learn love’s new tidings. Never mind that once Geffrey gets there, he doesn’t hear
anything new, and never mind that, though Geffrey debunks the authority of dreams by
cataloguing their likely arbitrary and material origins, he nevertheless tells us his dream:
“Now herkeneth, as I have yow seyde, / What that I met or I abreyde” (109-110).
So on the one hand, Geffrey seems harmless enough. Besides his admission that
he doesn’t understand dreams (we’ll leave that to the master clerks, he says), he also
shows his ignorance of “what contree” he’s in (127-28; 474-75), or what he’s supposed to
be learning about love exactly (1884-1889). Plus, he’s cowardly; faints from fear, for
instance, in Book II when the eagle swoops down to carry him off (552-553). He also
laments his dearth of descriptive abilities, worries he’s boring the reader, and pleads to
Apollo to make his rhymes “sumwhat agreable” (1251-1258; 1299-1300; 1097).
On the other hand, Geffrey seems, well, rather smug. He pronounces his
superiority to other famous dreamers: “Isaye, ne Cipion, / Ne kyng Nabugodonosor, /
Pharoo, Turnus, ne Elcanor, / Ne metten suche a dreme as this,” and imagines, not
without some trepidation, the possibility of being turned by Jove into a constellation as
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were Ennok, Elye, Romulus, and Ganymede (514-17; 588-89). When he reads the story
of Aeneas in the Temple of Venus, he declares (in opposition to Virgil) that Aeneas is a
“traytour” who seriously wronged Dido, and he presumes to draw a moral to the story for
women: “Loo, how a woman doth amys / To love hym that unknowen ys” (267; 269270). And most importantly, he audaciously bullies the reader into listening to him by
promising blessings for those who judge him favorably and curses for those who don’t:
And who so, thorgh presumpcion
Or hate or skorne, or thorgh envye,
Dispite or jape or vilanye,
Mysdeme hyt, pray I Ihesus God
That—dreme he barefote, dreme he shod—
That every harme that any man
Hath had syth the worlde began
Befalle hym therof or he sterve,
And graunte he mote hit ful deserve! (94-102)
Surely Amtower didn’t mean for us, in our ethical skepticism, to emulate this?
Geffrey is contradictory. His apparent vulnerability, his unpretentiousness, and his
ineptitude could be feigned; he could have ulterior motives. Telling us his dream may not
be about love at all. Far from being a rung above the milieu as Amtower suggests,
Geffrey could be lying; he could be accused (as was Homer) of personal prejudice, of
being “to Grekes favorable” (1479). In other words, Geffrey’s criticism of Aeneas, just
because it’s critical, doesn’t guarantees that it’s just; in fact, Aeneas could be a mere
conveyance for Geffrey, and Geffrey’s recuperation of Dido, a clever means of self-
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promotion and self-justification. Probably he does want fame, wants to be heard and thus,
wants to matter, to be cited. His skepticism doesn’t guarantee anything.5
In fact, Amtower’s new ethic of reading recreates the same unethical practice she
criticizes in Aeneas. Accepting Dido’s complaint in the poem that Aeneas (typical man!)
just “pursues women for the pursuit of his own fame,” Amtower calls Aeneas “at best
[. . .] self-serving” (284). Yet in arguing that Chaucer believes “subjective judgment” to
be “the best way of asserting what is true or false,” she ends up concluding that
“subjective judgment” means a “reader [. . .] may determine values specifically beneficial
to him or herself” (288, 276). I suppose by advocating this ethic, Amtower is Mercury.6
My professors warned me of this, especially upon suspecting I liked beautiful
books. Quell your enthusiasm they said, don’t be taken in, be careful of your pleasure;
don’t imagine that just because a structure (like a book) suggests something is present
there, it means something is, unless the something is injustice. Recognize, they said, that
what is “in” the book has no ontology; it’s just like Derrida said, though it seems the
place of being, being isn’t there, like an absent father. Believing it’s there can only end in
oppression of others because you’ll try to tell them who to be, like a father. What is there
we might call after-images, “supplements, substitutional significations which could only
come forth in a chain of differential references, the ‘real’ supervening, and being added
only while taking on meaning from a trace and from an invocation of the supplement, etc.
And thus to infinity” (Derrida, Of Grammatology 159). It’s a universal law, The Law of
Being (or Non-Being): the “hot center” where the Master sits isn’t there; we think it is,
but it’s actually dispersed, it’s everywhere, like the love that I lost, and to believe it’s
dispersed is much more liberating, for I’ll learn not to miss it. Dorothy only wanted to go
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to the Emerald City because of the yellow brick road. Damn the road. Did I mention my
professors are from Columbia and Princeton?
I tattle on Amtower, therefore, because she’s broken this Law. In her enthusiasm
for Chaucer’s poem, her hope that in him she’d found authority (his and thus her own)
she’s mistakenly supposed the text either to embody or characterize a real ethic. Her
“naïve belief in meaning or referent,” her “irreducible” pleasure in mimesis has been a
hindrance to what she sought: a new interpretation (Derrida, Acts of Literature 45, 57).
Because “a text cannot by itself avoid lending itself to a ‘transcendent’ reading,” we must
be somewhat resigned, but our resignation must be a way of “taking account” of what we
can’t help, and thus of remaining permanently vigilant to our (secret) pleasure (45, 57).
Amtower failed to be vigilant; her love of mimesis caused her to repeat the text in her
own analysis of it, which from the perspective of her own skeptical ethic isn’t very
skeptical. We as readers are even encouraged to repeat Geffrey’s reading (via her
example) and so be copies of her copy. Such multiplications of the same don’t “change
language” and thus “change more than language,” and according to the philosophy of
nevertheless, change “is always more interesting than to repeat” (55). Given these
complications, we must ask whether from the standpoint of “more interesting,” it’s truly
possible to call forth Newness or does the pursuit of justice always return to the same?
Tit-for-tat. Let me try to answer my question by returning to Terrell, the third
point of the triangle. Her structural perspective, as I’ve already shown, complicates
Amtower’s reading which relies on structural integrity. The poem’s form, as Terrell
demonstrated, is deliberately confusing; Chaucer knows what his readers expect and he
says, “no.” By reminding us that poetic forms have a history, Terrell also reminds us that
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writing and reading are communal ventures. Therefore, the difficulty in Amtower’s
ethical formulation may be her focus on private reading. Geffrey, whom she advocates
imitating, does, after all, portray himself as a loner. But if, as I’ve shown, personal
skepticism doesn’t guarantee justice, skepticism in service to a greater cause might.
If it’s actually the Community of the Cause, not the individual who determines
reading practices, then there isn’t one ethic but as many ethics as communities, each
different but not truer than the others, although all will still argue, in the interests of
nevertheless, for the preferment of their own perspectives, of course. Marxists will read
differently than feminists, psychoanalysts differently than theologians. Each member of
his or her reading group will be judged according to the general story the group tells,
recognizing that interpretive strategies “proceed not from [the reader] but from the
interpretive community of which he is a member,” which means that “they are [. . .]
community property, and insofar as they at once enable and limit the operations of his
consciousness, [the reader] is too” (Fish, Is There? 14). Those who follow protocol by
professing their ties to a community will be accepted in that community, and those who
don’t, proving like Geffrey that they’re in denial or have always been aligned with a
different community, will be weeded out and will have to fashion their own Apocrypha.7
Understood this way, Amtower’s error is in assuming her assertion of autonomy
in her essay is, like Geffrey’s assertive rereading of Virgil, her own story and not already
the story preferred by a community that preexists her. As such, truly ethical reading
shouldn’t be so-called “independent critical thinking” in which each “decides for
herself,” but reading in which one admits all one’s communal ties. We must confess our
own contexts, conceding that objectivity is communal subjectivity and subjectivity is
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communal objectivity (Fish, Is There? 335-336). This in no way rules out that if one did
have a prophetic message from one’s Aunt Tilly, it would have to be acknowledged.8
Admittedly, all this begs the question of whether or not it’s possible to account for
one’s Aunt Tilly, but we can award A’s for effort since intention is more important than
results. As Derrida has said, “Since [. . .] every particular [metaphysical] borrowing drags
along with it the whole of metaphysics,” and since “[y]ou cannot choose to avoid doing
this,” you can at least maintain that not “all the ways of giving in to [this necessity] are of
an equal pertinence. The quality and the fecundity of a discourse are perhaps measured
by the critical rigor with which this relationship to the history of metaphysics and to
inherited concepts is thought” (“Structure” 251, 252). The moral of this story is clear:
choose quality and fecundity. Understand that “the choice is never between objectivity
and interpretation but between an interpretation that is unacknowledged as such and an
interpretation that is at least aware of itself” (Fish, “Interpreting” 480). Claim this
awareness and intention for yourself, even if that means, as it must, that you have to give
up the claim you actually want to make, in this case, that Amtower has advanced an
unethical reading model which isn’t in the poem. By adopting these principles, I’d
undercut my own ability to say I’m right and Amtower wrong (480).
Or would I? For the focus has shifted; now it isn’t the meaning of the poem that’s
at stake but my degree of awareness, my awareness of how aware I am that I’m aware
that I’m aware. And we all know that when we think we’re aware, we are.9 And even
more importantly, the issue now is whether or not I’m aligned with a group that is aware
as much as I am, one that, therefore, recognizes my awareness, for I can claim awareness,
but if no one concurs, then am I aware? When we relinquish our autonomy in this way
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and regain it only through the recognition of others who share our story about autonomy,
the end result (whether or not we intend it) is a more aggressive demand for justice.
Which returns us to the same. Tit-for-tat. If, as someone has said, “only through
the social confirmation of others whom we believe adequately equipped do we earn the
right of feeling secure in our knowledge,” then I need others to be the same as me (Mills
300). I need them to believe me, to recognize that my awareness gives me certain rights.
“[We] try to persuade others to our beliefs,” one scholar has said, “because if they believe
what we believe, they will, as a consequence of those beliefs, see what we see.” But why
not just let them be? Because it “is the whole of critical activity, an attempt on the part of
one party to alter the beliefs of another so that the evidence cited by the first will be seen
as evidence by the second” (Fish, Is There? 365). Hence, the focus has again shifted:
persuasion isn’t for the sake of evidence but for the sake of the recognition, for the sake
of one’s authority to name evidence. Others must see as I see; otherwise, who am I?
Declaring one’s right to talk isn’t enough; others must be made to listen—and cite.
“For there are only four kinds of people in this world,” my professor said, and
some, when they bow before Lady Fame, get the boot:
‘Madame,’ quod they, ‘we be
Folke that here besechen the
That thou graunte us now good fame
And let our werkes han that name;
In ful recompensacion
Of good werke yive us good renoun.’
‘I werne yow hit,’ quod she anon,
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‘Ye gete of me good fame non,
Be God—and therefore goo your wey!’
‘Allas,’ quod they, ‘and welawey!—
Telle us what may your cause be.’
‘For me lyst hyt noght,’ quod she. (1553-1564)
My professor-editors want me to explain myself; they’d like commentary on this
quotation from Chaucer’s poem, or at least better and more frequent transitions. But I can
only cite nevertheless: “I do not wish to enlarge upon this, nor to give any references, for
what I have just spelled out is legible on every page” (50). Or I will say, “Since this is too
evident for anyone who wished to begin to read, I will not insist, and go on [. . .]” (54).
Or maybe I’ll say, “Since I have already explained myself on this topic, and since I find
[your misunderstanding] rather comical, I will not come back to [it]” (51). Truly, I don’t
understand, given their own theories of the dissemination of authority, why I this time
cannot be Fame. (Editor’s note: the above complaints the author cites are all taken from
Derrida’s Positions.)
Let me return to the Law of Being (non-Being). When authority is only the
awareness that the basis for authority is repetitive citation, then the only way to maintain
one’s authority is to erect even more barriers others must overcome to claim to have
gotten the same awareness. Absolute democracy must be prevented; the coterie of the
inner circle must be small. In addition, the coterie of the aware, because the basis of their
authority is their awareness, can’t rely on others accepting their authority upon principles
of rationality or law or religion. To cite such principles in their defense would be to cite
as authoritative something other than the awareness they claim as authoritative.
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Consequently, they must resort either to charisma or bullying. Perhaps this is why so
many other aspiring literary scholars I met on my way to hating books, complained, as I
did, of feeling permanently saddled with their own stupidity and incapable of finding a
teacher who’d unburden them. It was just that our professors respected us too much to
teach, they said; we were their colleagues after all, and they were letting us teach
ourselves, and wasn’t it liberating, wasn’t it empowering not to have a father? Well? 10
The “well?” is the rub; it isn’t a real question; it isn’t about debate. We noaccounts were as the readers of Geffrey’s dream-vision, “seemingly [being] invited to
judge,” but “actually being commanded to judge favorably.” In the poem, Geffrey lacks
any authority except what he self-declares, and since “the old identifiable rules do not
apply, he seems impelled to threaten (rather than convince) his audience in order to win
their belief in him and his story” (J. Miller 104). And it is, so he says, a story of quality
and fecundity and good intentions, a story that for those, like myself, who can’t hope to
believe it, can only end in—
First, mockery: “I have been trying to persuade you to believe what I believe
because it is in your own best interests as you understand them,” a scholar has said. Then
he went on to tell his readers how to understand: adopting his model of persuasion would
be a “gain,” he said, because “it provides us with a principled account of change,” and
because “we are free to consider the various forms the literary institution has taken.” But
that’d be nothing, he said, compared to “the greatest gain”—“a greatly enhanced sense of
the importance of our activities.” And if you, as the reader, chose not to believe him, that
made you “the humble servant of texts” stuck with “a certain anti-theoretical bias” and
“parochial point of view” (Fish, Is There? 367, 368, 369, 371).
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Second, footnotes if one is lucky, for they are, after all, marginalia, the stuff that
if it really mattered and was really worth citing would be in the main text: For instance,
Bernadette C. Vankeerbergen’s footnote to Sheila Delany’s classic Chaucer’s House of
Fame: The Poetics of Skeptical Fideism:
[This book] which I read after completion of this essay, picks up some elements
of uncertainty in the poem but argues that the various ambiguities are solved by
repeated fideistic moves. My analysis of the House of Fame differs in that it does
not see any resolution of skepticism in the poem. On the contrary, skepticism
increases with the poem. Geffrey’s appeals to God, on which Delany bases her
argument, should not be taken too seriously. (168)
Why not seriously? Perhaps because it wouldn’t be convenient; the preexistence of a
challenge, a roadblock—how unlucky! Like Katherine H. Terrell who wrote her essay
three years before Amtower wrote hers and whose thesis, as I’ve demonstrated,
complicates Amtower’s claims: “On this topic [of decentered authority],” Amtower
wrote, “see Katherine H. Terrell, ‘Reallocation of Hermeneutic Authority in Chaucer’s
House of Fame.’ Chaucer Review 31.3 (1997): 279-90.” The end.
Tit-for-tat. I don’t find by taking this path that I’m getting any closer to love. I
confess my filiation; I speak in-the-name-of my father and I feel more than ever my
right to be heard. After all, I cite the language my community, upon their own principles,
must recognize as authoritative. Taking into consideration all one’s contexts just further
and further abstracts the ethical problem with which we started: the authority and right of
the individual reader to judge and the ensuing justice of those readings. We can, of
course, continue to repeat the same ethical analysis at greater and greater heights of

Zias 38
abstract happening, but since the ultimate goal, according to nevertheless, isn’t to repeat
but to change language and thus change the world, but in no particular way otherwise it’d
be repetition, I don’t see how further multiplying jargon, which indeed has all the
appearance of novelty and ingenuity, is going to do more than multiply.
Thus I propose a different (I won’t say novel or ingenious) direction. My error,
which I now see clearly though not directly, was in blaming Amtower for constructing a
contradictory ethic. In fact, if we take into account Terrell’s enumeration of Geffrey’s
contradictions, then naturally Amtower’s ethic is inconsistent since it’s based on
emulating Geffrey. Perhaps what’s needed is insight into how inconsistencies, in their
inevitability and hence their achievement, are themselves the path of the love I seek.
If we accept that “[c]ontradictions are not meant to be solved, but experienced,”
as do the proponents of nevertheless, then we need not suppose that Geffrey’s ignoranceand-knowingness are disingenuous because both can’t be lived simultaneously (Fish,
“Interpreting” 465). Such limiting either-or logic misses that Geffrey’s ignorance is
communal knowingness and his knowingness is communal ignorance. Neither need be
discarded; both can be saved. Saving them enables us to recognize that living a double
life is the purest, most honest, most ethical life of all. I’ve been trying to triangulate,
when doubling is the answer to everything: on the one hand, on the other.
To be a contradiction is a fundamental, universal condition; that much we know.
However, to recognize it as such is an achievement, and then in one’s recognition, to go
and live in the way one was living, but with new awareness of the way—this is an even
more profound ethic than one of skepticism. But we mustn’t just know we’re “torn apart”
by contradiction—we must feel it, for feeling it as Derrida said, “is the condition for
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responsibility, the condition for a decision, the condition for addressing the other.” We
must never know what to do ahead of time, but we must know enough to tell others not to
know what to do ahead of time (“Confessions” 38). This is what on the one hand, on the
other means: to make oneself immune to criticisms of contradiction by justifying
contradiction as supremely ethical.11 It is, perhaps, like refusing to pay child support.
The question of this ethic of contradiction is: Can’t we break out of oppressive
either-or, black-or-white designations? Can’t we “liberat[e] thought and its language for
the encounter occurring beyond these alternatives”? (Derrida, Writing 95). In or out, here
or there, only four kinds of people in this world: such a structure circulates being by
designating who is a being, which is also from the perspective of “liberation” a form of
rote repetition, of automatism, of “calculation of restitution, the economy of vengeance or
punishment” which cannot “yearn for a justice that one day, a day belonging no longer to
history, a quasi-messianic day, would finally be removed from the fatality of vengeance,”
would be “infinitely foreign, heterogeneous at its source,” a day that would “open[] up
the infinite asymmetry of the relation to the other” and “for justice as incalculability of
the gift and singularity of the an-economic ex-position to others.” In other words: a
justice that would never reduce all to the same (Derrida, Specters 22, 21, 23).
This new kind of justice, which wouldn’t be tit-for-tat, I’ll hereafter refer to as
Justice. I’ll retain the word “justice” instead of creating a new word to emphasize that we
don’t really know what justice is but are awaiting its happening. I capitalize it and put it
in red lettering, however, to emphasize that retaining the word in this way is someone
else’s way, namely Derrida’s, in whose name I speak. I should note that awaiting this
Justice is a form of triangulation after all, but the third point of the triangle doesn’t break
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in upon on the one hand, on the other hand to reconcile them; nor does it develop from
the twain in a sort of biological or dialectical evolution (that would be too obvious and
has already been done philosophically). Rather, this new third point is really old, older
than time, for time is its effect; it’s the beginning, that primordial unsaid or “Sable-vested
Night, eldest of things” which says everything and which, in the saying, if we’re aware,
can also be our end, the unsayable-to-come which isn’t here or there but has been, is (so
to speak), and also will be (Milton 2.962).
In this way of thinking, we can now read Geffrey’s duality not for what it “is” but
for what it will be. There’s nothing more loving than everywhere to see potential, and,
after all, it’d be presumptuous and narrow-minded, not to mention shoddily metaphysical
and hence oppressive to disqualify Geffrey’s interpretive practices based on suspicion of
impure motives, since impurity is fundamental, and especially since he has, in telling us
his dream, stated his motive clearly: he wants us to see as he sees, for only then will we
learn (his) new tidings of love. There’s no basis for not taking him at his word when his
word is what counts, especially since he’s promised to bless those who do take it and
curse those who don’t.
Here then is where I’ll take my stand: on the word of another, the word of
Derrida, which is so many words. And since they’re words recognized as authoritative by
the scholars I desire to recognize me, and since, to prove they recognize his authority as
well, they must acknowledge the awareness I’m claiming, I shouldn’t have to explain
myself or justify on any other grounds, as if I could, but simply cite. Given the agreed
upon terms for our mutual recognition, I know I’m making reasonable demands; after all,
I’ve proven I believe in citation; I am the same.12
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Like poor bookish Geffrey, in the one hand I hold Virgil and in the other Ovid; in
one hand there’s Macrobius; in the other John of Salisbury, and when I ask God to help
me decide who or what to believe, he sends me a big, boring bird that for all his
eloquence, tells me Nothing.13 My path is clear: “Non other auctour alegge I,” I venture,
knowing Virgil and Ovid, (cosmopolitans that they are) will appreciate the tipping of my
hat (314). And curse them, obviously, if they don’t.
Here’s how it will end: “[Y]ou certainly don’t have to be like every other
[scholar],” one professor wrote to me, “[b]ut you do need to keep in mind that in
choosing to write [scholarship] you’ve also chosen to write for an audience of scholars
who value certain qualities.” Therefore, see to it that you are like every other scholar, he
said, and start “presenting your argument [in a way] that is clear, linear, and characterized
by [received] scholarly practices.” Speak in your own voice, but do no such thing, or as
another professor explained to me: “Do whatever you have to do to please your
[editors], and then after you get a job—or after you get tenure—then you can do
whatever you want.” A bold philosophy indeed, this philosophy of nevertheless.
It will end as all things must end, in the unknown, a vexing silence, in the way
Chaucer could not or chose not to finish House of Fame. In Book III, Geffrey scurries
about the House of Rumor, trying to hear the new tidings of love promised to him by the
eagle, except he finds it impossible because everyone is talking at once and he observes
“fals and sothe compouned / Togeder fle for oo tydynge” (2108-2109). In the midst of the
chaos, suddenly what seems to be a “man of grete auctorite” enters the scene, and
everyone rushes to him, but Geffrey can’t identify him—and he never will (2158).
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One scholar suggests that Chaucer couldn’t end; the House of Fame “is an
unfinishable work” because “its inner contradiction cannot be resolved in the terms set up
in the poem” (Delany 109). The final contradiction is the relationship between the House
of Rumor and the House of Fame; they are “the loci, respectively, of experience and of
literary tradition” and are juxtaposed to demonstrate that “[e]xperience, mediated through
art, generates tradition” and in turn “tradition helps us to evaluate experience.” However,
since “[n]either locus is absolute,” “neither can be relied on for truth” (110, 111).
Another concurs, noting that “[n]o position” Geffrey has assumed in the poem, “whether
of self-effacing dependence or assertive self-reliance, has proved satisfactory;” and thus
“what results is an oscillation among inadequate options that are constantly surfacing,
calling into question and replacing each other.” Since “[n]o truly authoritative voice has
been discovered; no authorial stance can be fully validated; and the poetic voice and
enterprise end” in silence (J. Miller 112). The dismissive and aforementioned
Vankeerbergen, extending the above analysis, argues “that the man of great authority is
Silence personified—rather than a man of authority who is never allowed to speak”
(166). As Silence, the man of authority completes the final pairing of contraries in the
poem, being opposed to Fame, a word derived from the Latin “fari” which means “to
speak” (166). As such, Chaucer again complicates the reader’s interpretive choices by
suggesting that “[n]either words nor silence is a key to knowledge and truth. Ending the
House of Fame in uncertainty, i.e., abstaining from establishing either Fame/Rumor or
Silence as an authority, was the only solution possible and artistically completes the
poem” (167). And by further extension, because Geffrey ends in silence, he never tells us
that he awoke from his dream, thus completing the pairing awake/asleep.
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I agree with all these points; I only want to say that the poem provides plenty of
forewarning. Clues abound throughout that Geffrey in the end will just—stop talking.
The symptoms of silence are evident in Book III upon his arrival at the House of Fame.
From then on, he begins to lose interest. At the height of his adventure he mentions three
times that he can’t take the time to explain everything he sees; he seems (quite unlike the
eagle) to be concerned about boring his listeners:
“But hit were alle to longe to rede
The names, and therefore I pace.” (1354-1255)
“Though I hem noght be ordre telle,
To make yow to longe to duelle
These of whiche I gonne rede.” (1453-1455)
“That yf y wolde her names telle
Alle to longe most I dwelle.” (1505-1506)
In the same way, three times he asks—maybe the reader, maybe himself—why he should
continue writing the poem at all:
“What shuld I make lenger tale
Of alle the peple y there say
Fro hennes unto domes-day?” (1282-1284)
“Loo, how shulde I now tel al thys?
Ne, of the halle eke, what need is [. . .]?” (1341-1342)
“What shulde y more telle of this?” (1513)
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These questions aren’t answered in the poem, but the final silence might be the answer.
Or the silence could indicate the lack of justifiable answers. Maybe there’s no
justification for Geffrey telling us his dream other than that of repetition (i.e. tradition).
In the philosophy of nevertheless, repetition has another name; it’s called
“iterability” or the “mystical foundation of authority.” See it also demonstrated here:
Ne never rest is in that place,
That hit nys filds ful of tydynges,
Other loude or of wisprynges.
And over alle the houses angles
Ys ful of rounynges and of jangles—
Of werres, or pes, of mariages,
Of restes and of labour—of viages,
Of abode—of deth, of lyfe—
Of love, of hate—acorde or stryfe—
Of loos, of lore and of wynnynges—
Of hele, of sekenesse, of bildynges—
Of faire wyndes and eke of tempests—
Of qwalme of folke and eke of bestes—
Of dyvers transmutatcions
Of estates and eke of regions—
Of trust, of drede, of jelousye,
Of wit, of wynnynge, of folye—
Of plente and of grete famine—
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Of chepe, of derthe and of ruyne—
Of good or mys-governement—
Of fire and of dyvers accident. (1956-1976)
In this manner Geffrey describes the House of Rumor, “[aspiring] to an impossible
concreteness” (Hassan 8), or we might say absolute democracy, the repetitive ‘Of’
organizing as it proliferates, hypnotizing the eye momentarily before repelling it (we
skim ahead to get to the end). We skim ahead to get to the point; we wish to transcend, to
go “beyond interest for the signifier, the form, the language [. . .] in the direction of the
meaning or referent,” the story that will account for the list, the story beyond the “Of”
(Derrida, Acts of Literature 44). But Geffrey merely transcribes; the transcription itself
stands in for the missing arch-narrative; the arch-narrative is the “Of.” 14
That doesn’t eliminate our desire for the narrative to be about something other
than “Of”; rather, it intensifies it. We want to credit Geffrey with knowledge; we want to
believe in him: our desire is the “only foundation” for his authority (Derrida, Acts of
Religion 240). Thus Geffrey’s repetitions, the reduction of his dream to instances of the
same questions, the same anxieties, the same contradictions, the same injustices—all
push us toward that mystical “phantom of the center,” only now it is his center, his
authority, his ability to call forth new tidings, because, after all, he’s so aware of all the
difficulties of doing so (Derrida, Writing 297).
But there’s a danger in making “Of,” like nevertheless, the explanation for all, for
repetition is also our justification to deconstruct. “Can Sandra Gilbert or [Derrida] or
Stanley Fish still say anything that would really surprise us?” a jaded scholar has asked
(Fromm 3). For despite being “entangled in hundreds of pages of a writing
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simultaneously insistent and elliptical, imprinting [. . .] even its erasures, carrying off
each concept into an interminable chain of differences, surrounding or confusing itself
with so many precautions, references, notes, citations, collages, supplements,” I still,
whenever I read Derrida, always know how it will end, since every deconstruction is
undertaken in the name of itself, deconstruction being the to-coming of Justice, or “an
experience of the impossible,” the great unknown (Derrida, Positions 14; Acts of Religion
243, 244). Though it isn’t impossible or unknown always to assert the Justice of
deconstruction. As Derrida said in what appears to be a moment of recognition, as if he
himself had grown bored: “What I have managed to write in the course of these past
thirty years has been guided by a certain insistence that others may well find downright
monotonous” (Derrida and Feraris 3). Perhaps if he had not reduced the core of his
thought to on the one hand and on the other hand.15
But Geffrey’s repetitions are just the preliminary symptoms of silence; there are
others which appear in Book II when the eagle lands, a bird presumably sent in answer to
a prayer, a bird that can read his mind and promises him “noon harme” (594-595, 577).
“Jupiter has sent me,” the eagle declares, “in order to reward you for your hard work in
service to Venus (though having no direct experience of love yourself) making ‘bokes,
songes or ditees, / In ryme or elles in cadence, / As thou best canst’” (620-624). “It’s
time,” the eagle continues, “to get your head out of your books and hear new, wondrous
tidings of love.” And for that purpose, the eagle promises to carry him to the House of
Fame, where he shall hear “[b]oth soothe sawes and leysinges,” both “jolytee,” “fare” and
Mo discords, moo jelousies,
Mo mumures and moo novelries,
And moo dissymulacions
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And feyned reparacions
And moo berdys in two oures,
Withoute rasour or sisoures
Ymade, then greyens be of sondes— (676, 682, 685-691)
That is, he shall hear of love, in all its both and neither, either and none, all and naught,
but not, obviously, for it wouldn’t be new, only in its either-or.16
“How can this be?” Geffrey asks, skeptical that Lady Fame could know so much.
The eagle assures him it is possible. The possibility hinges on just four inconsequential
and obvious founding (so to speak) facts: A.) that “[Fame’s] paleys stant” “Ryght even in
myddes of the wey/Betwexen hevene and erthe and see—” and thus whatever is spoken,
“mot to hyt pace” without exception (713-715, 720).17 This is because B.) everything in
nature has its right place towards which it inclines; for instance, smoke rises upward,
rocks fall downward, fish live in water and trees on land, etc.,18 and since C.)
Soune ys noght but eyre ybroken,
And every speech that ys yspoken—
Lowde or pryvee, foule or faire—
In his substaunce ys but aire; (765-768) 19
then D.) speech, like smoke, will “foule or faire” most assuredly fly upward, passing
through Fame’s House by its very nature (832-834). “Think of it this way,” explains the
eagle, “when you throw a stone into a pool, it causes circles of ripples to expand everoutward, does it not? Well, it’s ‘Ryght so of ayre’ as well” (816). The philosophy of
nevertheless.20
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After explaining this, the eagle flies so high that Geffrey can no longer discern
forests, fields, mountains, or cities, so high that all was the same, for “al the worlde, as to
myn ye, / No more semed than a prikke, / Or elles was the aire so thikke, / That y ne
might not discerne” (906-909). “It’s no wonder,” says the eagle, “for half so high as this /
Nas Alisandre Macedo, / Ne the kinge, Daun Cipio, (913-916), nor any other man.
“Rising toward the sun of [abstraction], it is the way of Icarus” (Derrida, Speech 104).
Finally, cresting the hill of the House of Fame, the eagle sets Geffrey down and
gives him a final lesson: although Geffrey will see many people in Fame’s and Rumor’s
Houses, he shouldn’t mistake anyone’s appearance for presence, for when speech passes
through Fame’s halls, it recreates the likenesses of those who on earth spoke the words,
for “the conscious and speaking subject, depends upon the system of differences and the
movement of [Fame]” and thus “the subject is constituted only in being divided from
itself, in becoming space, in temporizing, in deferral” (Derrida, Positions 29). “And,”
concludes the eagle eagerly, “ys not this a wonder thynge?” (1083) 21
Yes. No. No matter. What? Geffrey doesn’t talk much here. The “conversation” is
dominated by the eagle; Geffrey can only speak in monosyllables. And after his
exclamations of initial fear, he doesn’t say what he thinks of the eagle. Prior when he
read the story of Aeneas and Dido in Venus’s Temple, he was quite opinionated, even
daring at points, as Amtower and Terrell have remarked, to attempt his own version of
the story. But now he listens passively, hanging like captive prey, though the eagle
assures him that it will all turn out for his good.
Perhaps it was easier for Geffrey to argue with Virgil and Ovid than with the
eagle, those authors being known to him. Or maybe the bird’s position is unassailable,
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immune to the deconstruction it carries out on Geffrey and his second-hand knowledge of
love, since Justice as deconstruction is irreducible (Derrida, Acts of Religion 243). For
Justice “is not another time, a day after history. It is present at the heart of experience.
Present not as a total presence but as a trace. Therefore, before all dogmas, all
conversions, all articles of faith or philosophy, [and before all loves] experience itself is
eschatological at its origin and in each of its aspects” (Derrida, Writing 95). It is simply
what is, or rather, is-not, the primordial isn’t that sets into motion the difference between
is and isn’t. “And who so seyth of trouthe I varye, / Bid hym proven the contrarye” the
eagle challenges Geffrey (807-808). Geffrey concedes that the eagle’s speech is “‘[a]
goode persuasion’” (872), but how is one to decide to believe him? 22
In searching for these clues of the coming end, I’ve obviously been reading the
poem backwards. In doing so I’ve followed the suggestion of Amtower who claims, “The
poem can thus be read backwards as a process in which Chaucer’s dream-persona, a
reader par excellence, reverses the medieval value placed on tradition and auctoritas as
he learns to question the values fixed by the canonical authors” (282). In Amtower’s
reading, Geffrey’s assertiveness in Book I in splicing together accounts of Aeneas and
Dido from Virgil, Ovid, and himself is retroactively the result of everything he learns
from the eagle and from his encounters in the House of Fame. Tossed about by every
wind of doctrine in the House of Rumor, oppressed by literary giants on whose shoulders
he can’t hope to stand, passively inscribed as consumer and sycophant, Geffrey is rescued
by the eagle who, in unveiling authority as discursive repetition, frees him from his dull
and doomed second-class status. Casting aside his metaphysical chains which compel
him to believe authority is other than repetition, Geffrey now locates his identity not in
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relation to authors or some man of great authority, but by overturning and displacing all
dichotomies and categories of authorship in an ever-receptive openness to what
authorship will become. Shedding his uncritical naivety which is prone to unjustly
kicking some authors to the curb, Geffrey is purified and becomes the agent of The Pure,
for “the claim for ‘openness’ is the purest of pieties” (Lentricchia 182).
Therefore, in reading backwards to mark the matrices of power which bring into
being Geffrey’s silence or, alternatively, foreclose it, I have (in emulation of Amtower)
really been reading not toward the beginning but toward the end of this dream. That end,
which Amtower doesn’t consider by neglecting to read all the way to the poem’s proem,
consists in Geffrey’s belligerent demand that his readers accept his account of things, a
final abdication of responsibility to declare his beliefs about dreams, and a frantic flight
into metaphysical security: “God turne us every dreme to goode!” (1).
Nevertheless, we must be skeptical of this conclusion. Who, after all, is
Amtower? Is she somebody? Can she circulate me? Why should I cite and thus repeat her
method? 23 I now propose a progressive reading of the poem, beginning with the prayer to
God, the skepticism about dream interpretation, the desire to be heard, the creative
manipulation of others’ stories in order to make room for one’s own, the gradual
abandonment of this pursuit after learning via the eagle that Lady Fame doesn’t give a
damn, and finally, crushed by an infinite multitude of clamoring voices all citing their
own authority and right to be heard, the sinking into silence and obscurity.
In this reading Geffrey, the committed metaphysician who believes some people
are really right, begins in ethical skepticism, tries to be heard by asserting his own
perspective, learns that all speech is hot air, becomes apathetic about his enterprise and
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stops. Contra Amtower, in a progressive reading, the more Geffrey is educated by the
eagle, the more reticent he is in offering opinions, and his earlier bold interpretive
freelancing must be read as the effect of his metaphysics. In addition, his final failure of
active discernment in the House of Rumor in the name of being open to hearing ever-new
tidings of love (which he never does hear) must be read as unethical.24
Having brought us this far, I can now find no basis for deciding (or deciding if we
need to or can decide) whether we should read backwards or forwards or in a continual
circle that begins and ends with who since my authority is as equally constructed and
groundless as Amtower’s, Terrell’s, or Derrida’s and only able to gain acceptance
through repetitive (or traditional) citation by people who in doing so will prove
themselves to be unethically uncritical. And since I wouldn’t want to be a party to
anyone’s corruption, I think I must end this prologue by . . . .
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Chapter 4
A Taste for Subversion
sub-ver-sion n [ME, fr. MF, fr. LL subversion-, subversion, fr. L subversus, pp. of
subvertere] 1: the act of subverting: the state of being subverted: OVERTHROW 2: obs:
a cause of overthrow or destruction – sub-ver-sion-ary \ adj – sub-ver-sive \ adj or n –
sub-ver-sive-ly adv – sub-ver-sive-ness, sub-ver-siv-ism n
sub-vert vt [ME subverten, fr. MF subvertir, fr. L subvertere, lit., to turn from beneath,
fr. sub- + vertere to turn – more at WORTH} 1: to overturn or overthrow from the
foundation (something established or existing): RUIN 2: to cause the downfall or
destruction of 3: to pervert or corrupt by an undermining of morals, allegiance, or faith:
CORRUPT. sub-vert-er n 1
It isn’t a typo. This is chapter four, but we aren’t at the end. This is still the
beginning, still an attempt to decide how to begin. It only appears to be an end, but the
end I pursue was prior to this beginning; it was first, and this beginning is second. For the
end is the love I have lost.
If you’ve continued reading beyond the prologue, you’re likely doing so either
because you can or because you must. You like what you’ve read or you dislike it;
you’ve chosen to proceed or you have no choice—perhaps the book has been assigned;
perhaps there will be a test later. Perhaps because I’ve declared myself to matter this
book has become important to people who like to think of themselves as mattering, and
you, because you also want to matter, don’t want to be caught having no knowledge of it.
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Luckily, the above reasons you may have proceeded need not be parsed; if you
were to try to do so you’d immediately reveal yourself to be one of those fourth-kind-ofpeople who, according to my professor, are only trying to matter—you’ve not yet arrived
by embracing nevertheless. Be assured that I’ve only enumerated the above reasons so
that you may be better aware that your reasons are, because they must be, contradictory,
and therefore, I’ve hoped to help you feel more acutely that you both do and don’t want
to keep reading. It’s just because I love you and want you to be such a good person and,
even more importantly, to be aware that you are. As for me, I keep writing because I both
do and don’t want to, because I seek my lost love or maybe not love at all. As a result, I
can help you be good because I am.
I proceed where I ended: “Non other auctour alegge I.” Except Derrida, of course,
the word of Derrida. It’s a word which, because it’s so many words, so many citations,
I’ve discovered that I can both claim and deny, use to my advantage while feeling
entirely disadvantaged. It’s my salvation, my narrow way on my way to loving books
again, and it’s my damnation, a heavy chain, a locked door that keeps me locked in hate.
Thus, on Derrida’s word, I’ve already arrived where I need to be and am already who I
should be; “excellence therefore consists in being what one is” (Bourdieu, Cultural 83).
What I am is aware of my condition, and it’s my duty (and joy) to live in my awareness,
so that by subverting Derrida from within, turning his words against his words, I can
await at the same time that I call forth, not my lost love, but a new one, a love that will
be, like Justice, called love but be something other than the love I knew. We could say
that in my awareness I await unawareness.
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Irony five? six? I forget. My subversion of Derrida in the interests of my love
must begin in likeness. I must say, before I say anything else: though he didn’t claim me,
yes, he is my father. And only then: I don’t wish to be his child. Likeness is a detriment
to one’s happiness, one’s power, power and happiness being such near kin—that’s what
children believe, and I am his child, or was. Likeness marks the child as nobody worth
citing, and the father, who seems to exist in enviable liberty especially when he is absent
is both the blueprint for liberation and the building that stands in the way. The child, in
the innocence and guilt of contradiction, is like her father by default of her birth and also
desires to be like her father—i.e. at liberty.
All conformity, therefore, ends in subversion. The child would never strive to be
(in the place of) her father without first wishing to be like him. “Oh, don’t be ridiculous,
Andrea—everybody wants this—everybody wants to be us.” This is the turning point in
the film The Devil Wears Prada. Miranda, editor-in-chief of Runway Magazine has hired
a new assistant, Andrea Sacks, a cynical know-nothing when it comes to fashion. To gain
Miranda’s approval, “Andy” decided to adopt the appearance, demeanor, and cutthroat
practices of her coworkers, all the while claiming to her friends that she had “no choice.”
The climactic moment unfolds when Andy, alienating her boyfriend and her coworker
Emily, seizes an opportunity to join Miranda for a fashion show in Paris. There she learns
that Miranda is in danger of being replaced as editor of Runway, but after trying to warn
her, discovers that Miranda has known all along and has been maneuvering to save her
job by promoting her competition and passing over her close and more worthy associate,
Nigel. Miranda justifies herself to Andy by claiming that her actions were necessary to
ensure the success of the magazine. “The truth is,” she says, “there is no one that can do
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what I do. [. . .] Especially because of the list— the list of designers, photographers,
editors, writers, models— all of whom were found by me, nurtured by me and have
promised me they will follow me whenever and if ever I choose to leave Runway. So he
[the owner of Runway] reconsidered.”
After saying this, Miranda praises Andy for being like her, for being able to “see
beyond what people want and what they need” and “choose for yourself.” But Andy
protests that she could never do what Miranda did to her friend Nigel. “You already did,”
Miranda replies, “to Emily.” “No, that was different,” Andy says, “I didn’t have a
choice.” “No,” Miranda insists, “you chose, you chose to get ahead. You want this life,
those choices are necessary.” “But what if this isn’t what I want?” Andy asks, looking at
Miranda in dismay, “what if I don’t want to live the way you live?” Oh, Andy . . . or, in
the words of Derrida: “When [you] make the machine work, there is no decision; the
machine works [. . .]” (Negotiations 231).
Miranda and Andy illustrate Derrida’s double bind it is our virtue to be aware we
live: yes, Andy did have a choice in trying to be somebody, but no, she had no choice
because being somebody is required. It is, as Miranda said, a necessity. Conformity will
end in subversion, but that subversion is conformity: “Everybody wants this . . . .” For
Andy to strive to be is to be like Miranda in the way Miranda came to be, and in retrospect to have always been Miranda. Those who want to be cited believe they deserve to
be and have been victims of a vile usurpation. To be cited is to be irreplaceable and to
manipulate one’s irreplaceability, to choose and not to have chosen. Miranda claims the
magazine will fail without her exceptionalism, but her exceptionalism consists in others
believing this. And others believing this will spur the rivalry that will end in her ousting.
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“For there are only four kinds of people in this world,” and the four kinds can’t
be what they are and will be without submitting to double logic. To be means all must be
equally subverters and conformists. Conformity of subversion constitutes the being of
each of the four kinds of people, which is also, I must point out, being constituted in
injustice. For Miranda would think it a great injustice to be booted out, just as Nigel
thought it a great injustice not to be let in. Just as I desire to be cited—like Derrida,
for instance—and loathe the very idea of it. “But everybody wants this . . . .”
I think my professor was incorrect, or at least, not a very good disciple of
nevertheless. Instead of four kinds of people in this world, there is only one kind—
people who want to be cited. All who want to be cited must, as Andy, both conform and
subvert, must submit to double logic; both-and is the one logic that can never be
subverted, for if Andy had chosen this but not that instead of this and that, the form of
necessity, she’d have never gotten to Paris. But, of course, Andy, though subject to the
same logic as Miranda, isn’t Miranda, because she lacks the same knowledge of what
she’s doing. So, my professor is a good disciple of nevertheless after all, for that allimportant categorization according to kind is still possible because of awareness.
Yet so many have become so aware and so eager to claim the subversive
potential of their awareness. A cursory glance at the holdings of Harvard’s library reveals
that since the 1950’s, approximately four hundred books have been written (in English)
on the subject of subversion, and this tally only reflects those books which include
“subversion” in their titles. No doubt the number would increase exponentially if we
could take into consideration subtitles, tables of contents, and indexes. The closer we
approach our historical moment, so also the more books on the subject we find. In the
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1930’s there were just two books on subversion, and in the 1940’s, a single two-volume
tome discussing Hitler’s overthrow of democracy. Only twenty-one books were
published on subversion in the 1950’s, many of them addressed the threat of communism.
Moving into the 1960’s, the number increased to forty books, many politically
themed like The Long Charade: Political Subversion in the Vietnam War (1968). In the
1970’s, while analyses of political subversion continued, there were references to
“subversion” in wider contexts, suggesting the broadening of the concept of the political:
The Power of Women and the Subversion of Community (1975) and Language, Sexuality,
and Subversion (1978). The total number of “subversive” titles published in this decade
was forty-five.
The proliferation of “subversion” into other realms continued into the next
decade, especially into literature. Representative titles include: Fantasy: The Literature
of Subversion (1987); The Contested Castle: Gothic Novels and the Subversion of
Domestic Ideology (1989); Victorian Pastoral: Tennyson, Hardy, and the Subversion of
Forms (1989); and Genre as Subversion: The Prose Poem in England and America
(1985). Beyond literature, not only was Christianity being subverted (The Subversion of
Christianity, 1986), but also rationality (Michel Foucault and the Subversion of the
Intellect, 1983). And while the total number of titles devoted to subversion in this decade
might seem impressive at seventy, it’s nothing in comparison to the subversive 1990’s.
Here’s just a smattering of this decade’s total one hundred forty-two:
Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (1990)
Killing us Softly: Technology, Reason, and the Subversion of Feminine
Discourse (1990)

Zias 58
Tough Girls Don’t Knit: and Other Tales of Stylish Subversion (1990)
Irony and Ideology in Rabelais: Structures of Subversion (1990)
The Bounds of Etiquette: Subversion Through Melodrama in Louisa May Alcott’s
Life and Work (1992)
Ethnicity, Gender and the Subversion of Nationalism (1995)
The Fantastic in Modern Japanese Literature: the Subversion of
Modernity (1996)
Subversion and Liberation in the Writings of St. Teresa of Avila (1996)
Dreams of Subversion in Medieval Jewish art and Literature (1997)
Nationalism, knitting, Louisa May Alcott, Medieval Jewish art, irony, and St. Teresa may
seem an odd grouping, but it all makes sense after we add to the list Satan (Satanic
Subversion of the Kingdom, 1991), and salesmen (A Nation of Salesmen: The Tyranny of
the Market and the Subversion of Culture, 1994).2
After all this subversion, in the new millennium we learn it’s still vital in The
Politics of Subversion: a Manifesto for the Twenty-first Century (2005), although we also
learn that it’s in jeopardy—Recovering Subversion: Feminist Politics Beyond the Law
(2004). Having amassed sixty significant titles like Stonehenge: Celebration and
Subversion (2004) and Baroque Garden Cultures: Emulation, Sublimation, Subversion
(2005) in less than six years, we can only guess what awaits us in twenty.3 Thankfully, it
is our joy to await.
And to celebrate so much achievement, though perhaps to the neglect of the
awareness that the achievement is the status-quo or that like pragmatism, it’s become a
principle of organization.4 It’s “[a]s if [our] whole vocation / Were endless imitation”
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(Wordsworth 106-107). The remarkable diversity of the above book titles suggests that
anything at any given time can be either subversive or subverted; likewise, anything can
be an oppressive or liberating force; happiness (or power) can be taken or given from an
infinite number of directions, so one must always be vigilant. The tyranny of the Master
is everywhere and must everywhere be both pursued and overthrown. There’s no
escaping, but one must try. Like the poor, the Master is always among us; without him,
we wouldn’t know if we were rich or poor. The sheer proliferation of tyranny invites us
to pursue it everywhere, and when we do, we find absolute suffocation. But that’s the
point, for the contradiction of our condition is that we’re both infinitely free and infinitely
oppressed. We exist in a closed system that is, happily for our virtue, forever vulnerable.5
Given my discussion thus far, I must now distinguish between two types of
subversion. These would be in theoretical terms: 1.) Subversion which is permitted, and
2.) Subversion which is not. Or, more precisely, 1.) Subversion within contradiction and
2.) Subversion of contradiction.6 The latter will be my chief concern, for I seek a way out
of the two hands, the one and the other bequeathed to me by my father. I must begin with
his language, for that, as he said, is the only kind there is.
Having made this either-or distinction, which, in the very trying-to identifies me
as a prodigal, I’m aware of an even greater difficulty, one that Derrida also understood.
For if there are only four kinds of people, which are really one kind united in contradiction or their desire for citation but divided in their awareness of it, and thus in
their power and authority, how are we to suppose there is any other kind—let us say, a
fifth kind of person? Presumably, this fifth kind of person would have to be not just
contradictory or aware of their contradictoriness, not just caught in the old while hoping
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for the new or writing a book while hating to read—the fifth kind of person would have
to be beyond this, untouched by it—Pure—like Pure Happening. But if contradiction
is the state of all, a state equal in subversion and conformity, how would turning
subversion against itself, which is also only another way of turning conformity against
itself, ever inaugurate a fifth state, one that would be more than a reconfiguration of the
four? Newness, as Derrida often said, can’t be named, for naming it can only be done in
the grammar of the old which makes the new another instance of the old. I can’t easily
say then that my second form of subversion—subverting contradiction—would be new,
because the very terms of discussion not to mention such a (subversive) procedure of
enlightenment are all very old.
In any case, since, according to nevertheless, there is also so much virtue in being
aware of these dilemmas, it isn’t immediately clear why one would want to give up one’s
goodness to become a great sinner. It’d be like if I told you who love reading beautiful
books that beauty had to be sacrificed for social justice, and for no other reason except
that trusting my word would be better for your academic career. And all this after I said at
the outset of this chapter that I love you and want to help you be a good person and not
corrupt you. And then to demand that my awareness of my contradictoriness should be
enough proof of my benevolence—I’d understand you feeling justified, as was one of
my professor-editors, in begging to know what could possibly be gained from subverting
contradiction: “[I]t is not entirely clear what we are missing,” he wrote to me, “in
following [contradiction].” “Your readings of Chaucer [. . .] remain underdeveloped,” he
continued, “so I can’t see that you’ve provided a ‘Fifth Way’ here. [. . .] That should be
clarified in your introduction. If you expect to earn the credentials conferred upon those
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who successfully write [scholarship], there are some conventions you cannot dismiss. To
begin with, I’d want to see a more helpful introduction. An introduction should spell out
not merely the problem, but also how you will address that problem. It should indicate
what is to be gained from such an engagement? It should map out the parameters of the
project and justify its choices and exclusions. Consider your own experience as a reader
of scholarly works,” he continued, “Would you stick around through an introduction and
three or four chapters while the author moves in tiny increments toward a promised new
way of reading?” Perhaps this professor only pretended to have read Derrida.
But in any case: quite right, quite right, I’d say to you, as I said to this professor,
but on the other hand, didn’t Derrida lamented others’ lack of imagination, lack of ethics,
lack of friendship, hospitality, responsibility, forgiveness, et. al. precisely by clinging to
the desire to know all in advance—in advance! If newness is to be, then it mustn’t be
anticipated; it must come, and our privilege is to let it come. And if newness is in some
way an opening to a coming, then it needs no justification, for that would also be
anticipation. To ask why is to prove you’re no friend of the new, or as someone elsewhere
has said: you just have a “parochial point of view” (Fish, Is There? 371).
The assumption I’d say to you, so inclined to doubt me, must be that newness is
to be preferred because it is new, that “it’s better that there be a future, rather than
nothing” (Derrida, A Taste 83). Therefore, subversion of contradiction, or what I call
the fifth state of being, though not good by nevertheless’s contradictory standards, is
nevertheless the best, or could be if we could identify it; fortunately, we can retain some
of our virtue in our awareness of how difficult it is to try.
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Many distinguished scholars, besides my father, have tried. For instance, Michel
Foucault, in explaining why Mendel’s genetic theories were initially dismissed by the
scientific community, said the problem was that while Mendel spoke the truth, he was not
“in the truth,” meaning that he didn’t speak according to the established rituals accepted
by scientists at the time. “Disciplines,” he argued, “constitute a system of control in the
production of discourse, fixing its limits through the action of an identity taking the form
of a permanent reactivation of the rules” (Archaeology 224). For an invention to be
recognized as such, it needs to cite a number of orthodoxies. It must honor a contract and
break it, justify itself by looking both to the past and to the future. An invention must
appear “for the first time” yet be repeatable; it must declare itself, “inaugurating or
signing its uniqueness, bringing it about, as it were,” and “at the same moment” also
“[describe] the generality of its genre [. . .], sustaining our memory of the tradition of a
genre and its practitioners.” So the uniqueness of the invention is only understood if it
repeats a recognized founding gesture (Derrida, Acts of Literature 317). Terry Eagleton,
in the context of discussing an alternative to capitalism, put the matter more bluntly: “The
only full-blooded critique [of capitalism] would be one launched from another universe
entirely, which would then challenge our own culture no more than the cawing of a rook.
True radicalism, conveniently enough for the system itself, would be utterly
unintelligible” (Illusions 39). Since there’s no way to be other-worldly unless one is God,
it seems we’re destined to subvert a system only according to the rules of that system.
The awareness of this quandary has led scholars to two alternatives: 1.) join in
order to un-join (sort of). Michael Bérubé exemplifies this when he explained why he’d
begun criticizing academia only recently: “There should be no mystery as to why I began
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taking [these] opportunities after being granted tenure in 1993,” he said. “[A]s I saw it
[. . .], if you’re going to talk about reform and be taken seriously, you’d do well to make
sure you have someplace to stand before you take your stand” (65-66). Standing on the
foundations gives you the authority to shake them. 2.) Un-join by admitting you are
joined. “[W]e must,” wrote Gayatri Spivak, “learn to use and erase our language at the
same time.” This is “a question of strategy. It is the strategy of using the only available
language while not subscribing to its premises [. . .]” (Pxviii); it’s “to preserve as an
instrument that whose truth-values [one] criticizes” (Derrida, “Structure” 255).
In a more extensive discussion of this strategy, Derrida said that “movements of
deconstruction do not destroy structures from the outside.” That wouldn’t be “possible
and effective,” for you can’t “take accurate aim, except by inhabiting those structures.”
But you must be sure to inhabit them “in a certain way, because one always inhabits, and
all the more when one does not suspect it.” The certain way to inhabit structures is by
only inhabiting them structurally, living in a house with no furnishings, and while this
practice means that “the enterprise of deconstruction always in a certain way falls prey to
its own work” you can be sure that you won’t feel this way in your heart where it really
matters (Grammatology 24).
Which is the point of nevertheless: not to feel confined no matter how you are, to
love the language you’re in and hate it, claim it as your own and do no such thing. In
either of these alternatives (and you should really adopt both in order to be a good
person) you’re adopting, not by default but by the achievement of awareness, a doublelife, and are committing yourself to being both joined/separated, affiliated/unaffiliated, an
insider/an outsider, believing/unbelieving, present/absent, for/against. Interestingly, the
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word used by both Bérubé and Spivak to describe their double-lives is “schizophrenia”
(65, Plxxvii). It shouldn’t surprise you that typical existence (we are hybrids!) is here
exaggerated as a state quite exceptional (be hybrid!) for the claim to exceptionality is
what makes it so typical. It need not be said that typical people are making this claim and
are in no way suffering from a mental disorder; only someone completely bourgeois
would ever desire schizophrenia.
A well-attested danger of trying to subvert any system by the above means is that
one’s endeavors can easily be co-opted and neutralized. Lateral moves and minor reforms
are always tolerated, especially if, as Jean-François Lyotard noted, they enhance the
productivity of the system at large (63). Hence Eagleton’s dismissal of the
postmodernist’s faux revolution: the proliferation of so-called differences just creates
new consumers eager to be cited; the only change the system undergoes is an expansion.
Bourdieu cited an exemplary case of neutralization: the fate of Marchel Duchamp. His
attempt to draw attention to how art is made valuable and not valuable inherently
backfired because his “ritual acts of sacrilege” were made “sacred in their turn,” being
“immediately converted into artistic ‘acts’, recorded as such and thus consecrated and
celebrated by the makers of taste” (Cultural, 80). So a urinal that should’ve been heaved
in the dumpster is now on display in New York City at the Museum of Modern Art,
making fools of us all.7 Bourdieu’s conclusion: “Art cannot reveal the truth about art
without snatching it away again by turning the revelation into an artistic event” (80). “In
fact,” he asserted, “in order to awaken today’s aesthete, whose artistic goodwill knows no
limit, and to re-evoke in him artistic and even philosophical wonder, one must apply a
shock treatment [. . .]” (265). But what would truly “shock” since “shock” is the norm?
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What would be “the one unforgivable transgression,” the transgression that would, in its
enacting, be a constant transgression? (81).
The irony is that in my former love of beautiful books, my “artistic goodwill” did
have a limit, one I held to until I learned that in doing so I was being a persecutor. In
Bourdieu’s terms, sensitivity to my indiscretion of differentiation is what precipitated
the loss of my wonder. Put differently, I’d say my discrimination was revealed to me by
my professors as atypical; in my parochialism, I hadn’t realized transgression had been
normalized. Danielle Steel had already been canonized, and I was unaware.
Bourdieu’s conclusion suggests that in order for me to love to read again, I must
develop (or re-develop) a more discriminating taste—stop selecting books willy-nilly.
Perhaps it’d be as easy as that if I wasn’t already aware that the very first book I
remember loving to read was Rebecca and that I had selected it from the library shelf
willy-nilly. Only after I selected it did the dust jacket impress me; the picture was
composed in the fluid strokes of an impressionist and was of a path barred by menacing
tree limbs and vines. And then, only after I inspected the picture did I open the book and
become intrigued by the first sentence: “Last night I dreamt I went to Manderley again.” I
think if I’m oppressed by an inability to discriminate, it’s of a different sort.
What would my father say? What exactly is wrong with the world? “No,
impossible,” he complained, “Too many premises that would have to be examined in turn
within the very words of the question, in each one of them.” Because “we no longer have
at our disposal a principle of response, a discourse sure enough of its legitimacy [. . .] that
it could authorize the response in principle, the telegram: ‘In two words, to decipher the
crisis, look in this or that direction; here is the master code, text follows’” (Derrida,
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Negotiations 69). So much labor, so much suffering that instills virtue—to dissect not
only “wrong” and “world” but “what” “is” “with” and “the” as well. Not to mention “?”.
“Testimonials repeatedly assert,” someone confessed, “that it was precisely
[Derrida’s] way of denying personal authority that engendered the unique power of his
personal authority [. . .]” (B. Johnson 45). It was, after all, Caesar who thrice denied the
crown. He professed not to know: “One day I might say that the Sandinistas should be
helped, the next that they should be opposed. [. . .] [W]hen it comes to burning questions
[. . .], I have the greatest difficulty orientating myself” (Derrida, Negotiations 183, 195).
But then again, he did know that there should be a world-wide abolition of the death
penalty (Derrida and Roudinesco 140). And of course he would, for this is the philosophy
of nevertheless.
Shakespeare’s Henry V: the Authority of Awareness
To proceed, let me reformulate Bourdieu: “Literary scholarship cannot reveal the
truth about scholarship without snatching it away again by turning the revelation into a
scholarly event.” The center must hold; its history is serial “substitutions of center for
center”; “in a regulated fashion, the center receives different forms of names,” names
such as “essence, existence, substance, subject,” or “God, man, and [Derrida]” (Derrida,
“Structure” 249). Contemporary scholarship exhibits this ebb and flow of knowledge; the
heightened awareness of itself as scholarship coexists with the most remarkable
blindness as if by deliberate sabotage. It seems identifying oneself as a literary scholar
necessitates keeping from oneself a certain type of knowledge, knowledge precisely
about what is wrong while all the time endeavoring to point it out. The three illustrations
of this that follow are excerpts mostly from texts written about sixteenth century England,
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with particular focus on Shakespeare. The question each scholar tries to answer is if
Henry V (in Shakespeare’s play by that name) is a subversive or aware king:
1.) From Phyllis Rackin: She begins her Stages of History: Shakespeare’s
English Chronicles with these confessions: “[A]nswers I recover, even when couched in
the words of sixteenth-century texts, are the products of my own selection and
arrangement.” “Moreover, I who write am the product of historical fabrication, and so is
the language I use.” “The words I use and the categories of my thought are not only the
medium that imposes contemporary designs on the history I describe; they are also my
inheritance from that history, the medium by which it imposes its designs on me”(ix, x).
Thus, she continues, “My versions of Shakespeare’s plays, and his world, are inevitably
shaped by my social and temporal location, my own interests and anxieties.” “The
questions with which we approach the past— and, therefore, the answers we seem to
hear— are inevitably shaped by our own historically specific concerns. Nonetheless, it
seems to me that the attempt at historical reconstruction is worth making even it if
inevitably falls far short of its ambition” (36, 39).
These general concessions are followed up more specifically: Given that the
categories of her thought have been shaped (no doubt) by an “elitist, patriarchal culture”
that has excluded women from the historical record, she determines “[t]o oppose those
exclusions” by “turn[ing] to an oppositional history” that “looks beyond customary
sources to discover the traces of the daily experience of ordinary people” (x). Since “all
historical narratives are ideologically motivated—my own, no less than the ones I
attribute to the Tudor historians and to Shakespeare,” she believes we should “historicize
historical practice, to focus more on the temporal and social site in which a historical
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narrative is constructed than upon the historical facts it purports to represent” (36, 37).
Notice that her heightened awareness of the difficulties of historical scholarship leads her
to call for a further meta-inquiry into the history of making histories—how histories are
made (their form) is much more significant than what happened (content). In fact, how is
really all we can know anyway; how = what. This equation is essential to her history
because by emphasizing the how of her text, she can assume the what while at the same
time misrecognizing it.
Consider her analysis of Henry V: “Shakespeare’s emplotment of history,” she
contends, “[is] an obsessive circling around a lost and irrecoverable center”; the plays
represent a “nostalgic yearning,” “a heroic effort to recuperate a lost, heroic past, but
they end by calling attention to the ineluctable absence of that past and their own
compromised status as commercial, theatrical representations” (x, 85). And so, as
Shakespeare progresses with his histories, “history becomes increasingly problematic and
truth more and more difficult to determine. At the same time, the plays become increasingly self-reflexive” especially in Henry V, where there is “a proliferation of
metadramatic allusions” which “interrupt the historical action to undermine the authority
of historical representation” (29). For instance, “[t]he action Shakespeare dramatizes
contradicts the story the chorus tells. The king’s recourse to Machiavellian plotting
contradicts his representations of his achievements as manifestations of providential
purpose, and his role-playing contradicts his characterization as a true embodiment of
royal authority.” Furthermore, “[t]he chorus constantly urges the audience to suppose that
the historical persons and events the play depicts are actually present, and just as
constantly reminds them that they are only watching a theatrical representation that falls
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far short of the historical reality it attempts to imitate” (82). The upshot of this is that the
play constantly presents “two interpretations of the action,” interpretations which
Shakespeare never reconciles (69). As a result, the character of Henry V “evaporates in
ambiguity” and “eludes representation” (30). “The danger, of course,” she concludes, is
that her interpretation inadvertently appropriates the play “for [my] own sermons” (36).8
The paradox in reminding readers once more about the impossibility of a
transparent history, is that it heightens our sense that this text is transparent—Rackin has
been gracious, unpretentious, scarcely even desirous that we should ever cite her. And
yet, the text isn’t transparent, at least not to Rackin. For all her talk of how her text is
constituted in and by her own anxieties, longings, and questions, she doesn’t seem to
have any knowledge of what those actual anxieties, longings, and questions are, though
the content of her sad story makes it exceptionally clear to us. Does Rackin have any idea
that her stated design to recover lost female voices has any connection to her assessment
that Shakespeare is “obsessive[ly] circling around a lost and irrecoverable center” or that
her belief in history as a construct is also the belief she attributes to Shakespeare? If in
this text we don’t get a window into Shakespeare soul (as Rackin tells us again and
again), we definitely get one into Rackin’s unawareness.
2.) From Mark Breitenberg: Similar confessions that both reveal and obscure
what occur in the introduction of Anxious Masculinity in Early Modern England. Here
Breitenberg asserts that in early modern England, “the public theater and the opposition
it provoked call attention to the constructedness of identity, the alarming possibility in a
world of at least theoretical absolutes that to be male means only to manifest the outward
signs of masculinity”(10-11). In this period, he continues, there was a “crisis of order,”
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which was particularly “played out through issues involving gender and sexuality” (22).
Men were anxious, so anxious that “anxious” is “redundant,” because any masculinity
predicated on “patriarchal assumptions about power” and “privilege” “inevitably
engenders varying degrees of anxiety in its male members,” no pun intended (1).
Anxiety, he continues, is “synonymous with doubt and suspicion” and both
reveal the “fissures and contradictions of patriarchal system” while at the same time it
“enables and drives patriarchy’s reproduction and continuation of itself” (3, 2). These
assertions, come, like Rackin’s, with qualifications: “that the images I develop to portray
early modern England are as rooted in the cultural moment” as anybody else’s. And
“[a]lthough I have tried to present my sense of the early modern period as persuasively as
possible, my own understanding of masculinity in the late twentieth century and my
hopes for its radical transformation inform this study every step of the way,” especially
since subversive subjectivities are being attacked by a nasty, conservative backlash which
is, of all things, attempting to reposition “the man on top” (2, 33).
However, while Rackin’s qualifiers attempt to clear-cut to retrieve a lost bloom,
Breitenberg’s aspire to an impossible inclusiveness. He assures his readers that his use of
psychoanalysis to study early modern culture is warranted upon certain conditions (3,
12); that he’s defined “anxiety” in accordance with its use in the period (4), that he’s
avoided a homogenizing deployment of the term “patriarchy” (7); that his study of
masculinity is new and different (7); that he’s taken into account the fact that his own
critical models have marginalized female subjectivities (8); that he’s tried to employ a
dynamic versus deterministic model of subjectivity (10); that he knows his interpretations
are, like everyone’s, allegorical at best (15); that he also realizes his overview of the

Zias 71
period is in no way exhaustive (23, 26); that he knows he can’t speak at “a position
outside [his] own ideological and conceptual framework” (27), that even though this is
the case he doesn’t think his ideas should be dismissed, for as someone has said, “If we
are condemned to tell stories we cannot control, may we not, at least, tell stories we
believe to be true?” (27); and furthermore, that he knows his ordering of the book is
atypical but it’s necessary and adequate to his purposes (28); and lastly, that “despite
these disclaimers and caveats,” he hopes that readers will believe what he says because in
his thirty-four page introduction he’s defended himself twenty-three times, cited ten
primary texts and forty secondary texts including some by very important people like
Derrida, Butler, Irigaray, Greenblatt, Althusser, Freud, Gayle Rubin, Coppelia Kahn,
Jonathan Goldberg, Keith Thomas, Susan Bordo, and Leonard Tennenhouse, for a grand
total of seventy footnotes, more than any other chapter in his book. Thank you.
It appears Foucault was right: “[I]t is not possible for us to describe our own
archive” (Archaeology 130). However, Breitenberg’s attempt to say and account for it all
discloses not just his own “doubt and suspicion” that his readers will really enjoy
deconstructing him when they catch him unawares, but his belief that accounting for it
all is it all. The structure of happening, of accumulation and tabulation which reduces
everything to the order of a number provides the needed transparency and thus the
trustworthiness essentially absent from the order of what happened. A spreadsheet has all
the appearances of disinterest.
Although different in form, Rackin’s and Breitenberg’s protestations of selfawareness are an attempt to garner trust and claim authority. Anyone who hides the
desires informing their scholarship isn’t to be trusted. So, confession is again shown to be
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one of our “most highly valued techniques for producing truth” (Foucault, History 59).
Eschewing anything that reeks of formality, the demand to confess, which characterizes
contemporary scholarship, in turn formalizes a display of interiority, which through its
formalization, enables one to hide one’s desires again and, in effect, get back to work
and make the claims one wanted to make all along.
Perhaps this paradox explains the fixation with subversion outlined above.
For subversion can also be thought of as the outing of a secret via another (secret) secret.
Consider this last illustration, an analysis of subversion From Jonathan Dollimore and
Alan Sinfield: they agree with Breitenberg that “transgression was especially feared in
early modern England, an age obsessed with disordered and disordering movement,”
which “was seen to threaten the very basis of civilization” (Dollimore 116-117). Along
with obsessed, they feel the best words to describe the panic of those who wished to
preserve the basis of civilization are, obviously, panic as well as fear, anxiety, disturbed,
alarmed, dread, terror, terrified, undone, shattered, and paralyzed, along with a great
deal of pulling at one’s hair. At the same time, they are careful to admit:
The suspicious thing about the concepts of subversion and resistance [. . .] is that
they tend always to turn up where we want to find them, and never where we do
not—i.e. in relation to ourselves. Also, the very search for subversion sometimes
presupposes a view of history as in perpetual crisis, so inherently unstable that the
least resistance has instant revolutionary potential. In fact, we should never expect
transgression or subversion miraculously to change the social order. If transgression subverts, it is less in terms if immediate undermining or immediate gains,
than in terms of the dangerous knowledge it brings with it, or produces, or which
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is produced in and by its containment in the cultural sphere. (Dollimore 88-89)
If subversion is largely a matter of circulating “dangerous knowledge” or awareness, then
when applied to Shakespeare’s Henry V, Dollimore and Sinfield are obliged to decide
what exactly the Elizabethans knew and when they knew it so as to ascertain what
would’ve been “dangerous” for them to know.
Such a difficult task is made easier by the supposition that whatever we’re aware
of now, the Elizabethans couldn’t have been aware of then, and so by default our kind of
knowledge would’ve been subversive to them (Greenblatt, “Invisible” 28). For instance,
we know, “[s]omewhat over-schematically” that “Western metaphysics can be
represented in terms of three interrelated tenets: teleological development, essence, and
universal, the last two being the source of essential and absolute truth respectively”
(Dollimore 116). Granted, the Elizabethans probably knew this too, but the difference
is they believed in these things whereas we do not. Perhaps it’s “dangerous belief”
Dollimore and Sinfield should be looking for and not “dangerous knowledge.”
In any case, they suppose whatever would’ve undermined Western civilization
would’ve been subversive to Elizabethans; that is, anything that could be cited as a latent
precursor to Derrida’s philosophy of nevertheless. Such latency they discern in Henry V
in Henry’s obvious theatricality and in his obvious mistrust of the sincerity of his
subjects’ obedience, as well as in the play’s obvious declaration of national disunity and
its obvious questioning of divine providence (Dollimore and Sinfeld 218, 217, 220, 221).
Because “the play represses and resolves and yet reintroduces” these obvious secrets “in
a half-rationalized form” throughout, they deduce that contradiction “is the mainstay of
intense ideological struggle” (217).9
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I’d say that “intense ideological struggle” is occurring in Dollimore’s and
Sinfield’s keenness to find it in Elizabethan England. The truth is it can be found
anywhere (as Dollimore and Sinfield admit) given their premises: that power requires
keeping a secret that if exposed would lead to its disempowerment. The secret always
kept—and always found by those like Dollimore and Sinfield—is the nature of power as
power, as citation. In order to keep legitimizing their own powers of discovery,
Dollimore and Sinfield must persistently turn Henry V’s openly avowed critiques of
power into the play’s best kept secrets. Supposing those in power experience ever-present
turmoil over the idea of being exposed no doubt makes the duty of unmasking them much
more exciting if not (as Dollimore and Sinfield admit) very effective.
As such, the secret pleasure propelling Dollimore’s and Sinfield’s fantasy of
others’ crippling paranoia is also no secret. Nor is the maneuvering undertaken to excuse
themselves from the charge of secret pleasure. Because while asserting that ideology is
“not just a set of ideas,” but a “material practice, woven into the fabric of everyday life”
(211), a practice that “strives” to achieve “harmonious unity” (226), when it comes to
throwing their support behind social movements they approve, they must reconfigure this
definition to isolate only those practices they consider to be pernicious. As a result,
ideology is no longer defined as “any system of values” but only as those which try “to
naturalize or universalize its own authority” (Dollimore 86). So, for instance, “the view
that homosexuals are naturally inferior to heterosexuals is [. . .] ideological; the view that
homosexuals are [. . .] deserving of equal rights in law is not, resting rather on an openly
admitted ethical commitment to equality” (86). Exempting oneself from ideology in
this fashion certainly gives one the liberty to ignore one’s own material practices.
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Perhaps it’s no coincidence that Dollimore and Sinfield conclude their analysis of
Henry V by claiming, “In [Henry] contradictions are resolved or transcended,” but
“[h]ow far [Henry] is to be credited” we cannot say, only that in light of the “fascinating”
strained ideological maneuvers which structure the play, “the question of Henry’s
integrity becomes less interesting” (221, 225). What, once again, doesn’t matter.
“Must there not be,” Derrida said, “some powerful utterance-producing
machine that programs the movements of the two opposing forces [. . .] [at work in each
of these examples], and which couples, conjugates, or marries them in a given set, as life
(does) death?” It appears that “[n]either of the two antagonistic forces can break with this
powerful programming machine,” for “it is their destination” as well as “their points of
origin”; “they exchange utterances that are allowed to pass through the machine and into
each other, carried along by family resemblances, however incompatible they may
sometimes appear” (“Otobiographies” 29). The machine in this case is these scholars’
belief that the Master Critic masters not others and the world he lives in but himself. Or,
to flex our muscle of skepticism: that the only way to master others is to prove one has
first mastered oneself. Not that they want to master others, of course, but for the sake of
their identity as literary scholars—that is, for the sake of the recognition of their selfawareness, well, it would be convenient to be believed—and cited. “Self-reverence, selfknowledge, self-control, / These three alone lead life to sovereign power” (Tennyson
142-143).10
Self-mastery, therefore, serves as a basis for one’s claim to justice, both to seek
one’s rights and the rights of others. It isn’t coincidental that all these scholars’ readings
of Shakespeare and English culture are principally endeavoring to right some social
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wrong. Those identified as wronged in ages past are the ones most clearly like the
scholars, and those who did the wrong are the ones least like. Importantly, those who did
the wrong also didn’t know exactly what they were doing, for they were unaware of their
actual condition of being; each scholar, therefore, equates acts of injustice with
ignorance. And those wronged had some inkling of their plight, but couldn’t exactly
articulate it, which luckily means the scholar has very important work to do.
I’ve illustrated the difficulty of legitimating one’s authority by citing selfawareness not, as you may imagine, to cry foul and beg for the righting of wrongs or for
more and better self-awareness, but merely to illustrate the power of contradiction and
just how good one can be when one achieves it. In fact, because Rackin, Dollimore, et. al.
are so contradictory, and now more than ever (since reading my important book) aware of
it, we should expect more and better critical happenings from them since they’re already
traversing the trail of the new.
If it isn’t yet clear to you how (since how is what matters) this can be, perhaps a
formula will make it plainer. Since the goal of nevertheless is to be both joined/unjoined,
an insider/an outsider, believing/unbelieving, published and utterly unknown, or in sum,
to be what one is by default and to believe this to be an achievement, and since you must
slide between these two fixed points—in and out—which is really one point, and since
there are an infinite number of ways to slide, then let I and O stand for in and out, and let
& stand for and—thus, I&O. And let S1 signify subversion which within contradiction
(C) is always the flip-side ( ▲ ) of sameness (S2) and thus establishes their
equilibrium. And so 5 will symbolize the fifth state of being which contradiction will
inevitably call forth if we are aware it can (A), which means ◊ will signify the absolute
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and predictable functioning of contradiction, of which we must be unaware (U):
S1 ▲ S2
AC ◊
I&O = U5
And then as the last step, let us put all this under erasure (X):

S1 ▲ S2
AC ◊
I&O
= U5

Digression: William Harrison’s The Description of England
and the Authority of Experience
Recalling my reformulation of Bourdieu, that scholarship can’t reveal the truth
about itself without snatching it away, we might wonder whether this is only a
contemporary or what scholars call “postmodern” problem, if our so-called rampant and
savvy incredulity and reluctance to accept stories that try to explain everything forces us
into the hedging, maneuvering, and (ultimately) blindness which characterize the
preceding examples. No doubt all the above scholars would claim that the dilemma is
local given their incessant need to tell us that they only speak from where they are and
not from where they aren’t. Pronouncing this truism is postmodern they might say; it’s
certainly a claim to exceptionalism, a way to claim a difference from their predecessors,
and as such to make their own name worthy of citation.
But if, as my professor said, “there are only four kinds of people in this world,”
then we could suppose there have only ever been four kinds. If this is so, then we also
must deduce that the contemporary call for openness to the new itself isn’t new, but a
reconfiguration of a very old call that has always provoked the necessary sense of
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injustice which propels all towards the desire to be cited. As such, the so-called fifth state
of being which I’ve equated with newness would really be the absent core of the four
states, the void around which they circle. If the fifth state is a negative vortex turning all
in centripetal motion, and if this motion produces the desire for itself which in turn
always reproduces contradiction, could we not then conclude that the true “beyond” of
contradiction would consist in not desiring the new? Living as a negation of the negation?
I will explore this possibility via another question: “What ish my nation? Who
talks of my nation?” This is the saying of Captain Macmorris, defensively fending off
Captain Fluellen’s inference that he doesn’t know the best way to fight a war. It’s the
battle for Harfleur, and Henry V’s motley Irish-Scotch-Welsh-English army is fighting
amongst themselves (3.2.124). “I do not know you so good a man as myself,” continues
Macmorris, “so Chrish save me, I will cut off your head” (3.2.132). Proving that what
we don’t know scares us and incites us to violence. Or what we know all too well.
England is many nations, but it’s also cozy.
Shakespeare’s mini-description of England on the battlefield in France could’ve
provided the basis for William Harrison’s more comprehensive Description of England
even though we know it was the other way around. Harrison’s Description included in
Raphael Holinshed’s Chronicles of England, Ireland, and Scotland is what it purports to
be: a detailed account of just about anything you’d want to know about pre-seventeenth
century England. In 1577, when the Chronicles first appeared, it was “the most
comprehensive and lavish history ever published in England” (Taufer 135). As an
expression of “citizen consciousness” it was popular enough to undergo extensive
revision for republication in 1587 and has the distinction of being consulted not only by
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Shakespeare, but by Marlowe, Spenser, and Milton (Patterson, Reading xiii). Harrison’s
attempt to be comprehensive in his Description of England often affects his ability to
organize, a problem aggravated by his constant tendency to digress; nevertheless, the
contents of The Description can be divided into roughly four categories: 1.) politics 2.)
physical qualities of the land 3.) characteristics of the English people, and 4.) religion.
Under “politics” would fall items such as explanations of the relationship between
Scotland and England; what nations have inhabited England (such as Romans/Normans);
charts of all England’s kings; definitions of class distinctions; explanations of
parliamentary procedures; the method of university education; the laws of England; and
the status of the English navy. In describing the “physical qualities” of England, Harrison
includes the locations of towns, rivers, and ports; the quality of the soil and mineral
resources; the keeping of gardens; and the kinds of animals to be found. Topics covered
under “characteristics of the English people” include physical appearance, customs, diet,
and manners of dressing and dwelling (types of houses). Harrison’s official discussion of
religion is confined to one chapter: “Of the Ancient and Present Estate of the Church
of England,” and another (in the 1587 edition): “Of the Number of Bishoprikes and Their
Severall Circuites,” although he offers religious commentary throughout the Description
by lamenting church corruption, complaining of apathy among the people, or attributing
elements of English history to divine providence.
Harrison’s ambitiousness makes The Description an interesting case study in
answering our guiding question. For to write The Description Harrison must exclude
what doesn’t belong to England, and exclusion may in turn represent a desire. Selectivity
is his sticking point; everything he knows might be essential; he seems to lack a criterion
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for making a judgment. As a result his work remains unorganized despite extensive
revisions to the second 1587 edition; unrelated chapters are still juxtaposed; there are
needless repetitions; related topics are out of order; he can’t resist randomly inserting
personal anecdotes. We discover in reading The Description that the chief organizing
principle in the text is the title.
However, I should tell you that I’m not telling you a secret. Harrison knows his
text is rhetorically flawed because he thoroughly apologizes for it. He feels it to be a
disgrace, and yet somehow he isn’t discredited. Readers didn’t find the disjointedness of
the book as reason enough to dismiss it. Harrison wasn’t discharged from the project
(though he might like to have been); his Description wasn’t deleted as dross from the
second installment of the Chronicles. But why not? Surely it fails to accomplish its
synthesizing and unifying ideological work; it exposes itself; it protests too much; it
should, according to Rackin, Dollimore, et. al. be unbelievable.
Harrison’s explanations of his shoddy work must be understood in the context of
his participation in Holinshed’s larger Chronicles project. History seems to have been
one of Harrison’s chief passions, for it was his objective to publish a “Chronology” of
world history, an objective he was never able to achieve once he became sidetracked by
writing The Description for Holinshed. Harrison was a latecomer to Holinshed’s group
and was reluctant to contribute to the Chronicles because he was working on his own
history. The Description is partially culled from Harrison’s “Chronology,” a manuscript
Holinshed consulted and quoted from for the Chronicles (Parry 807). Harrison must have
written The Description in 1576 in a rather hasty fashion while away from his library,
suggesting that it was either a last minute addition to the Chronicles or that the
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publisher’s deadline was approaching or both (Parry 800). It’s significant that of the two
editions of the Chronicles published, Harrison’s Description is the section that underwent
the most substantive revision. In the second edition, Harrison (presumably with access to
his library) inserted many classical quotations and allusions and also drew more historical
parallels to contemporary events (Parry 800).
In his preface, Harrison draws attention to the ad hoc construction of his text,
confessing: “I haue not by mine own trauell and eyesight viewed such things as I doo
here intreat of.” Admitting his knowledge of the country is confined to London, Kent,
Oxford, and Cambridge, he says he’s “never trauelled 40 miles forthright and at one
iourney in all my life.” Later, he refers to his work as a “barbarous composition” the
“mere negligence, disorder, and euill disposition of matter” and finally, a “foule frizeled
Treatise.” Harrison defines barbarity as fragmentation, disunity, and disorder, and while
it appears that he attributes the barbarity of his text to his lack of knowledge—not having
seen most of the places he describes—the real problem isn’t his inexperience but the fact
that his Description is a piecemeal version, the “crums,” in Harrison’s words, of an
original wholeness, his own “Chronology.” The corruption of his original text is due to
outside pressure—time constraints, being without his library, being talked into writing
something against his better judgment—and has nothing to do with the inherent
problems in writing about England.11
Keeping this in mind, here’s how Harrison describes the corruption of England:
positing the existence of “naturall Britons” who lived in a unified kingdom, he asserts, “It
is not to be doubted, but that at the first, the whole Iland was ruled by one onelie prince”
(14). Since then, “eiuill discord” has disrupted the original unity, and Harrison identifies
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this “evil” as Roman. The Romans (whose armies, he notes, were always comprised of
mixed ethnic groups) brought “all maner of vice and vicious liuing, all riot and excesse of
behauiour into our countrie” (5). Harrison continues that “this Iland hath not onelie beene
a prey, but as it were a common receptacle to strangers,” and that under Roman rule, “the
naturall homelings or Britons [were] still cut shorter and shorter [. . .] driven into a corner
of this region” (7). The Britons, he tells us, were finally annihilated during Roman rule,
but they still live through Harrison who sometimes substitutes “we” or “our” when
referring to them (6). In short, the corruption of England, like the corruption of his own
text, is the result of outside pressure—foreign influences.
All this may be a coincidence. Consider another example: Harrison later laments
that the Roman corruption of England is an ongoing problem:
This neuerthelesse is generallie to be reprehended in all estates of gentilitie, and
which in short time will turne to the great ruine of our countrie, and that is, the
vusuall sending of noblemens & meane gentlemens sonnes into Italie, from
whence they bring home nothing but mere atheisme, infidelitie, vicious
conuersation, & ambitious and proud behauiour, wherby it commeth to passe that
they returne far worse men than they went out. (Furnivall 129)
Why single out Italians like this? Of course, they’re Catholic and England at this time is
supposed to be Protestant. But maybe being Catholic wouldn’t be so bad except for the
fact that Harrison had in his youth been a Catholic convert. In his own life account, he
tells us he fell under the spell of Catholicism during his Oxford years, or as he more
eloquently states: in “insanity” he “flung himself into the filth of papistry and became a
shaven worshipper of Baal” (qtd. in Taufer 6). Apparently, many at Christ Church where
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Harrison attended had Catholic sympathies during the reign of Queen Mary. However, he
did reconvert to Protestantism before Mary’s death, at some personal peril to himself, and
in his words, it was “to the solace of the whole church” that “Jezebel” was “wonderfully
carried off” by the “Almighty Father” (qtd. in Taufer 6). Foreign corruption in this case
isn’t just the annihilation of an original unity; it also represents seduction. And being
seduced is possible. One may even be inclined to join, desire to join; perhaps the desire
itself is the seduction.
Harrison elsewhere confronts the possibility of joining when he cites the “forren
historiographers” in the chapter, “Of the generall constitution of the bodies of the
Britons.” He’s trying to define English identity, but he’s also trying not to define it. His
rhetorical maneuvering in the face of pre-existing descriptions of Englishness suggests an
allergy to naming or being named. From the outset of this chapter, he’s quite tentative
about making any absolute statements about English bodies. “Such as are bred in this
Iland are men for the most part of a good complexion, tall of stature, strong in bodie,
white of colour, and thereto of great boldnesse and courage in the warres” (114). This is a
straightforward declaration except for the qualifier “for the most part.” And here he could
stop, but he continues his qualification further: “As for their generall comeliness of
person, the testimonie of Gregorie the great, at such time as he saw English capteins sold
at Rome, shall easilie confirm what it is, which yet doth differ in sundrie shires and
soiles.” He could stop here too, but he qualifies further still by saying that those of the
regions of Pokington and Sedberrie are “distinguished by their noses and heads” (114).
Harrison’s qualifications effectively render Gregory the Great’s testimony ambiguous. Is
it that Gregory could distinguish which part of England various soldiers were from based
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on the size of their noses? Or do the various regional differences Harrison identifies
counter Gregory’s testimony, whatever “it” is? Does the specificity erase the generality
or prove the generality as the rule?
We can’t know; we can only observe that this equivocation represents a trend. As
the chapter proceeds, Harrison continues to define Englishness by throwing off or
severing. To cite but three examples: “Neither are we so hard to strangers as Horace wold
seeme to make us.” And again, “[T]hus also dooth Comineus burden us [with dull wit]
after a sort in his historie.” Finally, “[T]hese opinions do [not] iustlie take hold of us, yet
hath it pleased the writers to saie their pleasures of us” (115; emphasis added). The connotations of the emphasized words in these quotations imply that Harrison feels
constrained, saddled against his will, out of control. Englishmen are being “made,”
“held,” and “burdened” with words not of their own choosing, caught in alien signifiers.
Feeling captured by these signifiers accounts for his language becoming more aggressive
as the chapter proceeds. In a key moment he fastens on “barbarous” as it’s been used to
define Englishmen and attempts to drain the word of its negativity:
It is but vanitie also for some to note us (as I have often heard in common table
talke) as barbarous bicause we so little regard the shedding of our bloud, and
rather tremble not when we see the liquor of life to go from us ( I use their own
words). Certes if we be barbarous in their eies, bicause we be rather inflamed than
appalled at our wounds, then are [they] flat cowards in our iudgement. (115)
The tactic of redefinition creates more verbal slippage than if Harrison had just denied
that the English are barbarous. To have done so would’ve been to concede the definition
of “barbarous” to these others, thereby creating a static term that would’ve required

Zias 85
Harrison to deploy a substitute label for the English—for instance, “civilized.” Quibbling
over the definition of “barbarous” by drawing attention to the relative status of all labels
(dependent on whose “eyes” we look through) keeps Harrison from committing English
identity to the perceived stability of an either-or binary.
In failing to commit English identity one way or the other, Harrison holds onto
the possibility of independence and autonomy. Nevertheless, he’d like to be able to say
something definite, to contrast, for instance, English “sincerity” or “plainness” with the
“meere subtiltie, instabilitie, unfaithfulness, & crueltie” of southerners (Italians) (114).
But it’s so complicated, for the humoral theory on which he sometimes relies cuts both
ways. “Such as are bred in this Iland are men for the most part of a good complexion, tall
of stature, strong in bodie, white of colour, and thereto of great boldnesse and courage in
the warres” he claims, the connection between body and character established with his
“thereto” (114; emphasis added). Similarly, later he adds, “[H]e whose nature inclineth
generallie to phlegme, cannot but be courteous: which oioned with strength of bodie, and
sinceritie of behauiour (qualities uniuersallie granted to remaine so well in our nation, as
other inhabitants of the north) [means . . .] the Britons doo excell such as dwell in the
hoter countries” (115). Yet, according to Leland’s account (which relies on Aristotle), the
strength of the Britons is also connected to their hard, fruitless soil, which unluckily
means they also aren’t too bright, lacking “skillfulness of wisdome.” Such wisdom
southerners have in abundance though they are “less of stature, weaker of bodie, more
nice, delicate, fearefull by nature, [and] blacker in colour” than northerners (114).
Somehow, Harrison must make Britons both strong and smart. Here’s how he does it:
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For if it be a virtue to deale uprightlie with singleness of mind, sincerelie and
plainle, without anie such suspicious fetches in all our dealings, as they
commonlie practice in their affaries, then are our contrimen to be accompted wise
and vertuous. But if it be a vice to coour craftinesse, subtile practices, doubleness,
and hallow behauiour, with a claoke of policie, amitie and wisedome: then are
[Italians . . .] to be reputed vicious. (115)
Basically, Harrison returns to his former tactic, quibbling over the meanings of the given
terms. Before, he turned English “barbarity” into a positive; here he turns Italian
“pregnancie of wit, nimblenesse of limmes, and politicke inuentions” into negatives. In
both cases he relies on an implied binary—the distinction between appearance and
reality—what looks to be barbarous in one case actually isn’t; what seems to be virtuous
in another case really isn’t either. Harrison doesn’t disagree with the connection the
“forren historiographers” have made between body, place, and character; rather, he
claims to have superior insights which enable him to read that connection rightly.
Why does Harrison think he has superior insights or the authority to make
changes to the accounts of England written by “foreigners”? In the preface to his work,
he’s expressed the desire to be absolutely accurate in his accounts. Let’s just assume for
the sake of argument that he means this. Also, in the preface, as I’ve mentioned, he
admits he has limited, local knowledge of England; plus he notes the lack of agreement
among his sources. For a man who wants to be truthful, these are obstacles to be
overcome. And he overcomes them by not being seen to desire to.
Harrison authorization of himself to amend prior accounts of England is directly
proportional to his sense of being other-ed by the prior accounts. And his sense of
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otherness is greater or lesser depending on his personal experience. Believing “that’s not
me” precedes self-definition, or believing that one already is other, already the exception
which has fallen out of the signifying system. The greater one’s sense of occupying the
void between the words, the greater one’s feeling of injustice and thus the greater is one’s
sense of autonomy. As such, it’s perfectly logical to assert oneself, to speak out, for who
will accurately speak you if you do not? And you must keep speaking, tirelessly proclaiming your difference to (and from) the one who made you what you aren’t. If you
cease to speak, you’ll cease to be. Self-definition is the answer “I am” to the question:
“Who is other?” The not-all is always the self.
Reliance on personal experience is key to Harrison. In the following passage on
English versus Italian climate, Harrison’s revisions of received records are based solely
on his experience:
[England’s] aire [. . .] is such as by reason in maner of continuall clouds, is
reputed to be grosse, and nothing so pleasant as that is of the maine. Howbeit
[. . .] experience teacheth us, that is no lesse pure, wholesome, and commodious,
than is that of other countries [. . .] Italie, which in my time is called the paradise
of the world, although by reason of the wickednesse of such as dwell therin in
may be called the sinke and draine of hell: so that whereas they were woont to
saie of us that our land is good but our people euill, they did but onlie speake it,
whereas we know by experience that the soile of Italie is a noble soile, but the
dwellers therein farre off from anie virtue or goodnesse.” (110; emphasis added)
The contrast Harrison makes between “speaking/writing” and “experience” is striking.
The former can be disputed as lies—the mere desire of evil people—whereas experience
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is indisputable because it just is. There’s no argument to be made; experience represents
nothing but itself; it speaks for itself and is hence perfectly reliable. It isn’t really
Harrison’s ability to cite authorities which gives credibility to his Description. Despite
his admission that he lacks knowledge of most of England, it’s his “I” which dominates
the text, his “I” which is of England and thereby most qualified to comment on it. His
“I’s” “our’s” “my’s” and “we’s” are, in addition to the title of his text, its other key
organizing principle. Harrison or the experiences of Harrison substitute for England
throughout The Description.
Citing experience as the locus of disinterested objectivity isn’t unique to Harrison.
Similar claims are also sprinkled throughout Spenser’s A Veue of the Present State of
Ireland. In the dialogue between Eudoxus and Irenius, ultimately Irenius’s comments are
more authoritative because he can say he’s been to Ireland. When Irenius claims the Irish
are Spanish in origin, Eudoxus questions his reliance on the Irish Chronicles, describing
them as “fabulous and forged” (25). But Irenius doesn’t argue for the validity of the Irish
Chronicles; rather, he supercedes them:
But unto [the Chronicles] besides I adde my owne readinge; and out of them both
togeather, with comparison of tymes, likens, of manners and customes, affinitie,
of words and names, properties of natures and uses, resemblances of rights and
ceremonies, monuments of Churches, and Tombes, and many other like
circumstances I doe gather a likelihood of truth.” (25; emphasis added)
So the connection between the Irish and Spanish is preserved not on the basis of the
authority of a book, but by Irenius’s hands-on investigations. “I adde my owne readinge”
means: “I’m other to what I’ve read; my experience isn’t represented.” The text isn’t his
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judge; he, like Chaucer’s Geffrey, is the judge of the text; the text is legitimated (or not)
only by how well it conforms to his experience. In this way of thinking, experience
precedes and determines the truth or falsity of a text. Only those texts or authors who
write of one’s own experience would be considered authoritative. Or only a text written
by oneself. Non other auctour alegge I. 12
Nevertheless, there’s a difficulty in equating truth with the exceptionality of one’s
experience. One’s experience may, in fact, be unexceptional. In other words, reading
one’s own experience as misrepresented or negated by a symbolizing system may be a
misreading. I wouldn’t mention this rather unoriginal point except that I feel constrained
to do so by the texts; they limit what I can speak; I am, in a sense, theirs whether I wish
to be or not, and I don’t in this particular case because they make me sound so stupid. But
that’s the point—both Harrison and Spenser’s Irenius chafe under the implication that
they’re stupid. Stupid, in Irenius’s case, for believing a “fabulous and forged” text;
stupid, in Harrison’s case, for being a northerner forced to plow rocky ground. And
wouldn’t Harrison prove his stupidity by believing a text that says so. Ironically, the
“forren historiographers,” in trying to describe what’s exceptional about northerners,
open up the space for Harrison to feel himself to be the exception—that is, not stupid.
The final irony is that in trying to prove he’s not like everybody, Harrison makes himself
(and all England with him) the same: “We’re as smart as Italians—so there!” In effect,
clinging to the singularity of his experience as a way out of stupidity makes him say
something that isn’t very smart. So . . . were the foreign historiographers lying? 13
As an addendum to my former hypothesis that self-definition is preceded by a
belief that one has been unjustly represented, I’d now say that self-definition could just as
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easily be preceded by the suspicion that one has been represented all too well. That one
doesn’t particularly like how one has been represented doesn’t mean the representation
isn’t just. But to claim that it is unjust necessitates disguising one’s dislike (i.e. desire) in
that which needs no interpretation—experience. Harrison’s faith in experience is both his
way out of description that he doesn’t like and his way in to description which he prefers.
Along the way he needn’t admit that he’s fleeing the possibility of his own stupidity, his
own recognition of “that’s me.” Nor need he admit that feeling other-ed is evidence that
he’d like to be other than what he is. After all, he’d been stupid enough to be like an
Italian for a time, to “see himself” in Catholicism. That he later castigates himself for his
“insanity” reveals that his belief in his difference may be driven by his inability to
explain his desires. There’s something in him other to him, something for which he can’t
account. He isn’t himself in the same way his own Description isn’t his, for, if you’ll
recall, it isn’t the text he desired to write or (especially) believed he was writing.
Finally, his suspicion of his own unaccountable desires may explain why, in the
end, he denies that people have the ability to give accurate accounts of themselves:
As for that which the French write of their owne manhood in their histories, I
make little accompt of it: for I am of the opinion, that as an Italian writing of his
credit; A papist in treating of religion, a Spaniard of his meekenesse, or a Scot of
his manhood, is not to be builded on; no more is a Frenchmean to be trusted in the
report of his owne affaires, wherein he dooth either dissemble or exceed, which is
a foule vice in such as professe to deale uprightlie. (115)
No one’s experience or awareness is a sure-fire guarantee of truth; more likely, it isn’t.
People can’t just “declare themselves,” for they don’t know themselves—especially as
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Harrison knows them. “[Should] the final aim [be] to achieve an adequate narrative
account of a life?” someone has asked. “Is the task to cover over through a narrative
means the breakage, the rupture, that is constitutive of the ‘I’?” Isn’t, in fact, the ‘I’ “the
moment of failure in every narrative effort to give an account of oneself”? (Butler,
Giving
69, 79). Harrison basically sweeps away the basis from which, throughout The
Description, he’s made a claim to his own difference. Everyone is a suspect (the same).
Because what we don’t know scares us and incites us to violence. Or what we know all
too well. Harrison is many “I’s”, but he’s also cozy.14
Return: The Wooing Scene and the Authority of Non-desire
*Note to scholars, what follows is citation as justification, for, in my love, “I
would like to spare you the tedium, the waste of time, and the subservience that always
accompany the classic pedagogical procedures of forging links, referring back to prior
premises or arguments, justifying one’s own trajectory, method, system, and more or less
skillful transitions, reestablishing continuity, and so on.” I’d spare you, though “the
imperatives of classical pedagogy” are nevertheless inescapable. “Yet, if you were to
submit to them rigorously, they would very soon reduce you to silence, tautology, and
tiresome repetition” (Derrida, “Otobiographies” 3-4).
O hard condition,
Twin-born with greatness, subject to the breath
Of every fool whose sense no more can feel
But his own wringing! What infinite heart’s ease
Must [scholars] neglect, that private men enjoy!
And what have [scholars], that privates have not too,
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Save ceremony, save general ceremony?
And what art thou, thou idol Ceremony?
What kind of god art thou, that suffer’st more
Of mortal griefs than do thy worshippers?
What are thy rents? What are thy comings-in?
O Ceremony, show me but thy worth! (Shakespeare, 4.1.233-244) 15
“We’re all writing about ourselves,” one of my professor-editors told me, “we just don’t
say so” or “it’s usually more disguised.” But even when we make our confessions, are
required to make our confessions, we still aren’t confessing, for we only write about who
we think we are. Or who we want to be. For, as someone has said, “There is no truth that,
in passing through awareness, does not lie. But one runs after it all the same” (Lacan,
Four vii). Moreover, even when I try to confess myself in order to reach beyond myself,
by declaring that I can’t reach beyond but will still try via my disclaimers, I am, in due
course, blamed again. “You can’t be the primary text for your own [scholarship]—unless
you’re Freud,” another professor wrote to me. “In your way of reading, the texts seem to
be reduced at times to location for your own self-discovery.” Plus, talking about oneself
will be seen as “self-indulgent” or “narcissistic” he continued, because “one also has to
give us some insight into something.” And if the double bind of contradiction encircles
again, he will also have to say: Look, she’s trying to give us insight into “something” but
is only really talking about herself! You see, I can do nothing right even though I follow
all the rules. Nor can Rackin, Harrison, et. al. This is the philosophy of nevertheless.
Let me read between the lines: when Brian McHale described the postmodern
condition as one in which “we are being urged to ‘just say no’ to narrative, and where
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even attempting to describe the situation is likely to draw accusations of metanarrating,”
and that the effect of this is “succumbing to a paralyzing anxiety not to be seen to
narrate,” what he should’ve said is not to be seen to desire, for what is narrating except
the movement of desire? (6). A metanarrative is desire on display, accompanied by all its
“secret,” (no doubt) nefarious pleasures. Do not narrate = do not desire; it is dangerous.
Scholarship, the servant of ceremony, can’t coexist with this danger, can’t avow the
coexistence, and so much the more now that we know (that we know) that scholarship is
nothing but ceremony.
And what is ceremony except another (secret) venue of desire? The silences of
scholarship are silences of desire, the refusal of scholars to account for their own in the
incessant deconstruction of others’. For example, a moment of clarity on this point occurs
in Feminist Contentions, a book designed to be a dialogue among several distinguished
feminist scholars on the merits of Derrida’s philosophy. Near the conclusion, Judith
Butler, exasperated by her inability to sway others to favor it, confesses:
But what I have come to understand is that [. . .] the pursuit of the reasonable is
[. . .] the site and instrument of other kinds of investments, ones which are
difficult, if not impossible, to uncover, much less to change. But because this
thesis is not avowed, there is a deadlock that pervades this debate. This is, of
course, a sad state of affairs. And, in the end, I find the work of this volume to be
saddening. In a way, what structures this volume remains unspeakable within the
very terms in which the volume proceeds. For the question of whether or not a
position is right, coherent, or interesting is, in this case, less informative than why
it is we come to occupy and defend the territory that we do, what it promises us,
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from what it promises to protect us. Unfortunately, this conversation is not one
that takes place within the context of this volume. (127-128)
Nor can it, for if scholarship avows its attachment to “other kinds of investments” then
scholarship in its current form would change, might even become new. It’s revealing that
Butler believes such “investments” couldn’t be recognized or changed, which suggests
discussing them would be pointless anyway. So, while blaming scholarly ceremony, she,
in the interests of nevertheless, retains it as a “as an undeniable fact of life.” “In so doing,
[Butler] turns a potential exercise in self-examination and demystification into [another
instance of] delusion” (Cartelli 7).16
Or not. For this is the philosophy of nevertheless. Not to be seen to desire, to be
without “investments” while all the time admitting it, declaring that scholarship is
nothing but “investments.” And to be cited you either have the right ones or you don’t,
but preferably both if you’re to be good. And of course, I’m good; I’m everything I
write about, and so much more. I have no desire to love beautiful books anymore, and it
is all I desire; my scholarship is nothing but this desire, though it will never say so. But
even if it did, it would be to garner trust, to say I’m so aware of the difficulties of my
desire. You wouldn’t hit a person with glasses, would you? I can throw myself down by
admitting all I’m aware I can admit. There’s no necessity for deconstruction here.
And perhaps, after all, to deconstruct while being immune to deconstruction is, in
fact, the opting out of justice that I seek, the Justice, the newness which will be like the
love I lost but only in name. And this Justice will be the second form of subversion, the
subversion of contradiction while, at the same time, it will remain dependent on
contradiction for its coming. Now if only this weren’t the language of my father, the one
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who, if I’m to be cited, I must subvert. If only this weren’t the language of a theft, the
theft of my love. Though, of course, while his language has confessed so much, it has
never confessed a desire to steal.
Act 5, Scene 2: I return to Henry V in Shakespeare’s play of that name, for I
find Henry’s name so riddled with possibility. In this scene Henry is earnestly trying to
woo the French princess Katherine. The wooing is unnecessary, for he’s just conquered
France; Katherine is by definition already his. Nevertheless, he insists. Why he insists
makes critics wonder. It is rather inexplicable that he fashions his conversation with
Katherine as if they were both free to choose each other. He acts as if he’s not just
conquered France and as if Katherine isn’t an automatic spoil of victory. “[H]aving [. . .]
won his love with his sword, [he] nevertheless woos and flatters her as if all rested on her
decision alone” (L. Wilcox 74). He pretends “that he is actually a man in love persuading
a woman who loves him to marry him,” and it is the very “superfluousness of the
wooing” that “calls our attention to Henry’s almost compulsive need to seem that it does
matter” (Williamson 331; 329-330). What’s driving Henry to go to such lengths to act as
if he and Katherine are freely choosing subjects? What’s at stake for him?
There are three features of Henry’s wooing: First, this is a one-sided conversation;
Henry’s long speeches contrast sharply with Katherine’s often one-sentence responses
such as “I cannot tell wat is dat” (5.2.177). Also, Henry asks Katherine seven times for
direct responses to his questions of whether she will have him or if she can love him, and
all this, while he maneuvers in indirection. Lastly, Henry’s rhetoric attempts to break
down the distinction between French and English, a distinction Katherine wants to
maintain. This is the crux of the matter: Henry’s speech obfuscates difference while
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Katherine’s speech insists on it.
Central to Henry’s appeal to Katherine is his assertion that France already belongs
to him, and the proof of his love for France is that he came to claim it. To confirm this, he
both begins to speak French (to show in his heart he is French) and to suggest to her that
she already loves him: “Come, I know thou lovest me; and at night, when you come into
your closet, you’ll question this gentlewoman [Alice] about me; and I know, Kate, you
will to her dispraise those parts in me that you love with your heart” (5.2.197-201). By
implication, Katherine’s language lessons earlier in the play in which she aspires to be “a
true Englishwoman” (notice Alice’s statement in 3.4.38 that Katherine speaks as well
as the native English) indicates that like Henry’s performance of French, Katherine’s performance of English proves what she already is. She’s not taking on a role per se but
revealing what she always was (English) since France itself already technically is
England according to Henry.
In contrast, Katherine upholds throughout the conversation her loyalty to a
particular idea of herself as French. She inconveniently (for Henry) asks, “Is it possible
dat I sould love de ennemie of France?” (5.2.169), thereby defining Henry in accordance
with a binary he rejects. When Henry asks for the last time whether she’ll have him,
Katherine agrees “as it shall please de roi men père” (5.2.247), drawing attention to her
identification with the desire of her French father, not Henry’s desire. Most revealingly,
when Henry kisses Katherine, she reacts by citing in her defense the laws of France: “Les
dames et demoiselles pour être baiseés devant leur noces, il n’est pas la coutume de
France” (5.2.258-59). Henry counters Katherine’s insistence on adhering to French
custom in a crafty manner: rather than arguing with her about what English customs are
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in opposition to French customs, (which would keep the discussion within the confines of
the distinctions she established), Henry dismisses their commitment to customs
altogether: “Dear Kate, you and I cannot be confin’d within the weak list of a country’s
fashion. We are the makers of manners, Kate; and the liberty that follows our places stops
the mouth of all find-faults” (5.2.269-272). Such is the power of the King, and who
wouldn’t want to have such liberty? It is, after all, the-way-of-the-West, as another has
would-be king has confessed: “[T]o abandon self-fashioning is to abandon the craving for
freedom, and to let go of one’s stubborn hold upon selfhood, even selfhood conceived as
a fiction, is to die.” And continuing in Henry fashion: “I want to bear witness [. . .] to my
overwhelming need to sustain the illusion that I am the principal maker of my own
identity” (Greenblatt, Renaissance 256, 257).
Henry’s challenge is to convince Katherine to adopt this illusion as well and to do
so voluntarily. If she does so of her own free will, he’ll have succeeded in helping her be
a victim of an injustice only he can rectify. If the laws of France are the enemy keeping
Katherine oppressed, then Henry can’t be an oppressor but a savior, and Katherine would
welcome him as such—but indirectly—because for liberation to work her dependency on
Henry must be obscured; she must believe she’s saving herself, that she’s “the principal
maker of her own identity.” Katherine simply must become a seeker of justice, for then,
as Absalom could testify, how easily her heart might be stolen.17
What annoys Henry is that Katherine won’t cooperate by believing herself to be a
victim of French laws; rather, she sees herself as a citizen of France with all the rights
and privileges thereof. To Katherine, her father the French king is to be obeyed (and
loved) not subverted; for that reason Katherine doesn’t understand herself to be someone
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seeking justice, and Henry’s suggestion that others ought to be citing her doesn’t make
sense—literally, she doesn’t understand his speech.
That’s why when Henry sees he’s not leading Katherine where he’d like her to go,
he decides to annihilate the need for citation as such. “We’re not subjects of citation,” he
tells her. Citation is also a matter of definition; thus, in Henry’s talk with Katherine, he
avoids defining himself and makes his own desire elusive: he slides between French and
English, he flatters, he repents, he questions, he rambles, and all in an attempt to induce
Katherine to reveal her desire, or perhaps her “dangerous belief.” The founding principles
of definition to which she’s committed forestall Henry’s ability to be (or appear) radically
uncommitted. His non-desire only appears as such because it’s predicated on
deconstructing her desire for system or system of desire (Derrida, A Taste 4). Henry
never cites an authority, but he wants to be cited; for him, disrupting Katherine’s identity
wouldn’t free her to be different (no longer French!); rather, it would swallow her up by
subsuming her identity within his.
I’m reminded of a book I had to read, one I disliked, for in it there was no place
for me, or perhaps it was I felt put in my place. Here are the relevant passages:
“Like you, [Derrida], I have a nostalgia for this period [the 1970’s]” (13).
“I agree with you in insisting on the necessity to fight ceaselessly for
emancipation” (30).
“I agree in condemning all physical violence” (31).
“In addition, like you, I am in favor of [homosexual unions]” (32).
“I situate myself on the same side as you” (35).
“I agree with you” (42).
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“That’s my opinion. There is something undecidable, or some undecidable, as you
say” (58). (my favorite)
“On this point, I follow you completely” (60).
“I agree with you on all these points” (82).
“Concerning unconditional forgiveness, you are right” (161).
“I agree with you in mistrusting any glorification of some specificity or of a
chosen people” (189).
These are the words of Elisabeth Roudinesco, co-author with Derrida of For What
Tomorrow . . . A Dialogue. But let’s avow what our authors could not: Roudinesco in this
“dialogue” is a conve(y)nience for the being of Derrida. In the Foreword, written by
Roudinesco, she describes the book as “an exchange whose logic is constructed from two
unfolding discourses that intersect without ever fusing.” But then, in a Freudian moment
of unaware clarity, she admits fusion by describing the book as “a text in two hands,”
which is most accurate, for as Roudinesco’s role is to question Derrida and then agree
with his answers, the book is certainly not a text in four hands (ix).
I spell things out for my professors, so desirous, in their insistence that clarity is
tyrannical, that I prove myself among the oppressors: as Henry is to Katherine so is
Derrida to Roudinesco. As I read various scholars’ condemnations of Henry’s injustice to
Katherine, I imagined the new possibilities of interpretation if I substituted: “Clearly
[Derrida] is less concerned with defining his speech practices than with imposing his will
in a context where the separation of word and meaning involved in his disclaimer[s]
becomes a kind of polite cover for the naked reality of his demands.” In this so-called
dialogue, “[h]e is not wooing [Roudinesco], either with the conventional language of love
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or any other; he is telling her that her submission is required as both a symbolic and
literal expression of the larger submission of [academia]” (Ayers 254). Derrida’s pattern,
as another said of Henry, is “toying with people within a framework of certainty, together
with an expression of a strong desire to act as if he is [uncertain].” Thus, Henry “creates
situations in which others will justify his actions, which he has already decided to carry
out, but which he likes others to seem to bring about because of his unease in the
kingship” (Williamson 328; 329). For simply to seize power, to declare oneself king is, as
Derrida said, and this is no substitution, “disgusting.” “It is a question of taste,” he
confessed, “I do not like it” (Negotiations 21).
Translation: Henry’s speech from Act 5, scene 2, lines 268-279, into the jargon
of nevertheless:
Henry: O Kate, nice customs cur’sy to great kings. Dear Kate, you and I cannot be
confin’d within the weak list of a country’s fashion. We are the makers of
manners, Kate; and the liberty that follows our places stops the mouth of all findfaults, as I will do yours, for upholding the nice fashion of your country in
denying me a kiss; therefore patiently and yielding. [Kissing her.] You have
witchcraft in your lips, Kate; there is more eloquence in a sugar touch of them
than in the tongues of the French council, and they should sooner persuade Harry
of England than a general petition of monarchs.”

Henry: “[B]y means of this double play, marked in certain decisive places by an
erasure which allows what it obliterates to be [governed], violently inscribing
within [Katherine] that which attempted to govern it from without, I try to respect
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as rigorously as possible the internal, regulated play of [Katherine’s ideas] by
making them slide—without mistreating them—to the point of their
nonpertinence [. . .].” Deconstructing Katherine [Fucking her.] “would be to
think—in the most faithful, interior way—the structured genealogy of
[Katherine’s] concepts, but at the same time to determine—from a certain
exterior that is unqualifiable or unnameable by [Katherine]—what this history
has been able to dissimulate or forbid, making itself into a history by means of
this somewhere motivated repression. By means of this simultaneously faithful
and violent circulation between the inside and the outside of [Katherine] [. . .]—
there is produced a certain textual work that gives great pleasure” (Derrida,
Positions 6-7).
Katherine must learn to take the same pleasure Henry is taking, and who or what could
she possibility cite as reason not to, especially since Henry promises he wouldn’t have
conquered France except that he loves it with a “loving jealousy” and not “nihilistic
fury,” as “I love very much everything that I deconstruct in my own manner” (Derrida,
“Otobiographies” 87). To refuse would be to be charged with distrust and ingratitude.
But perhaps you can, as I did, imagine contemporary Shakespearian scholars as
Katherine’s ladies-in-waiting, translators, as was Alice, of Katherine’s ethical skepticism:
Katherine: “O bon Dieu! Les langues des hommes sont pleines de tromperies.”
Henry: What says she, fair one? That the tongues of men are full of deceits?”
Alice: “Oui, dat de tongues of de mans is be full of deceits: dat is de Princess.”
(5.2.115-120).
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One of these ladies might whisper to Katherine that she finds Henry “utterly charming
and utterly disturbing” for his “masterful stage-managing of the entire encounter”
“enfolds [you]” “safely inside his own agency” (Howard 149, 150). Another might tell
her she’s just been made “vulnerable to long, cajoling speeches”; warn her that’s she’s
been “browbeaten” and humiliated by Henry’s deconstruction because he “insistently
[called you] ‘Kate’ (twenty-eight times in the interview)” (Sinfield, Faultlines 137). And
all this, while Henry’s own “self-deprecation” another might say, “is absolute
balderdash” (L. Wilcox 70).
And like Katherine, their doubts about Henry would only prove they neither
understand nor appreciate the power, possibility, and virtue of contradiction. They are
simplistic, reductive; they are theory bumpkins. They think Katherine ought to resist;
they think her “minimalist strategy of one-line replies” is her way of “avoiding collusion
with Henry’s approaches,” of refusing “to join in the pretense that her preferences
matter” (Sinfield, Faultlines 138). They believe that although Henry’s “subjectivity and
sexuality are predicated upon his repression of Katharine’s linguistic power,” his power
is compromised when Katherine learns English and turns English words (particularly
naughty ones) to her own use (Traub 62). They really think that “Katharine is the only
person [. . .] who is resistant to all of Henry’s shifting roles” and that “France may have
been co-opted by Henry, but Katharine was not” (Abate 74, 81).
Why, if Katherine listened to all these Alices, she’d never be free. “I sometimes
have the impression,” she might later say after listening to Henry and accepting her
liberation from French limitation, “that the world today resembles you and resembles
your concepts, that our world is deconstructed and that it has become [Henri-dian] to the
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point of reflecting, like an image in a mirror, the processes that decenter thought,
psychology, and historicity and that you helped to set in motion.” “In short, I am inclined
to say that you have triumphed” (Derrida and Roudinesco 3, 2). From England to France,
and from there across the seas to the hills of Appalachia, as this photo “Always a
Mountaineer” from the Morgantown Times proves:

I speak in two voices as I must; the burden of this yoke is light. Naturally, I’m
committed to everything I write since I wrote it, and I’m committed to nothing I write
since I wrote nothing (Derrida, any text). Rest assured, however, that this I will accept
all accolades in addition to being published by Stanford University Press. In the
meantime, I now must add that Katherine’s freedom from French law is the freedom to be
erased. Henry’s amorphous (non)desire can’t allow Katherine to be free from him
through her obedience to French laws because her obedience marks not an end in the
abstract but his end. Her obedience is his limitation. And Henry, who’s opposed to his
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own end but not to the ends of others, and moreover, is quite open to openings in ends or
the opening of ends, and who, like my father, I can easily imagine proclaiming himself to
be “a sort of great earthquake, a general tremor, which nothing can calm,” finally
encounters one who won’t be shaken or bent (Derrida, A Taste 9).
Thankfully, she can be made to bend, although because we’re now free to talk of
all Katherines as signifiers, discursive rubrics, matrices of power, and discourses, we
don’t have to think of our “violent inscriptions” as forms of murder, theft, or rape.18 How
unexceptionally naïve Katherine is—actually thinking the laws of France are sacred and
define and protect her as they would any French citizen. To commit to Henry, she’d need
to submit to a radical reorientation of her guiding principles based on Henry’s premise
that “there are none but singular contexts,” and as such, none but that “bears witness to
that which will not allow itself to be enclosed within a [law].” (Derrida, A Taste 13, 17).
By becoming open and bearing witness to Openness, Katherine would be empowered,
she’d give birth to “a new right,” she’d take her own “context into account and then, at a
given moment [. . .] transform it radically” (17). Or, at least in Henry’s image.
Conclusion: “Of all the cants which are canted in this canting world,—though
the cant of hypocrites may be the worst,—the cant of criticism is the most tormenting!”
(Sterne 152). For Henry’s non-desire which proclaims itself to be love for Katherine is
a desire to steal her desire; stealing the desires of others must appear as non-desire in
order to avoid being subverted in turn. For if Henry invites Katherine to make her own
manners, there’s nothing to stop her from unmaking Henry’s, especially since awareness
of how manners are made is the only justification for his power. The subversion of
others’ desires is based in a belief that it is fundamentally unjust for oneself to be limited
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by others. Believing one exists in injustice, and that justice can only be the right of one to
be cited, not to cite, is, however, the constituting principle for all four kinds of people in
this world. Therefore, while Henry V seemed to be a promising fifth kind of person,
I find he’s only “led me [back] into a labyrinth” (Derrida, Positions 5).
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Chapter 3
That Which Can Never Be Named
In two words, text follows, what’s wrong with the world: “I am.” 1
sub-mit v., -mitted, -mitting [ME submitten, fr. L submittere to lower, reduce, yield, fr.
sub- + mittere to send] vt 1a: to yield in surrender, compliance, or obedience to
governance or authority b: to subject (esp. oneself) to a regime, condition, or practice 2a:
to commit to the discretion or judgment of another b: to make available: OFFER c: to
state or urge with deference; suggest or propose ~ vi 1: to yield oneself to the authority or
will of another 2: to defer to the opinion or authority of another – submittable,
submissible, adj. – submittal, n. – submitter, n. – submittingly, adv. – Syn. 1: comply,
bow, obey, agree, resign. See yield. – Ant. 1: fight
sub-mis-sive adj. 1: inclined or ready to submit; unresistingly or humbly obedient 2:
marked by or indicating submission – submissively, adv. – submissiveness, n. – Syn.1:
tractable, compliant, amenable 2: passive, resigned, patient, docile, tame, subdued 2
I progress—or regress, but either way I’ve still hardly begun, can’t decide how to
begin. I feel more than ever that love is a stranger; I can only play the game of tit-for-tat.
I too can accuse and subvert; I can assert the authority of my awareness, my experience
as a student of masters; I can plead with the disinterest of (non)desire for justice to be
done, and in so doing I can ignore that this is all I can do, all I know how to do.
I can defend Katherine passionately and argue that Henry’s distinction between an
unknown Justice to come and the justice of tit-for-tat can’t be sustained because the
radical asymmetry and heterogeneity of Justice which presumably would never reduce all
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to the same is exactly the asymmetry and heterogeneity which drives tit-for-tat. All who
seek to be cited believe by default that they’re asymmetrical, i.e. different from those
currently being cited; proving their asymmetry is required for publication. In Rousseau
we hear the cry of every scholar: “Myself alone! I know the feelings of my heart, and I
know men. I am not made like any of those I have seen; I venture to believe that I am not
made like any of those who are in existence. If I am not better, at least I am different”
(1630). That the form of scholars’ desire for citation isn’t singular is overshadowed by
their belief that what they’re saying has never before been said. Katherine doesn’t believe
she’s singular in that sense; she’s just like all the other French girls who, according to
French custom, aren’t supposed to go around kissing perfect strangers. It’s the singularity
of the French custom in which Katherine believes, a singularity she defends in-the-nameof-France, not, as Henry would wish, in-the-name-of-herself. Henry speaks in-the-nameof-himself, and liberating Katherine to speak similarly he calls love—love of Katherine—
which is actually love of his own power to liberate, for Katherine, if she believes him,
won’t, however much she may think so, speak in her own name; she’ll speak in-thename-of-Henry.
And however much I might defend Katherine’s citation of French law in the
interests of maintaining her difference from Henry, I can also just as easily, since I speak
in-the-name-of-Derrida, which is in-the-name-of-nevertheless, not defend her at all. As
disappointed as I was to discover that Henry V isn’t a fifth kind of person, I confess it
seems preferable to be him than to be Katherine. He is, after all, king, and has published
forty-plus books and seventy-plus essays and interviews to prove it (Reynolds and
Roffe152-164). And what can we attribute to Katherine’s name? She can’t even keep her
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name from being deconstructed by the all-consuming Henry who repeatedly calls her
“Kate.” To secure her difference from him, the most strength she can muster is to insist
that French law is French and not English law in disguise, and that therefore a French
subject is French and not English in disguise. As a citizen of France, with all the rights
thereof, her loyalty is due to the King of France—not the King of England.
The difficulty of defending Katherine is that I’m forced to defend submissiveness,
for her difference from Henry is sustainable only in as much as she obeys French law. To
defend her is to defend words such as compliant, passive, and docile, weak words which
connote sheep-like conformity and undifferentiation. If Katherine’s submission to law is
defensible, then perhaps “the world’s unanimous advice,” which is to think for oneself, is
not (Barthes, Lover’s 118). Katherine really thinks that French law can preserve her
power and happiness, that her name, her given name, a French name, doesn’t prevent her
from being English but liberates her to be French. For Katherine, there’s been no mistake,
no misrepresentation, no injustice; the law enables her to be who she is—why would she
want to sacrifice her being and join Henry? For it would be joining Henry, submitting to
Henry, no matter how much he may wish to hide that fact from her. For Katherine,
French law is exceptional, and her obedience to the law is the conduit which channels its
exceptionality to her. As a result, Katherine’s definition of justice is opposed to Henry’s:
Henry’s Definition:
1. The King is exceptional, but the French king is an unexceptional usurper.
2. I am exceptional; I’m rightfully the king of France.
3. The French king will never concede my right to the throne; his law is
prohibitive.
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4. I must make my own law, one that enables my conquest of France.
Justice: The acknowledgment of the French king of my right to his throne via
my subversive overthrow of his law.
Katherine’s Definition:
1. The King is exceptional, as is the French king.
2. I am unexceptional and have no right to rule.
3. The French king grants me exceptionality via French law.
4. If I make my own law, I forfeit my exceptionality as French.
Justice: My acknowledgement of the singularity of the French king via my
obedience to French law.
Katherine’s definition of justice doesn’t seem very empowering. From Henry’s
perspective, she’s a sucker. Consider her situation: her country has just been defeated by
foreigners (who brazenly claim to be no foreigners at all, but kin); the leader of this
invasion force intends to cement his claim to her country by marrying her; and her father,
ruler of her now-defeated land, does less to protect her than he did his territory and agrees
to the match. And nowhere in any of this does anyone
prioritize Katherine’s wishes. Did she want her country
to be invaded? Does she want to marry Henry? Does
she have a say? No, no, no. Her agreement to marry
Henry “as it shall please de roi men père” seems a
Forced choice—she submits only because she can’t do
otherwise. And as I’ve already suggested, her marriage
to Henry is practically a theft and a rape, so what good

A. Sucker
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did her belief in the uniqueness of French law and of her uniqueness as a French subject
do her in the end, if she’s just supposed to take it in the end? 3
It’s impossible not to entertain the possibility that Henry is right, that Katherine
just needs to throw off her naiveté and realize that under so-called French law, she’s
actually “in the presence of male heterosexual desire, in the form of a desire to
consolidate partnership with authoritative males in and through the bodies of females”
(Sedgwick 38). As mere “merchandise” and victim of a compulsory “heterosexual
matrix” which fashions her body as a “fetishized [object]” for male consumption and
vehicle of reproduction, never as subject of her own desire, Katherine has internalized the
power mechanisms which render her complicit in her own subjection (Irigaray, Speculum
140; Butler, Gender 35). Clinging dutifully to submission as salvation is, as so many
feminists have asserted, a very convenient doctrine disseminated by and for men.
It’s therefore quite possible to imagine an alternative ending to Henry V, one that
Henry, in his invitation to Katherine to make her own manners or cite herself, wouldn’t
have had in mind. He extends the invitation in order that she might submit to him, but she
could certainly interpret it otherwise and make her own manners by, say, laughing at
Henry uncontrollably. In this scenario Katherine and her newly empowered ladies-inwaiting would encircle Henry and take turns cataloguing all his flaws:
He never gives, nor lends, nor trusts. He can’t offer a woman true sexual
fulfillment. He can neither define nor distinguish his feminine component. He
repeats himself. He wears socks in bed. He’s guilty of being aloof, self-indulgent,
he pities himself. He can’t find a way out. He’s afraid of decisions. He’s always
mum. He’s guilty of feeling guilty. Takes himself too seriously. He never visits
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his mother. He’s guilty of ‘maniacal assophilism,’ he cannot commit himself to
one woman. He loses his hair. He deceives himself by imagining an ideal woman.
He believes that women are mentally inferior. He considers them superior beings.
He prefers the dark side of the moon. He can’t justify his aggressiveness, his
vulgarity, his arrogance towards women. He feels lonely. He can’t cook. And he
pees standing up! (City of Women)
But laughter may not be sufficiently retributive.
A second scenario: the play ends by Katherine . . . stabbing Henry to death. . .
and then her father. She seizes the French throne, banishes men from the court, and sets
up an oligarchy of very capable women such as herself, women devoted to governing by
consensus and resolving conflict peaceably via compassion, nurturing, compromise, and
mutual respect. It would inaugurate a new era of love. Of course, some sacrifices would
need to be made in love’s interest—Katherine’s mother, for instance—who’d
probably be too vexed at the murder of her husband to be grateful for her liberation . . . .
So, perhaps in order to find my way to love, I must begin with what I am, a
woman; I must begin by listening to my sisters who tell me that a stronger, wiser
Katherine (K2) is to be preferred. This Katherine would take matters into her woman’s
hands because she can, because she understands that desiring citation is of the order of
man. Manners are always made; they aren’t natural, inevitable or absolute cultural
formations but have been constructed by men and in the interests of men, and thus, at the
expense of women. Women can, in understanding this, make manners differently. For
instance, chief among patriarchal constructions is that of “sex,” cited in the interests of
propagating as biological what is a “naturalized effect” of “a reiterative or ritual
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practice,” a reiteration that fortunately for us subversive women produces “gaps and
fissures” and “instabilities” “as that which cannot be wholly defined or fixed by the
repetitive labor of that norm.” Therefore, the phallogocentric law which constitutes
women biologically also deconstitutes “in the very process of repetition,” opening up
“the possibility to put the consolidation of the norms of ‘sex’ into a potentially productive
crisis” (Butler, Bodies 10). But we would hope not reproductive. The contradictions of
patriarchal citation enable women to “‘cite’ the law to produce it differently, to ‘cite’ the
law in order to reiterate and coopt its power, to expose [it] to displace the effect of its
necessity” (15).
In fact, I must begin with the fact that not only “sex,” but nearly everything has
been thusly constructed and thusly can be (re)(de)constructed.4 Thus I must begin by not
allowing myself to be the means by which patriarchy names and maintains through
unquestioned citation, its oppressive, violent hierarchies. And if I unite with my sisters,
then the Master Judge (a male invention) will crumble into a myriad; the world will be
classless, sexless, and judgeless, which will inaugurate a new era of peace, freedom, and
Justice. But sisters must stick together.
K2’s Revenge, Part I: The Case of Aemilia Lanyer
Virtue covets her like, and doth devize
How she her friends may entertaine with grace.
(Lanyer, Salve Deus 1595-96)
The dismemberment of what is assuredly a phallogocentric erection—that is, a socalled potent, transcendent presence grounded on the “dark continent” of women’s
material and penetrable bodies—can begin to be accomplished once we women commit
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to extracting ourselves from the objectified, silenced, and solitary existences designed to
keep us separated and in competition with one another (Irigaray, Speculum 141). The
fifth kind of person who, as I’ve hypothesized, would have no desire to be cited, may
very well be a woman. And the contradictory double-logic which drives men like Derrida
might not be able to endure a revolution of love or non-contradiction between women.
“A world for women”—this is what, according to one feminist scholar, has both
“never existed” and always been “present, although repressed, latent” and never able to
achieve its potential because women have been too distracted building worlds “for the
other” “as keepers of home and children” (Irigaray, Ethics 109). The distraction is the
fault of patriarchy because men, desperate for male progeny and citation among other
men, have both subtlety and coercively conditioned us to believe that we can “exist” only
by “situat[ing] ourselves on the edges of the other,” the other being men (103). Being
thusly “situated” is only possible if women abandon their mothers and sisters as rivals for
the “single possible position in the desire of man,” a position we believe amounts to
achieving the status of “the unique one” or sort of the Master Judge’s wife or maybe
daughter (102). Therefore, “[w]ithout realizing it, or willing it,” we “prize one another by
standards that are not our own” but the Master Judge’s, and become “the most terrible
instrument of [our] own oppression” and the “agents of [our] own annihilation” because
we seek to destroy any woman who seems to be unique—on the arm of the Master.
Aroused by jealousy, women consequently don’t love other women, “but merely the
place she occupies, that she creates, and that must be taken away from her, rather than
respected.” Conclusion: there’s “no love of other without love of same” (103-104).
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Love of same. Or, to love what is beautiful, one cannot begin by loving the
standards that make some things beautiful and some things not. The place of beauty is not
a place; it is a person, or perhaps a book, one written by a poet, a woman, Aemilia
Lanyer. Salve Deus Rex Judaeorum—a “little book” she calls it, comprising a lengthy
meditation on the Passion of Christ and the role of women therein, followed by a shorter
meditation on the sadness of a country house, Cooke-ham, upon the departure of its
mistress. Our poet—daughter of an Italian court musician who served Elizabeth I;
beneficiary after the death of her parents of the beneficence of Susan Bertie Wingfield,
Countess Dowager of Kent and Margaret Clifford, Countess of Cumberland; subsequent
victim of seduction perpetrated by the Queen’s Lord Chamberlain who marries her off to
a court musician when after five years as his mistress she’s discovered to be with child;
unhappy wife who consults a noted astrologer to discover if her fortunes will improve;
widow after 1613 and in a financial pinch since her brother-in-law wouldn’t share with
her the hay-and-grain patent granted to her husband by King James in 1604; bereaved
mother after the loss of her only son who left her with two grandchildren to support; and
lastly, failed entrepreneur of a school for upper-crust children—decides at the age of
forty-two to write a collection of poetry in hopes of securing a little aristocratic
patronage, the only kind there is (McBride, “Biography”).
It could be considered a long shot, Lanyer having long fallen off the courtly radar;
nevertheless, she risks it, for having been “economically and sexually at the mercy of
men” who’ve proven to be “unreliable, where then but to each other should women turn
for support?” The “insufficiency and hostility of the male-dominated social, sexual,
political and religious systems,” finally compels Lanyer to “[turn] to women as a source
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of spiritual and economic protection and poetic inspiration” and to “[call] into being [. . .]
a community of literate women,” “an alternative, matrilinear patronage network” which
“bypasses the existing structure designed to enable male production of culture” (McGrath
220-221; Bowen 278, 277, 283). Or, she means to call into being love of same.
In fact, what the above scholar described as a “matrilinear patronage network”
had already been called into existence, not by Lanyer but by Queen Anna or Anne who,
upon her arrival in England with James I, “[made] manifest her concept of her majesty by
ruling a ‘world’ created by the arts” (Barroll, Anna 15). According to another scholar,
artistic patronage during James’s reign “flourished first around Anna” who, unlike her
husband, was more inclined to bestow favor upon individual artists rather than groups of
players like Shakespeare’s, and the evidence of this is that she “appoint[ed] two men of
letters, Samuel Daniel and John Florio, as grooms of her Privy Chamber” (37, 68). Unlike
her predecessor Elizabeth I, Queen Anne afforded noblewomen “an opportunity for
specifically female court activity,” and Anne “was generally regarded as the (social) head
of all female nobles in the land” (39, 40).5
Although in James’s England, women were technically propertyless, they
established alliances among themselves via exchange of things they did own: “medicines,
and [religious] relics,” “recipes, spices, and embroidered ‘work’ from women’s hands on
dresses, petticoats, and purses; and poems (Donawerth 18). Poetry especially could
“circulate in an ‘economy of abundance’” because it only took intellectual rather than
material resources to create and could “establish a larger political support community and
even [. . .] influence political decisions” by passing through many hands, being given
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over and over again (Donawerth 18, 17). Many women could read the same poem, which
would in turn create love of same.
Perhaps this is why Lanyer opted for poetry instead of needlework. Embroidery is
kept, or at best is given as a hand-me-down and probably to a servant. But poetry is read;
it’s recited and so can be reborn. And Lanyer, once a member of the courtly community,
has been forgotten. She desires rebirth; she conceives of being as passing from hand to
hand as one would pass a baby. Via her poetry, her name, her self would become objects
of exchange, of conversation, of desire. Though the focal point of the community to
which she begs entrance is Queen Anne, her poetry could reconstitute the community into
her own, for she would be the new tie that binds, the same that all the women would love.
To become the same she must first prove herself to be the same, but only
indirectly, else why should the community desire her? They already have the same. She
must evoke desire in them for the same (her) by retaining for herself the power to be
elusive and hence different. Her petition for patronage should in no wise be
misunderstood to mean she needs or wants to belong. “I am tempted to say,” we could
imagine Lanyer confessing, “that my own experience of writing leads me to think that
one does not always write with a desire to be understood.” “[B]ecause,” she might say,
“if such a transparency of intelligibility were ensured it would destroy the text” by being
“consumed immediately” like embroidery. Patrons would just “applaud and read with
pleasure,” “close the book and it’s all over”—the conversation (about me) would cease
(Derrida, A Taste 30, 31). And she doesn’t want to be yesterday’s fashion.
It’s as if Lanyer anticipated how it would go. The prefatory dedications which
appear in both the 1611 volume and the second one published at an unknown date
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perhaps demonstrate how she imagined word, her name, would spread: First, Queen
Anne would read Salve Deus and then give it to her daughter, Princess Elizabeth, who’d
in turn give it to her mother’s favorite, Lucy, Countess of Bedford, who’d then give it to
the king’s cousin Arabella Stuart who’d give it to Susan, Countess of Kent who’d give it
to the Cliffords, Margaret and Anne, who’d give it to Mary Sidney, Countess of
Pembroke who’d give it to Katherine, Countess of Suffolk—and this would constitute
only a beginning. As Lanyer would continue to spread, her value likewise would
gradually accrue; let’s see, that’s nine dedications @ roughly £2 per, or 40+ books in
addition to the vast industry dedicated only to deciphering her . . . .
How happy they’d all be! The women for being honored and blessed by Lanyer’s
poetry, and for feeling good about themselves for rewarding her; and Lanyer for having
her suffering alleviated, and by such notables, and for feeling proud that she was able to
accomplish her (non)desire, which was for all of them to desire her. But it’s a precarious
happiness; to succeed, Lanyer must be careful;
she must employ a deferential double rhetoric so
as not to offend, so as not to presume too much.
“Renowned Empresse, and great Britaines
Queene,” she begins her dedication to Queen
Anne, “Vouchsafe to view that which is seldome
seene, / A woman’s writing of divinest things: /
Reade it faire Queene, though it defective be, /
Your excellence can grace both It and Mee”
(1, 3-6). This is a pattern Lanyer will use throughout:

B. Four Eyes
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1.) Praise of patron
2.) Criticism of patron
3.) Praise of herself
4.) Criticism of herself
The pattern delicately intertwines Lanyer’s image of herself with the image of her patron;
both images are united in their common duality. For instance, in the above stanza, Lanyer
avows her own worthiness; she’s done something remarkable in being a woman who has
written, and moreover, written of “divinest things.” Yet she also disavows her worthiness
by apologizing for performing this great act so imperfectly. In the same way, she
attributes excellence to the queen yet counsels her to act in an excellent manner, that is,
by gracing the poet. Queen Anne is described as already gracious, but when Lanyer
asserts that her excellence “can grace” the poem, not “will grace” or “does grace” by
sheer proximity, a doubt is introduced as to whether or not the queen is gracious after all.
Gracious giving is at all times associated with virtue in Lanyer’s poem, and of
course, Lanyer is herself virtuous by giving her poetry to her patrons, modeling behavior
she’d have them imitate.6 Yes, she’s the needy inferior begging some crumbs, but she’s
also an equal (or superior) lavishing the rich gift of her own virtue on women who may
never sufficiently be able to return her kindness. True, she gives the women nothing but
what they already possess; in turn, the women might give her what she does not, in fact,
need or want. It’s a careful balancing act; see the equipoise Lanyer manages in the
following line: “Look in this Mirrour of a worthy Mind, / Where some of your fair
Virtues will appeare” she tells the queen (37-38). The structure is ambiguous; “a worthy
Mind” may refer to the poet’s own mind, in which case this is an assertion of equality
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with Queen Anne; or “a worthy Mind” might refer to Anne’s mind, in which case this is
an acknowledgment of the poet’s inferiority.7 The only difference Lanyer is willing to
grant between her virtue and that of the other women is that her own virtue doesn’t
immediately appear as such:
In the meane time, accept most gratious Queene
This holy work, Virtue presents to you,
In poore apparell [. . .]
[. . .] in meane attire. (“Queenes” 61-63; 65)
You will accept even of the meanest line
Faire Virtue yields; by whose rare gifts you are
So highly grac’d, t’exceed the fairest faire. (70-72)
Veiled, hidden, disguised, worthiness with the appearance of unworthiness her “mean
attire” is virtue and not-virtue at the same time.
Then again, maybe this virtue isn’t so different from that of her patrons. Consider
Lanyer’s dedication to Lady Anne, Countess of Dorset. As in the poem to the queen,
Lanyer first builds the case that Lady Anne is already virtuous and in possession of grace.
As a member of the aristocracy, she’s the descendent of those who in the past were
rewarded with titles of honor because of their noble deeds (presumably). In Lady Anne
“the seeds of virtue have bin sowne”; she is “the Heir apparent of this Crowne / Of
goodness, bountie, grace, love, pietie” (58, 65-66). And yet, like the queen, Lady Anne is
also challenged to prove her virtue by acts of grace:
Bind up the broken, stop the wounds that bleeds,
Succour the poore, comfort the comfortlesse,
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Cherish faire plants, suppresse unwholesom weeds; (76-78)
Lanyer’s counsel is straightforward until she begins to emphasize possible reasons for
Lady Anne to follow the recommended course of action. First, there’s the obvious motive
of acting in order to sustain the family honor; but then she suggests other motives,
incentives more personal to Anne’s own interests—or her vanity:
So shal you shew from whence you are descended,
And leave to all posterities your fame,
So will your virtues always be commended,
And every one will reverence your name; (81-84)
These inducements to generosity are dismissed by Lanyer as unnecessary, but her
dismissal is couched in a series of stage metaphors:
And you a glorious Actor will appeare
Lovely to all, but unto God most deare.
I know right well these are but needlesse lines,
To you, that are so perfect in your part,
Whose birth and education both combines;
Nay more than both, a pure and godly heart,
So well instructed to such faire designes,
By your deere Mother, that there needs no art:

C. Lady Anne Clifford,
circa 1990

Your ripe discretion in your tender yeares,
By all your actions to the world appears. (87-96)
It’s possible to read layers of meaning in the words Actor, part, designes, art, and
appears, layers which imply the possibility that Lady Anne’s character is artificial,
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insincere, and duplicitous, and that her outward generosity disguises inner pride.
Introducing motives for action has complicated the status of Anne’s virtue, for though
Lanyer dismisses the motive of self-gain, the idea still lingers that in giving, Anne may
just be reciting lines for onlookers.8
In fact, Lanyer reminds Anne that “this world is but a Stage / Where al doe play
their parts” (121-122), an allusion that may well hide a “rant against the class system in
which Lanyer distinguishes between true nobility and inherited title” (McBride, “Sacred”
71). But if Lanyer is suggesting her patrons are the unworthy ones and that there’s a
measure of disingenuousness in the graciousness of Lady Anne, then this duplicity
becomes the mirror image of Lanyer’s self-construction. Lanyer portrayed her own virtue
as being worthiness disguised in a coat of corruption, while the virtue of Lady Anne
could be interpreted as corruption well-dressed.9
I’d keep illustrating the double-rhetoric and thus the double interpretive potential
of Lanyer’s poetry if my sisters had not already been so thorough. For instance, what is
the status of Lanyer’s Christian devotion? After all, the title Salve Deus Rex Judaeorum
is meant to call to our minds the Passion of Christ. Well, “the poem [is] either a radical
appropriation of scripture to re-envision woman’s relationship with God, Christian
institutions and texts, or [is] a fatally-compromised, and ultimately cynical use of
scripture to further this particular poet’s patronage goals” (Loughlin 133). What about
Lanyer’s feminist vision in asserting the centrality of women to Christianity? Well, she
can be read as “either a feminist heroine, striving to rewrite the largely misogynist,
interpretive heritage of the Bible, or a groveling hypocrite, willing to employ appeals to
the spiritual excellence of her dedicatees in order to gain material and social advantages”
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(Loughlin 134). What about her sexuality? Well, we’ve no evidence that Lanyer was
anything but heterosexual—she was after all mistress and wife—and “sincerely, if not
very profoundly, religious” (Lewalski, Writing 219). Nevertheless, we have every reason
to suspect her of “female-female eroticism,” for throughout Salve Deus she “insistently
sexualizes the scene of Virtue’s entrance,” so much so that when she asks Lucy, Countess
of Bedford to accept Virtue/Christ into her heart, we can regard that “penetration” “as a
same-sex encounter” with Christ acting “as a kind of supplementary instrument,” or in
other words, “as a dildo” (Goldberg 34, 31, 32). Lest we forget, “service of a patron
could involve sexual services” which is no doubt why the Countess of Bedford, the
queen’s favorite, always appeared as the “Amazon” in the queen’s masques, a role that
required her to bare her breasts, and we all know what that means (37).10
Lanyer’s desire to be the same and hence to
engender love of same necessitates being the same,
that is, double. For if she didn’t play at the edges of
irony and in so playing, keep her distance, she might
really be different and risk offense. She might
become not a subject of women’s desire but an object
of their gossip (Ng 439). Her dedicatory poems seem a
D. “[T]here’s nothing more
degrading than being someone’s housekeeper. I mean,
God bless my housekeeper
and – well, all my housekeepers.” (qtd. in Dunn 44)

means to “shore up for herself some kind of protection
from attack by women” (Coiro 266), to preempt the
charge that she has been “less than tactful,” as one of

my professor-editors wrote to me. “I [have been] shocked by both your tone and the
contents of your remarks,” he said. He told me never to forget that he sits on the
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“accrediting body that certifies your qualifications to be credentialed in the discipline.”
My tone can only be “shocking” if it is unauthorized; like Lanyer, my assertiveness
suggests I’m trying to credential myself, which is impossible for a subordinate. Only
someone like Derrida who is an authority can succeed in citing no authorities in his
defense. Citing no authorities is the mark of authority, and I’m not permitted such a mark.
In fact, this professor cared only about the tone of my work. He said, “I hope I’ve made it
clear that what I value is not so much a particular argument [what you say] as a way of
presenting your argument [how you say it].”
My tone, as Lanyer’s tone, suggests I seek no patronage; I’m claiming that
Derrida and I are the same, of the same order, the order of nevertheless. The only
difference between me and Derrida is that my professors don’t believe I’m the same;
rather, they contribute through their citations to the “mystical foundation” of Derrida’s
authority rather than mine. Citing him is their own authority; thus, my professor can say
to me, without irony: “If you are unhappy with the institution’s processes and hierarchical
nature, you are perfectly free to quit the program.” And in asserting that it’s so easy to
quit an institution, so simple to excommunicate oneself, so effortless to up and leave justlike-that, he renders Derrida’s philosophy ridiculous, for nevertheless is predicated on the
difficulty, the impossibility of ever leaving institutions. Laughing at my professor’s
pomposity may express a desire to leave, but I only laugh because I do seek patronage.
So much my sisters have already said before me. And I can repeat their sayings,
admitting, like them, that in desiring citation I too have internalized patriarchal sins. I too
can say with Lanyer: “If any Evill did in [Eve] remaine, / Beeing made of [Adam], he
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was the ground of all” (Salve 809-810). I can say that only through Adam does Eve
discover that she’s “fallen,” “inadequate,” and “a monster” (Gilbert and Gubar 234).
I can claim it is “the mirror of the male-inscribed literary text” which causes Eve
to see herself darkly, to be frustrated in
self-definition, for it’s these foreign
historiographers who tell her to be obsessed with issues like “odors and aging”
of all things (15, 17). It’s really “male
supremacist values” that I exhibit in my

E. Bad Girl, sort of

“suspicious, defensive, competitive behavior” toward other women (Hooks 297). After
all, “it is certainly not Black lesbians who are assaulting women and raping children and
grandmothers on the streets of our communities” (Lorde 635). As painful as it is, I can
admit Eve was right to claim she was tricked.11 Because as every woman knows: “Eve
never lies” (Cixous, qtd. in Conley 36).
And, as my sisters have said before me, my newfound awareness of my condition
will grant me authority. I will be able to say, as Lanyer said:
If Eve did erre, it was for knowledge sake,
[. . . ]
Yet Men will boast of Knowledge, which he tooke
From Eves fair hand, as from a learned Booke. (Salve 797, 807-808)
I will become, like Eve, “the Book of Knowledge” (Woods, “Women” 110). I will assert
my intelligence which has heretofore survived on “fragments of the world brought to it
by husbands or sons or strangers or, in our time, television or the occasional film
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(Dworkin 38). Denigrated from the beginning for trying to better myself, to act
for myself, I must, like Eve, reclaim and affirm that act as the moment of my
liberation. The fruit is mine to take. No longer accepting my status as “an enraged
prisoner,” I must proclaim the “invincible sense of [my]own autonomy” (Gilbert and
Gubar 15, 16). As my sisters have said, “We are [not] locked into the masculine
symbolic, fated to bang our heads against the wall,”
but are able to “push against and beyond the
boundaries,” expunging our unconscious
identifications with patriarchy through our
conscious enactment of that identification, thus
exposing male fantasies of women as just that,
fantasies unable to account for “the complexity of
F. “I wouldn’t want a penis.
[. . .] I think I have a dick in
my brain.” (Madonna, Sex)

actual women” (Cornell 91, 95, 97). I must say,
because I’m a woman and because I can: I already

have the credentials I require, thank you very much.
But the authority of one’s self-awareness, is, unfortunately, rather precarious even
for a woman, or, as so many of my sisters have said, especially for a woman. For
instance, although Lanyer’s desire to call forth a community desirous of her is certainly
celebratory, we can’t exactly celebrate her “calling forth” because “calling forth”
anything is fundamentally phallic: “In the beginning, God. . . .” Begging for Queen Anne
to notice her just encourages further citation of the phallic function. Lanyer should’ve
bypassed Anne entirely, and she probably wanted to. Her poem could be read as “a
virtual anatomy of the abuses of power practiced by the elite on those dependent on them
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for patronage,” specifically, the abuse of making promises one has no intention of
keeping for the sheer purpose of keeping one’s dependents in a constant state of
dependence (Schnell, “Breaking” 89, 90). “[A]n indictment of the myth of aristocratic
generosity and fairness,” Salve Deus registers Lanyer’s “rage at other women” who
demand of her “self-abnegation” if she’s to be desirable (Schnell “So Great” 34, 35).
“Not all women are women,” and mother gets to decide (Bowen 274). And God help you
if say you don’t need her (Koehn 3).
In short, Queen Anne is really King James in disguise. The examples of the
interchangeability of mothers and fathers are many and profound. Even our poet
Lanyer can be said, in the very moment of asserting a female vision of female power, to
have represented the women in Salve Deus not as women at all but as “in some
sense masculine” (Seelig 49). In fact, any woman, no matter the degree of her selfawareness, can at any given time be accused of being the conveyance of another’s desire,
especially at the moment when she believes herself to be asserting her own. For instance,
note the pattern of criticism of feminists by Toril Moi, chief agent, penis police:
1.) “Showalter’s position on this point in fact strongly
favours the form of writing commonly known as
critical or bourgeois realism [. . .]. It is not a coincidence
that only major literary theoretician Showalter alludes to
in her chapter on Woolf is the Marxist critic Georg
Lukacs [. . .].” (Sexual 4)
2.) “Gilbert and Gubar are theoretically aware. Their
G. You’re a Mean One,
Mr. Grinch

critical theory is seductively sophisticated [. . .].
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But what kind of theory are they really advocating?” They commit the
“autobiographical ‘phallacy’” which is a capitulation to male ideas that
women’s writing is more directly related to their experience then men’s
writing. (61)
3.) “[Myra Jehlen’s] acceptance of the most traditional patriarchal aesthetic
categories is [. . .] little short of astonishing in a critic who calls herself a
feminist.” (82)
4.) “Stirring and seductive though such a vision is, [. . .] [i]n her eagerness to
appropriate imagination and the pleasure principle for women, Cixous seems
in danger of playing directly into the hands of the very patriarchal ideology
she denounces. It is, after all, patriarchy [. . .] that insists on labeling women
as emotional, intuitive and imaginative, while jealously converting reason and
rationality into an exclusively male preserve.” (123)
5.) “Irigaray is a patriarchal wolf in sheep’s clothing.” (146)
Poor Eve! It seems women must become aware that their specifically female ethic, love
of same, is really already love of the standards which establish what is the same and what
different. Our very striving for autonomy is itself a masculine form of subjectivity. But
even intersubjective models of subjectivity can turn phallic, for mothering has a “marked
tendency to re-produce the rigidity and insensitivity to difference” most associated with
“‘male’ impartialist ethics of principle” (Koehn 4).
And minority Eves are even harder hit, for they must contend not only with their
internalization of masculine praxis but also that of all Western civilization, as Butler
implies in her criticisms of Seyla Benhabib: Benhabib exhibits a “paternalistic disdain
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toward that which is youthful and irrational”; she is a “masculinized Western subject”
with a latent desire “to colonize and domesticate [. . .] under the sign of the same, to
group [. . .] synthetically and masterfully under a single rubric,” a gesture which “enacts a
certain self-congratulatory ruse of power” (“Contingent” 35, 43, 37, 38). It’s as if, in our
self-awareness, we must just admit what men have long said: women have been unable to
resist seduction, and so, we’re endlessly seductive, “[r]ide ten thousand days and nights,”
you’ll find “[n]owhere / Lives a woman true, and fair” (Donne, “Song” 12, 17-18).
H. “Give it up. Do as I
say. Give it up and let me
have my way. I’ll give
you love. I’ll hit you like
a truck. I’ll give you love.
I’ll teach you how to
fuck.”
(Madonna, Sex)

But perhaps, with greater self-awareness, I need not, with my sisters, be reduced
to such irony. For instance, when Toril Moi accuses Showalter, Cixous et. al. of not being
real feminists because they haven’t questioned phallic law enough, haven’t discovered
their own desires yet, she just needs to recognize that she can criticize them only because
she’s also under law:
1.) “According to the French philosopher Jacques Derrida . . .” (Sexual 9).
2.) “As [. . .] Jacques Derrida [has] argued . . .” (66).
3.) “Cixous’s distinction[s] [. . .] provided the first signs of a slippage away from
Derridean anti-essentialism.” She creates a binary between poetry and
philosophy that “Derrida himself might well want to deconstruct” (110, 120).
4.) “But if, as Derrida has argued . . .” (139).
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5.) “Difference, Jacques Derrida has argued . . .” (153).
6.) “Jacques Derrida has shown how a text can be taken to have any number of
contexts” (155).
7.) Moi’s dream = Derrida’s dream: if only, (s)he muses, relationships were
“‘sexual otherwise: beyond the opposition feminine/masculine, beyond
homosexuality and heterosexuality [. . .],” an “‘indeterminable number of
blended voices’” (172-173; red mine).
If Moi accuses other women by the standards of a man, there’s only one conclusion to be
made: Derrida is the perfect woman, for according to Moi, all women are really women
in as much as each obeys his law. But, of course, those blasted foreign historiographers
have said so all along:
SONG: Miss Chin? Why, in the Peking Opera,
are women’s roles played by men?
CHIN: I don’t know. Maybe, a reactionary
remnant of male—
SONG: No. Because only a man knows how
a woman is supposed to act (Hwang 63).

I. Butterflies are for Girls

Obviously, we women are aware of this irony of ironies. Which is why so many
of my sisters have chucked self-awareness and found salvation in their vaginas. It is the
one thing men consistently demonstrate they know nothing about; most are hardly able to
find it without help. They set sail for England and miss it high or low, for they are not of
England and therefore aren’t qualified to comment upon it. The experience of our unique
physicality grants us some authority and autonomy, as Lanyer knew:
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Not that I Learning to my selfe assume,
Or that I would compare with any man:
But as they are Scholers, and by Art do write,
So Nature yeelds my Soule a sad delight. (“Queenes” 147-150)
Herein then is hope, pun intended. We must,
as one feminist scholar has said, “rethink
womankind beginning with every form and every
period of her body,” including her period, plus her
imagination which is “inexhaustible, like music,
painting, writing,” of her masturbation, “a veritable
aesthetic activity,” with “each stage of rapture
inscribing a resonant vision, a composition,
something beautiful.” O! If only all women would
J. “I really do prefer swimming.” (Cixous, qtd. in
Conley 151)

cry out, “[M]y body knows unheard-of songs. Time

and again I, too, have felt so full of luminous torrents that I could burst—burst with forms
much more beautiful than those which are put up in frames and sold for a stinking
fortune”! (Cixous, “Laugh” 352, 347, 348). Who needs masculine Art with all its
“eulogistic or denigratory metaphors,” its “cheap chivalric finery” which traps women in
a “decorative sepulcher, where even her breath is lost” (Irigaray, Speculum 142-143).
But in our own vaginas we can escape with Emily Dickinson who yearned
for a paradise while sitting at home, with Emily Bronte who “wrote of ‘rocky dells,’ and
‘silent moors,’” with Jane Austen who “gave her Catherine Morland a wild, free, romping
girl-hood in green meadows,” with Charlotte Bronte’s Lucy Snowe who “dreamed in a
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secret garden,” and with Christina Rossetti who “imagined herself dwelling in a [. . .]
muse-inhabited haunt of song, an innocent interior of Eden” (Gilbert and Gubar 643).
Nature is her own language, and thus every woman can “[touch] herself in and of herself
without any need for mediation” (Irigaray, “This Sex” 363).
In citing the authority of our natural experience, we can, like Lanyer, subvert the
authority of masculine citation of law conceived as prior-to or superior-to nature:
And since all arts at first from Nature came,
That goodly Creature, Mother of Perfection,
[. . .]
Why should not She now grace my barren Muse,
And in a Woman all defects excuse. (‘Queenes” 151-152; 155-156)
Here nature-as-mother, and a perfect
mother no less, is exalted at the expense of
culture, or culture is conceived as a
falling-away from perfection. The
contradictions of masculine citation of law
give way to feminine unity, to an
“alternative language of women’s
mutually enhancing pleasure” (McGrath
244). It’s a language not of indirection but
of “direct relationship” and “direct com-

K. “My pussy is the temple of
learning” (Madonna, Sex).

munion” with oneself and other women (McGrath 223; Beilin 187). It’s “a language
sufficiently transparent, sufficiently supple, intense, faithful so that there would be
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reparation” (Cixous, qtd. in Conley 146).
It’s a language not like an orgasm but orgasmic itself. In Salve Deus, Lanyer’s
orgasm occurs where it should, at the end: it is the “Description of Cooke-ham.” There,
she “represents a female Eden in which the mother-daughter bond” she enjoys with the
Countess Margaret Clifford “empowers her to assert her own subjectivity in discursive
terms,” i.e. in poetry (N. Miller 161). Rewriting the Fall to make the Tree of Knowledge
(symbolized in the Countess’s oak tree) the “source of spiritual knowledge and [female]
community,” Lanyer depicts “the subversive power of the [female] imagination [to] enact
resistance and challenge to oppressive institutions,” and to “move beyond dominant
gender ideologies to more enabling conceptions” (Jenkins 165; Lewalski, “Re-writing”
106). As “the emotional center of the text,” the Mother-Countess “[gives] birth and
nurture to poetry”; she “makes everything all right,” “stands up against separation”; she is
“a force that will not be cut off” (Beilin 201; Herz 131; Cixous, “Laugh” 352). The
Mother-Countess enables Lanyer to “[speak] with the tongues of women”; she “enable[s]
[Lanyer’s] female audience to glimpse for themselves the potential to see other women
no longer as in a (male-constructed) glass darkly, but face to face”; she enables us to
believe that “to write from the body is to recreate the world” (N. Miller 163; Jones 374).
And therefore will’d they should for ever dwell,
In perfit unity by this matchlesse Spring:
Since ‘twas impossible either should excell,
Or her faire fellow in subjection bring.
But here in equall sov’raigntie to live,
Equall in state, equall in dignitie,

L. Are we about done?
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That unto others they might comfort give,
Rejoycing all with their sweet unitie.
(Lanyer, “Author’s Dreame” 89-96)
In this Eden, “there is [. . .]: no extended family, no servants, no villagers, no
visitors, no men at all”; it is “ageless, classless,” “a nonconflicted space” that works from
a “collective, interdependent, and cooperative model of social relations” (Lewalski,
Writing 237; S. Miller 144; Weiss 3). The “paradigm of ‘economic man’” has been
replaced by the paradigm of the non-contractual mother-child relationship. Having
“export[ed] to the wider society the relations suitable for mothering persons and
children,” Lanyer’s Eden is cured of greed, war, and dirty diapers. It’s a haven of sensitivity and teamwork, where the highest good is to live in “nonviolative relationality,”
each being loved for her exceptionality (Held, 210, 217, 221-226; Cornell 78).
Freed from penises, we women can experience our “immediate relation [. . .] to
jousissance and another type of knowledge” (Cixous, qtd. in Conley 144, 135). Our Eden
is a “pure affirmation” of life; it is “the greatest generosity possible, of the greatest virtue,
of the greatest spending,” finding pleasure “almost anywhere” (Cixous, qtd. in Conley
154; Irigaray “This Sex” 366).
We now only need to teach our
children the same, giving them,
boy and girl alike, “the same
demands and rewards, the same
severity and the same freedom,”

M. Jouissance: Pleasure Anywhere
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“the same studies, the same games,” “promis[ing] the same future,” until the world
knows that freedom comes from the same (de Beauvoir 726; Holmes 184).
Admittedly, it is a little inconvenient that we have to teach children at all. Or,
what I mean to say is that it is inconvenient that there should be children to teach. It’s
because Mother Nature, that freaking turncoat, “failed to provide women with sterile
periods like other mammalian females,” and
so we have long-lived under “the bondage
of reproduction,” a bondage which was “a
terrible handicap” for the earliest cavewomen in their original power struggle with
men. Tied to “maternity,” “woman remained
closely bound to her body, like an animal”
(de Beauvoir 62, 65). Or, as one of our own
has succinctly said, “[M]y pussy [. . .] is the

N. Target Practice

complete summation of my life” (Madonna, Sex).
Plus, when you really stop to be aware of your vagina, you realize, as Lanyer did:
That pride of Nature which adornes the faire,
Like blasing Comets to allure all eies,
Is but the thred, that weaves their web of Care,
Who glories most, where most their danger lies; (Salve 201-204)
In other words, you realize that men have always associated women with their vaginas,
always with nature. You realize that there’s nothing natural about saying woman have the
authority of nature on their side. You realize it’s “civilization as a whole that produces this
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creature” of nature when there’s nothing “biological, [or] psychological” that determines
women being so produced. Therefore, you realize that there can also be nothing natural—
i.e. of one’s body—that could ever determine women otherwise (de Beauvoir 248, 267).
As such, you’re also forced to admit that the power of nature-inspired poetry
isn’t so powerful. Though the poems of Salve Deus “re-write patronage in female terms,
imaging for the poet Lanyer a family of maternal and sisterly patronesses who will
honour and reward her celebrations of
them and of the female sex,” “nothing
visibly happened to patriarchy or to male
patronage networks as a result of [. . .]
Lanyer’s re-writing” (Lewalski, “Rewriting” 106). Nor did Lanyer receive a
shilling from any of the women she sought
to unite under the banner of the same, i.e.

O. You were saying?

herself. I mention this, however, not to criticize. You can be sure the women wanted to
help, but you know how life (i.e. patriarchy) intervenes.
It so happened that poetry wasn’t one of Queen Anne’s chief aesthetic passions;
there was her art gallery after all, her architectural commissions, her preoccupation with
court masques. There was her love of theater generally and of the Italian language. Her
Italian tutor John Florio in 1611 presented her with an Italian-English dictionary, Queene
Annes New World of Words. He was rewarded, as were other writers who sought under
her name financial shelter. She was sensitive to her privilege, gracious, not stingy—
unless one contradicted her; then she was (according to the Venetian ambassador)
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“terrible, proud, [and] unendurable” (Meikle and Payne). Possibly, Lanyer committed a
faux pas by not sensitively acknowledging the Queen’s dignity in dedicating Salve Deus
to multiple ladies (Barroll “Looking” 39-40). Or, if there was no offense, personal
matters must’ve eclipsed all other concerns: the unexpected death of the Queen’s
firstborn Henry in 1612; the impending engagement of her daughter, Elizabeth— to
Frederick Ulrich of Brunswick? or Prince Otto of Hesse? Gustavus Adolphus, prince of
Sweden? or Frederick V, elector of the Holy Roman empire? It will be Frederick V
although she preferred the duke of Savoy’s son (a Catholic). But Elizabeth is happy with
the match, and the contract is signed 16 May 1612. Between bereavement at her brother’s
death and the expectation of her marriage, Princess Elizabeth can think of little else;
there’s the preparation for Frederick’s visit in October, her betrothal in December, the
wedding on 14 February 1613 (Meikle and Payne).
And Lucy Russell, Countess of Bedford though “closely associated with some of
the leading poets, playwrights, and translators of the day, notably Michael Drayton, John
Florio, Samuel Daniel, John Donne, and Ben Jonson,” was likely at the time too
disheartened to notice Salve Deus. From 1610-1614 occurred the death of her infant
daughter, a miscarriage, a terrible illness, the death of her father (who left the family
in debt), and the death of her brother from smallpox (Payne, “Russell”). And another of
the Queen’s attendants was a bit unscrupulous, more likely to take gifts than to give
them; she scarcely bothers with literature, for it cannot be worn (Payne, “Howard”).
And poor Arabella, the King’s first cousin. If only she hadn’t defied his warning
and secretly married another cousin William Seymour and been suspected of trying to
usurp the throne, she may have had time to read Salve Deus. But as it was, she likely was
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without candles in the Tower of London where she died in 1615 (Marshall). Of course
Margaret and her daughter Anne, avid readers both, how could they be expected to grant
an extra penny with Anne’s inheritance tied up in court proceedings from 1605-1617?
Salve Deus is just such bad timing. If only Margaret’s husband hadn’t left his estates to
his brother, there would’ve been no reason for the two women to petition for their return.
And if Anne hadn’t married Richard Sackville in 1609 and disputed with him over her
inheritance—it’s the estates she wants, not the monetary compensation the King will
grant, and if only her husband hadn’t accepted the King’s compromise and stolen the
£17,000 from her, leaving her a measly £2,000 per year at his death in 1624 . . . (Spence).
Anyway, the other mother-figures who might’ve noticed Lanyer are of no significance.
Who is Mary Sidney? Scholars have not been able to discover.
K2’s Revenge, Part II: The Case of Aphra Behn
Do you believe in love at first sight?
It’s an illusion. I don’t care.
(Madonna, “Get Together”).
When one is reduced to irony and
the irony of ironies, it is perhaps the best
wisdom simply to submit to irony. For in the
submission (the aware enacting of one’s
submission) one can believe in one’s heart
where it really matters that one has not
P. Irony

succumbed at all, but has, in fact, achieved
irony. The great virtue of this submission
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for a woman (such as myself) is that it frees one to dispense with the burden of defining
what exactly a woman (such as myself) is. I can confess what men have always said of
me: I don’t know my own mind or vagina—it is the same thing. There goes “eternal
beauty wandering on her way” or however it goes.12 The burden of saying what, as my
sisters have demonstrated above, simply leads to contradiction upon contradiction, a
surplus of contradictions. Definition based on one’s awareness and experience was
intended to create unity and love; instead, it bred division. It could only breed division
since every community, even a community of sisters, is constituted via violent exclusion.
The exclusions which have constituted the feminist subject “return to haunt the ‘integrity’
and ‘unity’ of the feminist ‘we’” (Butler, “Contingent’ 48). Feminism becomes nothing
but this haunting, the recognition that some poor woman, like Lanyer, is always left out,
denied feminine capital. Or believes she was so denied.
Submitting to all the ironies entailed in
asserting what marks her difference from a
man, or more specifically, from her father,
enables a woman (such as myself) to assert
that a woman isn’t what but how. How a
woman is made what is the contradiction of
naming that forever renders what a woman is
elusive. A woman is simply that which can
never be named. Woman is the complaint of

Q. “None of it is real.”
(Madonna, qtd. in Bailey 375)

exclusion, of injustice, of misrepresentation; woman is the “challenge [of] any
interpretation of [woman] as our ultimate truth,” a challenge that has “no end” (Cornell
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98). Woman is a kind of negative immortality.
We might say that woman is the question: “What is woman?” And the purpose of
the question isn’t ultimately to say what, but to keep asking. In fact, for woman (the
question) to exist, everything must be questioned: thought, ethics, sexual difference,
“everything concerning the relations between the subject and discourse, the subject and
the world, the subject and the cosmic,” even our understanding “of space-time, the
inhabiting of places, and [. . .] the relations of matter and form and of the interval
between” (Irigaray, Ethics 6). And particularly the interval between everything
because that’s how the question reproduces itself, shakes the concepts, interrogates them
until they crack-up and beg for a reprieve they’ll never receive because all must be turned
“upside down, inside out, back to front,” “[racked . . .] with radical convulsions” and
driven quite mad (Irigaray, Speculum 142). By “snipping the wires, cutting the current,”
and “by modifying continuity, alternation, frequency, intensity, [making] it impossible
for a while to predicate whence, whither, when, how, why,” we women will declare what
woman is: “endless transformative possibility” (142; Cornell 87).“[A]t bottom,” one
woman declares eagerly, “I am really a questioner”
(Cixous, qtd. in Conley 161). “I feel a real urgency
[. . .] to invent new frameworks, new images, new
modes of thought,” to affirm “fluid boundaries,”
“to let go of nostalgia for fixity” (Braidotti 1, 6, 22).
Or, in short, “I’m a bit of an excitement junkie”
(Madonna, qtd. in Bowles).
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R-W. Party Girls

As the eternal question, woman is surplus, pure fluidity, the slippage of
signification that in contradiction generates further surplus. We could say there’s no such
thing as “feminine capital” because the structure of capital is feminine. What is capital
except fundamentally the pursuit of justice which renders injustice necessary? And so is
woman. For instance, in the fifth edition of the Norton Anthology of English Literature,
Lanyer’s prose dedication “To the Vertuous Reader” was included as an example of
feminism because of “her depictions of ‘a community of contemporary good women,’”
and because of her “historical project that rereads the Bible to offer paradigms of ‘good
women’ to counter ‘weak and evil men’ and that turns in the poem on Cookham to offer
‘an Edenic paradise of women, now lost’” (qtd. in Goldberg 17). In the sixth edition of
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the Anthology, Lanyer’s dedication was replaced by her “Apology of Eve” with no
change to the description of her as a player in the “querelle des femmes.” Ann Baynes
Coiro’s reaction: associating Lanyer’s feminism with “‘sisterhood’ ignores ‘highly
varied configurations of women.’ By grouping women (writers) together ‘simply as
women,’ [. . .] ‘a disservice to women writers and a distortion of their real power’ results”
(qtd. in Goldberg 17). In an unrelated story, “Every year,” another feminist confesses,
“about halfway through my feminist theory class, students begin to complain about being
depressed.” This “malaise” she hypothesizes, is the result of students learning
(unintentionally, for she never meant to give this impression in the least) “that women
have always been oppressed, continue to be oppressed, will always be oppressed and that
nothing anyone can do will change anything because that oppression has always been
‘the same.’” “I am puzzled by this pervasive sense of hopelessness and powerlessness,”
she muses, “which is the opposite of the empowerment I had wanted them to gain from
the class” (Finke 154, 155).
Feminism always succumbs to ironies because
woman is irony, “contradictions that do not resolve
into larger wholes,” “the tension of holding incompatible things together because both or all are
necessary and true” (Haraway 149). Woman is “an
imaginative space in which is articulated the desire
for the illusory merge of representation and reality,
that very space of unsatisfied desire where the split
subject will [always] emerge” (McGrath 217).

X. “There is something comforting
about being tied up.”
(Madonna Sex)
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Woman is “simultaneously an account of radical
historical contingency for all knowledge claims and
knowing subjects, [. . .] and a no-nonsense commitment to
faithful accounts of a ‘real’ world.” Woman is finding it
“hard to climb when you are holding on to both ends of a
pole, simultaneously or alternately” but nevertheless
Y. “I’m just a
middle-class girl
from Michigan.”
(qtd. in Dunn 42)

(Haraway 187, 188).
Therefore, I must begin again, for I see I’ve hardly
yet begun, let alone ended. I’m not sure now that I’m even

allowed to or able to end, for it would be the end of the question, the end of questioning,
which would be for woman death. I must begin not with what I am, a woman, but how I
am—woman. I must begin with the structure of a question, a structure that is a question,
is I am, woman is—or isn’t. And herein in this beginning, which isn’t my vagina but
might be, I’ll find love; I’ll find I love this beginning which will never, ever end.
To begin in this manner, with the structure of a question which is woman, I call to
my conve(y)nience Aphra Behn, a playwright whose masterpiece The Rover, Part I & II,
I will distill to its essential form and contemplate in its unadulterated abstractness. For,
as Derrida said, and as my sisters have repeated, as soon as there is particularity—a
woman (such as myself)—the form “loses its purity” (A Taste 21). Hence, to be pure I’ll
only describe the plays; I’ll say what is or, more precisely, what appears to be. I’ll ask the
one question allowed to be foremost in my mind: not what is said and whether it is true or
false, beautiful or ugly, but how it is said. And in so doing I’ll free how, once unfairly
marginalized, to swallow all other questions into itself as follows:
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1.) Where = how localized
2.) When = how synchronized
3.) Why = how politicized
4.) Who = how personified
For, as another scholar has said, “[I]deas and themes [should] interest [us] less than the
way society takes possession of them” in order to ground various symbolic systems. Our
“critical task [. . .] is purely formal” entailing only as its “moral goal” “not the
decipherment of the work’s meaning but the reconstruction of the rules and constraints of
that meaning’s elaboration” since “literature is indeed only a language, i.e., a system of
signs; its being is not in its message but in this ‘system.’ And thereby the critic is not
responsible for reconstructing the work’s message but only its system” (Barthes, Critical
151, 258-259).
Woman couldn’t have said it better. To proceed with my responsibility: I’d call
our playwright Aphra’s name a pretty name if I could, but it’s more important for the
purity of woman that we recognize it as a name, a given name, a signifier arbitrarily
operating as the nodal point for a discursive rubric which calls bodies into being by
violently writing them into a symbolic system in a manner which excludes other
particularities and effaces the system’s radical and essential contingency. Other words
woman prefers using to describe this cruel business are: compelled, forcible, constrained,
compulsory, and demands (and all in one paragraph) (Butler, Bodies 12).
Symbolic systems purport to locate the “meaning of Aphra” “in the body,” that is,
in the arms and legs which seem to designate “human,” in this case “female human,”
when, in fact, meaning is enacted in the matrices of power which are perpetually recalled
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and reenacted over time, never perfectly, of course, and it’s this inevitable and invariable
flux which opens up the space for divergent and re-interpretive dances of identity. So that
to ask “who is Aphra” or “what is Aphra” must really be to ask who or what is the body
in its radical state of becoming? In the same way, “who is a playwright” and “what is a
playwright” and especially “what is a play” are questions that must all be recast to
address not only the genealogical formations which have constituted the very concepts of
playwrights and plays, but also the particular political interests which are being served by
such constructions. It need not be said that we ought to perform the same procedure to
“our.” In light of all this, I will heretofore, in-the-name-of-Puritanism and the fluidity
which is woman, be replacing the signification “our playwright Aphra Behn” with “*”.
Having said this, woman can’t let you
forget that * is a woman, so in reference to *,
woman will always retain the pronouns “she” or
“her.” Similarly, the significance of * writing plays
rather than, say, philosophical treatises can scarcely
be underestimated given that philosophy has historically been a tyrannical, phallogocentric technology
designed to squelch the polymorphic, dialogic,

Z. Available for Birthdays,
Bar-Mitzvahs. . . .

and heterogeneous, features long-associated with woman. In fact, woman suggests that
drama’s inherent heteroglossia not only makes it the perfect vehicle for the promotion of
heterodoxy, but it also may make it the quintessential feminine art form. Of course, from
this we shouldn’t draw the mistaken conclusion that all women are heterosexual,
heteroecious, or heterophytic. However, it could be argued that women ought to fight to
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reclaim the pejorative “drama queen” and its first cousin “hysterical bitch,” designations
hijacked by men to negate female self-definition and to not-quite-suppress their own
deep-seated paranoia that all women are closet heteroclites.
As stated above, The Rover plays come to us in two parts for double our
entertainment. Both plays are courtship comedies drawn extensively from a pre-existing
play called Thomaso written by a man whose name is irrelevant. What is relevant is that *
reworked many of Thomaso’s female characters; she is asserting her own vision. What
exactly this vision is has been well-documented by * scholars; the short of it being: how
to free feminine desire? or: how might women be freed to have sex in the city?
Historically, there’s been a double standard. Men have enjoyed sex in the city; women
have not—unless we’re prostitutes—then we can have as much sex as we can earn. But to
have as much sex as we can without having to earn it, and without having to be called a
prostitute . . . now that would be justice, “the
female body [. . .] never [being] appropriated and controlled,” never being reduced
to its vaginal secretions but enabled
to be secretion itself (Hutner 117).
*’s vision is sexual liberation.
Liberation from marriage, from whoredom,
from virginity, states created by men to
control women’s sexual expression, to make
it particular and hence limited. But woman
is unlimited sex in pure unadulterated

AA. “She is now Esther, Madge, Lady
Madonna with children at her feet, or,
as her staff calls her, simply M.”
(Strauss 72).
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abstractness, sex distilled to its fundamental (orgasmic) form. Women have historically
been defined only in terms of particular relationships (wife, sister, mother, mistress,
whore) when woman is a-relational. Woman as that which can never be named is the
void which generates all particular naming. Understood this way, sexual liberation isn’t
just one freedom among many or even the gateway to other freedoms (economic,
political) but rather, it’s the definitive freedom, for it enables women to escape being
defined in terms of relationship as such.
To free all women via woman, we must make sexuality approximate what in art is
called “pure painting,” painting which “is meant to be beheld in itself and for itself as a
painting—as a play of forms, values and colours—and not as a discourse, in other words,
independently from all references to transcendent meanings” (Bourdieu, Field 264).
Woman or “pure sex” would be “a result of a process of purification” not unlike that
carried out in poetry or philosophy in which “in the
name of a return to the rigour of beginnings,” all of
“its accessory properties are abandoned in order to
arrive at the “most specifically [sexual] effects.” We
must, undertake this purification in the interests of
“greater autonomy,” and for the proclamation of
“mastery over that which defines [us] and which
properly belongs to [us], that is, the form, the tech-

BB. “I live the life of a gypsy.”

(Madonna, qtd. in
McClane 126)

nique, in a word, the [sex], thus instituted as the
exclusive ain of [sex]” (Bourdieu, Cutural 264, 265). Sex must be a matter of function,
of sustaining and controlling functionality, the function, we might say, of nevertheless.
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Is Your Man Really
Into You?

vision of liberation in Part I is incomplete and explains the necessity of the
supplement or sequel. While it is temp-

You can’t read his mind,
but our Quiz is the next
best thing!

ing to jump immediately to Part II since
it is *’s complete vision and thus its end,
our comprehension and appreciation of

Find out if Your Flame is

‘Forever’
▀ It is, unfortunately, difficult to sustain
pure fluidity, for the temptation of particular and thus exclusive relationship is
ever-present. Even if, let’s say, one’s
whole house were a bookshelf, some
poor minor poet, though her volume was
slim, would still find herself relegated to
the manger, forced to bear ignominy
from you though her book is on a million
other shelves. For your bookshelf, of
course, is the one that matters.
Similarly, though Part I of The
Rover is a veritable blueprint for
escaping life unnamed, the name
reemerges as that which is indispensable
for one to live at all. Consequently, *’s

her end will only be partial if we neglect
to understand the partiality of Part I.
Part I begins in separation, that of
Florinda from Belvile, her true love.
How can she be sure she hasn’t lost him
to another? Answer: Chivalry won’t
allow it, and Florinda and Belvile are
emblems of chivalry. Belvile, a soldier,
had formerly protected Flo’s chastity and
thus earned her regard. But she’s meant
to be betrothed to another, and Belvile,
though honorable, is penniless. Still,
they wish to be together and will
contrive a way, exchanging during the
play letters, rings, and vows, tokens not
just of their commitment to one another,
but of their belief in commitment as
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such. “‘The whole point of being in a

believes to be a “filthy beast,” a “wicked

relationship and having children,’”

man,” and a “rude man” (3.5.31, 41, 77).

Florinda would say, “‘is that you learn to

They also judge Hell and Will for

love . . . unconditionally. That’s the best

lacking a sense of proper value, value

contribution to making the world a better

being essential to commitment. Flo and

place’” (Madonna, qtd. in Bowles).

Bel believe their love is due to one

She’d also confess, “‘I’m very Catholic,

another because they’re intrinsically

and I’m generally a woman of my word.

worthy of love; in a way, their love is

[. . .] I mean, I don’t want to get married

their debt to each other. For example,

[. . .] and get divorced. I want to honor

speaking to Hell, Flo says she values Bel

that vow” (Madonna, qtd. in Smith 180).

because he “threw himself into all

As stand-ins for the romantic ideal,

dangers to save my honour, and will you

Flo and Bel judge the other characters in

not allow him my esteem?” (1.1.73-74).

the play—especially Hellena and

Later, in criticism of Hell, she inquires,

Willmore, the other primary couple—

“I wonder how you learnt to love so

for being uncommitted. For instance, Flo

easily, I had a thousand charms to meet

tries to reign in Hellena’s sexual

my eyes and ears, e’er I could yield, and

exuberance with comments such as,

‘twas the knowledge of Belvile’s merit,

“Prithee, be not so wild” (1.1.38) or

not the surprising person took my soul”

“Thou art too rash to give a heart at first

(3.1.49-52). In saying this, she assumes

sight” (3.1.52). She calls Hellena a “mad

there’s a necessary link between a good

wench” and a “mad creature” (3.1.36,

deed and a good heart, for if it’s

63); likewise, the libertine Willmore she
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impossible to name who is exceptional,
chivalry is meaningless.

Are you tired but sleepless?
Do you take anti-depressants to
make it through graduate school?

YOU ARE NOT ALONE
Thousands of frustrated students
just like you have reported similar
symptoms of anxiety, irritability, and angst.
Fortunately, there is hope. No, it is not
graduation. You can experience relief right
now just by reading one more teensyweensy little book:
THE ACADEMIC SELF
This advice manual from one of academia’s finest minds will tell you how to:
Buy a planner to get organized (Hall 47).
CC. Florinda is all smiles at her
engagement party.
In sum, Florinda and Belvile’s
relationship is traditional; it is nameable,
for they seek to name it. The goal is
commitment, the vehicle is true love,
and the means of recognizing the latter is
by sacrifice. To them, commitment via
sacrifice isn’t local or optional but is a
universal mandate. But there’s nothing
stingier than a mandate. ▀
– By Staff Writer

Fine-tune what you’ve written in your new
planner to feel some accomplishment (51).
Micromanage so you can have all your
work done by 5:00 p.m. (49).
Invest in calendars or dry-erase boards to
construct outlines and flowcharts (54, 84).
Read more books, especially new ones in
your field (57).
Present more conference papers (60).
Remember, “[r]evolutionary acts and monumental campaigns are hardly necessary”
(94). So if you’re looking for real change,
all the things you’ve never once thought to
do are here explained in simple but
prescient prose, and all for nothing except
your tuition dollars wisely spent, since you
can get this book if you give a damn at any
freaking university library.
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And then be used at pleasure; / But,

Blow Him Away!

5 Kick-Ass Sex Secrets
Even He’s 2 Shy 2 Tell!

madam, I have been so often cheated /
By perjured, soft, deluding hypocrites, /
That I’ve no faith left for the cozening
sex, / Especially for women of your

▀ Enter Hellena and Willmore. Will,

trade” (2.2.118-124). Save me from my

the rover of the play’s title, flouts

cynicism, Angellica! The ploy works,

chivalry; he won’t be constrained, won’t

and it’s a miserable business, but only

be tied to any woman; he won’t

from the perspective of chivalry. From

sacrifice. He doesn’t even believe he

Will’s perspective seduction is natural,

should have to pay a prostitute for her

for he defines existence in terms of his

services; to him, love isn’t love if it’s

libido and its satisfaction. To seduce is

obliged; love is that which conforms not

to keep moving, and he is the rover.

to a name, but to his pleasure.
Though Will flouts chivalry, he

Now, if Will were a woman,
(s)he would have to despise her own

uses his knowledge of it to seduce. For

virginity for virginity requires sacrifice.

example, in bantering with the courtesan

If Will were a woman, (s)he’d be

Angellica about her exorbitant going

Hellena, who at the play’s beginning is

rate, he fashions himself as a jaded

fleeing a nunnery, desiring a “mad

knight-errant disappointed again and

companion” who’ll relieve her of her

again by the cruelty of his elusive ladies:

dreadful virgin burden (1.1.34). Hellena,

“I know you take me for an arrant ass, /

like Will, believes commitment to be the

An ass that may be soothed into belief, /

end of pleasure, rather than its be-
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ginning. “Hang your considering lover,”
she says to Flo, “I never thought beyond

“I just think it’s important to fuck
what you want to fuck.”

the fancy that ‘twas a very pretty, idle,
silly kind of pleasure to pass one’s time
with” (3.1.53-55). Or, in another context:
“‘I just think it’s important to fuck what
you want to fuck and not feel shame
about it” (Madonna, qtd. in Mailer 52).
As Will’s twin, Hell is pleased by
his duplicity; when she catches him in a
lie, she says to herself, “Now if I should
be hanged I can’t be angry with him, he
dissembles so heartily” (3.1.140-141).
And as Will pursues his own pleasure,
she pursues him, initiating with him an
exchange not of letters, rings or vows,
but of wit. In this way she keeps
Will off-balance, for he’s intrigued by
her multitude of disguises, intellectual
and physical, and can never quite
learn her name, for she keeps it, as she
must to be a rover, a secret.

Though her “ever-changing
public image has often been criticized as
[. . .] superficial,” Hell contends that her
“personae are extensions of her current
passions. ‘I’m a biographer, to a certain
extent,’ she says.” (Madonna, qtd. in
McClane 126).13 Linking “movement” to
“freedom,” Hell believes “‘it’s good to
change” because it will “‘guarantee me
more longevity. I can make a transition
into something else’” (Madonna, qtd. in
Bailey 373; Bego 52, 53). As Will
learns, it isn’t her transitions which are
constant but her very transitioning, and
that transitioning to be recognized as
such does have a name, a name we all
know, for she is sure to tell us: “I am
called Hellena the inconstant” (5.1. 489).
▀
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DATE RAPE DRUGS:
OUR EXPERTS WEIGH IN ON
HOW TO ENSURE
YOUR SAFETY
▀ Though Hellena shows such promise
not as a woman but woman in pure,
impartial fluidity, she disappoints at the
end of Part I in a lame, prosaic way: by
getting married. Obviously, *, to earn
some extra coin, capitulated to popular
and parochial conceptions of happinessas-relationship. Duty to the mob
necessitated satisfying their fantasies and
not her own. *’s unfortunate relationship
to her fans mirrors that of Hell’s
relationship to Florinda. Hell’s failure to
flux is directly related to the fact that
Florinda, her inverse mirror, succeeds in
being only a woman, i.e. a married one.
Flo’s success is notable given that
danger in the form of Willmore threatens
her at every turn. No less than four times
does he jeopardize Flo’s longed-for
consummation with Belvile.

At one point, in a mix-up in a garden, the
very drunk rover almost manages to rape
her. When Bel confronts him, Will’s
defense is that he’s never before seen Flo
and that the woman he did see looked
like “an arrant harlot” (3.6.21). As
expected, this touches one of Bel’s
cherished beliefs, that Flo possesses an
inherent value that’s unmistakable.
“Damn your debauched opinion!” he
shouts at Will, “Tell me, sot, hadst thou
so much sense and light about thee to
distinguish her woman, and couldst not
see something about her face and person,
to strike an awful reverence into thy
soul?” (3.6.22-25) “Faith no,” Will
responds, “I considered her as mere a
woman as I could wish.” And Bel, his
patience expired, demands Will to draw
his sword or be killed (3.6.26-28).
Will doesn’t die; this is a comedy and
the chance of Flo’s rape wasn’t serious.
Genre conventions save her. They must
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save her, else our capacity not only to

convictions, he proceeds to adopt the

name flux but to accept it as a good is

pose of ardent lover. After Valmont

undermined.14

successfully captures the heart (and

The play must end predictably with

flesh) of Madame de Tourvel, Merteuil

the marriages of the principle characters,

becomes suspicious that Valmont has

including Hell to Will, in order to sever

broken his pact with her by actually

fluidity from charges that it is rape and

falling in love with the Madame. To test

murder. Flo and Bel believe Will and

him, Merteuil tells him the story of a

Hell to be thoroughly unenlightened,

man who fell for an unsuitable woman

children really, who are disingenuous in

and excused himself to his friends by

their cynical appropriation of relational

saying, “It’s beyond my control.” After

ethics for their own ends, as if their

discovering that among his friends “his

stupid attitude alone can save them from

name was in danger of laughingly

such ethics’ effectual force.

being associated with this phrase for the

In this regard it’s instructive to

rest of his life,” he abandoned his mis-

compare Willmore and Hellena to

tress by telling her, “It’s beyond my

Valmont, the seducer who toys with the

control.” True to her designs, Valmont

heart of Madame de Tourvel in

takes the hint and leaves Madam de

Dangerous Liaisons. Having made a bet

Tourvel, telling her seven times, “It’s

with the Marquise de Merteuil that he

beyond my control.” Thus, Valmont’s

could achieve in making the very

forsaking of the Madam mirrors his

virtuous Madam de Tourvel fall in love

seduction of her: in both cases, he uses

with him and deliberately abandon her

language he imagines has no “control”
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over his inner autonomy. His allegiance

must ask as Will did of Flo: Who does

to this imaginary autonomous space

she think she is? That she’s capable of

proves to be his undoing, as he realizes

being seduced proves she’s just like

it’s precisely this sense of autonomy

everybody else. Seduction is the status

which Merteuil has been able to

quo; it is, like death, the great leveler.
That is why it must always dress in
novelty and accuse traitors like Flo and
Bel of being stodgy old farts.
Flo and Bel are, of course,
susceptible to doubting their commitment to commitment; their strong
reactions to Will testify both to their

EE. The Marquise de Merteuil,
circa 2004
“There always must be a tiny bit
of phallus.” (Cixous, qtd. in
Conley 138-139)

faith in each other and to the fact that the
chivalry rests on faith. Because Will’s
hedonism appears faithless, he pricks

manipulate to her purposes. One could

Bel and Flo at the point that is both their

even say that “it’s beyond my control”

weakness and their strength. Weakness:

are the truest words Valmont ever spoke

because faith must take doubt into

to Madame de Tourvel.

account. Strength: because faith is also

Of course the true person to

an assertion of will. From the

blame isn’t Merteuil or Valmont but

perspective of chivalry, hence the

Madame de Tourvel for being so

following definitions:

virtuous in the first place. Of her we

1.) Faithfulness: will leading doubt
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2.) Unfaithfulness: doubt leading will

not condone unsafe sex. These are

3.) Faithlessness: doubt disguised as will

fantasies I have dreamed up. Like most

4.) Fanaticism: doubt disguised as will

human beings, when I let my mind

Notice that only in the first two

wander, when I let myself go, I rarely

categories is the will distinct from doubt.

think of condoms. My fantasies take

Because of this, the actions of the

place in a perfect world, a place without

faithless and fanatics alike are char-

AIDS. Unfortunately, the world is not

acterized by negation, exclusion, and

perfect and I know that condoms are not

disidentification (not believe, not

only necessary but mandatory.

tolerate, not join, not submit, etc.) in

Everything you are about to [see] is a

which true belief is always thought to be

fantasy, a dream, pretend. [. . .] Nothing

that which only ever defines others, like

in this [play] is true. I made it all up”

Flo and Bel for instance (Žižek, Puppet

(Madonna, Sex). ▀

6). The implication of Part I, and what
makes *’s vision partial, is that it
ultimately severs will from doubt and
suggests that only in this severing can
there be any affirmative action.
Unfortunately, this severing also
implies that fluidity is not affirmative
or productive but is the purest form of
stasis, that is, of fantasy. As * states in
the opening prologue: “This [play] does

FF. Rainy Day
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taken for granted but is itself brought
under scrutiny.
Blunt and Angel don’t believe in
chivalry (commitment via sacrifice =
true love). Blunt makes fun of Bel’s
GG.

sighing for the virtuous Flo and recommends “a cheap whore” to cure him
(1.2.42). Nearly the first words from

Surprising Ways to Take
Control of Your Healing

Angel’s lips are that “inconstancy’s the
sin of all mankind,” which makes

▀ Besides Willmore who’s identified

commitment impossible (2.1.135). In

chiefly by what he won’t do—marry—

addition, both their interests are in

there are two other characters in Part I of

making or in preserving their fortunes.

The Rover also defined by negation: the

Blunt blesses himself for not having lost

Puritan Blunt and the prostitute

his estate by throwing in his lot with the

Angellica. Both of them are excluded

overthrown king Charles (which would

from the happy ending allotted to the

have been a commitment indeed); and

other characters because their faith-

Angel declares that “nothing but gold

lessness doesn’t permit them to take

shall charm my heart” (2.1.136). Lastly,

positive action. They also demonstrate

Blunt and Angel both have exalted ideas

how easily faithlessness can descend into

of their singularity—Angel, that she can

fanaticism when the simple equation

command 1,000 crowns for her services;

between doubt and will can no longer be

Blunt, that he has above average
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acumen: “Ned Blunt is not everybody,”

show they make of their choice confirms

he declares (2.1.52).

they aren’t choosing. What else can they

By the play’s end, Blunt and Angel

do? Blunt proclaims that all women are

have both been duped in the same way:

“[d]issembling witches” and that he

they’ve mistaken another’s submission

“shall never be reconciled to the sex

to their pleasure as a sign of their own

more” (4.5.63, 9-10); as proof of his

power. Blunt loses his money to the

“new” conviction, he tries to rape Flo to

whore Lucetta whom he mistook for a

take revenge. Angel, after discovering

woman of quality, and Angel gives Will

Will’s liaison with Hell, in spectacular

a freebie, forfeiting the 1,000 crowns he

fashion pulls a gun on him “for the

won’t pay, plus another 500 she gives

public safety of our sex,” (5.1.313), an

him to bribe him to commit to her. The

action which, like the non-rapes of Flo,

lesson they both learn is that one’s

can’t result in death lest violence cease

autonomy is dependent on others’ fi-

to be equated with strong moral and

delity, fidelity like that of Bel and Flo’s.

religious beliefs like Bel’s.

One need not learn this lesson; in

Angellica and Blunt are also

fact, the rage induced by this knowledge

excluded from the happy ending in

in Blunt and Angel may indicate they

keeping with the theme of the play: that

can’t learn it; that is, they can’t sever

is, each character learns which narrative

their wills from doubt. So they “decide”

really defines him or her. Will, though

to choose doubt. They pretend they had

self-defined as a libertine, learns he’s

really trusted and were deceived, that

really a marrying man. Likewise, Hell is

chivalry failed them. But the dramatic

really a marrying woman. “‘I’ve become
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a domesticated cow,” says Hell, “it’s a

painting of Angel hung from her balcony

funny place to find yourself in, when

shows that she “is doubly commodified

you think of yourself as having some

—first because she puts her body into

kind of revolutionary spirit’” (Madonna,
qtd. in Dunn 45, 68). In the same way,
Angel learns that despite denying she’s
just a prostitute, she really is a prostitute.
“Every time anyone reviews anything I
do I’m mistaken for a prostitute,” she
laments (Madonna, Sex). People don’t

HH. Giving us 1%

understand that when she performs, she

exchange, and second because this body

disconnects from herself. “‘I have no

is equated with, indeed interchangeable

control over that person,’” she explains;

with, the art object” (47). Thus,

her performance represents “‘only 1

“Angellica cannot exceed her simulacra”

percent of what I am’” (Madonna, qtd. in

because as a prostitute she’s the epitome

Mailer 46; in Hirshey 100).

of abstract sex (47). Finally, Blunt learns

Commenting on Angel’s

what his friends already knew about

characterization of herself, one critic

him: that “fool was writ upon [his]

notes, “Angellica is trying to demystify

forehead” (3.4.7).

and authenticate herself. She wants to

In sum, Angel and Blunt are

step out of the paintings, to be known

excluded from the happy ending because

not by her surface but by her depth”

they are the disavowed dark side of pure,

(Diamond 46). Will’s theft of the

unadulterated flux. ▀
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woman all grown up. “‘From the

Guys Decoded
Our Survey Uncovers
His Hidden Hopes – and Fears
▀ The great flaw in the structure of Part
I, therefore, is the suggestion that
Blunt’s and Angel’s refusal to be defined

moment I got pregnant,’” Hell explains,
“‘I started looking at life in a different
way. Suddenly it was like, ‘Oh my God,
there’s someone else to think about. You
cannot be an anarchist if you have

leads to violence. Angel’s reluctance to
accept that she’s a prostitute and Blunt’s
unwillingness to accept that he’s a fool
is, according-to-woman, which is also
according-to-nevertheless, the very
definition of freedom. To suggest that
nevertheless is itself a constraint best
overcome by the positive affirmation of
one’s symbolic role is to give the entire

II. Anarchism, sort of

game over to Flo and Bel who’ve from

children. [. . .] Listen, I did my sexual

the beginning been epitomizing just that.

rebellion thing. I took it as far as I could

Because * doesn’t ultimately through

go. [. . .] I’ve been naked in every state

Hell and Will or Angel and Blunt affirm

and country [. . .]. I mean, there’s

variability as the key to radical redef-

nothing more. I did it. I dealt with my

initions of identity, the play suggests

sexual rebellion. I worked it out of my

that woman must eventually become just

system’” (Madonna, qtd. in Smith 106).

a woman, or rather, that a woman is

This teleological vision suppresses the
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fact that there are many who wish to

what’s her fortune: which if but small,

remain abstractions and therefore will

you cry ‘she will not do my business,’

find smart ways to justify themselves.

and basely leave her, though she

In addition, the inevitability of

languish for you” (2.2.90-93). It’s

chivalry limiting the number of subject

impossible to deny the ruthless

positions also suppresses the brutal

exploitation committed my men who

disillusionment of women when they

want nothing more than their own

discover they’re only cherished as

pleasure while denying women theirs.

abstract symbols of masculine prowess.

It’s impossible to deny that, as Angel

“There’s more to life than
fame and fortune –
something much more deep
and profound.”

says, there are many women who hope
for a knight-in-shining-armor only to be
disappointed again and again by utter

Too many battles have been fought in

crassness, indifference or infidelity.

the name of chivalry, too many women

“‘There’s more to life than fame and

have been left widows or worse yet,

fortune—something much more deep

forced to marry some ogre and bear him

and profound,’” Angel continues, “‘[but]

twenty children; too many women have

[w]e live in a culture and a society that’s

been left destitute old maids for lack of

obsessed with the surface of things’”

looks or, what’s more likely, lack of

(Madonna, qtd. in Bowles). We ought

money. Angel rightly confronts Will on

not to forget Katherine, compelled to

just this point: “When a lady is proposed

marry Henry, while he pretends it’s all in

to you for a wife, you never ask how

the name of England. What else is

fair, discreet, or virtuous she is; but

marriage except another way to gratify
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men? You can tell this is true because of
how many of them are desperate for it. “I
just adore my career, but I’ll never be
truly happy without a wife!” men always
say. What else but polymorphous
perversity can cure such a confounded
ethic created by poets and preachers and
politicians (all men) to service
themselves, an ethic spawning
viciousness, hierarchy, competition, and
oppression? When chivalry is dead,
women will at last be free. ▀

JJ.
(“Guy Confession” 54, 52)

Contributors: Eve Inc.
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duress. In short, there’s no equivalent to
Flo and Bel in Part II; they receive a
mention that they’re living happily
married somewhere, but we soon forget about them as the play progresses.
Their replacements are Ariadne and
Top Make-over Tips from
Our Celebrity Gurus

Beaumond who are their opposites,

▀ That * didn’t have the heart to kill

running away from marriage. “Ariadne,”

Will via Angel’s bullet in Part I of The

Beaumond says, “—damn the dull

Rover gives us hope for a better ending

Property, how shall I free my self?” To

in Part II, one which absolutely cleanses

which Ariadne responds, “Beaumond

pure form from any taint of evil. In the

[. . .] I hate the formal Matrimonial Fop”

sequel, *’s displacement of chivalric

(2.2.414-416). We also learn at the

violence onto Angel and Blunt is

beginning of the play that Hell, who

corrected, along with the depressing

snagged Will at the end Part I, has been

impossibility of living

suitably punished by being drowned at

beyond the bounds of
definition.

“I am now for change [ . . . ]
of Place, Cloaths, Wine,
and Women.”

The genius of Part II can be

sea. So the rover is free to
pursue fresh amours such

as La Nuche, the new-and-improved

discerned in *’s useful relegation of

prostitute to replace Angel. Blunt also

chivalry to the margins of the play. By

returns to be made a fool again; he has a

narrowing the frame significantly, Will’s

companion to ensure this: Featherfool.

libertinism is secure from any ethical
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It’s unnecessary to delve further

achieves this variety more actively than

into the plot of the play, for it so closely

he did in Part I where he mostly

resembles Part I, except for the fact that

stumbled about drunk. Now he’s refined,

without any ethical crises, there’s no

more self-conscious about how he’s

dramatic tension, no climax, and no

enjoying “himself” in his pleasures,

denouement. There are, however, a

rather than just hedonistically enjoying

number of laughs which give the play a

only the pleasures. So he dons disguises,

refreshingly irreverent and farcical tone.

he intentionally creates mischief; he

These we should examine.

commands and manipulates what plot

In Part II, laughter is essential to *’s

there is in order to achieve the purest

vision of woman as one of perpetual

amusement for himself. Completely

reinvention and rejuvenation. Free from

embracing flux, he moves from joke to

restraint, woman is free from scarcity;

joke, now tricking La Nuche, now Blunt,

her imagination is at last fecund;

never making the same joke twice.

possibilities are ever-present. I say “her

For libertinism, Willmore says,

imagination” purposely, though it’s Will

demands not “displacement but

in Part II who keeps the play moving.

replacement.” Libertinism requires that

“Ay, such a fool I was in my dull days of

“each intervention [. . .] banish its

Constancy,” he says early on, “but I am

predecessor and start again from the top”

now for change [. . .] of Place, Cloaths,

in a gesture of “endless self-surpassing:

Wine, and Women. Variety is the soul of

not Levi-Strauss but Althusser, not

pleasure, a good unknown, and we want

Althusser but Lacan, not Lacan but

faith to find it” (1.1.145-149). He

Derrida . . . not Foucault, Kristeva,
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Lyotard, Said, but Bhabha and Butler,

seems eminently desirable: who could

not Bhabha and Butler but . . .”

survive without it?” (Cain 9).

(Easthope 34). With a hint of self-

Significantly, laughter can also

satisfaction in his voice, Willmore

compensate for the dea(r)th of

admits that an “inevitable by-product of

originality. For instance, we can over-

the growth of [libertinism]” is “its

look the fact that Will reads the same

capacity to keep its devotees alert, rest-

script with Nuche as he did with Angel

less, and dissatisfied. [Libertinism]

because he does it with so much gusto:

makes readers suspicious, skeptical,

“[T]he bright La Nuche! Oh Fortune!

hard to please; it makes them admirably

Cursed blind mistaken Fortune: eternal

nomadic, unable to inhabit any single

friend to fools! Fortune! That takes that

[identity] as more than a momentary way

noble rate from man, to place it on her

station.” Libertinism “decrees constant

Idol interest” (1.1.29-31). We can also
overlook that he would read the same
script with any woman because, as the
rover, he isn’t free to do otherwise.
But I think this would only be tolerable
as long as he continues to perfect his
pattern of seduction and abandonment

experimentation, fosters change,

until it is stripped of any recognizable

promotes a steady degree of self-

content and becomes pure form. Don

consciousness about how one performs

Juan, I think, would be the model

one’s work. Put this way, [libertinism]

we’re looking for, for he “sleeps with all

KK. Academic Willmore
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kinds of women: blonde or brunette, tall

man that scorns to impose dull truth and

or short, fat or skinny, old or young,

constancy on a Mistriss” (2.1.107-108).

gentle-women or peasants, ladies or

Or again, “I’de have my Lover rough as

maids” and can do so only because he

Seas in Storms upon occasion; I hate [a]

maintains an “indifference to all

dull temperate Lover, ‘tis such a

differences.” In other words, “Don

husbandly quality! (2.2.393-394). Or

Juan’s paradigm is not variety, but

take Will, for instance, speaking to

repetition. He does not seduce women

Ariadne: “Name not those words, they

because of what is special about or

grate my ears like Jointure, that dull

unique to each one of them, but because

conjugal cant that frights the generous

of what they all have in common: the

Lover!” (2.1.53-54). Or Will again,

fact that they are women.” Only in Don

speaking to La Nuche: “[I]f thou’rt for

Juan do we see that the “pursuit of

me, Child, it must be without the folly

change for the sake of change is one of

[of marriage], for better for worse,

the purest instances of repetition

there’s a kind of Nonsense in that Vow

compulsion,” “a repetition of one and

fools only swallow” (5.1.122-123). Or

the same [conquering] gesture”

Will again, speaking to whom it doesn’t

(Zupancic 130, 131).

matter: “I’m none of those Spirits that

Through laughter, we can also ignore

can be conjur’d into a wedding-ring, and

any pull towards limitation by blaming

dance in the dull Matrimonial Circle all

chivalry and deprecating vows, con-

my days” (4.2.256-258). Or Will again:

stancy, and marriage as the “source”

“Constancy, the currant Coyn with fools!

of boredom. As Ariadne says, “I love a

No Child, heaven keep that Curse from
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our Doors” (2.1.109-110).

inward. La Nuche in the center can

The visual Form of what I’m

command their vision, while her own

illustrating by these quotations is best

eyes can look or rove in any direction.

shown by these snapshots of La Nuche:

However, while the circle does revolve

LL. Where’s La Nuche?
Note that the repudiation of repetition
about her, she also can’t escape it; and,
ensures the invariable return to the same,
most importantly, she would be nothing
rather than advancement, growth, and
without the circle. That’s why ensuring
differentiation—even revolution—for
that the circle remain closed is the best
while each scene of the above cluster
protection for our new ethic, the libertine
fuck seems teeming with activity, the
ethic: love of same.15
succession of frames doesn’t develop a
* succeeds in closing the circle at
story. Rather, each figure is caught in a
the end of Part II by guaranteeing that
centripetal vortex with their gazes turned
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this time, Will gets to live according to
his ego self-image. She must do this in
order to free La Nuche to live her selfimage which is: One who can never be
named. Hence * ends Part II with the
thesis with which I began discussing *:
The minute that the category of
women is invoked as describing
the constituency for which feminism speaks, an internal debate

MM. Pretty in Pink

invariably begins over what the

disidentify, rallying around that which

descriptive content of that term

they are not, accepting that “‘women’

will be.” “[E]very time that spec-

designates an undesignatable field of

ificity is articulated, there is

differences,” “a site of permanent

resistance and factionalization

openness and resignifiability” (50). It is

within the very constituency that

perhaps like living with one’s legs

is supposed to be unified by the

always open, as La Nuche might say.

articulation of its common ele-

Since “foundations exist only to be put

ment. (Butler, “Contingent” 49)

into question,” no woman can come into

This “factionalization” over naming

being uttering any other words but La

isn’t, as I have said, optional or

Nuche’s: “He speaks not of me: sure he

avoidable but necessary precisely

knows me not” (51; 3.1.342).

because it is defining. Women can only
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Since “he speaks not of me: sure he

Male language may have begun

knows me not” has always defined and

to create in the early modern

can only define the subjectivity of

period the illusion of a unitary

women, women can in turn embrace

monolithic subject as a tactic of

what they’ve always been and always

discursive, capitalist and colo-

will be. This choice is best summed up

nialist political power, but this

“I don’t think pornography
degradeswomen. The women
who are doing it want to do
it. No one is holding a gun to
their head. I don’t get that
whole thing.”

subject was then, as it has been
since, insecure because always in
danger of falling into disunity,
into a failure of coherent identity,

by La Nuche in explaining that though

in fact, into a condition which for

an Italian, her formative years were

women writing in early modern

spent in Australia, France, and the

England – and probably always –

Netherlands: “I can say that I had the

is, though variously defined, a

condition of migrant cast upon me, but I

wholly familiar and therefore

chose to become a nomad” (Braidotti

perhaps more expertly negotiated

10). Similarly, she imagines that since

space. (McGrath 15, 16)

the “male fiction” of “a centered,

The expertise of women in inhabiting

coherent subject” has been that “from

incoherence, woman, or what has also

which women have always been exiled –

been described as “long[ing] instead for

or freed,” then freedom exists in being

the desert: areas of silence, [. . .] in a flirt

so exiled:

with radical non-belonging and
outsidedness,” is, as * affirms by the
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final salvation of La Nuche from the

a ‘result’ of the fact that ‘Woman

fixity of prostitution, the “possibility of

doesn’t exist’”; what women have no

action that induces political change”

trouble naming as “patriarchy” is “a vast

(Braidotti 16; McGrath 16).

attempt to deal with and ‘overcome’ this

The attraction of Willmore-as-rover

fact, to make it pass unnoticed” and

(not marrying man) to La Nuche the

thereby to negate women’s desire not to

prostitute (and ultimately to *) resides

be named (Zupancic 132) Women do

then in the fact that he promises that

exist in patriarchal societies, but their

he’ll only relate to her
as the unnamable (i.e.
as woman). Of course,

“I do have special
affection for the places
of transit that go with
traveling.”

identities “as daughters, sisters,
wives and mothers” “disguises
the lack that generates them” by

some male psychoanalyst or other once

disguising that “the ‘common

infamously pronounced that “woman

denominator’ of all these symbolic

doesn’t exist,” by which I suppose he

roles, the substance underlying all these

meant what I’ve been asserting: that

symbolic attributes” is, in fact, that

woman is that which can never be

which can’t be symbolized: the desire

named.16 Woman can’t be named not

not to have a name (Zupancic 132).17

because there’s no place for her in an

Will, because he “demands to have—as

oppressive patriarchal society that

if on a silver platter—this substance in

depends on silencing and effacing all

itself: not a wife, daughter, sister or

women, but because women essentially

mother, but a woman” in all her

do not desire to be named. Society is

unadulterated abstractness, he affords

“patriarchal” only in the sense that it “is

wives, daughters, sisters, and mothers
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the opportunity to live out their lack or

rove, sort of; together, happily, only for

their desire for nothing (Zupancic 132).18

a time. ▀

“I don’t think pornography degrades
women. The women who are doing it
want to do it. No one is holding a gun to
their head. I don’t get that whole thing,”
Will tells Nuche (Madonna, Sex). And
she: “I do have special affection for the
places of transit that go with traveling:
stations and airport lounges, trams,
shuttle buses [. . .], [i]n between zones”
where time is “stretched to a sort of
continuous present. Oases of nonbelonging, spaces of detachment. No(wo)man’s lands” (Braidotti 18-19).19
Consenting is all that matters—so what
the hell—in an ending bright with hope
for the unnamable future to come,
La Nuche agrees to follow Willmore
“o’re the habitable World,” to
“live and starve by turns as fortune
pleases” (5.4.503-504). And so they both

PP. A 613 million dollar contradiction.
Change we can believe in.
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Chapter 2
The Law of Inertia
What woful stuff this Madrigal wou’d be,
In some starv’d Hackny Sonneteer, or me?
But let a Lord once own the happy Lines,
How the Wit brightens! How the Style refines! (Pope 418-421)
law n
1: a rule of conduct or action established by custom or laid down and
enforced by a governing authority;
also: the whole body of such rules
2: the control brought about by enforcing rules 3 cap: the revelation of
the divine will set forth in the Old
Testament; also: the first part of the
Jewish scriptures 4: a rule or principle of construction or procedure
5: the science that deals with laws
and their interpretation and application 6: the profession of a lawyer
7: an act of the supreme legislative
body of a state or nation 8: a rule or
principle stating something that
always works in the same way under
the same conditions 9: any rule or
injunction that must be obeyed 1
One of the funniest comments I’ve received from the professors judging the
progress of this book, is they fear it is a “protest without an alternative.” This, can you
imagine, from the generation who thought The Graduate was super groovy and that
when, in the end, the would-be lovers, Benjamin and Elaine, locked all those hypocrites
in the church and jumped on the bus, they must’ve really been going somewhere just
because it was a bus. What my professor-editors and, I believe, the 60’s generation
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generally can’t avow in their continued desperation to alter the world in their image is
that the world has already been altered in their image. That they continue to find fault
with this image is not the fault of the world.
I am my father’s image. And I reflect that image to my father; I reflect what
I’ve been taught, what I have heard spoken: “protest without an alternative.” Why isn’t
my return message received? Why do my professors reject what they have made? Why
am I accused of blasphemy? “Protest without an alternative” is the mode of my
professors’ speech; it’s the condition that sustains their irony. Protest is their alternative;
existing as “alternative” they’ve enshrined as an achievement of difference from a
nebulously and variously named “society” or “matrix of power.” Somewhere, someone
who never quite has a face is supposed to be oppressing one’s ability to “alternate,” and
eluding that someone’s grasp requires assuming a rigorous cynicism and (when I was a
teenager) a flannel shirt.
“Protest without an alternative” is also the very definition of woman, of which I
am chief. As that which can never be named, woman is pure protest; woman is Willmore
and La Nuche—the defilement of banal orthodoxy; exhilarating, radical exceptionality in
a world where the majority are presumably committed, obedient, and bored. Woman is
Teflon existence; it is freedom from the injustice of ever having to name the alternative.
Protest, as woman, cannot designate itself; it’s an eternal state of defensive posturing,
bending this way and that to deflect with magic bracelets every bullet of symbolization.
Protest is, as woman, the declaration: “I want to be Queen, but don’t ever tell me I’m
bossy or I’ll slug you!” 2 Or, in other words: I want to be Queen and I don’t want to be
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Queen. Thus, woman is also the freedom from ever having to be challenged by an
alternative perspective.
“Protest without an alternative” is also the definition of Derrida’s philosophy of
nevertheless. It is the film The Graduate; it’s going somewhere that if not better, is, as
Rousseau would say, at least different. Except if The Graduate were remade today,
Derrida would be less Ben and Elaine than he would be Mrs. Robinson. As both
disinterested seducer and passionately jealous lover, Mrs. Robinson is the contradiction
that sustains protest as the pure suspension of alternative, both its own and the possibility
of another’s. Derrida would also be Mrs. Robinson because as the protection of pure
protest, the philosophy of nevertheless co-opts the feminine; it is a feminine philosophy.
It’s the utilization as a political strategy of disinterested yet passionate desire for the
purposes of continuously questioning the validity of (inconvenient) laws, thereby
assuring for itself a sort of negative press, like any washed up diva. In fact, it is possible
to name Derrida’s Justice-to-come and the great Unknown that should never be violated
by naming: it’s called a vagina or the forever mysterious event Cosmopolitan, in its
interest to sell the same magazine over and over, describes as “the multiple orgasm.”
Derrida’s philosophy basically posits that feminine jouissance (abstracted into
jargon) can be the very liberation of the world. To love Derrida’s philosophy for me
would be to love the same, that is, my own forever mysterious orgasm. Fantasizing about
the liberating potential of women’s pleasure, is, of course, a woman’s fantasy as well.
I’ve often thought my orgasm could save the world if given a chance; I’m certainly ready
to assume, as Madonna has, the responsibility. You could be sure I’d spend the 613
million dollars it would earn me in pursuit of even wetter and wilder orgasms. I wouldn’t
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be surprised to learn that Derrida was actually a great fan of The Material Girl and
probably bought Sex in hopes of inspecting her cunt. For it would have to be just an
inspection, as pleasure can only be pleasure if it is never violated by penetration; that the
inspection would withhold the very means by which Madonna’s pleasure would be
accomplished need not be stated, for it is Derrida’s pleasure we are discussing. While
Cosmopolitan never advises their readers just to think really hard and sit still and maybe
it will come, Derrida’s readers can do precisely that.3
It’s no injustice to say these things about Derrida, at least from a feminist
perspective. Feminism, which is also a way I was taught to read to mark injustices done
to women, knows men better than men know men—if only men would admit it. It’s
Derrida’s fault if he can’t confess my analysis of him is correct, for men, unlike women,
are to a feminist, fundamentally nameable. As a corollary, the gossipy and tabloid nature
of contemporary literary scholarship undertaken in Derrida’s name (what sins has Mark
Twain committed today?) not to mention the chasing after the latest theoretical fashions
as for a new handbag and heels marks not just the commercialization of academia but
also its Chickification. But as I am protest, you can be sure neither criticizing Derrida
nor using his name to pursue the fantasy of my liberating enjoyment will please me.
So I must begin again. For I’ve hardly yet begun. I have repeated my sisters, cited
my sisters, only to end where I began: with the structure of a theft. I began in injustice,
with a lost love of reading, a loss I’ve attributed to an overwrought and overworked
obsession for justice bequeathed to me by my father Derrida and his many disciples. In
attempting to opt out of justice, to reject my inheritance, I’ve only gone further in, have
only proven I’m my father’s daughter, for he is woman as much as I am woman. Tit-for-
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tat. I cannot wash my hands of this. I cannot wash my hands of this particular pleasure:
my “obstinate intuition that the loose ends and crossed ends of identity are more fecund
than the places where identity, desire, analysis, and need can all be aligned and
centered” (Sedgwick viii). It is the pleasure of a theft.
I must begin with this pleasure. It is the pleasure of deconstruction which is
also the pleasure of pursuing justice for myself, for though I dislike reading, I’ve been
having an awful lot of fun writing and reading this book—yes, my gracious and everattentive editor, it is true. My fun, in fact, which I’m sure my editor either will or has
already pointed out, undermines my own thesis, which is that fun has been stolen from
me. I ought not to be having so much fun if I desire to have your trust in my word.
Perhaps I really didn’t formerly love something that I no longer do; perhaps I’ve been
lying, perhaps I do nothing but lie, perhaps I am a liar. Perhaps part of my pleasure is not
at the expense of Derrida and his disciples, of which I am chief, but of you, my reader; it
is the pleasure of stealing your trust. Nothing was ever stolen from me; but I have stolen
from you—perhaps. “The serpent deceived me,” Eve declared, “and I ate.” Oh, really? 4
The pleasure of deconstruction is not only mine; it is the pleasure of Lady
Gertrude at the end of An Ideal Husband, a film based on the play by Oscar Wilde. It is
here I must begin, at the climax, where the impeccable Gertrude faces the possibility that
she will lose her husband Robert if she doesn’t forgive him for an indiscretion he
committed while trying to advance his career as a politician. For so long she’s held him
in the highest regard and has been devastated to learn that he isn’t as perfect as she’d
imagined. “[I]t takes great courage to see the world in all its tainted glory and still to love
it,” her friend Arthur tells her, urging her to forgive Robert. “Gertrude,” he presses, “it is
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not the perfect but the imperfect who have need of love.” Relenting, she forgives her
husband—but in a pious way, as one granting a favor to an unworthy. However, true
reconciliation occurs when, caught in a compromising circumstance of her own, she’s
forced to declare to him:
Well, [Robert], the truth is . . . the business about Mabel [. . .], well, you see, that
was just . . . my friends being kind and, um, protecting me. Uh, well, the truth is
. . . when I agreed to the story about the letter being intended for you . . . and not
for Arthur, well, you see, the truth is—the truth is . . . I lied.
And after saying this, her face brightens, and she laughingly exclaims, “I need a drink!”
Why did Lady Gertrude, so committed to truthfulness in all things, lie to her
husband? And why, after confessing her lie to him, does she laugh instead of, say, cry?
To answer these questions unfortunately requires me to sacrifice my own virtue, for in
doing so I must begin to name the alternative to protest. My professors, so eager for me
to sin, will be pleased, for in doing so I will prove that I’m like them, am bound by
ironies that are indispensable to one’s sense of autonomy. So I must name what is
unknown, what can never really be known, for it is pleasure, my own, my professors’.
Recall the formula for nevertheless:

AC ◊

S1 ▲ S2
I&O
= U5

Here under erasure (X) is S1 (Subversion) teetering on the totter with S2 (Sameness) in
an effort to overthrow all contradiction (C) (i.e. law) which also in our awareness (A) of
it permits as it restricts (◊) the sliding of all subjects between two polls of being (I&O, or
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In and Out) which in the sliding will call forth true existential difference or a fifth state of
being (5) of which we must be unaware (U). A life dedicated to the safeguarding of U5 is
a life dedicated to Justice, which is also paradoxically a life dedicated to continual
transgression of law. Law is really injustice, though it is a necessity; it only binds people
in more-of-the-same, in a lame tit-for-tat economy of retribution. But U5 is beyond this;
it is beyond because it can be, because law contains the seeds of its own beyond, its
transgression. It is transgressing the law which marks one as exceptional and is what
nevertheless disinterestedly and passionately seeks for all—remember Henry trying to
free Katherine from French-ness. But there is no beyond where there is no law;
consequently, nevertheless is marked by an inability not to orient itself toward law, a
necessity to ensure law survives to be subverted. I am here hypothesizing that this
inability and necessity hinders the capacity of all seekers of Justice to be just, that is, to
tell the truth.
What is this inability and necessity that sustains contradiction as contradiction, the
form, as Mrs. Robinson might say, of a hope for its own difference which isn’t itself
different? Where does the form of the contradiction come from? There are two possible
answers: 1.) the necessity to retain the power to be ambivalent about law is the effect of
law. For example, in Kafka’s fable “Before the Law” the man from the country pursues
access to law but never sees beyond its open gate. Why doesn’t he bypass the doorkeeper
and enter the gate instead of waiting there forever? It’s as if the gate with its doorkeeper
acts a magnet or vortex holding him there. In fact, the man becomes so obsessed with
studying the inscrutable doorkeeper and how to step beyond him, that he can even detect
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the fleas on his coat collar. The doorkeeper’s presence, a “difficult[y] the man from the
country has not expected,” impedes his entrance, immobilizing him (148).
In this reading, the man’s immobility would mark him as a subject of law, as a
subjectivized being, not in the sense that the law rubber-stamps him, but in the sense that
the law is his coming-to-be, a law that as a subjective experience remains an enigma. In
this way, each subject has a singular relation to the enigma of his own being, a singularity
that can’t be duplicated or generalized. This is implied in Kafka’s story when the
doorkeeper at the last yells into the dying man’s ear, “No one else could ever be admitted
here, since this gate was made only for you. I am now going to shut it” (150). To be a
subject is to bear the mark of this mystery; each subject can only be a subject on the
condition that he misrecognizes or misunderstands the law of his own being. Thus, the
man from the country, wanting and not wanting to “enter in” and lacking the important
knowledge that would’ve enabled his entry, symbolizes the equilibrium in which subjects
abide to keep them from falling into the insanity of solving themselves. Immobility =
freedom and safety; it is stability. Think of Madonna—her ever-more-daring rejections of
morality are stabilized by the very laws rejected, and so much so, that more and bigger
obstacles always manage to manifest themselves on her path to “uninhibited jouissance”
(Lacan, Ethics 177). Suffice to say, she will never get there. “I’m definitely compulsive,”
she admits, “but I’m compulsive about being in control” (qtd. in Fisher 45).
Incidentally, this is Derrida’s reading of Kafka’s story: that it is an allegory of
language because the law isn’t really there but has the appearance of being there because
it’s guarded and the man’s arrival is endlessly deferred. The law is like “différance,”
Derrida’s code word for the fundamental absence or disjunction which puts meaning into
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motion while its own story or history remains hidden. But we can’t avoid narrativization,
and in this way, literature demonstrates analogously law inscribing itself, bringing itself
into being, for the law of literature is not contained within literature, nor is it prior but
always becoming, surpassing itself, never fully contained. As such Kafka’s fable also
recreates in us the same perplexity as that experienced by the man from the country
because as we read or stand before it, we are unable to grasp its meaning. Like the man
from the country, we must “forbid [ourselves] from entering.” For only on the condition
of “not gain[ing] access to the law,” law understood as both “prohibition/prohibited,” or
“a prohibited place” can law be law or literature be literature. “[Law] forbids itself and
contradicts itself by placing the man in its own contradiction” Derrida argues, and there
can be no other way of being (Acts of Literature 203). “We must remain ignorant of who
or what or where the law is, we must not know who it is or what it is, where and how it
presents itself, whence it comes and whence it speaks. This is what must be before the
must of the law” (204).
The difficulty of Derrida’s reading is that positing ambivalence toward the law of
one’s being as the necessary condition of subjectivity is just in the end to say that law is
law and functions pretty damn well. But we already knew that. Nothing follows from this
knowledge, although much in Derrida’s philosophy is made to follow it. What is made to
follow cannot come from the structure of law, subjectivity, or language itself. Which
leads to a second possibility: 2.) the necessity of ambivalence toward law points to the
existence of another law. Returning to Kafka’s story: while it’s clear that the man from
the country believes the doorkeeper bars his entrance to the law, it isn’t clear that his
belief is justified. The doorkeeper never physically restrains him, nor does he
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intellectually restrain him by forcing him to solve a riddle as a demonstration of his
worthiness to enter. Rather, one could argue that the doorkeeper is nothing but helpful:
warning the man of the dangers of entering, foretelling what he will face if he does enter,
giving him a stool on which to sit, accepting all the man’s bribes, answering all his
questions, keeping him company to the very last. The doorkeeper merely declares to the
man that it is possible for him to reach the law, “but not at the moment” (148). “[J]ust try
to go in despite my veto,” he tells him (148). We could just as correctly say that the doorkeeper doesn’t affect the man’s immobilization whatsoever; the man just is immobile and
the doorkeeper can’t move him. The law, despite the inviting open gate, is powerless.
How is it, we should wonder, that the man from the country lacked the vital
knowledge given him only at his death? The door was made for him, says the doorkeeper
—how did the man not know? Another way to ask this question would be: “[W]hat does
[the jouissance of transgression] consist of?” Or: “Does it go without saying that to
trample sacred laws under foot [. . .] itself excites some form of jouissance?” Madonna’s
constant “testing of a faceless fate” seems a means to prove to herself her own power, but
if the law is a necessary means, “what is the risk that is involved? What is the goal
jouissance seeks if it has to find support in transgression to reach it?” (Lacan, Ethics
195). Yes, yes, you say you’re a revolutionary, Madonna, but “[w]hat will this revolution
be in the name of?” (Mailer 50). Or, is it that you only want it to be in-the-name-of . . .
“of?”
If we pursue these questions by assuming that the man’s immobility represents
not his state as a subject of law but his state impervious to law, then the gate is open for
us to hypothesize the existence of a second law, one I will call the Law of Inertia or LI.5
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This Inertia is the man’s subjective center though he doesn’t recognize it as such since his
attention is fully captured by the law he seeks and not by his own inactivity. “Why don’t I
move?” is a question he never asks himself, so focused is he on why the doorkeeper
won’t (apparently) allow him to move. It’s as if the man thinks the law he seeks is the
doorkeeper’s law; as such, I will call the law the man seeks DL for “doorkeeper’s law.”
The connection between the two laws seems to be that DL eclipses LI so that LI only
appears as a hazy glow about the periphery of a dark moon. The man sees the light, but
only in its incongruous emanation from a void; it’d require a focal shift for him to see
that LI is its own light which, in fact, illuminates DL. Thus the following formula:
E
DL
LI
Here E stands for Eve, who, as the man from the country, represents any subjective
identity oriented toward the Doorkeeper’s Law. The arc represents the obscure economy
between DL and LI because to Eve the two laws appear only as DL, the Law of Inertia
remaining unknown and unnamed, its traces diffused throughout DL and misidentified by
her as its effects. We could say that the misrecognition of LI is the condition which
sustains Eve’s ambivalence toward DL, the ambivalence which assures the recognition of
her being before the doorkeeper.
There are several questions which follow from these conjectures: First, if LI is a
distinct subjective disposition resistant to DL, could this not be the fifth kind of being, or
the Justice Derrida posits as “beyond” the purview of the doorkeeper? Second, what is
the nature of the “obscure economy” or exchange system between the two laws? And
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finally, what is the “shift” required to perceive LI in its autonomy and what would be the
consequences of this discovery?
I. On Whether Inertia is the Fifth State of Being
“For there are only four kinds of people in this world . . . .” Which is inertia
indeed. But surely the Law of Inertia isn’t this. To discern if it is first requires discerning
what is the “subjective disposition” of the subject of Inertia. Kafka’s story contains a
clue: it’s that the man from the country believes the doorkeeper bars his entrance and
believes “the Law [. . .] should surely be accessible at all times and to everyone” (148).
The actions (or inactions) of the man from the country are driven by his beliefs about
law: that it should be available, that it should be inclusive, that it should conform to his
beliefs. Law obtained without effort, sacrifice, or alteration to himself would, to him, be
justice. Therefore law is also the site or promise of justice; it declares innocence and guilt
—and innocence surely for him. The Law of Inertia is simply the inability of the man to
suspend these beliefs. Or, stated differently, Inertia is the man’s belief in his own unjust
existence. Sitting before the doorkeeper early on, “[h]e curses his bad luck [. . .] boldly
and loudly, later, as he grows old, he only grumbles to himself,” Kafka writes (149). But
whether loud or low, there is certainly continuity of complaint.
There’s a corollary to this disposition: that is, if the man from the country believes
himself to be a victim of injustice, and if he believes the law promises justice, why
doesn’t he just manhandle the doorkeeper and rush through the gate? He doesn’t do this,
however, which invites us to deduce that he doesn’t believe he’s in need of justice after
all. Therefore, the Law of Inertia seems to be a structure of ambivalence: I believe in my
own unjust existence and I don’t believe in my own unjust existence. That LI bears such a
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similarity to woman—recall Lucy’s I want to be Queen and I don’t want to be Queen—
should be enough to disqualify it as the fifth state of being; however, a further
consideration will solidify the point. Recall that per our formula, LI only presents itself to
DL as an unnamable trace, or as a series of misrecognitions which assures the subject’s
continual recognition by the doorkeeper. As a boulder, Inertia can’t move itself or reveal
itself as an inability to move, and the doorkeeper’s law fails as the site of revelation.
Therefore, to imagine that just because we’re now hypothesizing the existence of Inertia
means we’ve moved it, and, more importantly, moved it in the place of DL as a
preferable law, or better yet, a law that subverts the function of DL, is to make a
judgment from the perspective of the doorkeeper, which is the perspective that justice
always lies elsewhere.
By “elsewhere” I do not mean, of
course, “in the future,” as if to say that the
man from the country would’ve received
justice in the long run if only he’d lived
long enough. Rather, by “elsewhere” I
mean “in the possession of” or “belonging
to another.” It’s to Derrida’s credit that in
attempting to articulate Justice as beyond
tit-for-tat, he recognized finally the need to
break with the supposition that such a
Justice is law-making (i.e. each “making

Jacques Lacan about 1960 6
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one’s manners” like Henry) by insisting on the heterogeneity of Justice and law. In this
way, making, breaking, or keeping laws puts no one “in possession” of Justice, and so
being can no longer be defined as gaining the authority to make laws one presumes
another has.
He doesn’t have it or that’s not it are generally Derrida’s maxims. And you don’t
have it either. For instance: you send a birthday card to a friend, but this act isn’t love
because you felt obliged; or, you receive house guests unannounced and though you
welcome them, you can’t be credited with hospitality because you weren’t sufficiently
prepared; or, you forgive a bully who steals your love of reading, but you didn’t really
forgive him, because you figured it’d be best to try to live in peace and earn an A+; or
finally, you defend the cause of the fatherless, but you still aren’t good because there’s no
way to justify choosing to help one particular orphan over another (Derrida, “To Forgive”
49). The insistence on the heterogeneity (but inseparability) of love and obligation,
hospitality and duty, Justice and law is an ethics and politics of “bad conscience” (69).
The moment you think you’ve really “done something,” have assumed goodness to be
“present” in your actions, that’s the moment you’ve betrayed the good because you’ve
reduced them to possibilities, and possibility is the realm of law which is also the realm
of calculation, of tit-for-tat, and the trouble with tit-for-tat is that it is automatic (Acts of
Religion 237). You’ve given and you’ve gotten in return; the machine has been shown
once again to function, but “[n]othing astonishing has happened; nothing new has
arrived” (Jennings 136). And wherein lies The New? In the structure of potentiality
believed to exist when one doesn’t stake any claims except in the structure of potentiality.
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The difficulty here is well-hidden until it becomes a matter of trying to convince
others that this is what everyone ought to do, and then, as I’ve already demonstrated with
Henry, “pure potentiality” becomes tainted with desire, a mysterious and unnamed X.
There’s no use hiding the X; there’s no use hiding one’s desire to subvert others’ desires
as manifested in laws in the belief that Justice, unlike any law, is the “experience of the
impossible: a will, a desire, a demand for justice” that just is the ungrounded ground of
all subjectivity (Derrida, Acts of Religion 244). Law-as-machine, as machination and
system of retributive same-for-same may make it deconstructible, but it is so because one
has already calculated the benefit (pleasure) of its deconstruction; one has already
assumed the return received was not in keeping with the investment (I tried to be a
scholar and look what happened—I lost my love of books); one has already given in to
the supposition that the fault lies in law and not in one’s “invincible desire for justice”
which, I must hasten to add, is in these formulations also automatic (Derrida, “Faith and
Knowledge,” 18).
The automatic demand for justice which is based in a belief that one exists in
injustice by default of the existence of law is the Law of Inertia. The Law of Inertia is
fundamentally a belief and an incapacitating one which, in Kafka’s story, ends in the
man’s death. Immobility = not freedom or safety but captivity and danger. It’s a problem.
The man from the country could be said to be suffering from pure happening. Like
Derrida, he waits; he is attune to his little life as it deconstructs itself, for deconstruction
isn’t a task he undertakes; it is simply “what happens, the event one takes note of,” a
minimal “manner a of attuning to something that is out of joint” something that just is in
one’s “experience of a world, a culture, a philosophic tradition” (Derrida, A Taste 82-83;
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80). Utterly suspending want, he covets weakness, “[a] weakness that can transform itself
into the greatest strength” he hopes, a strength of “disarmament” and vulnerability to
“what we cannot appropriate,” what “is there, before us, without us—there is someone,
something, that happens, that happens to us, and that has no need of us to happen (to us)”
(63). Perhaps it’s woman masturbating there behind the gate, a gate he doesn’t want to
breach lest “the recognition of what is stronger than I” isn’t (63). And there is great
pleasure (only) in the recognition.
Disguising Inertia as the opening to pure alternative-ness just intensifies its
eclipse, more aggressively erases its traces from the Doorkeeper’s Law, and thus
increases its misrecognition. All this should at least serve to sharpen our focus that a fifth
kind of person can’t be a person who is always elsewhere, always denied. The fifth kind
of person would have to be someone who doesn’t believe they exist in a state of denial
and thus experiences no automatic demand for justice.
II. On the Economy of DL and LI
While the purview of LI is that of a subject’s belief, the purview of DL is that of
the subject’s desire. In view of the doorkeeper, the subject, like the man from the country,
searches for the It that bears the mark of Justice, das Ding that “demonstrates that
something is there after all,” something that can “serve as points of reference in relation
to the world of wishes and expectations,” something that “will be there when in the end
all conditions have been fulfilled,” which means in actuality, the conditions will never be
fulfilled and what we seek “will never be found again” (Lacan, Ethics 52). In contrast, in
LI the subject posits the existence of das Ding as such, whether in content or form. This
isn’t a simple positing, for I remarked earlier that Kafka’s story, in its portrayal of the
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man’s contrary behavior, provides evidence that LI is, like DL, a contradictory structure
along the lines of: I believe in justice and I don’t believe in justice. Understanding why it
is contradictory is necessary to comprehend the connection between the two laws.
“[N]othing is more ambiguous than belief,” it has been said (Lacan, Ethics 171).
But why? Because no belief can exist independently of interpretation. There would be no
interpretation if all were known; interpretation signifies the existence of the unknown, of
a question, to which the belief becomes the answer. But this explanation only goes so far.
To return to Kafka’s story: why is there a doorkeeper? Or, why is the presence of the
doorkeeper a predicament for the man from the country? It basically consists in the fact
that the man himself must answer this question, and moreover, that he must interpret the
doorkeeper’s language. It isn’t obvious, that with his “big sharp nose and long, thin, black
Tartar beard,” the doorkeeper wouldn’t pummel the man if he tried to enter the gate. But,
of course, this is the interpretation of the man from the country, that given the
doorkeeper’s appearance, “it is better to wait until he gets permission to enter” (148). Or
is it? Perhaps the doorkeeper will accept a bribe . . . . In placing the doorkeeper between
the man and the law, Kafka’s story illustrates the impossibility of arriving at one’s beliefs
autonomously. Like the man from the country, one’s experience of law isn’t abstract—
nor can it be. Law is personal; it passes through who. No one has ever yet succeeded in
“believing in Justice” or believing in any other idea whatsoever; one can only believe in a
person whose language is far from transparent. One can only believe in-the-name-ofanother, a doorkeeper. The subjective experience of Inertia is constituted in and by the
question: who do I believe? Whereas in DL the fundamental question is: what do I want?

Zias 188
or, more specifically, what does he (the doorkeeper) want from me? which in turn
constitutes the structure of my own desire.7
The need of who is that which is obliterated in a project like Derrida’s
messianicity without messianism. It is like Christianity without Christ, a Christianity
dedicated only to and staking everything on nothing but the –ianity. Derrida describes his
new ethic (messianicity) as “the opening to the future or to the coming of the other as the
advent of justice, but without horizon of expectation and without prophetic
prefiguration,” even while assuring us that what will come “always takes the
phenomenal form of peace or of justice” because the fundamental structure of
communication necessitates it. (Editor’s note: all these dramatic italics are not the
author’s but Derrida’s). “[Justice] ought, exposing itself so abstractly, be prepared
(waiting without awaiting itself) for the best as for the worst, the one never coming
without opening the possibility of the other.” This any follower of an “Abrahamic
religion” would already know, but we are told not to “depend upon any messianism” or
believe any “determinate revelation” (“Faith and Knowledge” 17, 18). His reasoning is
that the positive content of the dogmatic religions makes them non-universalizable,
possessive and exclusionary—we, here, in our little group, already “have the truth.” In
addition, these religions are only possible because messianicity is already structurally part
of experience in our faith in communication: “This justice inscribes itself in advance in
the promise, in the act of faith or in the appeal to faith that inhabits every act of
language and every address to the other” (18). It is this “experience of faith, of believing,
of a credit that is irreducible to knowledge and of a trust that ‘founds’ all relation to the
other in testimony” that alone can be universalized and alone “permits a ‘rational’ and
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universal discourse on the subject of ‘religion’ ” (18). “This messianicity,” he continues,
“stripped of everything, as it should, this faith without dogma which makes its way
through the risks of absolute night”—such as publication by a premier university,
Stanford—“cannot be contained in any traditional opposition,” and as such is able to
bear witness to the mystical performative act that inaugurates and re-inaugurates every
instance of knowledge, of science, and of authority (18). In “uprooting” the “GraecoJudaeo-Christian tradition” as if these were all the same, “in atheologizing it, the
abstraction, without denying faith, liberates a universal rationality and the political
democracy that cannot be dissociated from it” (19).
Two observations: 1.) to assume that the abstract structure is prior to and enables
the content of the messianic religions, one must forget that one arrived at the abstraction
via the mediating content. Perhaps we could here see afresh the significance of the
statement: “For there is [. . .] one mediator also between God and men”—The Messiah,
whoever claims the title, always precedes messianicity (I Tim. 2:5). In the same way: 2.)
for there to be such a structure as Pure Potentiality, the form of a Promise which must be
guarded and nurtured, and to which I must always be open, spreading my legs in
structural nymphomania, and for me to do so in-the-name-of-Justice, would not this
name have to be Derrida’s, since it is only through his name that I recognize the
abstraction? And if so, have I not been right throughout to record the word Justice in red,
since it is, in a sense, a word of the Lord: “Wherever this foundation founds in
foundering, wherever it steals away under the ground of what it founds, at the very
instant when, losing itself thus in the desert, it loses the very trace of itself and the
memory of a secret, ‘ [Derrida]’ can only begin and begin again: quasi-automatically,
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mechanically, machine-like, [. . .] [a] desert in the desert” (19)? “Who mourns for
Adonais? oh come forth / Fond wretch!” (Shelley 415-416). 8
The link between LI and DL, therefore, and the reason Inertia is ambivalent, is
that it is structured by the disavowal of the traces (i.e. people) essential for the subject to
hold “her own” beliefs. This ambivalence, together with the necessarily contradictory
double-logic of DL, creates four subjective possibilities just like my professor asserted in
claiming there are only four kinds of people in the world:
1.) I believe in justice—I want to be Queen
2.) I don’t believe in justice—I want to be Queen
3.) I believe in justice—I don’t want to be Queen
4.) I don’t believe in justice—I don’t want to be Queen
Obviously, these aren’t discrete categories because subjects must slide in and out of
them. This is why DL eclipses LI: because Inertia only exists as the effacement of the
people the subject has believed, and since law or the-making-of-manners is a machine for
generating individuals who feel autonomous in their hearts where it really matters,
avowals of dependence (obedience, submission, unoriginality) threaten its functioning by
disclosing that it is, in fact, a machine. Law always depends on those subject to it not
believing they are subject—especially when they suspect they are. Recall one of my
professor’s pronouncements that he’s just a cog in a machine, a “stooge for the
profession.” We are right to suspect that such a “candid cynical admission of guilt none
the less remains false” because it is precisely by “emphasizing one’s responsibility or too
readily assuming one’s guilt in an exaggerated way” which serves “as a stratagem not to
face the way he, as a ‘radical’ intellectual, perfectly embodies the existing power
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relations towards which he pretends to be thoroughly critical” (Žižek, Fragile 45, 46).
Inertia or automatism is the truth of DL, and the-one-who-is-believed—the Doorkeeper
(D)—who is there from the beginning of the subject’s experience of law, is the truth of
Inertia, though removed from sight through another eclipse. So the formula now is:
E
DL
LI
D
It’s remarkable that the faculty Kafka says first fails the man from the country is his
sight: “At length his eyesight begins to fail, and he does not know whether the world is
really darker or whether his eyes are only deceiving him” (149). Based on our above
conjectures, we could say it’s a double deception: he is blind, and the world is dark.
III. On the Shift Making Visible LI; the Consequences of Such
Given that the underpinning of DL is a double eclipse which generates subjects
who feel doubly free (in belief and in desire), it seems twice as doubtful that any “shift”
in perspective would ever succeed in opening a subject’s eyes to its predicament. But
really, who is to say that it is a predicament after all, especially if, as the formula
demonstrates, the co-existence and co-ambivalence of the two laws is required for
subjects to be recognized? A subject who exists in dependency isn’t a subject, but only a
for-another or as-another—never a for-itself. For-another or as-another would be realms
of non-being; it’s instructive to note in our culture the amount of abuse heaped on those
who are unoriginal, mere copies, derivatives. The academic mantra “publish or perish” is
one of the more unashamed configurations of this obsession-to-be-cited, blatantly
associating failure to innovate with death. For a subject truly to acknowledge its own
unoriginality would therefore be equal to an acknowledgement that he or she has just
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died. And is such a form of death, sinking into a realm of non-being, a better death than
that of the man from the country? If this accepted dependency must designate a fifth kind
of person, for instance, why would anyone want this? Such a desire, it would seem,
would hardly be automatic.
I hypothesized above that the fifth kind of person would have to be someone
whose constituting quest isn’t for justice. Combined now with the insight about the
requisite who through whom must pass all the beliefs a subject claims as its own, a
requisite which must be forgotten for a subject to be for-itself, I can now assert that to opt
out of justice, to desire other-than justice would first be to remember who one has
believed. This will be clearer by comparing again the definitions of justice from chapter
three. I was there trying to access whether or not Katherine is really a sucker based on her
orientation toward French law. The breakdown was as follows:
Henry’s Definition:
1. The King is exceptional, but the French king is an unexceptional usurper.
2. I am exceptional; I’m rightfully the king of France.
3. The French king will never concede my right to the throne; his law is
prohibitive.
4. I must make my own law, one that enables my conquest of France.
Justice: The acknowledgment of the French king of my right to his throne via
my subversive overthrow of his law.
Katherine’s Definition:
1. The King is exceptional, as is the French king.
2. I am unexceptional and have no right to rule.
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3. The French king grants me exceptionality via French law.
4. If I make my own law, I forfeit my exceptionality as French.
Justice: My acknowledgement of the singularity of the French king via my
obedience to French law.
To translate these differences into the terms I’m using now: Henry’s desire is to be
believed, while Katherine’s desire is to believe. “To be believed,” as the only form of
justice acceptable to Henry, is the very structure of the effacement of the one (the
Doorkeeper) Henry believes, for it makes “belief” the duty of others, exempting himself.
Henry only wants to exist as the site of another’s belief, to be the incarnation of himself
in another, the doorkeeper for another. In contrast, “to believe” marks Katherine as
already the site of another, another existing “in” or “through” her; she is the other’s
conduit, the other’s “message.” Her existence is the very openness to this other, and this
is justice.9
This openness to the other, or Katherine’s acknowledgment of her belief in the
doorkeeper—her father the French King, let’s say—is justice in this sense: it enables
her to tell the truth: “as it shall please de roi men père.” Justice according to Henry can
never be accomplished because when all, like Henry, believe themselves justified in
making their own manners, no one is left to do the necessary believing in the manners
so made. There is a lack of recognition, which conveniently confirms to the one who has
made his own manners that he is, in fact, a victim of injustice and thus entitled to
improvise. The equivalence made between being believed and justice enables Henry to
project his own belief beyond himself. He can never acknowledge a doorkeeper; thus his
Justice can only be justice according to a lie, the lie that he believes no one.
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By contrast, Katherine’s declaration that she will marry Henry in-the-name-ofher-father is the truth. She cannot assert her independence as Henry would wish because
there’s no such thing. There’s no belief or desire that’s simply “hers” and which she can
demand be heard, appreciated, accepted, or believed “for itself” in-her-name. Even if she
didn’t want to marry Henry, this desire, to exist, would also have had to pass through an
unacknowledged doorkeeper whom she secretly believes is correct in his (or more likely
her) assessment that marriage to Henry is unjust. Of all the possible doorkeepers in the
play, Katherine affirms that her desire is directed by her father. “[H]ow mild
transgressing the Law is in comparison with obeying it thoroughly,” it has been said; or
“as Kierkegaard put it in his unique way: ‘We do not laud the son who said ‘No,’ but we
endeavour to learn from the gospel how dangerous it is to say, ‘Sir, I will’” (Žižek,
Fragile 147). The point to be made is that Henry is caught up in making manners only
because he doesn’t “fully identify with it but maintain[] a kind of distance towards it”
(147). Recall how easily Valmont, in his cynicism or “inner autonomy,” was entrapped
by the Marquise de Merteuil.10
Katherine’s openness to the directive of her father is not the same as Derrida’s
openness. He has often spoken about himself in the same terms I’ve used to describe
Katherine: that she is the site of another, the other’s conduit, the other’s message. For
instance, when he contends that a decision to be a decision must not be “decisionism,”
that is, based in the notion of a sovereign subject who has a will of her own, he states,
“[M]y decision is the other’s. [. . .] [W]e have not to account for but to experience the
fact that the freest decision in myself is a decision of the other in myself. The other is in
me; the other is my freedom, so to speak.” The same, he continues, is true of desire: “The
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desire of my desire is not mine. [. . .] If my desire is so powerful in myself, it is because it
is not mine. That does not mean that I’m simply passively registering or welcoming
another’s desire. It simply means that I experience my own desire as the other’s desire”
(Derrida, Caputo, and Kearney, 306, 307; bold mine). Similarly, as the I never precedes
its decision or its desire, and as the I is never identical to itself in time, so also the I also
never confesses itself, but always “the other in me” (“Composing” 25). “What is terrible
in confession,” Derrida confesses, “is that I’m not sure that I am the one who can claim
the mastery of or the responsibility for what has been done, and I am not the one who can
claim to be improving and to be good enough to repent” (25). There’s a persistent
division in oneself, and it is this division that one confesses, “so that I never confess
myself. A confession is never mine. If it were mine, it wouldn’t be a confession. It is
always the other in me who confesses” (25). The permanent divisibility of the subject is
what, Derrida contends, enables the “scandalous” “passive decision,” a decision which is
a rupture, which “cuts” one out of continuity, teleology, and calculation and hurls one
into meaningless, into what has, from the perspective of history, no significance (25).
I have two interrelated objections to these formulations: 1.) note Derrida’s
characteristic insistence that one not just wonder about or contemplate but experience
one’s own openness—a precarious dangling in the balance between the possible and
impossible. Without this experience, and more importantly, the awareness that one is
having this experience, the implication is that one is just like everybody else, succumbing
to a rote and rather dull economic exchange: tit-for-tat. To be “cut out” of the possible is
to be exceptional, to experience something “astonishing,” a miracle as it were, which in
the end is always going to be Derrida himself. 2.) This is why his Justice always remains
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an abstraction; he has “no contents to propose”; he has “no answer” whether or not we
should be “for or against” deconstruction, “happy about it or not,” and if we should
“accentuate the process or slow it down” (A Taste, 83, 82). He justifies these silences by
claiming that if we knew Justice or named it, it would at that moment cease to be Justice,
since “every name is a betrayal because it stabilizes and spatializes the flux” of pure
becoming (A Taste 69). The point is to keep the realm of Newness open, and we
jeopardize it or violate it when we point to it and say, “Here it is!” for then we’ve just
reduced it, “dissolved” it into more of the same. We’ve tamed it; we’ve presumed too
much (Derrida and Roudinesco 138). The other, therefore, who speaks, desires,
confesses, and decides “in” Derrida could, in fact, be everything or nothing in particular;
it is the unknown factor X, that which can never be named. Certainly, a very convenient
philosophy for the preservation of one’s precious autonomy, never having to say, as
Katherine: “Here is the one I believe!” Keeping the realm of Justice “open” enables
Derrida to step deftly into it himself, to exception himself, to be the miracle, the other we
await, and thus to be the unnamed one we must believe (secretly) as our own factor X.
Derrida’s subjectivity is that of Eve’s, in contrast to that of Katherine:
Eve’s:
E
DL
LI
D

Katherine’s:
K

DL
LI
D

The significance of Katherine’s diagram begins first with the inverted arcs. These depict
that DL and LI are no longer accomplishing their eclipse of the doorkeeper but that the
doorkeeper is illuminating LI and DL as separate laws, and in that order, and that this can
be discerned by K who, from her decentered position in the diagram, is within sight of the
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doorkeeper. It’s her very position “before” the doorkeeper that exposes the existence of
LI and places her within its arc as her subjective center rather than DL. As such, DL
appears for the first time “beside” her, as existing in tandem with her or along the same
axis as her, both bearing a connection to the doorkeeper. This triangulation of K, DL, and
D is that which illuminates the existence of LI, which suspended in the center of the
triangle, appears both as its necessary interior which neither the doorkeeper, nor
Katherine, nor the Doorkeeper’s Law can dislodge, and also as an unaccountable “extra”
that can’t quite be connected absolutely to any of the three points.
What I’m attempting to elucidate is the shift in perspective which I suspect is a
step beyond a world of only four kinds of people, a world such people would never
recognize as existing. Having said this, I wouldn’t want to give the impression that such a
shift marks a stage in dialectic and that the fifth kind of person is a synthesis of the four.
To be truly other, a fifth kind of person couldn’t emerge from the four by a gradual or
essential development, for if this were so, the fifth kind of person would still
fundamentally be tied to law and thus would be a seeker of justice. Although I’ve
asserted that Katherine can and does tell the truth whereas Eve can only lie, it isn’t my
contention that Katherine represents true law or Justice of which Eve is the opposite or
fake reflection; but even if it were my contention, this would at least highlight the point
that what is opposite could never in itself turn into its other. There would have to be an
intervention. Therefore, Katherine’s subjectivity isn’t the mere opposite of Eve’s, nor is
Eve’s the opposite of Katherine’s. I’m simply illustrating that Eve’s subjectivity could
become other than it is if the relationship between herself, DL, and the Doorkeeper were
to come to light through not a development but an intervention. While Henry V doesn’t
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provide us any sense of how Katherine’s subjectivity came to exist differently than Eve’s,
we can understand the shift she represents if we return to Lady Gertrude.
I mentioned previously that Lady Gertrude has suffered the bewilderment that her
husband Robert has cheated his way into political advancement, proving that rather than
being the ideal man, he’s just like everybody else. Her own virtue offended, she struggles
with whether or not she can forgive him. Her friend Arthur intervenes: “[I]t takes great
courage to see the world in all its tainted glory and still to love it,” he says, reminding her
that “it is not the perfect but the imperfect
who have need of love.” Notice first that
Lady Gertrude does struggle with forgiveness; that is, she can’t let go of her
ambivalence: I want to forgive Robert
because I still love him and I don’t want to
forgive him because I no longer love him.
Her struggle is directly related to her belief
that the law—that you shouldn’t cheat or lie
—presumes obedience is possible and
Jacques Lacan at his desk, 1971 11

therefore legitimates punishment. Robert

broke the law he could’ve kept; he’s no longer worthy of her love, especially since she
perceives his sin as an affront to her belief. She tells Robert to pack his bags. In reply,
Robert says, “Let women make no more ideals of men, or they may ruin other lives as
completely as you. You, whom I have loved so wildly, have surely ruined mine.” Robert
challenges Gertrude’s belief about law by correctly perceiving that Gertrude’s judgment
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of him “as required by law” is really a judgment made “as required by Gertrude.” Why
does Gertrude enact her own desire to punish under the guise of the law?
There are two interrelated answers to this question: 1.) hiding her desire to judge
within the law by believing that law necessitates judgment (i.e. she’d be breaking the law
herself if she didn’t judge Robert) accomplishes the effacement from herself of the
necessity of this desire. In other words, Lady Gertrude uses law to disavow the fact that
she can’t do otherwise than condemn Robert. By believing she “chooses” to condemn her
husband (however reluctantly, for the sake of the law), she can therefore maintain her
own autonomy and especially the exceptionality which she perceives her husband to have
lost for himself. In sum, law for Lady Gertrude is an instrument to be wielded against
others as a means of announcing her own innocence. This leads to answer number two:
2.) Lady Gertrude’s use of law to declare her innocence also conceals from her that her
own innocence depends on the condemnation or sacrifice of someone else. Before she
discovered her husband’s lie, it was the miscellaneous rabble of ordinary politicians who
were guilty of playing politics as usual. Now that her husband has become part of the
rabble, her contamination by association brings the truth of her innocence much too
close: that the need to declare one’s innocence is already the very mark of a lawbreaker.
Derrida makes the connection between law and sacrifice in The Gift of Death
when he laments that “because of the structure of the laws of the market that society has
instituted and controls, because of the mechanisms of external debt and other similar
inequities, that same ‘society’ puts to death or [. . .] allows to die of hunger and disease
tens of millions of children [. . .] without any moral or legal tribunal ever being
considered competent to judge such a sacrifice, the sacrifice of others to avoid being
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sacrificed oneself.” This situation isn’t accidental because “the smooth functioning of
[society’s] economic, political, and legal affairs, the smooth functioning of its moral
discourse and good conscience presupposes the permanent operation of this sacrifice”
(86). In this formulation, Derrida comes close to the thinking of another scholar,
René Girard (who is never cited and thus is an unknown factor X) who posits that ritual
sacrifice, as a reenactment of an original murder which threw the community into a
dangerous cycle of retribution, is a means “to protect the entire community from its own
violence” (Violence 8). Derrida would brush aside Girard’s hypothesis of an original sin
that the community hushes up or exonerates itself from by representing it to itself
in an acceptable (i.e. lawful) fashion, but it’s noteworthy that out of all the poor victims
Derrida could’ve mentioned, he seizes upon “the children,” because in doing so he
makes Girard’s point that “sacrifice is primarily an act of violence without risk of
vengeance,” and of course, children can’t retaliate (13).
But none of what I’ve said would be very surprising to Lady Gertrude; she’s
much too smart for all this psychoanalysis and knows very well that she herself is
guilty—a lawbreaker—yes, she can say it! “We have, all of us, feet of clay, Robert.
Women as well as men,” she tells her husband late in the story, admitting that there isn’t
anyone, even herself, who’s really a cut above the rest. “Can it be that you’ve forgiven
me?” Robert asks her. “Oh, I—I suppose it must be that,” she replies, “Oh, goodness.
Hold me, Robert. Forgive me.” But this proceeds too quickly. For Lady Gertrude’s
admission of general guilt and pardon of Robert occurs after Arthur urges her to assert
her courage and forgive, but prior to her confession, I lied. The relationship between her
first statement of guilt and the second must be understood in relation to Arthur’s counsel.
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It’s interesting that An Ideal Husband doesn’t end directly after Lady Gertrude’s
pronouncement of guilt about all women. She’s listened to Arthur, believed that the
imperfect need love, put this truth to work in forgiving Robert—end of story. Surely the
subplot in which Arthur realizes his love for Mabel, Robert’s sister, can be resolved
without Gertrude intervening on Arthur’s behalf to clear him of the charges that he
remains attached to his former flame, Mrs. Cheveley. The continuation of the story
beyond the reconciliation between Gertrude and Robert, the crisis that drives the entire
film, seems extra, even anti-climactic. When Robert finally declares that he won’t allow
Mabel to marry Arthur because he believes Arthur to be involved with another woman,
one can’t shake the feeling that this scene doesn’t belong in the film. The discordant tone,
the sudden obstacle, the irresolution don’t fit with the narrative of redemption just played
out between Gertrude and Robert. In fact, Robert’s stubborn resolve in the interests of his
sister’s future happiness shifts the focus of the story, so that the principal problem seems
never to have been Gertrude’s inability to forgive, but all along Robert’s stubbornness.
And this would be exactly right. In the same way that the Law of Inertia is “the
truth” of the Doorkeeper’s Law, so here the addendum to the manifest plot turns out to
reveal its misrecognized truth. Robert is stubborn the entire film, chiefly in his
determination to be the ideal politician by not giving up his ideals, even when holding
onto them would be detrimental to his career. When Mrs. Cheveley who knows the dark
secret of his past attempts to use her knowledge to blackmail him into voting for a shady
government profiteering scheme that would earn her millions, he totally refuses, though
knowing that she’ll reveal his secret and ruin his professional standing. In fact, it’s his
refusal which forces Mrs. Cheveley to assert additional leverage by revealing his secret to
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Gertrude, thus compromising his marriage as well as his career. What a lot to lose—just
for the sake of not telling a little white lie on the floor of Parliament—something every
politician does, is even expected to do. What’s driving Robert into self-destruction?
The answer is that he really does believe Gertrude: that is, he believes that the law
makes obedience possible and therefore legitimates punishment. His indiscretion was
committed prior to his marriage to Gertrude; now, inspired by her virtue, he excels to
match her excellence. Upholding his integrity by refusing Lady Cheveley while at the
same time being punished for his refusal—which in his mind is being justly judged for
his prior lies—is his enactment of Gertrude’s belief living in him, and as such is also
certainly his interpretation of what pleases her. By way of similar example, though in this
case the objective was nefarious, recall the confession of Mr. Bumble near the end of
Oliver Twist. When confronted about conspiring with his wife to suppress the evidence
that reveals Oliver’s parentage, he complains, “It was all Mrs. Bumble!” Oliver’s
grandfather Mr. Brownlow disagrees: “That is no excuse; you were present at the sale of
the locket [containing a picture of Oliver’s mother], and indeed are the more guilty of the
two in the eye of the law, for the law supposes that your wife acts under your direction.”
But Mr. Bumble continues to protest: “If the law supposes that, then the law is an ass, an
idiot! If that’s the eye of the law, then the law is a bachelor, and the worst I wish the law
is, that his eye may be open by experience—my experience!”
Robert’s stubbornness as his interpretation of Gertrude’s belief about law is the
truth that eludes Gertrude. Her misrecognition is evident in the first instance of her
avowal of guilt which Robert interprets as her forgiveness of him. Recall her statement:
“We have, all of us, feet of clay, Robert. Women as well as men.” What is the
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pronouncement of this platitude except the inverse form of her belief that it’s possible to
keep the law and all who don’t should be punished? This scene of “forgiveness” merely
represents the negation or “no” which together with “yes” is the ambivalent state of all
subjects of law. Prior to this, she “chooses” to say “yes” to law and punish Robert; here,
she does not choose to say “no” and suspend the law by forgiving. Notice that in
contradistinction to her former method, she here denies any self-government: “Oh, I—I
suppose it must be that,” she replies when Robert interprets her concession as
forgiveness. It just “happened” to her apparently without her knowing! She’s had no say
or control over it really—it’s caught her just as unawares as it did him! So just as before,
when she hid her desire for punishment within the law, here she hides her forgiveness in
the law’s inverse form: that everyone breaks the law. Both her “yes” and “no,” her
“reluctant” punishment and “surprise” forgiveness, is the joint mechanism which sustains
her own sense of sovereignty and innocence, for in neither case is she tainted by any
desire whatsoever.
It’s only when she understands Robert’s behavior to be the performance or interpretation of her desire that she recognizes herself as desiring. This occurs once the danger
of being caught in her desire has passed: Robert has interpreted her cliché about
everyone’s guilt as forgiveness, there’s been an adequate reconciliation, the focus is no
longer, as Arthur before made plain to her, the assertion of her courage by choosing to
love. There’s nothing left to do but celebrate the newly announced engagement between
Arthur and Mabel. But Robert insists on doing the right thing by questioning Arthur’s
(indeed questionable) honor. However, Arthur only appears to be dishonorable because
Gertrude, after learning of Robert’s indiscretion, sent a note to Arthur requesting a
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private interview, a note intercepted by Mrs. Cheveley, who while Robert was present
appeared in Arthur’s apartments in Gertrude’s place. The note, of quite dubious language,
was then sent to Robert by Mrs. Cheveley as her final act of revenge for being thwarted
in her political machinations. To quell Robert’s impending ire upon receiving the note,
Arthur and Mabel convince Gertrude to tell Robert that the note was always intended for
him and not for Arthur, and that Mabel, as the messenger, had simply been delinquent in
her delivery. The story satisfies Robert, except as scripted, it does nothing to exonerate
Arthur for being the unexpected host for the conniving Mrs. Cheveley. This turn of
events redirects our focus back to Gertrude, as if all along, the problem of the film has
been not Robert’s stubborn resolve, but her inability to tell the truth.
And this also is right. The truth of the addendum is the truth of the film: that Lady
Gertrude has been unable to tell the truth of her desire. Now, for the first time, explicitly
positioned as the cause of Robert’s decision—for it’s her lie that leads him to incorrectly
explain Mrs. Cheveley’s presence at Arthur’s—Gertrude is finally forced to see herself as
one who desires, who is caught in desire, and literally so, for she’s the only one who can
truly clear Arthur’s name. She has no choice but to tell the truth, the truth of her desire to
lie which Robert has misidentified in his pronouncement against Arthur. This is the
inverse situation which has dominated the enter film: prior, it was Gertrude who failed to
see any connection between her desire and Robert’s behavior, a connection Robert
understood full well; now, it is Robert who fails to see that his decision bears any relation
to his wife’s desire, though Gertrude sees it plainly. In fact, Robert knows he’s just
stamped out everyone’s celebration of the engagement, whereas before, it was Gertrude
who stood in the way of everyone’s desire for her reconciliation with Robert. These
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reversals or doublings mirror Lady Gertrude to herself, so that in Robert’s judgment of
Arthur she sees the truth of her own judgment of Robert: that it is judgment based on a lie
and Robert (like Arthur) is innocent—innocent in that he never betrayed her, like she
never really (with Arthur) betrayed him.
Arthur’s counsel to Gertrude that the imperfect rather than the perfect need love,
and that it requires an assertion of courage to love what is imperfect is fundamental to
these reversals. “You have more courage than any woman I know,” Arthur tells her, “do
not be afraid to use it.” But why would anyone be afraid to love, to “quake to say they
love”? (Sidney 14). Why would it take courage to see flaws and defects and still love?
There’s no reason for Gertrude to be prodded by Arthur unless her state is already one of
disinclination. The key here is that Arthur’s encouragement points directly to the issue of
choice. Lady Gertrude’s self-perception is dependent on where she believes her choices
lie; specifically, she must carefully guard the idea of herself as free to choose, and thus
her convenient maneuvering between the “yes” and “no” of law. She must see herself as a
choosing being at all costs. Arthur, however, unequivocally indicates to her that she may
not, in her current subjective configuration, be a choosing being. Her first half-hearted
forgiveness of Robert represents more than anything an attempt to prove Arthur wrong, to
prove that she’s perfectly capable as she is of choosing not to choose, for instance. But
that isn’t love.
It’s only in the moment when Gertrude understands she has no choice but to tell
Robert the truth if Arthur and Mabel are to be together that she feels the existence of her
own Inertia. The truth of her desire is the truth of her Inertia: that she was never at any
time prior a loving, forgiving (i.e. virtuous) being unjustly wronged by her husband. For
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one’s sense of existing in injustice depends on the supposition that one also exists in
virtue. Seeking justice for oneself requires denying that one exists only as a seeker of
justice; one cannot do otherwise, but one tries not to know that for the sake of one’s
sovereignty and sense of achievement. This is her law, for law never lies where one
thinks it does. How distressing for her to realize that it is her best (only) pleasure to see
that all get what they deserve according to the law. Arthur’s advice is radical; he’s
basically telling Gertrude: stop being a seeker of justice; die to justice—kill the thing that
has always defined your being. And in its place, put what is absolutely new—love. In
other words, why don’t you finally make a real choice!
The choice to stop seeking justice is impossible to make in Derrida’s ethic of
openness to otherness. Only when the “invincible” demand for justice is set aside, only
when one is “cut” out of the belief in one’s unjust existence can there be an opening for
otherness—that is love. “Irreducible” and “undeconstructible” justice, necessary for
deconstruction to proceed by rote will never succeed in being truly transformative.
Derrida creates the illusion of transformation by claiming that awareness of one’s default
state is itself transformative, an achievement that is a fundamental change. The illusion of
change hinges on equating one’s awareness of irreducible justice with love. Derrida
claims that he only deconstructs what he loves and through this alone is he able to do
justice to and thus love another’s singularity (Derrida and Roudinesco 4-5). In contrast,
Robert correctly perceives that there’s an extra factor X, a stowaway desire in Gertrude’s
call for justice that has nothing to do with justice, let alone love. This X goes by the name
of justice and hides itself in law; it clings to her secretly and only by recognizing it,
confessing it, can she finally let justice go. Derrida’s “irreducible” justice can’t avow the
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secret desire of its own desire, the pleasure of seeing others get exactly the punishment
(we think) they deserve. No one deconstructs what they love—one only deconstructs that
from which one desires escape. And Derrida could never deconstruct justice because he
loved the pleasure of seeking it. Love fundamentally binds.
Arthur’s description of the act of sacrificing justice as “courage” is quite apt, for
to love would first require Gertrude to take responsibility for her own Inertia. Blaming
Arthur and Mabel, for instance, for making her lie or blaming Mrs. Cheveley for causing
such a mess to begin with would be the same old, tired means of retaining her phony
innocence and secret pleasure in judgment. So also would be claiming that seeking justice
is just the way she is and she can’t help it—it’s human nature!—or the devil made her do
it, or (as we prefer to say now) “society” or “language” has “constituted” her that way.
And how can she blame Robert? Isn’t his drive to excel in virtue the misinterpretation of
her virtue, his ambition the product of her lie? The only aspect of herself that Gertrude
can and must claim as “her own” is her Inertia. Her lie is all that belongs to her: she exists
in a lie, she exists to lie, she inclines toward lying. I lied, Lady Gertrude confesses: I
believed the serpent; I wanted the fruit.12
The consequences of this ownership would be twofold: 1.) it necessitates a
reinterpretation of Arthur’s “it’s the imperfect who need love” speech to Gertrude. If
Gertrude takes this idea and applies it to her husband—he’s flawed and needs her help—
she just recreates her orientation toward law on a different plain which requires no
fundamental change to her subjective disposition. Forgiveness along these lines would be
a confirmation of her innocence which she already believes in anyway. The abstract
application of law upon others is what she already knows how to do and requires no
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courage. Engaging in this practice also requires no serious commitment to Arthur as
bearer of the message, and no confession that she believes him. However, acknowledging
her own lie alters the perspective from which she interprets Arthur’s speech, for now, it’s
a speech about her—she is imperfect and needing love. From this viewpoint, the last
thing she would wish for would be justice done to her, so how could she demand justice
be done to Robert? This reorientation requires 2.) that the initial object of love must, in
light of the discovery of her Inertia, be herself, and only then, others. If she wallows or
berates herself, she’s not put to death her desire, that is, justice.
It’s noteworthy that at the beginning of Derrida’s career, he spoke of the loss of a
stabilizing center as not a loss at all but a “joyous affirmation,” a laughter, dance, and
“adventure” which we can surrender to without regrets (“Structure” 264). However, later
Derrida cannot laugh; on the contrary, un-centeredness is nothing but dreary. It’s because
with the proliferation of centers or “universal singularities,” each I becomes responsible
for every other I so that in The Gift of Death, Derrida actually argues that because every I
is finite but faced with infinite choices, every I is therefore always blameworthy for its
inability to make at the same time, all the choices available (68-71). As if a woman
wrongs all other men because she decides to marry her husband. Such excessive blame
and burden (which not even Christianity places on people’s shoulders) is only possible
through the most radical abstraction, and as such is perfectly, even excessively logical
given Derrida’s premises. All must be treated the same; every I must make the same
choice for all, and the impossibility of multiplying this sameness to all equals the
exclusion of the New or Justice. “It will always be the case that someone is being injured
by the present order,” one of Derrida’s disciples states, “so that the worst injustice would
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be to say that present order represents perfect justice” (Derrida, Caputo, and Kearney
302). And because we can only exist in the traditions which promise Justice but don’t and
will never embody it, the only ethical stance is eternally to testify to this predicament.
There’s no redemption from this problem; in our acts of goodness, we will always
“discover that we are already embedded in a world of injustice in which to respond to the
claim of the one I betray the claim of the other” (Jennings 151). Such relentless
seriousness must be countered with the laughter of Lady Gertrude.
Recall the formulas delineating the subjectivities of Eve and Katherine:
Eve’s:
E
DL
LI
D

Katherine’s:
K

DL
LI
D

It was my contention that Katherine represents a shift in orientation toward law because
she recognizes that her desire can only be desire according to a doorkeeper to whom she
becomes the living message. It’s the triangulation among Katherine, DL, and the
doorkeeper that exposes LI, though such an exposure doesn’t automatically negate its
operation or dictate a means of movement. In this mode its function and even more its
cause as it relates to the triangle is still to be determined.
I propose now that Gertrude, who began in position E, successfully passed
through position K to arrive at a state beyond LI and DL, which I will chart thusly:
DL
LI
GD
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I place Gertrude next to the doorkeeper—in this case Arthur—to stress both the need of
his intervention in the subjective transformation and that this need is no longer read as an
obstacle to autonomy by the subject, and thus as something the subject must disavow.
Rather, the doorkeeper is accepted as the hope of a different being in which autonomy
doesn’t figure because justice is no longer the subject’s goal. Also, Gertrude
is positioned within sight of but separate
from LI and DL to symbolize that her
subjective experience is now split along
a new axis. Rather than being caught in
the ambivalence of I want to be Queen
and I don’t want to be Queen which
marks the subject of law, Gertrude’s
subjectivity is characterized this way:
Queenship is irrelevant and I want to be
Queen and I don’t want to be Queen.
“Queenship is irrelevant,” as the newly

Jacques Lacan leaving his
seminar, March 1980 13

created site of being in her, becomes the locus of resistance to LI and DL and propels her
new activity, which is love.
According to Derrida’s ethics, Lady Gertrude’s confession is nothing particularly
radical or transformative. First, the motive for her confession no doubt was “to reach
some reconciliation, some redemption, to improve [her]self, to change [her]self,” in
which case it isn’t a true confession since its “guided by a teleology.” “It’s just an
economy, it’s a therapy, it’s whatever you want,” but it’s not a confession (“Composing”
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25). Second, Derrida would argue that Gertrude presumed to say I lied, which is a lie in
and of itself because she can never be “identical with [her]self,” which means to confess
her lie is really to confess that she’s no longer the same person who lied, and as such it’s
just a way to “exonerate [her]self” (“Confessions” 32, 33). Third, her forgiveness of her
husband wasn’t difficult enough, for “pure forgiveness must forgive the one who [. . .]
remains unforgivable. If I forgive something or someone that remains forgivable, I don’t
forgive; it’s too easy. If I forgive the fault (the ‘what’) of the one who has repented, or the
one who has repented himself (the ‘who’), I forgive something or someone other than the
crime or the criminal. The true ‘meaning’ of forgiveness, therefore, is to forgive even the
unforgivable and even someone who does not ask for forgiveness” (Derrida and
Roudinesco 161).
In Derrida’s ethic, both confession and forgiveness “must remain meaningless,”
that is, free from law or the machine of “calculation, calculability, and repetition,” for
only then is there freedom, or what he also calls the “incalculable,” the “event,” the
“unforeseeable and therefore not programmable [. . .] which exceeds the machine”
(“Composing” 25; Derrida and Roudinesco 49). The difficulty of his ethic as it concerns
Lady Gertrude is 1.) as I have maintained all along, Derrida’s inability to account
for the role of his desire. The structure of pure happening, pure confession, pure
forgiveness, etc. can’t speak for itself. The real issue is why Derrida desires to turn
pure abstractions into a means of judging and condemning the actions and motives of
others as ethically deficient. Gertrude struggles both to confess and to forgive because
she is wrestling with the why of her desire, the nameless factor X. The truth is she can’t
forgive because her demand for justice is her subjective center; it is her pleasure to
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imagine her innocence and thus the guilt of others.
And 2.) Derrida’s division of confession and forgiveness into two separate acts
also doesn’t help us understand the resolution of the film. When exactly does Gertrude
forgive her husband? Already disqualified is her half-hearted effort which was, in
Derrida’s terms, quite programmed because carried out in the shadow of law. It must be
that Gertrude’s confession I lied is itself her act of forgiveness. Her confession has just
annihilated the distinction she formerly kept between herself and her husband; she now
sees that they’re both liars. And because they’re both liars, she discerns that in an
important way her announcement of her forgiveness of him would be superfluous. Her
forgiveness is possible because she discerns a fundamental likeness; her former insistence
on her own singularity was an impediment to forgiveness. Her understanding of likeness
has broken down her categories of being and the law which sustained those categories as
ones of justice. To Gertrude, “[t]here is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor
free man, there is neither male nor female,” and as such, it is no longer necessary for
there to be “enmities, strife, jealousy, outbursts of anger, disputes, dissensions, factions,
[or] envying,” but rather “love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness,
gentleness, [and] self-control; against such things there is no [longer any] law” (Gal.
3:28; 5:20-21a, 22-23).
Gertrude’s laughter is a break with justice and its necessary contradictions and
ironies. She laughs rather than cries when she admits she’s just like everybody else
because sadness would be the site of law and it’s bitter blow directed at herself, and
having believed Arthur that the imperfect need love, not justice, Gertrude has already
taken hold of another joy, a pleasure completely unrelated to the one experienced by
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seeing sinners get what (we think) they deserve. Queenship is irrelevant, expressed in
the form, “I need a drink!” is therefore not the opposite of I want to be Queen and I don’t
want to be Queen; the latter structure of being already includes its negation. In other
words, I’m not arguing that love is the opposite of justice. I am suggesting, however, that
love as the fifth state of being marks the end of Justice’s permanent deferral, and thus the
end of its absolute tyranny.
16 December 2008
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I am sure this Jesus will not do,
Either for Englishman or Jew. (Blake 329-330)

Notes Upon a Case of Persecution Complex1
I. Introductory Overview of the Patient’s History:
In 1983 a man whom I will call The Persecuted, or “Percy,” published Literature
in Protestant England: 1560-1660, a small volume that focused on the work of Sidney,
Spenser, Milton, Donne, Shakespeare, and Marlowe among others. According to Percy,
these figures in various ways wrote in and through and sometimes out of the contradictory Protestant theology that dominated the period. “The Reformation belief of
contradictories created a universe of strife and tension,” Percy asserted. “It insisted on the
need for grace whilst denying any means to obtain it. It claimed that God is aware of
every movement of the individual spirit whilst emphasizing the inevitability of sin. And it
posited a good and just divinity who damns the larger proportion of his people without
their being able to affect the issue” (Sinfield 11). Such paradoxes could not sustain the
credulity of the majority of people, Percy claimed, and so “most people rejected it,” a
rejection made manifest in the growth of secularism toward the period’s end (11, 129).
And it was just as well—according to Percy. For Protestant Christianity “is the
explicit and systematic formulation of a hierarchical, indeed tyrannical, attitude to human
affairs” (3); it is “punitive and authoritarian” (129); is “intolerant of disagreement to the
point of taking life” (138); is “characterized by personal cruelty and the exercise of
autocratic power” (142); and all in the name of a so-called loving God who is really quite
“tyrannical” and “intrusive” (142, 151). Thankfully, said Percy, we’ve now achieved a
“more sensible view of the world” and can look back on the seventeenth century pioneers
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of secularism like Hobbes, Bacon, and Chillingworth to “appreciate what we have
gained” (151, 129). No longer languishing under the “domination of religious attitudes,”
we are free to “just let God slip out of the main part of [our] lives” (129, 142); and truly,
this couldn’t be more warranted, for “[t]he contradiction in protestant thought
legitimated the development of secularism” (133; bold mine).
II. Preliminary Guiding Question:
A.) When I find inconsistencies and contradictions in secularism, would that
legitimate my turn to religion to find a “more sensible view of the world”?
III. Beginning of the Treatment:
It was quite remarkable how positively put-out The Persecuted became when I
posed the above question to him. “No, it would in nowise be legitimate—I don’t
understand your use of this word.” Clearly, the patient did not recognize his preference in
his own speech for legitimate to the exclusion of potential synonyms: reasonable,
understandable, among others. Whether this was a conscious or unconscious failure I
could not surmise, but only noted that any patient’s lack of vocabulary affords accessible
clues to the mode in which their psychic structures have coalesced. In this case, the
patient’s reliance on legitimate to signify causality underscored the necessary versus
contingent nature of his secular transformation. What Christians could not resolve, it was
left to the philosophers to clean up (Hill 83). Naturalizing the process of discovery and
rejection of paradox by eliding any modicum of desire, choice, or responsibility in the
matter—he and others were just carried along in the march of history—seemed to me a
means to preempt via the application of law the charge that the patient was a lawbreaker.
Thus the superego demand to obey (here projected onto an autocratic deity) was satisfied
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while at the same time the id stole pleasure by thwarting the injunctions of authority as
“unnatural.” Of course, for the ego to maintain its precarious equilibrium this enjoyment
must always be in jeopardy, and so the patient was certain that “the punitive and
authoritarian approach which ratified Reformation theology is still active,” and therefore
still capable of making him once more a victim of paradox (Sinfield, Literature 130).2
Speaking of which, of course I did not reply to the patient’s demand to know my
purpose in suggesting the ironies underlying his own use of the word legitimated.
Invariably, patients suffering from persecution complexes severely regulate their thinking
to eliminate complexity. The mere hint that his secularism might entail any contradictions
which should therefore naturally move him to abandon it would undermine his sense of
himself as one who has (paradoxically) chosen the most “sensible” option among several
available. It was impossible to make the patient see this. Indeed, we’d do well to
remember that it is impossible to make patients see anything about themselves at all.
Nevertheless, as our sessions continued, it became apparent that Percy’s struggle
to think compartmentally was intensifying. This was marked by an agitated pacing along
the edge of the couch which was no longer a place for him to recline with ease. He began
accusing me of sinister motives: I was stifling him, “[striving] to clamp the lid back upon
the forces of individual thought” and “[seeking] finality in doctrine and [using] any
argument to cut off the possibility of ambiguity or freedom of interpretation” (Sinfield,
Literature 138). I showed “a lack of affection” and believed he was a child who “had to
be broken” (142). No doubt I thought that “whipping [should be] the usual response to
infringements at all levels of society” and that parents should “beat the Catechism into
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their children” (142). “[T]eaching modern Christian creationism should be fought as a
form of child abuse,” he remarked during one particularly bitter outburst (Haraway 152).
All such “proofs” demon-strated to him that I had what he called “a punitive
personality—to [you] sheer accident or social process is intolerable, always someone
must be blamed and punished,” he
declared (Sinfield, Literature142). In
these accusations among others of
similar nature, I noted “[t]he mechanism
of symptom-formation in paranoia”
Cigar Break, I

3

which necessitates that “internal

perceptions” be substituted for outward ones. “Consequently the proposition ‘I hate him’
becomes transformed by projection into another one: ‘He hates (persecutes) me, which
will justify me in hating him.’ And thus the unconscious feeling, which is in fact the
motive force, makes its appearance as though it were the consequence of an external
perception: ‘I do not love him—I hate him, because HE PERSECUTES ME’” (Freud 139).
Though seemingly regressive, this eruption of aggression encouraged me that we could
proceed to the next stage of treatment.
No doubt you will have noticed that my initial question to Percy on the
legitimation of a turn to religion if contradictions were discovered within secularism was
structured as a test of a hypothesis I’d made prior; that being, that the patient’s own use
of the term legitimate disguised a fear of illegitimacy. His response to the question
verified my suppositions, for though he believed a religious conversion would indeed be
illegitimate, he could not, in fact, use the word, but resorted to a labored structure of
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double negatives—no, not legitimate.4 Could this avoidance be the symptom of the
patient’s sense not simply of his illogicality or illegality but of his own bastardy? I speak
not of a literal hushed-up birth, an abandonment at an orphanage in the middle of the
night, but rather of a symbolic failure, the patient’s belief that he had been insufficiently
recognized, had been improperly “owned” for himself, as himself, in-the- name-of—
what? Christendom? The patient’s insistence that his Christian father(s)—for “the father
is he who acknowledges us”—was in actuality despotic and interfering was no doubt
necessary for him to believe for the sake of his ego; however, as every analyst knows not
to be taken in by ego-talk, I concluded that his story of persecution was not as thorough
as it could have been (Lacan, Ethics 309).
It should be remarked, by way of additional notes on the patient’s history, that he
confessed to having a “passion for Nietzsche, Rousseau, and also Gide,” writers who, in
his youth, helped him express the sentiment, “‘Families, I hate you.’” “I thought of
literature as the end of the family, and of the society it represented,” Percy stated, “even
if that family was also, on the other hand, persecuted” (Derrida, Acts of Literature 39).
The persecution he spoke of referred to his sense of displacement as a Jewish boy living
in Algiers in the 1940’s; during this time Algerians were no longer considered to be
French citizens and Jews especially were singled out for discrimination. In the patient’s
words, the difficulty he experienced was one of identification: “[Jews] could not properly
identify themselves, in the double sense of ‘identifying oneself’ and ‘identifying oneself
with’ the other. They could not identify themselves in the terms of models, norms, or
values whose development was to them alien because French, metropolitan, Christian,
and Catholic” (Derrida, Monolingualism 52). Percy felt lost; for his family’s Jewish
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identity had incorporated into itself French Catholicism, or a critique of Jewishness from
the perspective of Christianity:
This is my grievance. For as I thought I perceived it during my adolescent years,
when I was beginning to understand a little what was happening, this [Jewish]
heritage was already ossified, even necrotized, into ritual comportment, whose
meaning was no longer legible even to the majority of the Jews of Algeria. [. . .]
I was rebelling against what I took to be gesticulations, particularly on feast days
in the synagogues—I could not lose my temper, except from what was already an
insidious Christian contamination: the respectful belief in inwardness, the preference for intention, the heart, the mind, mistrust with respect to literalness or to
an objective action given to the mechanicity of the body, in short, a denunciation
so conventional, of Pharisaism. (Monolingualism 54)
How to resist such influence and recapture one’s original, untainted identity? Of course,
it was impossible, and it was Percy’s realization of this which in turn motivated his
resistance to any ideology he felt attempted to impose homogeneity in the name of a
fictitious “purity,” for any ideology contained, as he experienced of Christianity,
paradoxes and “polylogues” of its own (Monolingualism 56).
The next phase of treatment consisted in attempting to add to this narrative of
persecution, to expand it, to dislodge its orientation towards the master-signifier (i.e.
legitimate) which gave it its coherent but meager sustenance. This process of decentering
proved quite difficult, for I could not automatically rely on a straightforward assertion of
counter-narrative, challenging the patient, for instance, with evidence that his father
wasn’t “really” a despot. As a general rule, we cannot pile up inductive facts in hopes of
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overwhelming our patients’ cherished deductions. Not to minimize patients’ sufferings,
but to analogize: UFO enthusiasts won’t be embarrassed if shown the hangers at Area 51
are empty; it will only confirm to them that the government is conspiring to keep secrets,
for “ideology really succeeds when even the facts which at first sight contradict it start to
function as arguments in its favour” (Žižek, Sublime 49). It is the enthusiasts’ desire to
believe in bureaucratic cover-ups which is the problem.
The truth of this became apparent in my subsequent
interviews with Percy. One day he mentioned off-hand that
he’d kept diaries as a young man and that “perhaps I’d start
believing him” if I read them. I agreed; they were not too
tedious. On the contrary, he’d recorded many illuminating
descriptions and impressions of his father (named Donne),
even some snippets of conversation. As I read, I initially
Cigar Break, II

was astonished by his remarkable memory, until I began to

notice that in his conversations with me, he was telling me barely a third of what his
father had said, was neglecting whole episodes, and skipping over long stretches of time.
This isn’t unusual, as in most neurotics “the un-certainty of memory is used to the fullest
extent as a help in the formation of symptoms” (Freud 68). I asked him when he’d last
read his journals and he confessed he didn’t know. I thought it might be constructive to
confront him with his omissions: “Look here,” I said, “your father may have been a bit of
a libertine in his youth, but he did become a minister; your complaints don’t account for
the last half of his life.” 5 “So what?” he replied, “he didn’t have a choice about becoming
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a preacher; I never took that ‘conversion’ seriously.” 6 Quite an extraordinary declaration
in light of Percy’s account of his own “choice” of secularism.
We continued in this way for some weeks, pitting evidence against evidence.
At one point I seized upon a sermon his father Donne had preached the Sunday after the
celebration of the conversion of St. Paul. The celebration provided Donne with his central
text, Acts 9:4, “And he fell to the earth, and heard a voice, saying, ‘Saul, Saul, why
persecutest thou me?’” The sermon was typical of its Protestant class: the explication of a
main text, warnings, admonishments, the emotional incitement to follow the
recommended course of action based on newly discovered or carelessly forgotten
principles; in short, the sermon cited a spiritual law and applied it in the name of
homogeneity—just the sort of a procedure Percy despised. However, as I read Percy’s
notes, it became clear that his father was actually using the example of Paul to challenge
the efficacy or safety of just such a procedure. Donne’s God was anything but safe:
Will thou be so ill a Logician to thy selfe, and to thine own damnation, as to
conclude so, God is alwayes the same in himselfe, therefore he must be alwayes
the same to me? [. . .] So ill a Historian as to say, God hath called Saul, a
Persecutor, then when he breathed threatnings and slaughter, then when he sued to
the State for a Commission to persecute Christ, [. . .] And therefore if he have a
minde to me, he will deale so with me too [. . .]? God forbid. It is not safe
concluding out of single Instances. (6:208)
It could be countered that Donne was citing a spiritual law—the unpredictability of God
—but if this were so, how would such a law squelch “individual thought” and “freedom
of interpretation” as Percy complained? Would it not rather encourage them?
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He was by no means open to this suggestion. “Look,” he countered, taking his
diary from my hand, “you’re being purposely simple-minded.” He then explained to me
that no less than twenty-seven times in this sermon did Donne construct a binary. For
instance, consider this description of Saul’s disposition at the moment of his conversion:
[W]hen he was in the height of his fury, Christ laid hold upon him. It was, for the
most part, Christ’s method of curing. Then when the Sea was in a tempestuous
rage, when the waters covered the ship, and the storme shaked even that which
could remove mountains […], then Christ rebukes the winde, and commands a
calme. Then when the Sun was gone out to run his race as a Giant (as David
speaks) then God by the mouth of another, Ioshuah, bids the Sun stand still. Then
when that uncleane spirit foam’d, and fum’d, and tore, and rent the possessed
persons, then Christ commanded them to go out. [. . .] [I]n the midst of his fit, he
gave him physic, in the midst of his madnesse, he reclaimes him. (6:206)
Percy had underscored this passage in his notes with some passion, for the pen marks had
left deep indentations on the page. The binaries fury/cure, tempest/calm, racing/stillness,
possession/release, fit/physick, and madness/recovery, he told me, all conspired to arrest
the meaning of Saul by subordinating the prior term to the latter, thus creating the illusion
that the latter term was both original and unitary, having expelled from its center the
multiple and mutable. But the “truth of Saul,” he said, could never be founded in simple,
stable concepts which were themselves the effects of a prior distinction and had no
existence outside the realm of their own articulation. That Donne had to repeat this truthgesture, founding and re-founding, stacking binary on binary at an increasingly
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prodigious rate, only attested to the precarious instability of his building. He directed my
attention to his notes recording the other binaries he’d identified in the sermon:
prison/church

instrument of Satan/organ of the Spirit

iron/gold

mouth of blasphemy/mouth of Christ

persecutor/apostle

earthly/angelic

fall/rise

human/heavenly

breaking/mending

blind/sight

death/life

raven/dove

fear/health

accident/providence

dream/waking
“You see how there is an imbalance, with an extra entry in the left column,” he said to
me, “so the edifice will inevitably tip to the right.”
When I expressed some perplexity, he continued, “It’s called logocentrism—it
began with the Greeks—look it up—there’s a great deal of literature on the subject.” For
a moment I assumed he was speaking of himself, describing his condition as one might
refer to oneself as suffering from agoraphobia, and indeed, in his calculations about his
father’s speech, I did detect a degree of superstition, and imagined that if I said the terms
“black” and “white” in quick succession, the patient would suffer a fit and begin carrying
a charm to ward off the effects of my word-power. (Note: it wasn’t long after this that the
patient coined a strange neologism, “différance,” and began to chant it precisely at those
moments when we seemed to near the cause of his persecution complex. The result was
that though he expressed a desire “to discover the date of the first occurrence of [his]
obsessional idea,” he continued “to place it further and further back” in the past, and was
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constantly “finding fresh ‘first’ occasions for the appearance of [his] obsession” thus
endlessly deferring a cure (Freud 64)). However, I soon deduced that Percy meant to
describe Donne, not himself, and that “logocentrism” as he defined it, meant an
unjustifiable leaning to, bias toward, or partiality toward the right, when the compass
indicated no such direction, indeed, no direction whatsoever.7
Donne’s logocentrism, the patient maintained, couldn’t be more typical. Consider
another passage describing the dramatic reorientation of Saul toward the object of his
persecution: “[F]or here a Wolfe is made a Lambe . . . A bramble is made a vine
. . . Cockle and tares become wheat . . . A Pirate becomes a safe Pilot . . . The lees are
come to swim on the top, and the last is growne first” (6:209-210). “And all this English
even juxtaposed with Latin,” Percy groaned, pointing to the ellipses which indicated he’d
omitted his father’s translations. Signifiers had to be unstable, he told me, because they
could only be comprehended in relation to other signifiers, but Donne’s binaries implied
stasis rather than movement, permanence rather than change, transparency rather than
ambiguity, certainty and dogmatism rather than openness and inclusion. He flipped
hastily through his notes to find another example to prove his point: “The Lord, and onely
the Lord knowes how to wound us, out of love; more then that, how to wound us into
love; more then all that, to wound us into love, not onely with him that wounds us, but
into love with the wound it selfe” (6:212). See how Donne used all his cleverness to keep
the binary wound/love from collapsing on itself? Percy said to me. By maintaining a
strict distinction between “wounding us out of love” and “wounding us into love,” Donne
failed to grasp the paradox that what formerly had seemed to be only a wound, and thus a
negation of love, turned upon a second look into the very love that had originally seemed
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its absent antidote. Hence, he continued, wounding = loving in the same way that,
according to Paul, weakness = power. In his discussion of the “thorn in his flesh” in II
Corinthians, 12:1-11, Paul pleaded for God to save him from weakness, only to realize
that God’s power resided in his weakness, and so weakness was the vehicle for power.
After this speech, The Persecuted ceased treatment for several months against my
advisement. He left his diaries with me however, which gave me hope for his return; in
the meantime, I reviewed his case history and was able to draw some conclusions of a
purely theoretical nature: First, it became evident that “in obsessional neuroses the
unconscious mental processes occasionally break through into consciousness in their pure
and undistorted form,” so that we must be careful not to trouble ourselves to search for
some hidden meaning behind a patient’s speech; rather, we must be aware that the truth
lies on the surface (Freud 64). For instance, Percy blamed his father for believing a
paradox—that the God who saves is also the God who condemns, and by his own choice
—a belief Percy argued was oppressive. But later, Percy also blamed his father for failing
to appreciate paradox, for being so simple as to misunderstand that truth invariably
exceeds any grubby little binary. In this I was able to discern that the “deep structure” of
the patient’s psyche was fully articulated, and by the patient himself, and it consisted in
this ambivalence toward paradox. On one hand, paradox was a cruel, unnatural force
imposing upon him from without, and on the other, it was, through “différance” the very
condition and possibility of his freedom. I’ve found in such cases that it’s best to proceed
on the supposition that the patient really does have two minds; that is “two separate and
contradictory convictions” (Freud 65).
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Discovering the patient’s ambivalence gave me a clearer understanding of why
merely pitting evidence against evidence did little to dislodge his formative narrative of
injustice and persecution. A patient of “two minds” will always adopt the mind most
convenient to the protection and perpetuation of his ego, often with such pronouncements
as, “But I’ve already taken everything into consideration,” or “I can’t talk to you within
this framework,” or “I’m sorry but I can’t adequately answer this question in such an
impromptu manner,” or “On one hand . . . on the other hand” (Derrida, any text). To put
it differently, this very division and especially the movement between the divides is that
which constitutes the patient’s ego. Therefore, I propose that to challenge a patient’s ego
in this context requires us to challenge the patient’s movement as movement, to dispute
whether his perception of movement, his desire for it or belief in it, automatically
indicates movement is occurring. It was symptomatic that The Persecuted’s procedure
when confronted with Donne’s sermon on the conversion of Paul was to accuse his father
of an obstinate and static interpretation. Though his reading of his father’s sermon was
simplistic, his certainty throughout was that Donne was the one without understanding.
Hiding behind “différance,” he wielded one paradox to defend himself from his father’s.
And why he defended himself in this way I was also able to deduce. For while
Percy perpetually cited contradiction, aporia, paradox, ambiguity, undecidability, and
impossibility as the very possibility of his own freedom, he was unwilling to grant the
same to his father. No, his father’s Christian paradoxes were the epitome of constraint,
limitation, constriction, closure, staleness, and ho-hum orthodoxy. In fact, he could only
assume his father to be living a miserable, colorless, and unadventurous life, and keeping
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others from doing the same, when the rich and profound depth of his father’s language
seemed to me to indicate quite the reverse, and so much so, that the only conclusion to be
drawn was that Percy absolutely could not abide the idea of his father’s freedom.
The viability of my analysis grew as I
continued reading Percy’s diaries. The magnitude
of his misunderstanding of his father tempted me to
describe it as willful, but of course we ought not to
forget in any obsession, the part played by
compulsion, i.e. the instincts (Freud 78). Donne’s
sermon on the conversion of Paul pronounced the
Still Smokin’

possibility of personal freedom based on the

supposition of divine intervention. “God speakes,” wrote Donne, “[Paul] heard a voice”
(6:216, 217). And the voice came in the form of an unanswerable question: Why do you
persecute me? “No discourse can lay claim to truth if it does not contain an explicit
answer to the question: Who speaks?” (Badiou 17). As such, Paul appropriately asked,
“Who are You, Lord?” (Acts 9:5). However, the appropriateness of the return question
was so by means of its prior disjunction, for who in no way followed why rationally; a
connection only existed because in the instant Paul heard the voice, all prior suppositions
about himself, his God, and his mission to persecute Christians were suspended. Who
speaks? Surely no longer Saul; his subjectivity had been thrown into doubt; therefore he
could do nothing but answer God’s question with another question. In a way the second
question resigned the signature of the first, confirming that God’s speech had already
transformed him in-his- name (Asals 130).
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Logos, logos, logos! Percy had scribbled this in a margin—a voice out of the sky
and all is assured! I could not agree with his assessment, however, for it missed the fact
that Paul, blinded, fell from his horse—Donne insisted on this point—Paul was abruptly
thrown down; it was a “medicinall falling” Donne called it, for Paul fell to be raised or
resurrected (6:212). In this way his falling and rising mirrored that of Christ who spoke to
him; as one writer has remarked, “Just as the Resurrection remains totally incalculable,”
“Paul’s faith is that from which he begins as a subject, and nothing leads up to it. The
event—‘it happened,’ purely and simply, in the anonymity of a road,” and in this way it
acted as a “subjective sign of the event proper that is the Resurrection of Christ” (Badiou
17). It seemed to me that riding on the horse was the sure thing, and the intervention of
the Logos of God (as St. John would have it) brought disruption and uncertainty.
In his sermon, Donne at times struggled “to say the unsayable,” and more often
than not, confirmed through his paradoxes that so irritated Percy “the incapacity of
ordinary grammar to express the unfathomable grammar of grace” (Cummings 405, 413).
The Logos that confronted Paul is dangerous said one scholar; it “plays havoc” with “the
rules of language” and “demands the invention of a new language” precisely because it
reveals one’s own language as the rule, as a predisposition (414). For instance, for Saul’s
language of sight, God substituted one of hearing: “Man hath a natural way to come to
God, by the eie,” Donne said, “But then, God hath super-induced a supernaturall way, by
the eare. For, though hearing be naturall, yet that faith in God should come by hearing a
man preach, is supernatural” (6:217). Donne’s procedure in his sermons, in turn, was to
“throw down” his audience’s expectations, to “strategically undermine[] the hope that his
text expresse[d]” so as to create in them dissatisfaction with their “spiritual insensibility”
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(B. Nelson 253, 256, 259). It was a form of blinding that exposed blindness, revealing the
Word “by removing from [one’s] line of vision the structures that obscure it and cause
[one] to forget it” (Fish, Self-Consuming 69).
In remarking on my impressions of the danger of the Christian Logos and the
incalculability of God’s choice, I do not mean to imply that either are violent—at least,
not violent according to The Persecuted’s definition. Taking his hint, I did look up “the
great deal of literature” on the subject of logocentrism. There I discovered that the term
Logos came to be “an essential philosophical term in the work of Heraclitus. It is a term
that designates the actual object philosophical discourse is aiming at, over and beyond
language as such. If such a discourse could come to completion, it would be identical to
the Logos—that is to say, to the divine, rational and logical principle according to which
the world is organized” (Girard, Things Hidden 263). The Greek Logos functioned, in
much the way Percy complained, in “bring[ing] together entities that are opposites” for
the purpose of maintaining the “doubles in relative harmony and prevent[ing] them from
destroying one another” (265, 266). However, this harmonizing or balancing act for the
purposes of social order (i.e. to prevent violence from erupting) was only accomplished
via another violence which necessitated not only the subordination of one term to
another, but the forcible expulsion from the society of anything (or anyone) which might
upset the balance of power. For without careful categorization, there was no means of
social control, no “mastery of the totality,” and thus by definition (for a Greek) no
“wisdom” (Badiou 42).
But if we return to the story of Paul, we see that the Christian Logos did not pit
violence against violence by categorizing or excluding. For instance, Jesus did not label
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Paul a “persecutor”—he just asked Paul why he was engaging in the activity; in a way,
his question supposed Paul was not fundamentally a persecutor. But even if Paul was one,
that did not negate God’s choice to include him. And this marks the distinction between
the Greek Logos and the Christian, for the goal of the former is to maintain the social
order, but the goal of the latter is to transform it. In the story of Paul, everything is
purposely thrown off kilter. Therefore, Paul’s conversion to Christianity was, among
other things, a move out of logical equipoise. The best the Greek Logos could offer him,
as explained by one scholar, was to “tend toward justice by acknowledging and practicing
the violence within it,” fighting “light with a certain other light” in hopes that it had
chosen the “least violent” violence (Derrida, Writing 117). While the imprisoning of
Christians appears to us the “most” violent choice, it would not have been to Paul; it
would have been wisdom, for the preservation of his cultural order was at stake. As we
learn everyday from our patients, one person’s “least violent” is another person’s “most.”
Percy, of course, did not think his repudiation of his father to be very violent either.
The Christian Logos, therefore, because it is fundamentally the choice of God, is
not a philosophical system of categorization people can master (though many have tried)
to control nature or other people; if a persecutor can become a Christian, then there are no
longer any necessary (and unjust) exclusions. Another way to say this would be: there is
no longer any law. This is what Christianity makes possible: the obsolescence of the
rule(s) of philosophy. Christ was “the chosen one,” that is, the choice of God, and as such
he is “a coming,” or “what interrupts the previous regime of discourses”; he is what “in
himself and for himself, [. . .] happens to us” (Badiou 48). The choice of God is the
beginning of freedom from philosophy. Greek morality was “wholly founded on an order
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that is no doubt a tidied-up, ideal order.” It was “the morality of the master, created for
the virtues of the master and linked to the order of powers” (Lacan, Ethics 315). Christ’s
teaching slices through that tidiness; as but one of a myriad of examples: in his parable of
the unfaithful steward, Christ “the purest of the pure,” actually says “that the best way to
achieve salvation for one’s soul is to embezzle the funds one is in charge of, since that,
too, may lead the children of light to grant you, if not a reward, then at least a certain
gratitude.” Such counsel, “[f]rom the point of view of a homogeneous, uniform, and
stable morality,” can only appear to be a flagrant “contradiction” (Lacan, Ethics 96).
It was, I thought, an odd fixation in Percy that he could only view Christianity as
an obstacle to human liberty, for he otherwise valued openness and undecidability in all
things. And there could be nothing more open and undecidable than the choice of God. In
considering all this, I suspected, given Percy’s “unshaken belief” in his father’s guilt, that
he suffered from vertigo, and that his anger with his father disguised a fear of falling
(Girard, Things Hidden 47). As the story of Paul illustrated, reliance on the surefootedness of one’s horse was the real danger; this would even be a good definition of
sin: the insistence on fixity, the “refusal to interpret” or confront the moment of
ambiguity (Pendergast 121).8 It is the refusal to answer the question: “Why do you
persecute me?” Greek logocentrism was along this order, for it did not seriously question
why it persecuted those it did; it assumed the guilt of those it sacrificed. In fact, since
logocentrism was a machine for defining and maintaining uniformity and stability, I
began to wonder why Percy, given his own inclinations for stasis, reacted to it with so
much vehemence. Such a banal philosophy should not elicit his degree of distress, so I
concluded that his true distress was Christianity, and that by imposing Greek philosophy
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on that faith, he could in turn make Christianity non-threatening. Domesticated by the
rule of law, the unpredictable choice of God cannot happen.9
Therefore, though Percy rejected the authority of his father, he was not opposed to
authority per se; rather, it was that all authority had to be subject to philosophia. The
accusation that his father was logocentric and therefore bound by a philosophical system
that was oppressive, was a red herring. The underlying theme of all Percy’s complaints
was really that his father was not systematic enough but acted arbitrarily and demanded
obedience without question or debate. In short, his father was illogical; Percy could not
understand him. Or perhaps it was that Percy understood him all too well and rejected the
truth his father made plain, for Christianity begins where philosophy breaks down—it
reveals that any authority can only be accepted, not on the rationality of law, but on faith.
The Christian message is essentially: the words of Jesus are of “the one to whom,
according to his own statement, all power is given in heaven and on earth. You, my
listener, must now in your own mind consider whether you will submit to this authority
or not, accept and believe these words or not” (Kierkegaard 347). Philosophy urges one
to believe someone because what they say is “brilliant or profound or wondrously
beautiful,” and in this way it disguises the element of faith in belief because it makes
belief the effect of the application of established criteria (Kierkegaard 347). Christianity
insists that the operation is the reverse—belief is “formed” in one by God’s choice apart
from any recognizable criteria; justifications for one’s beliefs are always a secondary
formation, the effect of what one has already accepted. We call them “rationalizations”
because we know, whether we say so or not, that “people stick to their positions for
anything but ‘rational’ reasons” (Sloterdijk 14).
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From the perspective of philosophy, one’s beliefs cannot “choose you,” for that
would promote unfairness, irresponsibility or enthusiasm, and one’s faith cannot pull the
cart, for that would be presumptuous and disrespectful. It was charges like these which
spurred Paul’s adamant counter-charge:
What shall we say then? There is no injustice with God, is there? May it never be!
For He says to Moses, ‘I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, and I will have
compassion on whom I have compassion.’ So then it does not depend on the man
who wills or the man who runs, but on God who has mercy. [. . .] The thing
molded will not say to the molder, ‘Why did you make me like this,’ will it? Or
does not the potter have a right over the clay, to make from the same lump one
vessel for honorable use and another for common use? (Romans 9:14-15, 20b-21).
Defending the freedom of God from human will or desire can only be the freeing of that
will or desire. The choice of God simply is Justice—it must be. It is not the tyranny of a
rather insecure egomaniac. Paul’s defense is so passionate because it is his assumption
that all are already inclined to believe God’s choices are unjust, that his very
transcendence is an injustice. Recall the Original Sin, for the Fall of Adam and Eve was
essentially the rejection of the belief in the justice of God. The serpent tempted them on
this point by accusing God of injustice in withholding the tree from them, and in so
doing, preventing them from being the same as him (Gen. 3:4-5). The serpent thus made
the equation: justice = sameness. Paul, however, asserted that God doesn’t need to choose
sameness: some can be for “honorable use” and some for “common use” and this is no
injustice. The paradoxes of Christianity, such as this paradox of the relationship between
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human and divine choice, are all fundamentally “protest[s] against [the tyranny of]
immanence” (Kierkegaard 340).
When immanence is in the vanguard, the consequence, according to Christianity,
can only be injustice. Ironically, I discovered a perfect example of this in Percy’s critical
notes on another of his father’s sermons about Paul’s life. This time Paul was on his way
to Rome to stand trial and had been shipwrecked on Malta. All on board survived as
foretold by an angel. Yet when Paul scavenged for wood on shore to build a fire, a viper
bit his hand. Obviously, God spared him from drowning only to kill him in a more
vicious manner—because Paul was such an evil man—a murderer, no doubt—according
to the people of Malta. Their interpretation was, as Donne described, “natural logic”—
when God strikes, he must be angry; and when he is angry he strikes (8:314). Cause and
effect. However, their axiom proved incorrect as Paul failed to die. Witnessing the failure
of their logic, the people of Malta changed their minds and declared another axiom:
unexplainable events must be attributed to the divine. So they proclaimed Paul to be a
god. This, Donne declared was an act of “natural religion.” The people’s rigorous
compartmentalization precluded them from entertaining a third possibility: that Paul was
neither a murderer nor a god . . . but an ordinary man. Donne went so far as to say that
natural logic always misses the third possibility, that it can only miss it:
[T]o the naturall man, who is not onely finite, and determined in a
compasse, but narrow in his compasse, not onely not bottomlesse, but shallow in
his comprehensions, to this naturall, this finite, and narrow, and shallow man, no
burden is so insupportable, no consideration so inextricable, no secret so
inscrutable, no conception so incredible, as to conceive One infinite God, that
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should do all things alone, without any more Gods. [. . .] That the God of
Certainty, and the God of Contingency should be all one God, That that God that
settles peace, should yet make warres, and in the day of battaile, should be both
upon that side that does, and that side that is overcome, That the conquered God,
and the victorious God, should be both one God, that that God who is all
goodnesse in himselfe, should yet have his hand in every ill action, this the
naturall man cannot digest, not comprehend. (8:328-329)
This is a succinct articulation of the paradox Percy asserted “legitimated” his and others’
turn to secularism. But Percy’s dismissal of Christian paradox illustrates Donne’s point
on the inadequacy of “natural logic.” Percy believed secularism to be an advance, a
better, freeing, more “sensible” choice, whereas Donne’s contended that philosophy was
already one’s inclination, and hence not truly a “choice” in the strict sense. Percy’s
rejection of Christian paradox just repeated the Maltans’ judgment of Paul and even more
clearly revealed the injustice of that judgment.
In Donne’s view, the people of Malta could not automatically settle on the
possibility that Paul was ordinary because they couldn’t discern that God is extraordinary—that is, capable of escaping their categories and wounding Paul so that he
could cure him. Throughout the Scriptures, Donne found the same tendency to discount
the third possibility that God’s nature is the disruption of binaries: in the counsel of Job’s
friends to accept his “punishment” from God; in the declaration of Naomi that she was
not beloved of God because he’d given her “bitterness” in taking away her husband and
sons; in the theory of Jesus’ disciples that people were born blind as “judgment” for the
sins of their parents (8:317-318). Key in these examples for Donne was that reducing

Zias 237
God’s choice to conceptual categories led to unjust conclusions not only about God, but
about others: Job’s friends blamed Job for his troubles; Naomi blamed God or herself; the
disciples blamed perfect strangers. Similarly, in the people of Malta, Donne said we can
discern “the slipperinesse, the precipitation, the bottomelesnesse of uncharitableness, in
judgement; they could consist no where, till they charged [Paul] with murder” (8:321322). Then equally unjustly, they turned and attributed to him undo glory.
Reliance on immanence breeds injustice. The choice of God is ongoing; it is a
constant intervention. Thus, in all these instances, the initial conclusions made were
shown by God to be in error; the cause-effect laws applied to justify the judgments were
suspended. Job was exonerated, Naomi was given another son. In other words, only the
introduction of the transcendent variable creates an opening for one to be free (at last) to
choose mercy. Donne was quite clear on this point in several places:
Till I be a Judge of that mans person and actions, and being his Judge have cleare
evidence, and be not mis-led by rumours from others, by passion, and prejudices
in my selfe, I must passe no judgement upon him, in this world, nor say, This fell
upon him for this crime. But whatsoever my capacity be, or whatsoever the
Evidence, I must suspend my judgement for the world to come. (8:317)
But if we do not “suspend judgment,” Donne continued, let us at least endeavor “as we
are bound to make good constructions of those corrections that God layes upon us, so are
we to make good interpretations of those judgements which he casts upon others”
(8:319). Taking into account that the starting point for all is an inclination “to
misinterpret other men’s actions” (i.e. suspect injustice) by putting the worst spin on
them, Donne exhorted his audience that “in doubtful cases, all interpretations being
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equal, the proper course of action is to ‘turn the scale the best way’ as determined by
‘charity’” (Shami, “Squint-Eyed” 180, 179). For, Donne concluded, “God seeks no glory
out of the uncharitable condemning of another man” (8: 321). Charity or love, therefore,
is only possible on the precondition that judgment has been suspended and judgment can
only be suspended by appeal to the transcendental.
Christianity presupposes that people think of their relationships to others only in
terms of immanence or duality, and thus, only in terms of power and justice. It opposes to
this a tripartite understanding of relationships as being first and foremost also
relationships to God. On the supposition that God’s part in the relationship is justice, the
Christian subject is free to stop seeking justice for herself in the domain of immanence;
the Christian subject is free to stop thinking in terms of justice at all. The work of the
Christian, unanimously championed by the earliest Christian writers, is love. What then,
is love? It is simply the refusal to seek justice for oneself, or put positively, for love is an
action: “The one who loves presupposes that love is in the other person’s heart and by
this very presupposition builds up love in him—from the ground up, provided, of course,
that in love he presupposes its presence in the ground” (Kierkegaard 308). Love is
present, for God is present, and it is the duty of the Christian to seek out this love. It is
important to note that this love is fundamentally not something done “to” someone else,
for that would fall into the realm of tit-for-tat—to demand the recognition of someone
else, and thus to “change” them so that they will be capable of that recognition. Rather,
“the one who loves does something to himself—he presupposes that love is present in the
other person”; it is a “conquering [in] oneself” of the desire for recognition by realizing

Zias 239
that “ultimately no human being is capable of laying the ground of love in the other
person” but only God (Kierkegaard 309).
A loving person, therefore, is the one who “even when you doubt yourself, doubt
that there is love in you, [. . .] is loving enough to presuppose it, or, more correctly, he is
the loving one who presupposes it” (Kierkegaard 310). Only love explains the conversion
of Paul. Recall that Christ’s question to Paul presupposed that Paul wasn’t fundamentally
a persecutor. Jesus did not accuse or demand but asked, “Why do you persecute me?” In
other words, he set aside his right to judge and presupposed that there was something in
Paul that was out of step with his current actions. He loved Paul by presupposing love
and thus elicited the love of Paul.
We must bear in mind that there is one exception to Donne’s conclusion that
“God seeks no glory out of the uncharitable condemning of another man,” and this
exception marks the profound distinction and specificity of the Christian message—that
is, the only glory God sought from an uncharitable condemning was in the condemnation
of himself, in making himself, via the crucifixion of Jesus, “an outcast” (Girard, Things
Hidden 272). The Christian Logos could not reveal its distinctiveness as love except by
succumbing to the power of philosophy and its harmonizing, reasonable, and calculating
justice (265). In so succumbing the Christian Logos revealed “the fundamental principle[]
of human society,” the logic that requires condemning another in order to achieve utopia.
Philosophy is self-justification; it is hiding from oneself one’s own violence (271). One
scholar has even suggested that Christian conversion is always an encounter with Christ’s
question, “Why do you persecute me?” because no other question so succinctly forces
one to confront one’s allegiance to the pleasure of justice, an allegiance from which one
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secretly “profit[s] without knowing it.” Christianity is essentially the deconstruction of
one’s (so-called) irreducible desire for justice (Girard, Satan Fall 191). Perhaps it was
Donne’s sensitivity to the dark underbelly of justice which motivated his resolve to
preach the inclusiveness of Christianity and to “nurture what unifies the Church” (Shami,
“Labels” 145; Johnson 146). Those participating in Church schism, declaring themselves
“outcasts” and thus exceptional, performed an insidious inversion of Christ’s own
rejection because they infused it with self-justification. The sacrifice of themselves was
really a means to sacrifice the majority by condemning them. For Donne to insist on
charity was to insist that one remain vigilant to one’s tendency always to declare one’s
innocence (Shami, “Squint-Eyed” 179).
I have expounded on the particularity of Christianity at length because as analysts,
we face an analogous situation with our patients. They come to us with a philosophy, a
constituting narrative, as I said before, and uniformly it is a narrative of injustice. They
want to know from us how to be cured, or how to get justice, but how is a paradigmatic
question, a question for the construction of paradigms; it is an imperial question that, if
not challenged, can quickly colonize all aspects of being by subordinating to itself
questions of who, what, or why. How is a question of control—control of oneself, control
of others—in short, it is a philosophical question, but we won’t ever succeed in helping
our patients if we give in to their need to philosophize and speak to them only in
philosophical terms. Some analysts have argued that there are no other terms, but I
suspect such people of being “intoxicated with [their] own assertions” (Freud 205). No
doubt it is an inconvenience for them to be rigorous, for instance, to test their opinions
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“upon particular cases and problems,” and so they flee into abstraction (Freud 205). But
abstractions do not come to us for help.
The distinct project of Paul was to formulate a language which disrupted the
“Greek intellectual milieu” “whose essential category was that of wisdom
[. . .] and whose instrument was that of rhetorical superiority” (Badiou 27). Paul
challenged philosophy with a “radical antiphilosophy,” a non-metanarrative whose basic
question was not that of how but of what: the what was the resurrection of Jesus, “a
proposition [in]capable of being supported by a philosophia” because literally
“unnamable” by it (Badiou 28, 46). Similarly, as analysts our fundamental question
should be what—what happened—because the happening is exactly that which eludes
our patients; it is the unnamable negative void about which all their philosophy circulates.
The analyst, like the apostle (but unlike the philosopher) “declares an unheard-of
possibility,” that the what can actually be named (Badiou 45). As Paul confessed to the
Corinthians, “I determined to know nothing among you except Jesus Christ, and Him
crucified” (I Cor. 2:2). In the same way, we analysts do not know the what of our
patients; we only know that there is a what.
IV. The Cause of the Illness Discovered
The Persecuted did return. “Purely to collect my journals,” he declared; he had
“no interest” in continuing the treatment. However, as he appeared in an agitated state of
mind, I inquired into his health. “It isn’t me—” he said, “it’s my father.” Apparently, in
his long absence, his father had taken a bad turn unexpectedly; the prognosis was far
from encouraging. I expressed my sympathy, but this only angered him. “You don’t
understand!” he cried, flinging himself into a chair, “what’s going to happen to me?”

Zias 242
At first I was surprised by the inconsistency of his attitude. Wouldn’t his father’s
death liberate him from persecution and enable him to live the blessedly sensible and
unimpeded life he desired? Why suddenly
panic that after all this time, he was to gain
the object of his hope? “No, no, it’s not
supposed to happen this way,” he exclaimed,
“I never made him see!” We should recall
the point that the truth of the patient’s “inner”

Untitled, I

psychic makeup is on the surface, only he himself is unaware of it; that is, he is unable to
attach the needed significance to his own speech. “It must therefore be admitted that in an
obsessional neurosis there are two kinds of knowledge, and it is just as reasonable to hold
that the patient ‘knows’ his traumas as that he does not ‘know’ them. For he knows them
in that he has not forgotten them, and he does not know them in that he is unaware of
their significance” (Freud 38; note 33). As such, we could say that the psychoanalytic
cure is accomplished when the patient realizes the import of his own words.
My father is an old fogey! My father is a freaking racist and sexist! My father
won’t ever acknowledge “how much [he] needed an old self, a Jew-self, the false
professor, and the misbeliever in order to know himself” to be saved, and “that is why
[he] is relentlessly, sometimes hysterically, about the business of finding new others
every day— ‘faggots,’ perverts, apostates, world-loving socialists, non-Christians and
false Christians in endless variety”—so that he can always proclaim his own innocence!
(Luxon 86-87, 156, 207). These sorts of exclamations, frequent in my earlier interviews
with Percy, and often repeated as means to get us “back on track” in moments when he
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felt we were deviating from the real issue, now, in the wake of his father’s possible death,
became mantras, and he repeated the exclamations over and over. In fact, the worse off
Percy reported his father to be, the more he denounced him and the more aggressive he
waged his “war on prohibitions” (Girard, Things Hidden 40). As if his father had the
strength to beat him; it was as if Percy still felt he needed to “break[] down doors that
have been wide open for centuries” (40). Somehow, he did not want to walk through.
I want to return to my characterization of love as that which presupposes love
because it comes to bear in how we relate to our patients. Presupposing love does not
mean “explaining away.” Christ did not say to Paul, “You’re okay! You’re not really
persecuting me!” No, the persecution was real enough, but Paul did not recognize his
actions as persecution. In the same way, it would be a mistake to assume that the
difficulty all along had been to help Percy understand that deep in his heart, he really did
love his father and that all this disparaging talk was so much blustering. Rather, the
opposite is true: Percy needed to feel the full force of his own hate. The panic induced by
the likelihood of his father’s death wasn’t the reaction of a man losing his father, a
discreet being in himself, but the reaction of one losing the void of his own hate, the pure
negativity that sustained his identity as one (paradoxically) uncorrupted by hate. Without
his father to be hate for him, the void was in danger of falling back into him. “What’s
going to happen to me?” was the question of one becoming aware that his relationship
with his father was purely a means to legitimate and thus disguise his hate; purely a
means to sustain the myth of his own bloody castration (Lacan, Ethics 308-309).
Where does hate go when it has no where else to go? What happens when one’s
hate can no longer be hidden “out there” beyond the self in the condemnation of others?
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“I never made him see,” Percy protested. What did he fail to make his father see?
Obviously, that he was wrong and Percy right. But this desire should not be mistaken for
love, as if Percy truly cared about saving his father from a fatal error and his father was
just too stubborn. Rather, “I never made him see” should be taken in quite another way:
that is, to be recognized as right by his father would have deprived Percy not of the cause
his hate, but of its locale. Therefore, he could in no way allow his father to be “like” him,
to “see” Percy as he wished to be seen, for the perceived difference between them was
necessary for the preservation (through disavowal) of his own hate. Hate “nourishes
fiercely the illusion of an absolute difference between the Self and that Other” in order to
appear justified (Girard, Desire 73). Self-justification is the cloak of hate. As such, we
could also interpret Percy’s “I never made him see” as his testament that he could never
own his hate, could never see it through by, say, sticking his father’s head in a toilet and
admitting the pleasure of watching him writhe, of experiencing pain in the recognition of
his error. And now Percy could not have this pleasure, for his father was dying.10
Here we should make a further remark on the fact that
patients both “know” and “don’t know” the nature of their
traumas. Analysts should keep in mind that psycho-analytic
procedure is not a tool for the production of knowledge; we are
not teachers imparting to our patients a body of prepared data.
Untitled, II

Rather, it would be best to envision oneself as a witness to the

unconscious, and as such, as one who confirms to patients what they already know. We
must resist the impulse to say something new or “original,” especially for its own sake or
for our own importance, when what patients require is the articulation of the old. The
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truth of this became clear to me when one afternoon, in a very distressed state, Percy
announced his intention to burn his diaries. “Absolutely not!” I interjected, laying my
hand upon them, for they were stacked on the corner of my desk. He made a lunge for
them and I swiped them away; he protested loudly, insisting they were rightfully his and
that he never should’ve given them to me. But I was resolute, which drew from him the
charge that I was “just like” his father, and that because I liked “playing games” with
him, I would refuse to tell him “why” he couldn’t burn them. “Of course I’ll tell you
why,” I said, “because you haven’t read them!”
So began our task—or his task, though he undertook it with great reluctance. “Oh,
this is pointless!” he often exclaimed, or “This is so passé—can’t I simply move on?” I
assured him that he couldn’t forget and move on because he’d never really remembered,
had never really “been there and done that.” That he thought he had was the reason he
was sitting in my office continually complaining about his father. Didn’t he want some
day to make an end of it? So he persevered. One journal in particular he lingered over for
some time; it contained extensive notes on a small publication of his father’s titled
Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions which his father had written during a prior illness,
one that Percy confessed he’d recovered from “unexplainably.” According to Percy, the
book was arranged as a series of meditations, twenty-three to be exact, which I suspected
testified to a rather superstitious aversion to even numbers. It is no wonder that traces of
superstition in sacred signifiers like “différance” linger in the son.11 Each of his father’s
twenty-three meditations was followed by an expostulation in which the thought of the
meditation was questioned or extended, and by a concluding prayer which resolved the
problem under investigation. All the meditations concerned some aspect of the difficulty
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of sickness, not only physical, but spiritual, and it was this aspect of his father’s book
which troubled Percy the most.
Hate as sickness; sickness as hate. Or as Donne would say: sin—the state of the
body in his case being a metaphor for the state of the soul. The parallel was inescapable:
as The Persecuted was afflicted with the force of his own hate, so Donne with the force of
his sickness. “Variable, and therefore miserable condition of Man; this minute I was well,
and am ill, this minute,” Donne wrote, beginning his first meditation (7). Percy noted the
problem was the certainty of change as such, that at any given time, under any
circumstances, one could find oneself different from oneself, and that this difference
could only be negative. I agreed, for the state we call “health” is where we locate
ourselves; no one says, “I’m not myself” when physically well. Moreover, the
expectation is that this minute (and we can only experience ourselves this minute) I will
be well. And since we only experience ourselves from this to this minute, the expectation
is that the health felt now and now and now will persist. So Donne continued, “I am
surpriz’d with a sodaine change, & alteration to worse, and can impute it to no cause, nor
call it by any name” (7). Why be surprised if there is no anticipation of the perpetuation
of the health experienced this minute? Donne lamented the inevitability that the next
minute will impinge upon the now and ruin its security:
We study Health, and we deliberate upon our meats, and drink, and Ayre, and
exercises, and we hew, and wee polish every stone, that goes to that building; and
so our Health is a long & a regular work; But in a minute a Cannon batters all,
overthrows all, demolishes all; a Sicknes [. . .] summons us, seizes us, possesses
us, destroyes us in an instant. (7)
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I interrupted Percy’s reading to add that the fear of differing from oneself must be that
one fears one will be this differing. What do Donne’s words summons, seizes, possesses,
destroys indicate but that when one feels different from oneself, death is at the door? We
don’t wish to die, and thus our basic conception of difference is, from the beginning,
tinged with this fear. The fear of difference is laced with the fear of death.
This is an important theoretical point because if we just suppose that patients fear
change itself, we will inanely assure them that difference is no threat and that they ought
to celebrate it to achieve self-actualization. To do so would but prolong patients’
suffering by encouraging them to retreat to that imaginary interior space of thought in
which they feel secure and at liberty no matter what they say. The psychoanalytic cure
consists in challenging our patients’ faith in an inviolate interior, a secret “true self” that
at any patient’s convenience and to assert his self-government, he may or may not admit
bears any connection to his speech. As stated prior, it does little good to try to convince
patients “otherwise” of their beliefs, that in this case, difference has nothing to do with
death. If a patient’s speech weds difference to death, we shouldn’t tell him what he says
is incorrect, or worse, that he “doesn’t really mean” what he’s saying “deep down;”
rather, we must help him connect his speech to his belief and his belief to his speech.
In this respect we must confess that the psychoanalytic procedure is much closer
to that of the Christian Logos than the Greek and thus testifies to the difference between
the two. The subject of Greek discourse, the subject of philosophia, as we have already
remarked, is a subject who questions in order to be master of the question, for “[i]f one
questions philosophically, he who can reply becomes a master for the perplexed subject,”
even if the perplexed subject one is answering is oneself (Badiou 59). This, in turn,
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requires that there always be questions in order for there to be answers or mastery.
Question/answer is the law of Greek discourse. It was to Percy’s credit that he recognized
this to be a double-bind imprisoning the subject, but it was not to his credit that he
proposed to free himself by making the question its own answer. Believing that
questioning his father was the answer did not structurally break with the double-bind but
intensified it by demanding (as a sign of one’s virtue!) that one perpetually experience
one’s captivity. “[W]e must,” Percy said to me, “learn to use [i.e. answer] and erase [i.e.
question] our language at the same time.” He said for him it was “a question [or answer]
of strategy. It is the strategy of using the only available language while not subscribing to
its premises” (Spivak xvii). Therefore, Greek discourse, purified in the fire of Percy’s
hypersensitivity and awareness, was not only salvaged but enthroned as the only
discourse qualified to judge all others, especially those daring neither to question nor
answer but declare. As Percy has said, it is the nature of Greek thought to “[protect] itself
against every absolutely surprising convocation” (Derrida, Writing 152). You can discern
then how difficult it would be for Percy to affirm, “Yes, here I am,” in his words about
his father, for his inclination was rather, “Here I am?”
Declaration is the unique mode of Christian speech, the speaking aloud that the
resurrection of Jesus has occurred. “Delight to speake of God, and with God, and for
God; Dicite, say something,” wrote Donne. “[M]ore [is] required then to think of God.
Consideration, Meditation, Speculation, Contemplation upon God, and divine objects,
have their place, and their season; But this is more then that.” It is more because Christ
has made it more, for because he “came to us in verbo,” said Donne, “Let us, that are
Christians, go to God so, too” (qtd. in Stanwood and Asals 37, 27). In a key way, the
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Christian is “nothing but” or “no more than his words,” for the Christian subject “does
not preexist” but comes-to-be via “the event he declares” (Asals 126; Badiou 14). It is the
same for our patients.
To return to the fear of death: Percy and Donne both feared that becoming
different to themselves meant death. For Percy to give up his hate would’ve been to die,
for to him, hate was as Donne’s physical health. How to overcome this fear? As we
continued to peruse his notes on the Devotions, Percy became more exasperated by his
father’s approach to the matter. A few examples suffice to explain Donne’s strategy
throughout: “Interpret thine owne worke, and call this sicknes, correction, and not anger,
& there is soundnes in my flesh” (14). In this, his second prayer, Donne disregarded the
logical interpretation of his symptoms (sickness = God’s anger) by substituting a
figurative one (sickness = soundness). Similarly, elsewhere, he endeavored to substitute
“refreshing” for “correction” and “feathers” for “thornes” (18). He asserted that in his
“fear” was really “hope, and love & confidence, and peace,” and that “feare, and joy
consist together; nay, constitute one another” (33). He ruthlessly maintained his sickness
to be “everlasting health,” his weaknes, “everlasting strength,” and his “dejection, and
faintnesse of heart, a powerful Cordiall” (61). Truly, there was no attempt to hide his
disrespect for death; he even showcased it:
O eternall and most gracious God, who art able to make, and dost make the sicke
bed of thy servants, Chappels of ease to them, and the dreames of thy servants,
Prayers, and Meditations upon thee, let not this [. . .] inabilitie to sleepe [. . .] bee
any disquiet, or discomfort to me, but rather an argument, that thou wouldest not
have me sleepe in thy presence. (80)
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Donne in every case did not permit death to remain irreducible, to “speak for itself.”
Rather, he interrupted or “spoke for death” by translating its language into an unauthorized idiom that included hope, joy, and confidence. “But what romanticization,” Percy
complained, “the world isn’t flowers and butterflies all the time.”
It was fascinating how quickly Percy cried foul when he suspected his father of
doing that which Percy demanded for himself—to forget his hate or pretend that it was a
frustrated love in disguise, or to be patted on the head and told, “There, there—your
singularity is okay!” He accused Donne of colonizing death and relegating all to the
same, so that the most gruesome murder would somehow be “beautiful” if we just looked
at it the right way, through an artist’s eyes perhaps. Western philosophy has always
“neutralized the other” through abstraction, Percy protested; for instance by
subordinating beings to the “neutral,” “anonymous and inhuman universality” of Being
(Derrida, Writing 96, 97). But as we continued to read, I perceived that Donne’s
complaint wasn’t different but the same as Percy’s, that Death in the abstract colonizes
all deaths: “The Heavens containe the Earth, the Earth, Cities, Cities, Men. And all these
are Concentrique; the common center to them all, is decay, ruine” (51). An interesting
conception of death to be sure, that all things succumb to an inherent vacuity; ruin creeps
upon one slowly, little by little encroaching upon hallowed ground, but it creeps from the
center out; decay spreads from the heart toward all the outer limbs. Consequently, the
great activity of humanity is to fill all vacancies:
No corner of any place can bee empty [. . .] If that Man doe not fill the place,
other men will; complaints of his insufficiency will fill it; Nay, such an abhorring
is there in Nature, of vacuity, that if there be but an imagination of not filling, in
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any man, that which is but imagination, neither will fill it, that is rumor and voice,
and it will be given out, (upon no ground, but Imagination, and no man knowes,
whose imagination) that hee is corrupt in his place, or insufficient in his place,
and another prepared to succeed him in his place. (111)
“Who will in turn be found wanting,” Percy mumbled; I almost didn’t hear him, but after
a few moments of silence in which Percy continued to read, I thought that he could’ve
said nothing that would have better confirmed Donne’s point: that human activity marks
a determination to erase via abstraction the specificity of death.
In other words, why is it that anyone would ever complain that someone is not
sufficiently filling their place? If the fear of vacuity is so great, why constantly discover,
even create vacuities? Shouldn’t the objective be to squelch any such talk? Here is where
we as analysts can assert the unique contribution of our discipline, for it has from the first
been the axiom of psychoanalysis that the best kept secrets are always those openly
discussed. Therefore, we assert that the point of saying “All men are mortal” isn’t really
to complete the syllogism by concluding that “Socrates is a man” therefore “Socrates is
mortal,” but to assure us that if death is everywhere, it is of no great significance to any
particular person. “What, then, is it to cross the ultimate border? What is it to pass the
term of one’s life [. . .]? Is it possible? Who has ever done it and who can testify to it?”
“Is my death possible? Can we understand this question? Can I, myself, pose it? Am I
allowed to talk about my death?” (Derrida, Aporias 8, 21). We should not be fooled into
thinking that Percy’s questions to me were a means to draw death into the symbolic, for
their purpose was really to affirm that “the idea of death was in itself an impossibility”
(Roston 209). As Percy explained to me:

Zias 252
‘Fundamentally, one knows perhaps neither the meaning nor the referent of this
word. It is well known that if there is one word that remains absolutely
unassignable or unassigning with respect to its concept and to its thingness, it is
the word ‘death.’ Less than for any other noun, save ‘God’—and for good reason,
since their association here is probably not fortuitous—is it possible to attribute to
the noun ‘death,’ and above all to the expression ‘my death,’ a concept or a reality
that would constitute the object of an indisputably determining experience.’
(Derrida, qtd. in Roston 210)
A perfect description, according to Donne, of man’s central misery, a misery in which
hee is fixt, and sure to finde himself” (111). We ought not suppose by this that Donne
contradicted his earlier assertion that we locate our identity in health and not in sickness
and are accordingly surprised when faced with an “alteration to worse.” Rather, the
misery of man (and that which testifies to his death) is his necessity to erase death, to
keep it from signifying, to give it no room to mean, and to misrecognize this life-long
labor as health. The Romans, Donne said, went so far as even to avoid saying the word
“death”—even in their wills. They did not say “when I die,” but “when the course of
nature is accomplished upon me” (“Death’s Duel” 414). This reminded me very much of
Percy’s inability to say the word illegitimate.
Truly, we should not be surprised that flight into abstraction manifests itself
through perpetual complaints of inadequacy about all particulars. Our patients never
come to us concerned about pain and suffering in general, but about their sleeplessness,
their sexual proclivities, their overbearing mother. Similarly, the majority of our wannabe
associates, literary critics, who wannabe us in every way except for the actual clinical
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experience, can find innumerable faults with all writers alive and dead, all books popular
or obscure, all historical periods past and present, to the entire disregard of the “most
extraordinary coincidence,” “that a human history which according to some is just a
ceaseless chance twist of the kaleidoscope should again and again settle its pieces into the
pattern of scarcity and oppression” rarely (if ever) “punctuated with episodes of peace
and love” (Eagleton, Illusions 51). I should note here that The Persecuted too was aware
of the paradoxical exchange between the abstract and concrete and as a result also blamed
his father for “rootedness,” “pagan violence,” “ravishment,” and “enthusiasm” (Derrida,
Writing 97). It was as if, as someone has said, “any stick was good enough to beat [his
father] with” as long as it was his father (Chesterton 93).
It is convenient for those, like Percy, who enjoy having an endless supply of
sticks, that flight into abstraction and particulars is our culture’s status quo, nowhere
more obvious than in the “false universality” of capital in which “[e]verything that
circulates falls under the unity of a count, while inversely, only what lets itself be counted
in this way can circulate” (Badiou 7, 10). As such, “monetary abstraction” has “no
consideration for any singularity whatsoever,” even though it “demands a permanent
creation of subjective and territorial identities,” for it does so only to “homogenize its
space of action” and subject everything “to the uniform prerogatives of the market” (10,
11). Analysts would do well to remember that the proliferation of particular identities is a
testament to their homogenization, and it is in this case fear of the significance of the
generality which evokes such vitriol in our patients. Try telling a patient that his
symptoms are similar to another’s or worse, that he’s just like everybody else, and you
will note the immediate visceral denial and accusation that you are insensitive to the fact
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“that the world is multicolored, that one must let people live, eat, dress, imagine, [and]
love in whichever way they please,” and that the patient himself is a Cineplex, and one
ticket will not gain you access to all the showings. The fact that patients resort to this
tiresome cliché is a testament that they have succumbed to homogenization, for the cliché
is itself an attempt to homogenize by denouncing anyone who does not accept it (11).
In the weeks that followed our reading of the Devotions, Percy persisted in
accusing his father of erasing the particularity of death via metaphor and thereby turning
an indifferent eye to the reality of his own sufferings,
and alternately, of being much too masochistically
self-absorbed with his own suffering and hence
indifferent to the suffering of others generally—like
Percy’s suffering for instance. I admit to experiencing
impatience with the patient’s double-logic, for it persisted in obscuring the real issue: that the only love in
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Percy apparently was the love of hating his father, and his fear that giving up this hate
would mean dying. He would not die, of course, but his hate would; yet I had not
succeeded in helping him identify his hatred of his father as hate, let alone succeeded in
helping him rid himself of it. I recalled the wisdom that says, “The whale and the polar
bear [. . .] cannot wage war upon each other, for since each is confined to his own
element they cannot come together” (Freud 205). Neither, it must be said, could the two
ever love. But that is the limit of philosophy—its lack of imagination. The Christian
wisdom is that “there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamed of in our
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philosophy,” and that taking into consideration the “more,” it could be possible for the
whale and the polar bear to love (Freud 168). And so I continued to hope.
You’ll recall that I said Percy’s complaint that Donne’s substitution of flowers
and butterflies for death made everything “the same” wasn’t radically different from
Donne’s own complaints about death—that it is a great leveler in which all lose
themselves. Percy’s need to make his father different from himself so that he might have
a vessel in which to store his hate caused him to miss this similarity. In missing it, he
misread Donne’s solution as being just another example of the very problem Donne, like
him, abhorred. Or, maybe Percy understood his father’s solution all too well and simply
wanted to reject it. Let us examine Donne’s solution more carefully through this example:
The Church is Catholike, universall, so are all her Actions; All that she does,
belongs to all. When she baptizes a child, that action concernes mee; for that child
is thereby connected to that Head which is my Head too, and engraffed into that
body, whereof I am a member. And when she buries a Man, that action concerns
me; all mankinde is of one Author, and is one volume; when one Man dies, one
Chapter is not torne out of the booke, but translated into a better language; and
every Chapter must be so translated; God emploies severall translators; some
peeces are translated by Age, some by sicknesse, some by warre, some by justice;
but Gods hand is in every translation; and his hand shall binde up all our scattered
leaves again, for that Librarie where every booke shall lie open to one another: (86)
I transcribe from Percy’s notes at some length partly because I enjoy Donne’s metaphors,
being a bookish person myself, but also because this passage succinctly articulates the
Christian method of slicing through dualisms by interjecting a third term and thus altering
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the structure of the conversation. It would be irresponsible to accuse Donne of failing to
appreciate particularity—in the church, all deaths (and all die differently) are significant.
Nor does Donne fail to grasp the generality—that in the church, all belongs to all. Here,
the general and the particular are both accounted for and both, rather than being in
conflict or colluding to erase death, are made serviceable to the third term, that is the
church. The transcendental has been introduced, for God is the head of the church; with
the introduction of the transcendental, the meaning and relationship between the general
and particular is altered. So is the meaning of death; or let us say, death finally means.
With the introduction of the transcendental, both the universal and the particular
are saved as universal and particular. “The church” is not a dialectical solution of a thesis
and antithesis. Neither the universal or particular are colonized by the other; nor is there
dilution due to mixture; rather, both exist in all separately, and all exist in both separately.
Only with separation can there be unity. One scholar described this procedure of Donne’s
as uniquely Christian, the attempt to articulate “universal singularity” (Badiou 13). When
truth is made an event (the resurrection), it disrupts the double-logic of locating truth
structurally in “axiomatic,” “legal,” or “economic” abstractions and in particular
identitarianisms. In declaring a singularity, the resurrection, the ego is freed from this
necessary oscillation between two logics for the sake of denying its inertia (i.e. death).
Movement is at last declared; all can declare the event, declare life: “every profession and
nationality [is] admitted without restriction or privilege,” which is another way of saying
that justice is done; no one need exist any longer in and through injustice (Badiou 14).
Declaring one event does not require the all become one, that is, the same. Rather,
differences are essential because they signify that each one can “carry the universal.”
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Paradoxically, only by being indifferent to differences—no matter one’s sex, social
status, or customs, one can declare Christ—can differences be both transcended and
enabled to flourish (Badiou 106, 99). This new community “does not consume all rational
distinctions but rather animates and organizes the church so that it grows” (Kneidel 236).
Therefore, we can assert, in Donnean language: “Differences, like instrumental tones,
provide us with the recognizable univocity that makes up the melody of the True”
(Badiou 106).12
As I said, Percy either didn’t understand the significance of Donne’s
transcendental solution or he just didn’t like the idea of it. Or, perhaps recognizing the
possibilities of the solution, he wanted to try to recreate it in the domain of immanence
for the sake of his autonomy. In contrast to his father, Percy asserted that it is “the
singularity of the subject that validates what the subject says,” not “what he says that
founds the singularity of the subject” (Badiou 53). Attempting to give some meaning to
death, Percy said that singularity is death’s “gift,” for only in light of death does a person
acquire a sense of responsibility for oneself and others. At the same time, in announcing
one’s finitude and mortality, death makes one guilty because one can never live up to
one’s charge, never be responsible enough:
One is never responsible enough because one is finite but also because responsibility requires two contradictory movements. It requires one to respond as oneself
and as irreplaceable singularity, to answer for what one does, says, gives; but it
also requires that, being good and through goodness, one forget or efface the
origin of what one gives. (Derrida, Gift 51)
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Because Percy could think only in terms of immanence, his solution just reasserted the
supremacy of double-logic, for once again we have the particularity of the individual
wedded to the abstraction of the “pure” gift with the result that rather than universal
singularity, we have singular universality. Instead of all becoming singular by declaring a
singular event, here each is made all: “We should stop thinking about God as someone,
over there, way up there, transcendent, and, what is more [. . .] capable, more than any
satellite orbiting in space, of seeing into the most secret of the most interior places,”
Percy told me. Rather, he continued, “God is the name of the possibility” of a certain
“structure of conscience” which is “at the same time other than me and more intimate
with me than myself.” This double-me, Percy said, is God, it’s “what I call God in me, (it
happens that) I call myself God—a phrase that is difficult to distinguish from ‘God calls
me,’ for it is on that condition that I can call myself or that I am called in secret. God is in
me, he is the absolute ‘me’ or ‘self,’ he is that structure of invisible interiority that is
called [. . .] subjectivity” (Derrida, Gift 108, 109). When I objected that reducing
universality to a structure of conscience merely produces (and reproduces) multiplicities,
not singularities, Percy frowned and repeated more emphatically: “Look, ‘[i]f every
human is wholly other, if everyone else, or every other one, is every bit other [i.e. God]
then one can no longer distinguish between’ the general and the particular; it’s not really
possible ‘to determine the limit between those two orders’” (84).
The Persecuted’s indifference to categories was so similar to that manifested by
his father that it was difficult, at first, to distinguish them. In fact, the likeness made me
wonder why Percy was repelled by what he believed to be Donne’s disregard for death as
a category. But as it turned out, Percy’s strange reaction enabled me to mark the
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difference between their indifferences. It would be best to relate my findings in terms of
effect. First, as to Percy’s philosophy: to suppose with him that the starting point is
everyone’s singularity which can only be recognized via death, is not only to retain
vacuity of necessity but to expand it to infinity. Percy described this as “the universal
exception or the law of the exception,” meaning everyone is fundamentally exceptional
(Derrida, Gift 87). As a result, whatever calls itself exceptional can be shown to be that
which actually occurs everyday and what calls itself everyday can be shown to “fall prey”
to the exceptional (78). “You see,” said Percy, “‘We no longer know who is called [The
Persecuted], and he can no longer even tell us,’ so therefore, I must be bound to all
equally, to the ‘innumerable generality of others’ to whom I owe the same care and
concern (and at the same time) as I would give to any one in particular in any particular
moment. Unfortunately, ‘I cannot respond to the call, the request, the obligation, or even
the love of another without sacrificing the other other, the other others,’ a fact which will
perpetually involve me—and all others—necessarily, in injustice, forever and ever,
Amen” (79, 68). As Percy spoke, it occurred to me that his philosophy would breed both
indifference and injustice, for should I really attempt brain surgery knowing I am all
thumbs? Furthermore, if I’m guilty for not being able to help all, why should I help one?
And if I should help all, shouldn’t all be helping me? Which in turn would certainly
tempt me to complain that more people aren’t doing their job, and that my unhappiness is
their fault. Lastly, if I should help all and all should help me, than I and me will always
remain the central terms—I because too many poor souls will never experience my
exceptionality— and me, because too many cretins won’t recognize mine, and in this
centralization of the I there is no fundamental challenge to the I as central.
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Clearly, retaining death as a necessary vacuity just creates vacuous philosophies.
In contrast, the most impressive aspect of Donne’s Devotions to me was not, as Percy
protested, that his father tried to explain away his sickness by asserting that all was really
well, or conversely, that he attempted through language “to pass from the dissolute,
fragmentary world of the profane to a realm of completeness and transcendence” which
in either case would indeed have been an absurd blindness, but that he made his sickness
signify so many different things (Frontain 17). It was never a matter of death being
somehow “turned into” life by being made the condition and significance of life; rather, it
was the reverse: life—life-as-resurrection—finally made death signify. “[T]he Christevent,” as one scholar has said, “is nothing but resurrection. It eradicates negativity” and
“retroactively identifies death as a path, a dimension of the subject, and not a state of
affairs. Death is not a destiny but a choice, as is shown by the fact that we can be offered,
through the subtraction of death, the choice of life” (Badiou 73). If death is a choice and
not simply an absent given, the givenness of absence, what is sickness, the prelude of
death? Maybe, Donne pondered, a warning to repent, a sign of God’s anger, an assurance
of his mercy, an invitation to rest, an overture to the resurrection, a means to be thankful
for the consolation of others. Notice that all these interpretations emphasize a choice
Donne must make, a choice that alters himself, for it de-centers his subjectivity from its
foundation in justice: “Let me think no degree of this thy correction, casuall, or without
signification,” Donne prayed, “but yet when I have read it in that language, as it is a
correction, let me translate it into another, and read it as a mercy; and which of these is
the Originall, and which is the Translation, whether thy Mercy, or thy Correction, were
thy primary, and original intention in this sicknes, I cannot conclude, though death
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conclude me” (40). For Donne, death is no longer a vacuity; the resurrection of Christ, we
would say, “fills it in”—even to overflowing—there’s so much meaning that even those
aspects of life which had seemed meaningless or were only comprehendible in terms of
justice now mean and mean differently.
There are two additional observations to be made from this: 1.) “Donne’s attitude
was fundamentally Christian rather than [Greek]. He affirmed this world and the other,
and he rejected everything less paradoxical than that.” Yes to death and yes to life: only
through this dual affirmation did he escape the “danger of valuing one world at the
expense of the other,” or in other words, of succumbing to unjust, uncharitable condemning (Jackson 72; my emphasis). And 2.) this dual affirmation is accomplished
through and attested by one’s openness to metaphor.
The resurrection of Christ put into motion a quite
expansive project of re-interpretation. As Paul said,
“God has chosen the things that are not,” which
immediately puts into question what exactly is
(I Cor. 1:28). I gather that for Donne, metaphor was
a vehicle for negotiating this space between the “are
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not” and “is,” for moving from “is” to “are not” and “are not” to “is.” But his metaphors
weren’t a mere rhetorical device, but “a frame of mind,” a faith that wasn’t “static” but
the continuing “result of an evolution” (Salenius 330). It was, for Donne, a path of
salvation out of deadening literalisms or “labeling” which could lead to controversy and
needless divisions (Shami, “Squint-Eyed” 173). Not that the literal was wrong, but it was
simply not all, for as Donne declared, God is more:
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My God, my God, Thou art a direct God, may I not say, a literall God, a God that
wouldest bee understood literally, and according to the plaine sense of all that
thou saiest? But thou art also [. . .] a figurative, a metaphoricall God too: A God
in whose words there is such a height of figures [. . .] such Curtaines of
Allegories, such third Heavens of Hyperboles [. . .] as all prophane Authors,
seeme of the seed of the Serpent, that creepes; thou art the dove, that flies.
(Devotions 99)
It is as if metaphor for Donne was a safeguard; by “stressing the interpretive possibilities
rather than the absolute meanings of words,” Donne kept open that space for God’s
choice and in a way testified to it or reenacted that choice via his own ambiguities
(Shami, “Labels” 147). His metaphors attested that it was no longer necessary to exert the
effort to fill in a vacuity and in so doing to retain it as vacuity; rather, one was perfectly
free to substitute, or as Donne might say, let presence in (Devotions 80).
“But that’s crazy—it cannot happen,” cried Percy unaccountably, “I’d perpetually
be, along with Donne, ‘super-afflicted with [. . .] apprehensions of Sicknes;’ every
morning waking to ‘ask our own urine, how we do’ (7). How can I live always asking
myself why, always afraid to look in the mirror and find that I am changed?” 13

Psychoanalytic Notes Upon an Autobiographical Account
of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides) 14
I. Introductory Case History:
In 2004, a man named The Gaffer or “Gaff” wrote Clueless in Academe, a study
of the causes for the unnecessary disjunction and antagonism between American popular
culture and the academy and between students and professors. “[S]chooling takes
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students who are perfectly street-smart and exposes them to the life of the mind in ways
that make them feel dumb,” Gaff asserted, and this ought not to be (2). Rather, professors
should set aside their hauteur and look for intellectualism even in the most ghettoized of
places. To illustrate, Gaff offered this example: the case of Michael Warner, who in
“Tongues Untied: Memoirs of a Pentecostal Boyhood,” recounts his journey “‘from Pat
Robertson to Michel Foucault,’” a journey in which Warner “finds a ‘buried continuity’”
(211). “‘Curiously enough,’ [Warner] writes, though ‘fundamentalism is almost
universally regarded as the stronghold and dungeon-keep of American antiintellectualism, religious culture gave me a passionate intellectual life for which
universities are only a pale ivory shadow’” (211). But how can this be? Gaff wondered.
He again quoted Warner:
For the Pentecostal faithful, Warner says, ‘the subdenomination you belong to is
bound for heaven; the one down the road is bound for hell. You need argument to
show why.’ Furthermore, Warner goes on, for Pentecostals, ‘your arguments have
to be readings; ways of showing how the church down the road misreads a key
text.’ [. . .] ‘I remember being surrounded by textual arguments in which the
stakes were not just life and death but eternal life and death.’ [. . .] ‘Being a
literary critic is nice, I have to say, but for lip-whitening, vein-popping thrills it
doesn’t compete. Not even in the headier regions of Theory can we approximate
that saturation of life by argument.’ (211-212)
What should we conclude from this? Here’s what Gaff concluded:
[Warner’s] essay invites us to think about student intellectual abilities that go
overlooked by schools because they come in unlikely forms. To be sure, since
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religious fundamentalists rarely become intellectuals of any kind, much less queer
theorists, we might conjecture that Warner’s intellectualism must have come from
something else in his background. (212; bold mine)
II. Preliminary Guiding Question:
A.) When I think an intellectual is rather dim, should I just assume the cause is
something other than his intellectualism?
At the outset I must warn the reader that I asked this question only to myself and
not to The Gaffer as his treatment was taken up by another analyst. But as The Gaffer’s
case proved most unusual, taxing all the creative reserves of my colleague—who in turn
consulted me throughout—and as The Gaffer after being discharged from our facilities
published many volumes relating the particulars of his mental distress, I consider it
within the bounds of psychoanalytic protocol to offer the following analysis though
having no first hand interaction with the patient. It’s a commonplace that patients go to
physicians for the purposes of disclosing their private fears, which is why we see so few
cases of paranoia; it is the one malady which feeds upon publicity. The paranoid believe
in secrecy; their psychic structure is nothing other than the preservation of a secret; it is
the place of the secret. A world without secrets would be the death of them; thus they
tirelessly resort to provocation to assure themselves that the other, in his numerous and
emphatic denials, is hiding something after all. For this reason, the majority of paranoiacs
are dragged into therapy by friends or relatives and almost never admit themselves.
So it was with Gaff, who since he was so quick to rush his autobiographies into
print after leaving our care, in my estimation benefited little from the treatment, which is
not to admit a flaw with the treatment but with the duration with which the patient was
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under our supervision; it is also to lament the terrible power with which such dementia
seizes its sufferers, and to bear witness to the degree of respect and patience that must be
the foremost ingredients in the cure. Given the rarity of the opportunity the case of Gaff
afforded, I hope you will with greater leniency judge the unorthodox approach with
which my analysis will at present proceed.
III. Initial Observations:
Readers familiar with the case of Percy and persecution complexes generally will
notice similarities between them and cases of paranoia, and so much so that some of my
colleagues have argued that the difference between the two is only a matter of degree. I
am prepared to concede this point under the following condition: that it be recognized
that paranoia, while containing all the appearances of a heightened sense of persecution,
is in fact a symptom of its lessening, and that it marks a strenuous effort by the patient to
hold on to a certainty he has now unconsciously begun to doubt. The doubt is what leads
to the showy spectacles meant to incite, as if the more the paranoiac is shouted down the
more incapable he will be of doubting. But we are getting ahead of ourselves—let us turn
to the particulars of The Gaffer’s history and build our case from there.
The Gaffer dated his first symptoms of anxiety from the moment his son—named
Bunyan—“got religion” and “turned preacher,” and did so “by the grace of God.” “I
blame his mother,” Gaff confessed, “because despite my efforts she persisted is raising
him to believe in the ‘transcendental.’” This was not, however, the only explanation Gaff
offered for his son’s turn to Christianity. At another time he reasoned that his son was
lonely and wanted to be part of a group, that he had low self-esteem and needed to feel
better about himself, that it was a way for him to explain the unexplainable, receive
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consolation during earthly troubles, or feel assured that his life conformed to simple
guidelines. Yet in another context, Gaff asserted that his son’s choice was the byproduct
of ignorance or stupidity, or the result of being duped by a charismatic personality. He
thought Bunyan to be in the throes of psychological projection, or masochistically
addicted to guilt, or too cowardly to risk thinking for himself. He likened the choice of
Christianity to an aesthetic preference for stained glass windows; he thought his son to be
a bigot, homophobe, and chauvinist who enjoyed ordering others around: “Bunyan
discovers that with the scriptures he can talk with more persuasiveness than before.”
“[S]tuffing his speech” with Bible verses makes him “a centre of authority.” This was
not, Gaff asserted, remarkably different from how his son, in his youth, had integrated
curse words into his speech. Blasphemy and Bible verses are both attempts to “tap” a
power source he said, and thus, though becoming a Christian, “[Bunyan’s] involvement
with language does not fundamentally change” (Camden, “Blasphemy” 19, 7, 19). Hence
he dismissed his son’s preaching as little more than “therapy,” a means to denounce in
others what was really the “Satan in himself” (Hill 103).
Two preliminary observations are relevant: 1.) Gaff’s explanations for his son’s
conversion were contradictory, and the source of the contradiction was his inability to
name his son’s desire. On one hand, Bunyan’s conversion was nothing but an ulterior
motive—the appropriation of Christianity for the purposes of attaining “something
other,” whether that “other” was comfort, acceptance, aesthetic pleasure, or power. On
the other hand, Bunyan’s conversion was wholly motiveless—it was the symptom of
stupidity; it was the work of the unconscious and Bunyan was a mere passive vessel for
“something other.” These allegations invite us to ask what to Gaff would be a pure
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motive for believing Christianity, as if Bunyan had but believed in Christ for all the right
reasons, Gaff would not be forced to be suspicious. This leads to our second observation:
2.) despite their contradictoriness, all Gaff’s explanations were alike in their attempt to
discover in his son’s choice some “buried continuity.” For Gaff, to choose Christianity
could not be a choice different from any other, and thus, more importantly, the choice
could not be the mark of a fundamental change in the chooser. Bunyan simply substituted
religious speech for blasphemy, but the end result was the same; implied, of course, was
that there were any number of substitutions one could make in search of the same end,
and thus we infer that Gaff objected to his son’s belief that this particular substitution was
of an entirely different order, one that put an end to substitution as such.
By way of supplement to our second observation, we also note that Gaff’s need to
discover continuity in his son’s choice was the inverse of his need to discount the
possibility of any continuity in Warner’s choice. Warner could have no idea about how
his Pentecostal roots may or may not have affected his later conversion to secularism.
That there should be any link between religious argumentation and theoretical
speculation was so distasteful to
Gaff that he dismissed Warner’s
account without any supporting
evidence. Warner was just mistaken:
his intellectualism was the product

Cigar Break, III

of “something else” in his history, though Gaff could not produce that secret “something
else.” Yet a secret had to exist. We assert, therefore, that The Gaffer’s commitment to
continuity was as a commitment to law, and as a commitment to law, he kept it (by
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discovering continuity) or broke it (by discounting continuity) not in-the-name-of the law
per se, but in-the-name-of the secret. Bunyan and Warner were not permitted certainty
about their histories but were forced to submit to the supremacy of a (quite certain)
ambiguity. By another name, ambiguity is called desire. We hypothesize that Gaff’s
difficulty wasn’t truly Bunyan’s or Warner’s desire, but his own; more specifically, his
unwillingness or inability to name his own desire. Given the tie between desire and
conversion in our examples, we can also surmise that Gaff believed naming his desire
would make it susceptible to substitution.
It was noteworthy that Gaff sought for signs of continuity (signs of law) not only
in his son’s choice but in the object of his choice, Christianity. It was, after all, only this
decision which disturbed Gaff, a peculiarity which led me to suppose that he perceived
Christianity in particular to be a threat to law, or perhaps a threat to secrecy. “One
becomes a brother, in Christianity, one is worthy of the eternal father,” Gaff complained,
“only by loving one’s enemy as one’s neighbour or as oneself” (Derrida, Gift of Death
109). The basis for this complaint was twofold: 1.) that the admonition to love one’s
enemy itself wasn’t very noble, but was “the maneuvering hypocrisy of a perverse
seduction, a stratagem to mislead the other towards oneself” (Derrida, Politics 285, 286).
And, 2.) that Jesus claimed loving one’s enemies was somehow above or beyond the law;
one might go so far as to say that loving one’s enemies amounted to breaking the law, for
law, as understood by the people, Jesus said, meant the exchange of like for like: eye for
eye, tooth for tooth, rewards and punishments as determined by one’s deeds—cause and
effect. In this system, an enemy could only be hated (like for like); to love an enemy
would introduce a radical difference. However, Gaff asserted that the difference
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introduced by Jesus wasn’t really different, for it reinstituted the status quo (same for
same) under a new name: grace. Grace, in Gaff’s mind was “the profit of a sublime
economy,” “the pure gold of an infinite wage,” “the best exchange rate for virtue.” In the
guise of supplanting a legal system, Jesus was “too calculating still,” for he invited one to
“renounce earthly, finite, accountable, exterior, visible wages,” in the name of the secret,
or in the hopes of “a profit or surplus value that [is] infinite, heavenly, incalculable, [and]
interior” (Derrida, Politics 285; Gift 109). There could be no other interpretation for
Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount:
Starting from Chapter 6 [of the Gospel of Matthew] [. . .] the theme of justice is
[. . .] appealed to and named as that which must be practiced without being
marked or remarked upon. One must be just without being noticed for it. To want
to be noticed means wanting recognition and payment in terms of a calculable
salary, in terms of thanks [. . .] or recompense. On the contrary, one must give,
alms for example, without knowing, or at least by giving with one hand without
the other hand knowing, that is without having it known, without having it known
by other men, in secret, without counting on recognition, reward, or remuneration.
Without even having it known to oneself. The dissociation between right and left
again breaks up the pair, the parity or pairing, the symmetry between, or
homogeneity of, two economies. [. . .] But an infinite calculation supersedes the
finite calculating that has been renounced. God the Father, who sees in secret, will
pay back your salary, and on an infinitely greater scale. (Gift 107)
If anything, the “difference” Jesus introduced was, to Gaff, just the worst hypocrisy, the
desire for reward passing for complete disinterest or no desire at all. Desire was visibly
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set aside, only to be sneaked in the back door in “a sort of secret calculation that would
continue to wager on the gaze of God who sees the invisible and sees in my heart what I
decline to have seen by my fellow humans” (Gift 109). It was as if Jesus were appealing
to individuals’ basest instincts, attempting to bribe them into heaven.
It would have been better by far, Gaff said, if Bunyan had chosen to believe not in
this desiring Jesus but in Abraham, or perhaps, only in a certain Jesus, the Jesus who
dramatically raised the bar of the law so that adultery, for instance, would encompass not
just the physical act but the desire to commit the act (Mt. 5:27-28), or so that almsgiving
could only be said to have occurred if one never realized one had given (Mt. 6:3). In
these teachings, Jesus advocated the mastery of desire, the gouging out of one’s eyes and
the severing of one’s limbs if they caused one to want (Mt. 5:29-30). To Gaff this was
perfectly acceptable—take for instance, Abraham, the ideal figure of this mastery, for in
his sacrifice of his son Isaac at God’s request, he performed the equivalent of severing a
hand or foot, putting to death “that which is priceless” and doing so “without any hope of
exchange, [or] reward” (Derrida, Gift 96). Taking up the call of “absolute duty” or
“responsibility,” Gaff remarked, Abraham “renounces all sense and all property,” he
desires “nothing that can be given back to him, nothing that will come back to him,” and
“in the instant of absolute renunciation, the very thing that he had already, in the same
instant, decided to sacrifice,” “is given back to him because he renounced calculation”
(96-97). Gaff’s interpretation of Abraham’s act identified God’s desire as a desire that no
one desire; it was the desire for the eradication of desire as such, so that to obey God (or
keep the law) would be the equivalent of not being seen to desire.
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Two additional observations can be made here; the first concerns the grace of
God: 1.) what is grace exactly? Clearly, Gaff did not accept his son’s declaration that he
had become a Christian “by the grace of God”; nor did he accept Jesus’ teaching of
“(an)other righteousness” beyond the exchange of like for like. Into each of these
assertions of rupture and difference, Gaff inserted continuity and sameness—i.e. law.
But is it not a strange accusation that charges one with secretly preserving under a new
name a continuity one has openly avowed? Jesus unabashedly motivated others to desire
a reward from God, to hope for a return for one’s spiritual investment. In doing so, he in
no way set aside the desire for return, the like for like of the law; rather, it was his charge
that the people did not desire that return enough. The one “likeness” they never
considered was their likeness to God, and so they did not seek his reward but only the
rewards granted by those they did deem like them—other men. To put it another way: the
people only desired the desire of other people; they did not desire the desire of God.
Furthermore, their desire for the desire of others stood in the place of the law or tried to
pass for a desire for the desire of God. Jesus’ charge against the people was the opposite
of the charge Gaff leveled against him. Gaff blamed Jesus for desiring too much, while
Jesus declared the people desired too little. If only they could be bribed into heaven.
Herein then, is grace: the desire for the desire of God. It was the one desire which
Jesus elsewhere often said he possessed—that is, that he had no desire, no will, even no
words except those which were also his Father’s; indeed, he said his desire for the desire
of God was God’s gift to him (Jn. 5:19, 26, 30; 7:16-18; 12:48-50). He was “like” his
Father, “at one” with him. This does not mean that Jesus had no desire—this is very
important—he did not advocate that all adopt a state of non-desire or become empty
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conduits through which another’s desire might flow, for that was the problem already,
that the people’s desire was “dead,” was trapped in the desire (rewards) of many, many
others in an endless chain of substitutions. Jesus was not disinterested, nor did he identify
self-interest to be evil. Rather, he charged the people with lacking enough interest in or
love for themselves, for they would not accept that the desire for the desire of God was
their greatest good. Jesus claimed to be “life” itself, and we suspect that the life he spoke
of was the freedom of his desire in being subject only to God (Jn. 11:25).
Our second observation relates to the first: 2.) if the grace of God is the desire for
the desire of God, then the difficulty for Gaff in Bunyan’s declaration that he had been
saved by grace was that the declaration did, in fact, name his desire as the desire of God.
Bunyan not only named his desire but named it as a pure likeness to another’s. It appears
to us that what Gaff objected to was his son’s announcement that he was not autonomous
in his desire; his desire was not “his own” but was another’s. Perhaps it was that Bunyan
declared a likeness to someone other than Gaff, that he asserted the possibility of being
different from his father. If so, this would support our supposition that Gaff could not
name his own desire, for his eagerness to locate “something other” in his son’s choice,
both its motive and object, was an eagerness to locate something neither Bunyan (nor
Jesus) could name for themselves. The irony, of course, was that in trying to make his
son and Jesus like himself—subject to a secret, an unsaid—he affirmed the fundamental
revelation of Christianity, that all are subjects of secrecy. We will have to return to this.
IV. The Formation of the Disease:
In my initial observations, I have already identified many of the basic features of
paranoia. I will spell them out here in detail. I simply want to remark that in dealing with
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patients, particularly those suffering from dementia paranoides, it is vital to bear in mind
that the trigger which precipitates a patient’s symptoms is not itself the “cause.” Rather,
symptoms only appear as such because the patient’s equilibrium (which they experience
as entirely normal) has been thrown out of kilter. From this de-centered position, their
former equilibrium reveals itself for the first time as an unusual state, a state not quite
right. In other words, patients experience symptoms only when they have stumbled upon
what they unconsciously recognize to be a cure for their equilibrium. It is our duty as
analysts not to try to return patients to their former stability by agreeing with them about
“the cause” of their immediate distress. If the trigger is a pinprick testing for signs of life,
we should not remove the pin but press it deeper. The Gaffer’s reaction to Christianity,
therefore, we interpret as an attempt to return to a state of equilibrium. Therefore, my
colleague’s treatment rightfully did not begin by classifying Christianity as a foreign
invader or terminal cancer. Agreeing with Gaff’s assessment of his son would not make
his paranoia dissipate. His assessment was paranoid; it was an attempt to (re)assert the
normalcy of his disease. To have agreed that Christianity offered no cure would’ve been
to consign the patient to more of the same.
The reasons why Christianity offered Gaff a way out of his paranoia became
clearer as analysis proceeded. But let us first identify the primary mechanisms of his
disease. It was some weeks into his treatment when Gaff related the following dream (I
quote from my colleagues notes here with her permission):
I dream[ed] of a writing that would be neither philosophy nor literature, nor even
contaminated by one or the other, while still keeping—I have no desire to
abandon this—the memory of literature and philosophy. I am certainly not the
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only one to have this dream, the dream of a new institution to be precise, of an
institution without precedent, without pre-institution. You will say, and quite
rightly, that this is the dream of every literary work. Every literary work ‘betrays’
the dream of a new institution of literature. It betrays it first by revealing it: each
work is unique and is a new institution unto itself. But it also betrays it in causing
it to fail: insofar as it is unique, it appears in an institutional field designed so that
it cuts itself up and abducts itself there [. . .]. (Derrida, Acts of Literature 73-74)
Here in the dream Gaff recalled being met by the ghost of Ulysses who materialized in
the form of a book that “arrive[d] like one novel among others that you place on your
bookshelf and inscribe in a genealogy.” Afterwards appeared a man whom The Gaffer
took to be the author James Joyce; the man spoke to him and said, “I too have ‘dreamt of
a special institution for [my] oeuvre, inaugurated by it like a new order. And [haven’t I]
achieved this, to some extent?’” (74). When Gaff awoke, he recalled feeling suffocated
yet exhilarated; this was his gloss on the matter:
I did indeed have to understand and share [Joyce’s] dream too: not only share it in
making it mine, in recognizing mine in it, but that I share it in belonging to the
dream of Joyce, in taking a part in it, in walking around in his space. Aren’t we,
today, people or characters in part constituted (as readers, writers, critics,
teachers) in and through Joyce’s dream? Aren’t we Joyce’s dream, his dream
readers, the ones he dreamed of and whom we dream of being in our turn? [ . . .]
The dream we were talking about concerns what it is in the work which produces
its reader, a reader who doesn’t yet exist, whose competence cannot be identified,
a reader who would be ‘formed,’ ‘trained,’ instructed, constructed, even
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engendered, let’s say invented by the work. [. . .] The work then becomes an
institution forming its own readers, giving them a competence which they did not
possess before: a university, a seminar, a colloquium, a curriculum, a course. [. . .]
It teaches him or her, if s/he is willing, to countersign. What is interesting here is
thus the invention of the addressee capable of countersigning and saying ‘yes’ in a
committed and lucid way. (74)
We will return to the patient’s interest in the creation of subjects willing to say “yes” to
their own interpellation, for it bears considerably on his rejection of Christianity. I simply
want to remark that the subject of this dream is the subject of desire; that is, who “owns”
the desire expressed in the dream—Joyce, Gaff, neither? If it is Joyce, then who is Gaff?
And if it is Gaff, then who is Joyce? And if it’s neither, if Desire is a disembodied nonentity or structural function subjecting all to itself, then what exactly is who? Or, “What
matter who’s speaking?” (Foucault, Language 138).
The question of ownership manifested in the dream immediately suggested to my
colleague the likelihood that Gaff suffered from an anal complex. Although this diagnosis
was incomplete at the time the patient refused further care and left our institution, the
additional information I’ve been able to garner from his published accounts substantiates
my colleague’s initial impressions. In a more recent publication, Gaff expressed not just
his horror at being institutionalized, but his utter distaste for “belonging” generally:
I’m not one of the family means, in general, ‘I do not define myself on the basis
of my belonging to the family’, or to civil society, or to the state; I do not define
myself on the basis of elementary forms of kinship. But it also means, more
figuratively, that I am not part of any group, that I do not identify myself with a
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linguistic community, a national community, a political party, or with any group
or clique whatsoever, with any philosophical or literary school. ‘I am not one of
the family’ means: do not consider me ‘one of you’, ‘don’t count me in’, I want to
keep my freedom, always [. . .]. When someone is one of the family, not only
does he lose himself in the herd, but he loses the others as well; the others become
simply places, family functions, or places or functions in the organic totality that
constitutes a group, school, nation or community of subjects speaking the same
language. (Derrida and Ferraris 27)
While we would expect sweeping proclamations of heroic individualism from any
teenager on the street who shops at the Gap (especially in the United States where
asserting self-ownership is fundamental to the nation’s history), it is more surprising to
find such sentiment from a philosopher-poet of advanced age as Gaff was at the time of
this composition. Age tends with wisdom to temper the harsh and hasty judgments of
youth, and the fact that Gaff never surrendered an adolescent frame of mind confirmed to
us that a residual anal complex had stymied his development toward object-relationship.
Anal complexes form when, rather than accepting a connection to his own shit or
“owning” it by allowing it to signify in his developing symbolic framework, the child
fixates on the production of shit as such, both its preservation and destruction via mastery
of the sphincter. What the child enjoys is the ambivalence created by his bodily control—
it is like keeping a secret he knows only he can tell. Keeping the secret defers the
satisfaction of release and thus defers the satisfaction of meaning which by adulthood
becomes manifest in sadistic and “essentially bipolar” tendencies because the equation
between ambivalence and autonomy cannot be broken (LaPlanche and Pontalis 35). “This
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half-way phase” between a form of “auto-erotism and object-love may perhaps be
indispensable to the normal course of life; but it appears that many linger unusually long
in this condition,” suggesting that it is a stage quite vulnerable to trauma (Freud 137).
Indeed, while in analysis The Gaffer admitted to a constituting childhood
“indelible suffering” which we can now with greater clarity identify as a fear of finding
himself in the place of shit:
The fact is that I have a predisposition to not being one of the family, it wasn’t
just my choice. I am a Jew from Algeria, from a certain type of community, in
which belonging to Judaism was problematic, belonging to Algeria was
problematic, belonging to France was problematic, etc. So all this predisposed me
to not-belonging; but, beyond the particular idiosyncrasies of my own story, I
wanted to indicate the sense in which an ‘I’ does not have to be ‘one of the
family.’ (Derrida and Ferraris 39; 27-28)
Before proceeding, this is a convenient moment to remark that one of the reasons
paranoia is so difficult to treat is that its sufferers imagine themselves to be superior
beings—that is, endowed with superior knowledge. It would be nothing to Gaff to learn
of his analism; he would tell you that he already knew it long ago, but perhaps by another
name. In fact, Gaff’s best defense against the intervention of my colleague was openly to
confess and interpret his own symptoms through self-analysis, which gave the impression
that he lacked nothing because he already knew all, especially when what he admitted to
knowing was that he could never know all, that there would always be secrecy. The
patient’s speech was the very mode of secrecy and openly so; my colleague found herself
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awash in nothing but tedious circumlocutions and circumventions such as follows (I
select at random from her transcripts):
[T]he saying ‘I am not one of the family’ does not simply describe a fact, or way
of being. Although I have treated it this way, it can also mean: ‘I do not want to
be one of the family.’ ‘I am not one of the family’ is a performative, a
commitment. Once we have distinguished the performative from a description, we
can go on to analyse it. The first dimension of the performative is what I have just
said: I am not one of the family, ‘don’t count me in.’ But the second dimension,
which in a sense is lodged in the first, and which overflows it, is that the fact of
my not wanting to be one of the family is supposed by the fact of wanting to be
one of the family. The desire to belong to any community whatsoever, the desire
for belonging tout court, implies that one does not belong. I could not say ‘I want
to be one of the family’ if in fact I was one of the family. To put it another way, I
could not say ‘I want to be Italian, European, to speak this language, etc.’, if that
were already the case. Accounting for one’s belonging—be it on national,
linguistic, political or philosophical grounds—in itself implies a not-belonging.
This can have political consequences: there is no identity. There is identification,
belonging is accounted for, but this itself implies that the belonging does not
exist, that the people who want to be this or that— French, European, etc.—are
not so in fact. And they have to know this! (Derrida and Ferraris 28)
The patient’s aggressive use of emotive italics was characteristic, as if my colleague were
too stupid to recognize emphases without help, but of course, that was the point, to
position her always in the place of stupidity, to mark her as “the one who does not know”
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and therefore the “one who naively believes.” Paranoiacs are largely megalomaniacs who
never attribute superior knowledge to others; this is important to keep in mind, for if we
suppose that their accusations of others’ secrecy is an admission of their own ignorance
(i.e. they don’t know the secret the other is hiding), we will mistakenly allow ourselves to
be provoked into educating them—sharing with them what we know—which will but
confirm to them that we did have a secret after all. Rather, we must remember that a
paranoiac’s accusations of secrecy are accusations that others have secrets of which they
are unaware. The paranoiac alone knows the secret that the one accused neither does not
nor can ever own.15
The difficulty for my colleague was the inverse of the typical one we face when
dealing with patients. We do, after all, describe ourselves as specialists: “doctors of
psychology,” and thus patients typically expect of us superior knowledge; they come to
us believing that we have the key to their problems. However, as I have remarked
elsewhere, our role with patients comes very near to that of a Christian apostle or
evangelist, the bearer of good news. Like the evangelist, we do not have the truth so
much as the truth has us. As those chosen by our patients and precious to them, we
become through a series of projections, the temporary locale of their subjectivities, which
—if treatment is completed—returns to them changed, falling upon them like grace. This
is, in fact, an apt description of the psychoanalytic cure: the patient receiving as a gift the
completion of his subjectivity. Not that we are the gift-givers; for one to assume so would
be the worst professional pride; it would assume that we own the patient’s self in advance
and can bestow it or deny it as we see fit. It would also tend to make the patient beholden
to us or encourage the patient to think in terms of working for us, in which case the cure
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would just be the appropriate wage he gets for complying with the duty of wellness.
Patients already feel the burden of this duty; as my colleague has suggested elsewhere,
culture is little more than the erasure of sickness and death; we should not encourage
patients to continue in this futile pursuit but rather help them relinquish their work as the
prelude to grace. In fact, in light of Gaff’s maneuvers to preclude my colleague’s
intervention, we could add to our initial observations above and hypothesize that Gaff’s
objections to Christianity were likely also objections to the given-ness of grace, to Jesus’
claim that the desire of the desire of God was a desire bestowed to him and that he had
not earned it. Gaff’s accusation that Jesus just instituted another law destroyed the
giftedness of God’s desire and reasserted that it was the duty of all subjects to get back to
work.
Because Gaff already assumed my colleague was an empty vessel, a channel
through which he might talk to himself, it seemed as though he was in the preferred
position in which to accept treatment. However, the difficulty soon became clear: since
my colleague appeared only as an empty vessel, she served merely as a means for Gaff to
confirm to himself what he already believed. Gaff owned her. She could find no place for
herself in which to assert a difference which did not already belong to him; thus she was
left without a foothold, and Gaff’s circularity remained impenetrable. Typical neurotics
must eventually learn that the analyst’s difference is not as they initially assumed (i.e.
that they have superior knowledge), but there must still remain a perceived difference on
some score, otherwise the patient’s subjectivity will not return to them changed.
Dementia paranoides, however, seizes its sufferers in such a way as to frustrate anyone
but the sufferer himself from asserting a difference.
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We assert our difference now by returning to our analysis of the patient’s family
history as it was dramatically italicized above:
the fact of my not wanting

supposed by the fact of wanting

implies one does not belong

I was one of the family

are not so in fact

Accounting for one’s belonging

tout court (excluded as pure formality)
And they have to know this! (exclamation included as in the family
of emphases; column placement ambiguous)
These italics, like neon lights, advertised the patient’s certainty of his difference. And
what is that difference but ambivalence as illustrated by the above equal columns
grouped according to negative and positive assertions? According to the patient’s selfanalysis, his desire not to belong was but the inverse of an already operative desire to
belong, but this desire to belong was also already the effect of a basic and structural
necessity that precluded the possibility of belonging ever existing as such, and thus the
patient imagined that his effort to live out this paradox, pitting desire against desire, was
a means to bear witness to the fundamental secret of all existence, a witness that alone
was both ethical and (according to my colleague’s notes) Just. In these formulations we
can discern that the patient’s childhood refusal to let shit symbolize was transposed onto
the process of shitting so that the process was invested with an extraordinary, quasidivine significance that, conveniently enough for the patient’s ego, translated him into the
role of John the Baptist.17 Just as the prophet claimed to have no desire except for the
coming of the Messiah, so The Gaffer, in attempting to live the “purity” of existential
paradox—not succumbing one way or another to the manifold particular simplifications

Zias 282
which mark one’s refusal to bear the weight of such glory—could only conceive of desire
as suspicious and as a betrayal. At this late stage, we could say the patient’s outlook, like
that of paranoiacs generally, had long solidified into the law: not to be seen to desire.
This law in essence was the message of Gaff’s dream of James Joyce, who, as the
patient’s adopted father-figure, was both the harbinger of freedom—i.e. of the escape
from being forced to name one’s shit via the creation of an institution that had no
“precedent” or “remainder”—and the supreme authoritarian who “formed,” “trained,”
and “constructed” sons in his image so that their being was nothing but his remainder as
“dream” or shit. The figure of Ulysses, the skittish wanderer, who appeared in the
patient’s dream “like one novel among others that you place on your bookshelf”—i.e. as
nothing particularly special—designated the inverse of the patient’s perceived autonomyin-ambivalence by revealing it as a rote repetition; the site of ever-new-adventures was
but an incapacity ever to arrive at home. “[I]t is a feeling, an affective relation I have to
myself of being someone who cannot stop anywhere”; “I cannot do otherwise,” the
patient confessed (Derrida, Negotiations 12, 13). It was “the profoundly sedentary nature
of someone who travels a great deal” (Derrida and Ferraris 44). Note the patient’s
insistence in his dream that he had “no desire to abandon” his ambivalence, which can be
interpreted in two ways: 1.) that his double-bind was an indispensable instinctual impulse
which would place it beyond the bounds of desire; or alternatively, that the double-bind
was the patient’s only desire which would also mark it as an incapacity to desire
differently; or 2.) that he did desire to abandon his ambivalence, which if so would turn
his confessions and denials into so many endless, guilty apologies.
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We need not choose between these alternatives as the patient’s double-mind
warrants a double-interpretation. I am inclined, however, to favor the latter because I
have learned from the patient’s autobiographies that the Joyce dream was a repetition of a
incident which occurred between The Gaffer and his father, one that provides us with
further evidence that the patient’s psychic makeup was marked by an inability not to keep
repeating a particular founding relation—or non-relation. The episode Gaff detailed
concerned his reaction to a book his father (also a philosopher) had written: “[Michel
Foucault’s] book, admirable in so many respects, powerful in its breadth and style, is
even more intimidating for me in that, having formerly had the good fortune to study
under [him], I retain the consciousness of an admiring and
grateful disciple” (Derrida, Writing 31). The sexual
connotations of “studying under” are unmistakable as is
the pleasure the young Gaff took in experiencing or
imagining his own submission. Could there be any other
pleasure? Perhaps not, for Gaff continued to defer, but with
greater repentance, denying that he wished to “dispute”
or “challenge” his father’s ideas; he only wanted
“to engage in dialogue with the master,” “to articulate
the interminable and silent dialogue which made him into
a disciple” (31). But it was so difficult; he felt “unhappy,”
for “starting to enter into dialogue in the world, that is,
starting to answer back” made him feel “‘caught in the act,’ like the ‘infant’ who, by
definition and as his name indicates, cannot speak and above all must not answer back”
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(31). For the danger of doing so, of risking, was being “rejected or accused,” discarded as
shit by the master who could “reproach him for making this challenge” and by definition
as master “reject it in advance” (31). And even worse, as a disciple, “having interiorized
the master,” The Gaffer felt he must also reproach himself (32). Solutions to this
predicament?
This predicament first and foremost is one of desire, the patient’s own as well as
his father’s. What does Gaff want in speaking to his father? What is the object, the
motive? And what does his father want in return? And what is this fear of being “caught
in the act,” caught, shall we say, with one’s pants down? “I have an impulse of fear or
terror in the face of [. . .] a public space that makes no room for the secret,” Gaff
confessed. “For me, the demand that everything be paraded in the public square and that
there be no internal forum is a glaring sign of [totalitarianism]” (Derrida and Ferraris 59).
We could conjecture that these fears of exposure are the manifest symptoms of repression
—perhaps of the young Gaff stumbling upon a primal scene, catching his father “in the
act,” wanting at that very moment “something other” than his son. Given Gaff’s anal
fixation, we suspect that he saw his father in a homosexual encounter, or maybe just
enjoying a really good shit. “We should be inclined to say that what was characteristically paranoic about [his] illness was the fact that the patient, as a means of
warding off a homosexual wish-phantasy, reacted precisely with delusions of persecution
of this kind” (Freud 135). Guilt, confusion, jealousy, astonishment were no doubt the
emotions which accompanied the discovery of his father’s jouissance. From
that moment desire for Gaff became “dirty,” which explains why by adulthood, he
expressed a dread not of discovery (he already knew the secret after all) but of being
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discovered, owned, found out, and (indicating the likely positionality of his father)
pinned down. It was a horror of being like his father. Elsewhere, this horror and its
symptomatic ambivalence—“submissive reverence and the most intense malice”—has
been described not just as the prelude to hatred but its very subjective structure (Girard,
Deceit 10).
Gaff solved the predicament (and ensured that he would not be like his father) by
first of all cleansing secrecy, making it no longer “dirty” but sacred, unapproachable.
Like a fair lady in a castle, it was fragile; her honor must be assured; she had to be
protected. She was protected by never being named; thus Gaff overcame the dilemma
created by the names “disciple” and “master” by declaring that he had nothing to name
except the dilemma of naming, and that moreover, to declare the dilemma was only to
assert something as pedestrian as what “is” or, more accurately, “is not.” In this way, he
could account for the operation of desire, because there would be no dilemma without it,
but he could also discount it by making it a pure function of the system. “It is not I who
deconstruct,” Gaff wrote, “rather, something I call ‘deconstruction’ happens to the
experience of a world, a culture, a philosophic tradition” (Derrida and Ferraris 80). It is
simply “what happens, the event one takes note of,” and whether or not “one is happy
about it or not,” “I have no answer” (Derrida and Ferraris 82). And yet, there was also
“no efficient deconstruction without the greatest possible pleasure,” Gaff said. “This
lifting or simulacrum of a lifting of repression, a simulacrum which is never neutral and
without efficacity [. . .] can procure a subtle and intense pleasure” (Acts of Literature 56).
“[L]earn this pleasure from me,” he advised (“Otobiographies” 4). Like the secret he
protected, therefore, he was beyond reproach. For he had named nothing but what his
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father could, indeed, had to approve and commend—he had loved and preserved a
legacy, spoken only “under [his father’s] authority” and in the approved “grammar” that
“had been given [to him] for ever,” saying nothing particularly radical, and yet he had
also obeyed by becoming his own, by “transgressing, putting into question, displacing,”
embarrassing the family by shouting absurdities in the name of “a superior or more
profound truth” just like his father and his father before him (Derrida and Ferraris 43;
Derrida, Politics 50). He had been a bad boy, full of “blasphemous criticism and
mutinous insubordination” sure enough, but he had done so, only with the most “reverent
devotion,” to become a good man in the image, however altered, of his ancestors (Freud
126). “I hope this mingling of respect and disrespect for the academic heritage and
tradition in general is legible in everything I do,” he said (Derrida and Ferraris 43). If my
colleague could have, she would’ve assured him that he need not be paranoid—it is.
We now have sufficient evidence to conclude that the patient’s refusal to name or
be named was the expression of a fear of rejection. That his father had rejected him by
taking pleasure in “something else,” or alternatively had accepted him only on the
condition that he remain a passive infant (which is but another form of rejection) was in
the patient’s mind, never in doubt. Such absolute assurance, we surmise, is the necessary
precondition for the eruption of dementia paranoides, which is why in its advanced
stages it tends toward authoritarianism via universal indictments. Recall our hypothesis
that paranoiac symptoms reach their worst when a patient’s mind is buffeted by doubt;
we can now clarify this more particularly: it is not doubt as to whether another’s
acceptance is sincere, but rather, doubt as to whether it is not sincere. In other words,
what if there is no shit to be found, what if “spotless white is all the wear”? (Vaughan
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24). Paranoiacs resort to bold italics because they must repeatedly incite the other to
display his shit. “It is as if I were always trying to provoke someone to translate
something that escapes or refuses translation,” Gaff confessed (Derrida and Ferraris 41).
Only by relentlessly recreating the original scene of shit can the sufferer maintain control
of the shit and thus of the psychic structure that constitutes him as one who is free from
anything “dirty” by virtue of his rejection. Or, alternatively, keeping in mind the law of
non-desire by which he lives: only by incessantly demystifying other’s desires can the
paranoiac imagine himself as one who “never desires,” who “is completely and divinely
autonomous” in his “inner desert island” of “nothingness” (Girard, Desire 270, 271, 273).
Paranoia fortifies the subject against his own desire; it is a means of making his desire
secret or impossible to say and thus of keeping it safe from the threat of change.
Transformation cannot happen in the un-realm of the unsayable, which is why
paranoiacs can’t accept that there is no secret to preserve or, worse, that the secret is
already known. Recall Gaff’s charge that Warner couldn’t understand himself; it was a
symptomatic accusation: an enacting of the irony that Gaff’s romanticization of pure
form turned into suspicion of all formalisms—except his own. What was, in the patient’s
autobiographies, Jewish or French or European (all particularities) was problematized
while his own particular psychic structure never was. He could not question the form of
his own psyche because he took it as the singular given from which all his philosophy not
only naturally proceeded but also naturally confirmed as a universal condition. “[T]o
speak of the abyss,” Gaff said, “can be done only from the shore,” or, as another
colleague of mine remarked a little less poetically—with shopping bags in hand (Derrida,
Politics of Friendship 143; Easthope 83).18 The shore for our patient was his own
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idiosyncrasy as idiosyncrasy, or more specifically as we have argued, his own ass and
anus which he could not see for himself without intervention. Those “hinder partes, that
few could spie, / Were ruinous and old, but painted cunningly” (Spenser 63). We might
conclude, by way of additional speculation, that anxiety about the unseen instigates the
initial fixation with one’s own shitting which characterizes all anal complexes. We
contend that far from being a pure given that speaks for itself, the patient’s own psychic
structure was the form of the desire for all others to be seen to share in his anality.19
V. The Freedom to Say Shit
The error of the intellectual (and many analysts) is that the ability to deduce and
define does not, as the intellectual imagines, amount to the same thing as a cure, for the
realm of cure is that of desire, or, as so intrigued The Gaffer, the willingness to say “yes.”
We now return to the questions we had suspended: that is, in what ways Christianity
threatened Gaff with a cure as well as why in his dream analysis Gaff expressed an
interest to know how an “addressee capable of countersigning and saying ‘yes’ in a
committed and lucid way” is “invented” by the one who would have cosigners (Derrida,
Acts of Literature 74). We have reserved discussion of these issues until last because they
are interrelated. Supposing, as we have, that the structure of the patient’s dementia
paranoides was in place long before his son’s conversion, and that his reaction to his son
was a repetition of a fundamentally constituting failure of relationship, we can reasonably
conclude that paranoiac symptoms are triggered when sufferers are faced with an
opportunity to belong. We deduce that his son’s “yes” to Christianity confronted Gaff
with an alternative to ambivalence, a chance to repeat it differently, through, shall we say,
returning to the moment when shit was in order and this time, choosing to comply.
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It’s noteworthy that it was this particular choice of his son and not any other
which triggered The Gaffer’s paranoia. Hence we conclude that at issue for Gaff was not
choice per se, as if every instance of choice raised the specter of desire and ran the risk of
ravishing Lady Secret, but rather it was the particular object of choice, Christianity. Why
should this be? “Whatever some may think in certain milieux, you would be wrong to
think that the [Christian] authors aren’t a good read. I have always been rewarded
whenever I have immersed myself in their works” and believe that “[anyone should] find
[them] very good company” as well (Lacan, Ethics 83). But Gaff was rather narrowminded. His maneuvering to assert his difference from his father and his inability to see
difference anywhere but in himself suggested to me that this particular choice of his son
introduced an unwelcome assertion of difference or openness.
Indeed this is so. Initially, Bunyan was very much like his father, sharing a
penchant for theatrics and for the translation of himself into spectacle via the publication
of an autobiography, in this case titled Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners. I have
consulted this text and found that like his father, Bunyan also exhibited bipolar symptoms
characteristic of anal complexes. For instance, he described himself prior to his
conversion as one who was wholly committed to his sins: “cursing, swearing, lying and
blaspheming the holy Name of God,” but at the same time he was also “greatly afflicted
and troubled with the thoughts of the day of Judgment,” so that he could not enter
absolutely into his sins; nor could he absolutely forsake them (8). His mind he described
as “a pair of scales,” for “sometimes one end would be uppermost, and sometimes again
the other,” but in both cases it was caught between sin and repentance and repentance and
sin (67). He felt the weight of the extremes and between the extremes he would run: “I
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found within me a great desire to take my fill of sin,” he said, “still studying what sin was
set to be committed, that I might taste the sweetness of it”; but then, sure enough would
follow feelings of “secret shame

. . . before the God of Heaven.” Like his father, he also

took pleasure in imagining himself an infant: “I wished with all my heart,” he confessed,
“that I might be a little childe again” so that he might choose differently, for he
recognized that at present he could not choose whether to be a great sinner or a great
penitent; he could only choose both the sin and penance (13-14). The similarity between
father and son here is so striking and so complete that we suppose it bears an inverse
relation to Gaff’s dementia: that is, the greater Gaff’s sense of likeness to his son, the
lesser his paranoia, and the lesser his sense of likeness, the greater his paranoia. Paranoia,
as we have stated, is an attempt to reestablish a disrupted homogeneity.
Like Gaff, Bunyan also abided in this tedious state of suspended shit for some
time. However, gradually, through associations with sundry religious people, and through
his reading of the Bible, he began to attempt his own reformation. Still, his desire to
reform did not fundamentally alter his identity as one who vacillates between sin and
repentance. In his published account, it is possible to add up how often he hopes to be
saved and doubts he can be, but I grew weary of recording the occurrences after twenty.
In short, he wondered whether or not God had chosen him; whether the day of grace had
passed him by; he wished he were an animal and therefore undamnable; he imagined
himself one time to be Esau who sold his birthright, who told Jesus that he could “go if
he will,” and another time to be Judas who betrayed his Savior and therefore could find
“no place of repentance”; he believed he had blasphemed against the Holy Spirit and
thereby had committed the one unpardonable sin (45, 54). But he also felt encouraged to
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trust God, to believe there was room for him in heaven, that his sin had been atoned by
Jesus and was not unpardonable, that God loved him and had granted him sufficient
grace. But his encouragement might last “for the space of two or three hours” and then
“because it tarried not, [he] therefore sunk in [his] spirit under exceeding guilt again”
(46). In sum, God was both his “ally,” and “instigator” concocting a “plot against him”
(Freud 114).
Those familiar with my colleague’s work on contradiction will recognize in
Bunyan the following formula for subjectivity:

S1 ▲ S2
AC ◊
I&O
= U5

In Bunyan, under erasure (X) was his subversion of morality (S1) which lead him to
compare himself to other great sinners, demonstrating the utter predictability and
semblance of all sin (S2), for there are really only Ten different ways to go about it, quite
a finite number to be sure. That the ownership of his own subversiveness began to feel
like bondage itself, so that he had repeatedly to tell himself he was “something other”
than he was illustrates the radical supremacy of & which pinned him between I and O.
That he sought to choose other than I&O (U5) was hardly a sufficient wrench to
aggravate the perpetual motion of the machine (◊). Rather, it only revealed to him just
what a cog he was (AC). “I [was] both a burthen and a terror to myself,” Bunyan
confessed, “nor did I ever so know, as now, what it was to be weary of my life, and yet
afraid to die” (47). In diagnosing Bunyan’s ambivalence, several other colleagues of mine
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have rightly observed traces of mental illness, “recurring bouts of depression,” and
“anxiety,” and so much so that one was even lead to declare that “anxiety is arguably
Bunyan’s most important legacy to literary history” (Greaves 234; Sim, Negotiations 45).
Truly, we cannot ignore the symptoms of repression which accompanied his heightened
sense of sin, his suspicion that “sin accrues not just to a wrong action but also to a wrong
thought.” It is no wonder that, unable to relinquish the burden of guilt, it is later
“project[ed] onto the figure of Satan” (Hawkins 103). My only caveat to accepting these
formulations would be that in them we do not succumb to “the objectification,
classification, and marginalization of Bunyan as a fanatical individual,” for as Gaff also
illustrates, neuroses of this sort are quite commonplace (Davies 94).
I also discovered in my reading of Grace Abounding that Bunyan shared with his
father a comparable rhetorical style, a penchant for circumlocutions and circumventions.
Clearly, Gaff thought the best way to deter the soiling of Lady Secret was to write her
poetry, and of a rather metaphysical sort. In this way he could seduce and inflame from
afar, couching his longings in figures of speech which never quite said what they seemed
to say. In the same way, Bunyan’s language invited me to wonder if he meant to say what
he said; it was due to the preponderance of metaphor, a most insistent tendency to
substitute. I’ve already mentioned one of his most interesting images—his mind as “a
pair of scales.” The following examples are also typical of his manner: after reading
Martin Luther’s commentary on Galatians, he declared, “I thought, that I loved Christ
dearly. O me thought my Soul cleaved unto him, my affections cleaved unto him. I felt
love to him as hot as fire,” or later when he was depressed and could not pray, he wrote,
“despair was swallowing me up” (43; 51). Was Bunyan really burned by fire or ingested
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by an entity named Despair? Or are these metaphors like italics, an affectation meant to
advertise and perform a superiority and difference one doubts?
I pose this question as a way to introduce Bunyan’s departure from the “thrashing
ambivalence” bequeathed to him by Gaff (Camden, “Most Fit” 846). Though both father
and son tended to “speak otherwise,” unlike his father, Bunyan’s speech was noteworthy
for its concreteness, its “physicality”; his metaphors “transform[ed] abstract qualities into
personalities” which acted upon him, tore at him, seized him, struck him (Luxon, 171;
Hancock 77). They were “consistently physical [metaphors], granting weight and form
and personality and colour and taste and sound and shape to words” (Hancock 79). My
impression in reading Bunyan’s account of his conversion was that metaphor wasn’t so
much a descriptive device as it was a mindset. His life had become invaded by metaphor,
a logic of substitution which he confessed he had “fallen” into; or perhaps it “fell” into
him, much like (for those who recall the case of Percy) it had fallen into another preacher
in his “falling sickness,” John Donne. As a mindset, Bunyan’s metaphors were not
incantational, an attempt to call forth the unsayable in a sort of pagan religious homage to
the Great Eternal Mystery. Nor were his metaphors purely literal, a philosophical
devotion to “proper meaning,” as if anything short of calling a cow a cow would be
needless and dangerous obfuscation (Derrida, Margins 270). Rather, Bunyan’s metaphors
were incarnational, enacting the principally Christian logic of “fulfillment.”20
To the philosophically minded, metaphor is “the purview of theologians” which is
in no way a compliment, and as such is that which philosophy must eradicate from itself
and define itself against (Derrida, Margins 267). From this point of view, metaphor
oppresses the literal by eradicating it, making it “unreal.” For instance, Bunyan’s
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explanation of conversion as a “new birth” could be read as an “imagery of antimotherhood” because it “reverses literal birth and then recasts it as a faulty allegory of
the true experience it only dimly shadows—being made one with Christ” (Luxon 156;
158). Adherents to this view often police others through charges of hypocrisy and
“equivocation”—i.e. of not being literal enough (179). To the religiously minded,
metaphor is an indispensable tool for the articulation of what cannot be said. The unsaid
can never really be said; metaphor is thought to be the closest approximation. This
paradox is the very definition of living a religious life, living in communication with that
which cannot be communicated.
These two views are, obviously, mirrors of each other. Though different in
content, each is dedicated to the preservation of the unsayable, the “x being presupposed
in language” which is vital for the security of the status quo (Derrida, “Confessions and
‘Circumfession’” 35). Each view is eager to assert that metaphor should not be taken for
the “thing” itself, however that “thing” is identified, the “literal” cow in the barn or the
cow’s ineffable “mysterious essence.” Both the euphoria of the religious enthusiast and
the plain literalisms of the philosopher are sustained and depend upon exclusion—either
of “the divine,” however conceived, or of the “excluded” metaphor, the one metaphor
“without which the concept of metaphor could not be constructed,” the “metaphor of
metaphor” (Derrida, Margins 219). For both the religious subject and the philosophical
subject, metaphor must serve the established order by confirming that the excluded is still
excluded. To “mistake a metaphor” would risk the inclusion into metaphor of what by
definition must remain excluded; it would be breaking the law.
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Might Bunyan have been mistaking his metaphors and thereby transgressing the
law of the unsayable? We must answer this in the affirmative in a particular sense: if
Bunyan could not write a “straightforward narrative of religious conversion,” it was not
because truth could only be told indirectly via approximations, but because the
approximations, or the logic of substitution to which they adhered was, for him, the truth
(Davies 152). Metaphor for Bunyan did not preserve the unsaid but told the secret; it
announced the inclusion of the excluded, the say-ability of the unsayable, or in the
language we have been using elsewhere: it attested to the possibility of symbolizing shit.
The Christian subject is dedicated to this symbolization; we could describe this as the
nature of Christian conversion: the refusal to preserve a mystery. We are not saying, of
course, that Bunyan really did think he had an actual pair of metal scales in his skull; if in
his text the “[l]iteral and metaphorical, inner and outer, natural and spiritual,” were
“blurred to the point of a dizzying representational hesitation or iridescence,” it was not
because he was confused about what was really real (Davies 187). We are simply
asserting that he believed the substitutions everywhere alluded to by metaphor did
describe an actuality; they described grace (203).
Grace, as we earlier defined, is desire for the desire of God. It was Bunyan’s
contention in Grace Abounding that this desire came to substitute in himself for the desire
of the desire of others, or the very chain of endless substitutions itself was substituted for
“something else.” Bunyan’s conversion account in Grace Abounding was one long series
of substitutions, and the substitutions were (in true religious and philosophical form) the
effect of exclusion, absence, in this case, of I. Bunyan didn’t know who he was. This was
why so many other identities in the course of the narrative substituted for his own: Martin
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Luther, Mr. Gifford, Esau, Judas, Francis Spira, whose book only “rubbed [salt] into a
fresh wound” because, like Bunyan, Spira despaired of ever being desired by God (51).
Where was Bunyan in this list of names? This is a very Christian question; it is the first
question: “Where are you?” God asked this of Adam and Eve after they had eaten of the
tree (Gen. 3:9). Of course, they were hiding in the bushes, and by sewing fig leaves
together, had tried to make the bushes the support, cloak, or medium of their identities.
Assuming that God already knew where they were and didn’t have to ask, we can
conclude that the question was asked for Adam’s benefit; it was an opportunity for him to
identify his location by responding, “Here I am.” Adam, however, didn’t answer in this
manner; rather, his response explained why he could not say, “Here I am”: “I heard the
sound of You in the garden, and I was afraid because I was naked; so I hid myself” (Gen.
3:10). Christianity presupposes that the subject is hidden, that the subject is a hiding. The
explanations for being missing (and they are infinite) stand in the place of the subject.
Another way to say this would be that in Christianity the subject is presumed to
be unsayable; it is an inability to say, being suspended in the interstices, in a division
between “two ‘true Selves,’” as Bunyan and Gaff have illustrated. One of these selves is a
law-keeper and the other a law-breaker, or in psychoanalytic terms, one is the acceptable
“Ego-Ideal” of a symbolic social role, and the other an “excremental leftover/trash of the
symbolic process” (Zizek, Fragile 48, 49). Navigating between these two selves is the
permanent burden of the subject; the subject is the unending recalibration of the “Here I
am” to keep up with its permutations, for every naming of it initiates at the same time its
own un-naming. Locating the I only de-locates it, for every attempt to do so repeats the
inaugural act which constituted the subject as the site of another—Martin Luther, Esau,

Zias 297
Judas, etc. We should note that God did not dispute Adam’s assertion of nakedness but
rather asked him a second question: “Who told you that you were naked?” (3:11). Who is
this “who?” Adam did not answer the question or explicitly identify anyone; for instance,
he did not say, “the snake told me.” But in pointing out that there was a “who,” God
implied that this entity had taken the place of Adam, had consigned him to the status of a
subordinate. “Wretched man that I am!” Such was Paul’s famous articulation of the
experience of this split subjectivity:
For what I am doing, I do not understand; for I am not practicing what I would
like to do, but I am doing the very thing I hate.[. . .] For I know that nothing good
dwells in me, that is, in my flesh; for the willing is present in me, but the doing of
the good is not. For the good that I want, I do not do, but I practice the very evil
that I do not want. But if I am doing the very thing I do not want, I am no longer
the one doing it, but sin which dwells in me. (Romans 7:15, 18-20; 24a)
“Sin” here is in the position of the “who” of Genesis; it is the one who has taken hold of
the subject, who has insinuated itself as the one the subject needs in order to be itself. It
has, like Bunyan’s despair, “swallowed up” the subject.
We must emphasize that the division of the subject which is marked by
substitutions of self for self is set in motion by the breaking of a law. Adam’s explanation
followed his eating from the forbidden tree; similarly, Bunyan’s search for himself
followed, among other things, his guilty suspicion that playing games on Sundays was
sinful. It is not then the sheer existence of law which divides the subject, but rather it is
the subject’s experience of law, a perception of law which injects into it “something
other,” a mysterious x. The serpent’s temptation of Adam and Eve consisted of a
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reinterpretation of God’s decree: “You surely will not die [if you eat of the tree]! For God
knows that in the day you eat from it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God,
knowing good and evil” (Gen. 3:4-5). His reinterpretation turned the prohibition into a
“dirty secret”; it became the cloak of God’s desire for absolute power and superiority. We
conclude, therefore, that what has “swallowed up” the subject, is secrecy: it is the
inability of the subject not to presuppose or suspect a secret.
As analysts, we always hear from our patients that they have transgressed some
law or other in-the-name-of the secret; either their transgression was meant to expose the
dirty desire of the lawmaker and his law which was “brutally imposing itself on [them]”
or the transgression was meant to champion the innocence of their own secret, their
supposed internal “precious treasure that can only be loved, and cannot be submitted to
the rule of Law” (Žižek, Puppet 117). In either case, such confessions confirm that a
commitment to the secret is also a commitment to law; the law becomes the necessary
mode of the secret, it “fixes the object of desire” as the desire for the secret, which
effectively “delivers desire to its repetitive autonomy,” its ever-same search for
“something other” (Badiou 79). “Sin” in Christianity identifies not just particular
transgressions but this subjective structure which is unwilling or unable to relinquish the
unsayable; we are simply “in sin” Paul insists because the secret lives in the place of the
subject, rendering the subject effectively “dead” (Badiou 84; Žižek, Puppet 117).
If the subject is the automatic operation of desire, the perpetual relocation of the
secret, then it is clear why the subject cannot “come to life” or break with this structure
by obeying rather than transgressing law. The secret, by its very nature, moves; as a
result, to suppose that obeying law “kills” the secret or, in the other terms we’ve been
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using, successfully neutralizes the power of the unsayable by symbolizing shit, is to
suppose that the subject knows exactly what must be said or can identify his own shit.
This proves not to be the case. Recall that Paul, in naming himself the “chief of sinners”
listed among his sins “blasphemy,” “persecution,” and “violent aggression” (I Tim. 1:1215). Yet, he committed all these acts while devoted to the most strenuous observance of
the Mosaic Law. Though he committed murder in the name of the law forbidding murder,
he considered himself “blameless” (Phil. 3:4-6). Obedience to law consequently creates a
specific mutation of the secret; it allows one’s shit to hide in or pass for “zeal for keeping
the Law” (Žižek, Puppet 118). It isn’t just that the effort to keep the law also incites one
to transgress it, but that one’s desire to make oneself alive through such effort “itself in
the end is already sin” (118). The very “effort” is a testimony that obedience isn’t
automatic,“‘natural’, spontaneous, but always-already mediated by the (repression of
the) desire to transgress the Law. When we obey the law, we do so as part of a desperate
strategy to fight against our desire to transgress it; [. . .] this obedience, in effect, is a
defence against our sinful desire” (Žižek, Fragile 142). It is a means once again of
securing the supremacy of secrecy and thus of one’s perceived autonomy.
All this is quite explicit in Grace Abounding; there Bunyan confessed his
frustrated efforts to keep his shit from clinging to him through observance of law.
Dementia paranoides, we conclude, is inherently legalistic; it is an inability to police or
control the locale of the eruption of the secret. By multiplying laws and hence the
conditions under which the subject might lay claim to sinlessness, legalism aspires to
nullify the power of the secret through excessive naming. Itemizing sins is meant to limit
the subject’s choices and thus disable the mechanistic and substitutionary roving of
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desire. One can’t be the exchange of selves in the name of secrecy when there aren’t
many selves one is allowed to be. Supposing law to be the realm of non-desire, the
legalist misrecognizes that the multiplication of laws is also substitutionary, each law
being in turn found wanting and supplemented and re-supplemented again and again.
Bunyan’s anxiety about his salvation was a search for an adequate law—or “narrative” in
the words of one analyst:
[In Bunyan’s England] several kinds of grand narrative are unmistakably breaking
down (the grand narrative of monarchy, of Anglicanism, of social hierarchy on
the feudal model, of religious absolutism, and religious authority in general), and
where the problem of [. . .] how you secure legitimacy, is becoming acute. [. . .]
Bunyan’s writings [. . .] are responses to, a breakdown of grand narrative and the
crisis of legitimacy that it leaves in its wake. (Sim and Walker 15)
Or “authority” in the words of another:
The representation of conversion in Grace Abounding [. . .] is fundamentally
iconoclastic: anti-formal. [. . .] [I]conoclasm is first of all a problem of authority.
Since any and all forms are subject to the iconoclastic critique, the real question is
what legitimates any particular form. This is precisely the problem with which
Bunyan becomes obsessed in his autobiography. (Goldman 465)
Or “sign”:
The gracious meaning of [any] sign, for Bunyan, remains forever haunted by the
presence of the opposite, demonic meaning. A conviction of sin can be ambiguous
[. . .]: while it might be the first sign of grace, it could also be a simple recognition
of one’s eternal reprobation. [. . .] Salvation and a permanent sense of assurance

Zias 301
are always in some sense deferred. [. . .] Bunyan’s problem is that he cannot get
past this negative stage of destruction. He keeps repeating the experience of
humiliation over and over again. The iconoclastic impulse, directed inward,
threatens to become simply destructive [. . .]. (Goldman 469; 470; 479)
Or “conscience”:
Did Luther enrapture Bunyan because he emphasized the freedom of human
conscience, its ability to squelch anxiety and justify itself, or even to establish its
inherent goodness? No: Bunyan’s conscience did not find relief through an
inward resource but rather ironically through the realization that it was leased to
the law [and thus always in the flux of doubt]. (G. Johnson 53)
Or “providence”:
Bunyan’s text demonstrates unease with the very forms of which it has been
deemed representative. [. . .] The reasonings of Bunyan’s narrated self thus
converge with the master narrative [of providence] in a desire to find [. . .]
himself, in God’s grace. But the providential design which secures this narrative
is the latter’s greatest potentials threat: since God’s providence can be no more
proven than disproven in worldly language, it must be taken on trust. [. . .] Grace
Abounding does not seem guilty of temptation so much as psychically and exegetically habituated to it. In his ongoing need to convince and be convinced, and
in his spiritual dependence on the apparatus of exegesis, the godly author is
himself a tempter. [. . .] [Bunyan’s] all-but-unspeakable, rhetorical questions are
fuelled by [. . .] epistemological anxiety [. . .] the proof deficit which necessarily
makes the author a tempter of God. [. . .] The narrative process of Grace
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Abounding puts ‘an if’ upon its own enterprise. (Lynch 66, 72, 74, 76)
Or, finally, an adequate “Word of God”:
The concept of the authority of Scripture is so central to Bunyan’s faith and
experience of God that he is deeply disturbed by a storm of doubt as to ‘whether
the holy Scriptures were not rather a Fable and cunning Story, then the holy and
pure Word of God’ [. . .]. He acknowledges that an argument for scriptural
authority from scriptural sources is circular and thus unconvincing [. . .].
(Hancock 75)
Though different in content, each of these analyses addresses the same structural
impasse: Bunyan’s inability to conceive of any law without also conceiving of its secret
exception, the “something else” which escaped its jurisdiction. The exception to church
authority was individual experience and the inviolability of conscience; the exception to
conscience was providence and the exception to providence was the Word of God, and so
on; supplement for supplement, because structurally, every law is undermined by the
universal “if.” The legalist tries to particularize or localize this abstract “if,” but the more
aggressive his attempt, the more the “ifs” become “temptations of unimaginable and
obscene proportions.” With fewer and fewer choices, and “under the tyranny” of so many
laws, Bunyan could only “feel that the world [was] conspiratorially collapsing around
him” (Davies 105, 106). The secret was everywhere.
However, it is important to our understanding of paranoia that we recognize that
legalism can also work in the opposite direction. Let us return to Gaff: knowing that
legalism eventually turns authoritarian, crushing the self and others in an effort to name
(once and for all) the “if,” he endeavored to head off this possibility by seeking to
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preserve secrecy rather than by eradicating it. In a way, Gaff understood the power of
grace, or the desire for the desire of God to free one from legalism; thus he advocated an
“alternative grace” which, throughout his autobiographies, he referred to variously as the
“something, that happens [. . .] and has no need of us to happen,” or “an invention of the
other that would come,” a “passage toward the other,” or “the incalculable, the
unforeseeable, the undecidable, the event, the arrival, the other . . . ‘what comes’”; or
finally, “the perhaps itself,” the “[u]nheard-of, totally new, that very experience which no
metaphysician might yet have dared to think” (Derrida and Ferraris 63; Derrida, Acts of
Literature 341; For What Tomorrow 51; Politics 29). But because Gaff’s grace or desire
for the desire of God (the Other) can only be articulated in the realm of immanence, it is
subject to legalism; in fact, is a legalism of its own.
“The problem with iconoclasm,” someone has said, or the problem with the eversubversive “if” we’d say, “is that it has no logical stopping point.” Or, put axiomatically:
“[P]ure and godly religion can never be pure and godly enough” (Goldman 461, 462).
The Gaffer’s grace is just the transformation of this axiom into the logical stopping point;
it makes all laws subject to the One law of the universal “if.” My colleague has
previously in her work identified many of Gaff’s formulations of this axiom: the I can
never be I enough; confession can never be confession enough; forgiveness can never be
forgiveness enough; justice can never be justice enough, murder can never be murder
enough (we assume), and so on and so on. The axiom is open to endless substitutions,
which is the point, never to “close off” the jurisdiction of the “if.” By accepting the
universality of “if” and by turning the “if” against all laws which are its necessary
support, or as Gaff described, by “us[ing] the strengths of the [law] to turn its own
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stratagems against it,” Gaff not only purified the “if,” the secret, but declared the entire
subjective experience of dividedness holy (Derrida, Writing 20). It need not be said that
when we are in the presence of the holy there is law.
When all laws are subject to the One law of universal division, to “the confession
of an error that is not foreign to the truth,” it is true that legalism has been streamlined
and simplified; there is only One law to follow (and we can’t really help but do so
according to Gaff), but the structure is still legalistic (Derrida, Politics 50). Purifying and
incorporating the secret into the heart of law in an effort to stave off authoritarianism
cannot fundamentally negate its eruption in an undesirable form. Of necessity and by its
own law, the “if” must disrupt even this lone “stopping point”:
[Gaff] reduces Otherness to the ‘to-come’ of a pure potentiality, thoroughly
deontologizing it, bracketing its positive content, so that all that remains is the
specter of a promise; and what if the next step is to drop this minimal specter of
Otherness itself, so that all that remains is the rupture, the gap as such, which
prevents entities from attaining their self-identity? [. . .] [Gaff] threw away all the
positive ontological content of messianism, retaining nothing but the pure form of
the messianic promise, and [what if] the next step is to throw away this form
itself? (Žižek, Puppet 138)
The challenge made by this scholar is to let Gaff’s law of dividedness which purported
graciously to allow and enable endless freedoms through its preservation of the secret, to
itself be substituted for “something other.” And what, in response, could the legislator of
this law declare but the impossibility of any further substitution? There could be no more
supplementation, no choice; the “condition of deconstruction, the messianic promise of
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Justice,” he asserted, was just absolutely “irreducible, ‘undeconstructible’” (Žižek,
Puppet 138). Because it was the one and only law, the secret was everything.
When the secret is “everything” and not just “everywhere,” then the followers of
this law are in the grip of “[an]other totalitarianism” or a “far worse” Puritanism than
Bunyan’s (Girard, I See Satan 180; Things Hidden 441). Bunyan’s Puritanism, however it
attempted to purify (and homogenize) subjects by imposing on them respect for the same
laws, at least presumed the existence of a fundamental disjunction not only in subjects
but between individuals and the preferred social order. Difference was presumed both as
a starting point and an end, for the goal of obedience, as Bunyan illustrated in Grace
Abounding, was to be “something other” than what one was. To aspire to difference was
to aspire to the sacred; it was to become holy, and the possibility of holiness had to exist;
there had to be One “where” where sin was not. In short, Bunyan’s Puritanism assumed
the existence of (an)Other. Gaff’s Puritanism, on the other hand, in abstracting all
particular “dirty” laws into the One law of the universal “if” which subjects just by being
subjects obey whether they know it or not, declares everyone already and inherently pure
(homogenized). In addition, subjects simply “are” the social order by virtue of the
uniform operation of all language(s). If everyone by Gaff’s fiat already exists in the holy
place, and that holy place is simply what is because of the absolute reach of the One law,
then by definition there can be no Other place and no possibility of difference. Everything, as Gaff confessed, “unfolds according to this same law that commands these
always different things,” or the Law of Dividedness = the Law of Dividedness; division
can only breed division always, “[n]ever being bored while repeating the same thing all
the time—this is a real problem” (Derrida and Ferraris 47).
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Legalism, then, was one “-ism” Gaff couldn’t deconstruct: “I am always torn
between the critique of institutions and the dream of an other institution that, in an
interminable process, will come to replace institutions that are oppressive, violent and
inoperative,” he said. “It is probably this logic that has guided me for all these years,
always at war with institutions, but always attempting to found yet another one [. . .].”
(Derrida and Ferraris 50-51). Given our analysis thus far, we are now in a better position
to put forward a cure for Gaff’s ambivalence and the repetitive “always . . . always” to
which it subjects all its sufferers. Though, as I stated previously, Gaff rejected my
colleague’s prescription because he wasn’t even open to the idea that he needed treatment
because the structure of “always . . . always” was holy, we remain confident that the flaw
was not in the prescription itself but in the very presupposition that it must be flawed.
Psychoanalysis, if it does anything, does not give way to secrets. Nor, as we also stated,
does Christianity, and to this we return to pick up with our discussion of Bunyan’s
transgression of the law of the unsayable, which, as we’ve just demonstrated, is the
guiding principle of legalism in either of its forms.
At one point in his conversion account, Bunyan claimed to have broken with the
“always . . . always” logic that is the subject’s vacillation “before the law” (Derrida and
Ferraris 43). Here was his description:
[O]ne day, as I was passing in the field, and that too with some dashes on my
Conscience, fearing lest yet all was not right, suddenly this sentence fell upon my
Soul, Thy righteousness is in Heaven; and methought withall, I saw with the eyes
of my Soul Jesus Christ at Gods right hand, there, I say, as my Righteousness; so
that wherever I was, or whatever I was doing, God could not say of me, He wants
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my Righteousness, for that was just before him. I also saw moreover, that it was
not my good frame of Heart that made my Righteousness better, nor yet my bad
frame that made my Righteousness worse: for my Righteousness was Jesus Christ
himself, the same yesterday, and to-day, and for ever, Heb. 13.8. (74)
That the Gaffer perceived in Bunyan’s conversion the repetition of the moment in which
he caught his father experiencing jouissance cannot be in doubt; Gaff here caught his son
“red-handed in believing something” (Girard, Things Hidden 442). Bunyan confessed to
wanting “something other” than ambivalence and thus “something other” than Gaff’s
analism, or “always . . . always.” And worse, this “something other” that he desired had a
name, that of Jesus. To simplify, Bunyan’s new logic consisted of “not” in “not my good
frame of Heart that made my Righteousness better . . .” and “for” in “for my
Righteousness was Jesus Christ . . . .” The logic was “not . . . for” or “not this . . . but
this.” The “always . . . always” of ambivalence was imbedded in the new by way of
cancellation: “not (always . . . always) but Jesus” or “not (legalism) but grace” (Badiou
63). What Bunyan articulated was a re-division of his subjectivity which named his
identity as “something other” than endless substitutions. A difference was introduced by
the “but,” one that opened a locale for Bunyan to come to be; that locale and coming had
a name, so that to the question, “Where was Bunyan?” we must now answer “Jesus.” It’s
vital to see that the “always . . . always” of substitutions suspended was accomplished by
(an)Other substitution: Jesus in Bunyan’s place. Equally vital is to recognize that this
Other substitution claimed to be Other by virtue of its fulfillment of the law.
Christianity declares that Jesus came not to “abolish the Law” but to “fulfill” the
Law (Matt. 5:17). What does it mean to fulfill the Law? The legalistic answer would be
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that Jesus just obeyed the Mosaic Law, that he never transgressed any of God’s
commandments. From this perspective, the desire of the frustrated Father was at last
satisfied, for he could no longer complain that not one person had listened since the
beginning when Adam and Eve botched it. There are two difficulties with this
perspective: 1.) in the Gospel accounts, Jesus was persistently accused of breaking laws
—he took walks on the Sabbath through grain fields and picked the heads of grain to eat;
he didn’t pay his taxes; he didn’t wash his hands; he didn’t attend the required feasts at
the appropriate time; he was irreverent by calling God “my Father”; he gave no special
consideration to his mother or brothers; he associated with those who made him
ceremonially unclean—lepers, prostitutes, Gentiles, corpses; he was disrespectful of the
religious authorities; he promoted disunity among the people; he equivocated and
exaggerated; he presumed too much. In sum, the legalists of Jesus’ own day accused him
of not being a legalist. The second difficulty, which we have already identified, is 2.) that
the very “effort” to obey the law is already mediated by one’s desire to transgress it, so
that obedience is but the repression and mode of one’s secret sin. Jesus’ “fulfillment” of
the law, therefore, cannot be an extreme form of legalism.
It would be better to think of “fulfillment” as a “filling in” what is missing, like
coloring within the lines or connecting the dots on a page to reveal the image. Recall
from our previous example that in its temptation of Adam and Eve, the serpent
introduced an “if” to God’s decree that it asserted legitimated their transgression. The
“revelation” of God’s “dirty” secret in turn made Adam and Eve exceptional—the law
applied to everyone but them; we could say that in their transgression they became the
“secret” of the law, they entered into a hidden place it could not touch. Secrecy, then, as
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we’ve already shown, describes a subject’s fundamental experience of and relationship to
law; secrecy has taken over or stands in the place of the subject, and legalism only
confirms the supremacy of the secret; the dots, however configured, preserve an empty
space. The significance of Jesus is that in his death and resurrection he did not so much
“keep the Law” as he “told the secret.” The secret, as we have shown, by definition must
remain unsaid; it can have no final positive content but must keep up the appearance that
the “something other” is always (in Gaff’s words) “to come.” The Christian solution to
the endless substitutions and re-re-re-configurations ad nauseam which the unsayable set
in motion was not just to declare “that there is no mystery,” as if what must be done was
for everyone to give up their idolization of secrecy (Žižek, Puppet 138). That would be
the equivalent of making yet another law; the effect of which would again be the eruption
of secrecy, now as the secret to the law that there is no secret. If in Christianity there is no
longer any secret, it is because Jesus took the place of the secret; he now stands in the gap
and gives it positive content through his name.
The most profound Christian statement is that Jesus “who knew no sin,” or was
never subject to secrecy, was made “to be sin,” or was made subject to it (II Cor. 5:21).
The likeness of God and shit in Jesus came quite close to confirming the accusation of the
serpent of an unspeakable corruption in God; ironically, it was only by “taking up” the
accusation rather than refusing it that God proved it was really the serpent who was
corrupt, eating “dust” “all the days of [its] life” (Gen. 3: 14). At the crucifixion, Jesus
accepted being identified as “the chief of sinners” by the legalists of his own day, and in
so doing accomplished what in psychoanalytic terms we would describe as a “‘Thou Art
That’ experience,” the location of oneself as “the excremental remainder that secretly
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sustains the dignity of [one’s] symbolic identification” (Žižek, Fragile 49). Only his
acceptance of being shit severed the equation of himself and shit and revealed him as
“something other.” If, like a legalist, Jesus had held to the possibility of not being shit, he
would have ensured that shit would cling to him in the form of (in The Gaffer’s words)
an irredeemable “bad conscience” or a permanent accusation. In his death Jesus revealed
that any subjectivity which refuses shit will always be invaded by it—the unnamed and
unnamable who.
It was likely for this reason that The Gaffer confessed to an obsession with the
identification of this mysterious who—who he conveniently for the preservation of his
paranoia always found to be but an effect of so many pulled curtains. “I would say that
for me the great question is always the question who. Call it biographical,
autobiographical or existential, the form of the question who is what matters to me [. . .].
Who? Who asks the question? [. . .] It is always the most difficult question [. . .]. It is
clear that the who withdraws from or provokes the displacement of the categories in
which biography, autobiography, and memoirs are thought” (Derrida and Ferraris 41-42).
In his philosophy, one could never choose to name who and experience the freedom from
secrecy that would accompany its naming.
While Jesus’ death established the equation of himself and the unsayable, it would
be more accurate to say that the unsayable is said or is recognized as being said only at
his resurrection. Into the recurring structure of law and transgression is introduced an
absolute difference. Secrecy is made subject to life, and is no longer that which usurps
the subject’s locale, reducing him to automatism. Without the resurrection, Jesus would
have confirmed the power of secrecy to “kill” all subjects; with the resurrection, secrecy
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itself is “killed” in the sense that it is no longer a void, a permanent “something other,”
but has itself been transformed into “something other,” and that is Christ. Christianity
insists on the actuality of the resurrection because in it resides all the possibility of the
creation of a new subjectivity, one no longer consigned to ambivalence. Jesus abiding in
the locale of sin or shit transformed the unsayable from that which upheld the status quo
to that which transformed it. The resurrection “redistribute[d] death and life to their
places, by showing that life [or desire] does not necessarily occupy the place of the
dead,” that “Here I am” and “Sin” need not be equated (Badiou 85).
In the same way that naming the secret “filled in” the law, so it “filled in” what
was, from the religious and philosophical views mentioned earlier, also missing in
metaphor: that is, the truth of substitution, not only the nature of Gaff’s “always . . .
always,” but the existence of its Other, the
“not . . . but.” Jesus substituted for Bunyan to
stop his endless substitutions, which was why
Bunyan could call himself “the chief of sinners.”
Naming himself in this way attested to his freedom from subjection to the unsayable. By
declaring Jesus, a Christian subject explicitly
equates his “Here I am” with secrecy, effectively
positioning himself in the place of shit, becoming

Untitled V

as Paul stated, “the scum of the world, the dregs of
all things” (I Cor. 4: 13). Those who confess their sin can only ever be the worst sinners;
it is the very definition of Christian subjectivity as exemplifiedby Christ; by abiding in
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the excluded, Jesus rejected “what all previous discourses held as existing, or being”; by
“valoriz[ing] nonbeings against beings,” he revealed that “what exists is generally held
by established discourses to be nonexistent” (Badiou 47; 98). But shit does exist,
and it is Jesus; we should be able to see finally why naming Jesus and accepting his
signification in one’s symbolic framework would cure one’s anal complex and thereby
permanently alter one’s psychic structure; it would be, as illustrated by The Gaffer and
Bunyan, the difference between finding shit in Jesus and finding Jesus as shit.
VI. The Work of Love
Let us conclude with some observations about our work as analysts. “[W]hat do
you want to cure the subject of? There is no doubt that this is central to our experience, to
our approach, to our inspiration” (Lacan, Ethics 219). We are physicians; we want to
help. But “[i]n any encounter there’s a big difference in meaning between the response of
philanthropy and that of love.” As an analyst, I must confess, that “[m]y egoism is quite
content with a certain altruism, altruism of the kind that is situated on the level of the
useful.” “It is a fact of experience that what I want is the good of others in the image of
my own. That doesn’t cost me so much. What I want is the good of others provided that it
remain in the image of my own. I would even say that the whole thing deteriorates so
rapidly that it becomes: provided that it depend on my efforts” (186; 187). And if I
descend so far, then the “cure” the patient will experience in our exchange will be
nothing but my secret; he will assume the “Ego” and “Unconscious” of my own divided
discourse (Derrida, “Me—Psychoanalysis” 8, 9). The cure threatens to be nothing but a
lateral move. That is the limitation of immanence. We are not Jesus.
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Gaff’s accusation, then, that “loving one’s neighbor as oneself” might just be a
“perverse stratagem” of seduction, a way to love oneself at the expense of one’s neighbor
is a very real possibility for us. In loving our neighbor we might be doing nothing more
than substituting for him or her “an imaginary idea of how we think or could wish that
this person should be,” and thus only be loving our own “idea” and not the person at all
(Kierkegaard 300). It is a critical stance, a dual stance, one that we all too easily can enter
into with our patients. We see them as individuals to be loved, but we first see them as
objects of inquiry. We look at them with “one eye,” “testing, searching, criticizing,” and
only then do we see with the other eye that this is a person to love (301). And what
does this critical aloofness signify but “that you cannot love if . . . . .if now this or that is
not according to your wishes?” (301). If you are always looking for “something other” in
the patient that is more to your liking, what will happen if you never find it? What if the
patient never changes? Does your critical eye continue to test, or do both eyes now just
look away? “In that case, do you consider that something else is being tested, whether
you actually do have love or, more accurately, that something else is decided, that you
actually do not have love?” (301; my emphasis). The possibility that we analysts may not
love our patients returns us to our question: “What do you want to cure the subject of?”
It is the great insight of Christianity that the one who presumes to answer this
question is always the one who does not love. “What do you want to cure the subject of?”
ignorance? fanaticism? greed? hypocrisy? “false consciousness” as we like to say? Are
you sure? Christianity teaches that the shit one is so confident represents the “depravity
of the world” as it really is out there is but one’s own depravity misrecognized. As such,
the response of all “sick” people to their would-be-saviors can rightfully be something
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like: “Why don’t you get your own shit together?” (Sloterdijk 40, 89). But cynical
dismissal of someone else’s help also makes our point: that to assume the problem lies in
another is the very antithesis of love; it may try to pass for street-smarts or intellectualism
or justice, but it sounds and feels a lot more like hate.
As we would expect, into the impasse of trading cynical accusations, Christianity
interjects a third possibility: love your neighbor as yourself. I return to this and name it
the third possibility despite Gaff’s suspicion that the neighbor as neighbor is effaced in
the admonition. Gaff suspected because he approached the issue in legalistic terms when,
in fact, the admonition is a challenge to legalism. Jesus could have given “[l]ong and
discerning addresses [. . .] on how a person ought to love his neighbor, and when the
addresses had been heard, self-love would still be able to hit upon excuses and find a way
of escape, because the subject had not been entirely exhausted, all circumstances had not
been taken into account, because something had continually been forgotten or something
had not been accurately and bindingly enough expressed and described” (Kierkegaard
279). In other words, as law, the “if” of exception would’ve once more sprung to life,
threatening as Gaff warned, the well-being of the neighbor.
Jesus’ statement, however, is not a law in this sense, for the “as yourself” stands
in the place of the “if” of exception. To love one’s neighbor as yourself “envelops no
prohibition; it is a pure affirmation” (Badiou 89). We could say “as yourself” is in the
place of the secret of loving one’s neighbor; the “as yourself,” as someone has said,
“wrestles” one to the spot and holds one there (Kierkegaard 279). The emphasis of the
statement, therefore, isn’t on neighbor, identifying or knowing who one’s neighbor is—
that misses the point. The crux of the matter is the “as yourself.” And if these two words
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stand in the place of the secret of loving one’s neighbor, they do so by revealing why,
from a legalistic perspective, one would decide not to love one’s neighbor: because one
does not love oneself. Implicit in Jesus’ challenge is a question similar to, “Why do you
persecute me?” It’s the question, “Why don’t you love your neighbor?” Because they are
so stupid? such liars and bigots? Because they don’t deserve it for how they’ve treated
you so unjustly? No, you don’t love them because there is no love in you.
Christianity discerns that “genuine love exists only to the extent that one first be
capable of loving oneself” (Badiou 90). But loving oneself isn’t possible when the subject
is given over to secrecy; that is, when shit resides in the place of the subject. The one who
cannot or will not name his shit (for Christianity takes into account that one’s refusal can
be willful) fundamentally rejects himself and therefore cannot hope to accept others who
will, to the very last one, be just as full of shit as he is. 21 We should be able to understand
then why in Christianity, the place of shit is also the place of love. At the crucifixion,
Jesus, in a sense, “got his own shit together” in a supreme act of absolute self-acceptance;
the resurrection confirmed this act as a new subjective possibility for all. The subject
given over to shit “has no good reason to love himself,” but when shit is made a path of
the subject, is made that which a subject can take hold of, then love is born, for the
subject is now the ability to conquer the inclination to reject shit (Badiou 89). The new
“relation of love the subject bears to himself” is fundamentally “love of that living truth
that [. . .] allows the subject to be something other than a dead Self, which it is impossible
to love” (Badiou 90). To put it axiomatically: no love of self, without love of shit/Jesus.
What then, to return to our first question, do you want to cure the subject of? Selfhatred, you might now say. This answer, at least, would be more to the point, for by
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naming “self-hatred” we at least implicitly also name ourselves when speaking of “self.”
But however closer we have come to the truth with this answer, it still misses the mark.
The difficulty for us is that we want to answer the question; we are, after all, analysts, and
the question presupposes that the one who answers must have the power to cure. Do we
not, as analysts, have the power to cure? This question, together with the prior one goes
to the heart of why we became analysts in the first place. It is quite possible that many of
us became analysts because we either assumed we had the power to cure or we desired
the power to cure. We wanted, let us say, to be cited. I’m afraid that, if we became
analysts because we had some idea of our own power, we will, the longer we remain in
this profession, become increasingly disillusioned and disappointed. The majority of our
patients, let us admit, never fully recover. The delusions we encounter perplex us and
frustrate diagnosis; often we go without appreciation or thanks. If, after all this, we still
believe that secreted away deep inside us lies the remotest but most vital and
indispensable modicum of personal power, we will be miserable indeed. We will hate our
patients, for hate is essentially the expression of powerlessness, the inability to change.
Let us set aside The Gaffer’s reading and interpret Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount
another way: “Happy are the analysts who don’t believe they have the power to cure their
patients.” Doesn’t Christianity attest to the fundamental blindness of power—that at the
moment when every authority thought they’d hit upon the means to cure the land of
lunacy, that was the very moment they didn’t know what they were doing? (Lk. 23:34).
Why should we as analysts seek blindness? Let us love ourselves more than that.
One of my colleagues once said to me, a bit petulantly: “The only full-blooded
critique [of shit] would be one launched from another universe entirely, which would
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then challenge our own culture no more than the cawing of a rook. True radicalism,
conveniently enough for [shit] itself, would be utterly unintelligible” (Eagleton, Illusions
39). A true statement indeed. It is true that the “task of revealing the truth about [shit]
requires a man who is not obliged to [shit] for anything and does not think in terms of
[shit]—someone who is capable of talking back to [shit] while remaining entirely
untouched by it” (Girard, Things Hidden 218). It is also true that such a person could not
arise out of a shitty system, for “no one of oneself and by oneself can declare what [shit]
it, precisely because one is in [shit]” (Kierkegaard 370). And it is true that if someone did
come from another world to speak the truth about shit, that truth would be “foolishness”
to us; it would be rejected, “not comprehend[ed]” (I Cor. 1:21; Jn. 1:5). Therefore, it must
also be true that for anyone to be able to say “yes” to the truth of shit, to hear it as more
than the cawing of a rook, that desire would never be automatic but would have to be
given to them from outside the system. We cannot ultimately get outside the systems of
our patients; we remain subject to many legalisms, theirs and ours; we remain intelligible.
That is not our advantage, for from Christianity we learn that unintelligibility is the
ultimate challenge to shit because it reveals it as the unintelligible. Which is why my
colleague’s statement is also utterly and shamefully (for any analyst worthy of the name)
false. We can only try to be gracious, but Christianity is grace. Perhaps, as Gaff
suspected, it is, after all, a foreign invader.
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The Future of an Illusion
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Epilogue
Supplement to the Third Case History
Jesus……………….
Editor’s note: Here the author’s text abruptly ends as if she were interrupted or cut out
of her own story. Or perhaps she had nothing left to say or cite, for when I was finally
able to track down the author (for she has become something of a recluse) to press her to
explain this strange suspension of explanation, she only said, “Queenship is irrelevant”
and closed the door on me. By this I assume she meant power is irrelevant or perhaps, in
light of her previous discussions, the desire for citation be damned, which if true, may
explain why she took no interest in reviewing my editorial notes for this book’s
publication. “Do what you want,” she said, “because I know you will anyway.” I admit I
thought her comment a bit unfair, as I have been passionately devoted in the author’s
work from the beginning and only desire to represent it with the care and nuance it
deserves so that it can become what it will be. Clearly, she has left us much to discuss,
and we can only hope that she will soon return to public life or at least take up her pen
again as is proper for a scholar in order to continue the conversation.
As to the matter of the author’s love of herself and of reading beautiful books: I
confess I have no knowledge of the author’s private life and cannot say if she spends her
days reading novels or engaging in some other worthy activity. We are left with the text
before us, and from it we can conjecture that as she fails to mention anything of her lost
love by the final chapter, she must have either forgotten that righting this injustice was
the impetus for her work, or she neglected to tell us that the impetus had somehow
changed. Perhaps the author decided that she had not really been the victim of any
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injustice, that her love of reading had always from the first been motivated by a pursuit of
justice, by a desire to enter a world much more interesting than the one she occupied in
her real life. And why should she complain when forsaking this motivation has in turn
made her real life much more interesting? Or, given the tenor and trajectory of the final
chapters, perhaps the author decided that the injustices she had committed were as the
injustices committed against her, and therefore to seek retribution would be to condemn
herself. It is rather fascinating that by the end, Christianity and its Messiah in particular
stand in the place of the narrative of her lost love or the lost beautiful book. It is as if her
father is not Derrida after all, and her claim to be his heir is just one of those twenty-cent,
tabloid hoaxes. We can only regret that how the author may have stumbled upon such a
strange ending remains unsaid, especially at the moment when it seemed, after many
tedious deferrals, that the New was nearly upon us. Certainly, by succumbing once again
to irony here where it most matters, the author obviously exhibits a regrettable lack of
commitment to or belief in her own mission of transformation. Therefore, I’m afraid we
must also regret that her “protest without an alternative” remains without alternative, or at
least without an alternative that anyone devoted to public life could seriously consider.
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Supplements
“In your notes, avoid lengthy discussions that divert the reader’s attention from
the primary text. In general, comments that you cannot fit into the text should be omitted
unless they provide essential justification or clarification of what you have written”
(Gibaldi 252).
Prologue
The Philosophy of Nevertheless
1

Editor’s note: The incident referred is recorded in The Acts of the Apostles,

6:1-6. As the number of Christians increased due to the apostles’ preaching, the apostles
had to delegate responsibility to others who could organize and oversee the daily
functioning of the group, and thus ensure equal distribution of money and food. “It is not
desirable for us,” the apostles said, “to neglect the word of God in order to serve tables.”
2

Editor’s note: I’m reminded of those famous lines from Lord Byron:
As soon
Seek roses in December—ice in June;
Hope constancy in wind, or corn in chaff;
Believe a woman or an epitaph,
Or any other thing that’s false, before
You trust in critics, who themselves are sore. (75-80)

3

Editor’s note: The author has culled these definitions from two separate

dictionaries which I was, with some difficulty, able to track down. They are: Webster’s
Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, 1971 and The Merriam-Webster Dictionary, New
Edition, 2004. I deduce that she intends some irony by this, that because Derrida’s
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philosophy employs double logic, her definitions will also be double.
4

For when justice is the goal, there must always be injuries. As one literary

scholar said, “We can make no lasting peace with the incomprehensibility of the
Holocaust. In that context the refusal of personal forgiveness can be a form of public
witness. It signifies that the German nation-state bears its burden of guilt until the end of
time [. . .]. The guilt of nation-states is in a sense transferable to all subsequent
generations of citizens.” In the same way, he concludes that every American must take
responsibility for slavery and the riddance of the Native Americans. “No forgiveness for
these crimes is acceptable,” he said. In fact, “inculcating a refusal to forgive can be an
integral part of our scholarly commitments.” Therefore, he concludes, “I am not inclined
to forgive Nazi Germany for the Holocaust; if reading Holocaust poetry made me more
likely to forgive, I would read less of it than I do” (C. Nelson 318, 319).
5

I pause here to cite, for the contradictions I’ve highlighted have been noted not

just by Terrell but many others. One even calls House of Fame “a veritable verbal hydra”
(Ruffolo 338). Most analyses of the poem begin by illustrating all the doublings and end
by attempting to decipher what they mean. The meanings proposed fall into three
categories: that the contradictions signify freedom for the reader (Amtower’s/Terrell’s
position), or that the contradictions signify freedom for Chaucer. This is Jacqueline
Miller’s view when she argues “that this shifting character and situation of the
dreamer/poet— his naïveté, his exaggerated, comic responses, his solemn assurance, his
perceptive eye, his disappearances, his sure-handed direction and mastery—create in the
poem a context that allows Chaucer to explore, in its various aspects, the nature of the
poet’s position in relation to his text” (102). Thirdly, the contradictions are said to
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highlight the ambiguous nature of choice in general. Sheila Delany suggests this saying
that “if the House of Fame can clarify anything for us it is the potential sterility of being
unable to choose.” The narrator Geffrey attempts to overcome this by appealing to God
for guidance, thus “transcend[ing] conflict through faith” (122, 83, 84). Likewise, Robert
Clifford argues that “[t]he whole [binary] structure of the proem” in which “different
aspects of dream theory” are placed side by side “as if we should be able to choose one or
the other” is really only a means for Chaucer to “[break] down the possibilities of that
logic” and ensure “that no logical position or argument could actually arise from what is
being said” (158). Kay Stevenson, in some exasperation, asks, “Is this range of possibility
depressing or comic?” (17). For my purposes, it’s noteworthy that the interpretations of
the contradictions are contradictory: on the one hand, they’re a liberating window
opening, and on the other, an oppressive door closing.
6

As Chaucer notes from Virgil, Aeneas didn’t act alone but was prompted to

forsake Dido by Mercury:
But— to excusen Eneas
Fullyche of al his trespass—
The booke seyth Mercuri, sauns fayle,
Bad hym goo in to Itayle
And leve Auffrikes regioun
And Dido and hir faire toun. (427-432)
Amtower’s new ethic has a long history. It’s symptomatic that she doesn’t cite previous
scholars who discussed Chaucer’s “empowering” of the reader. For instance, George
Kane wrote in 1980 that Chaucer rarely moralizes explicitly because he wants the reader
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to make a judgment (16-17); and in 1982 Jacqueline Miller wrote that the breakdown of
“conventional standards” creates a venue for “the individual vision or voice [to] emerge
(101). I also found similar statements from essays published in 1993, 1998, and 1999
from Lara Ruffolo, Gregory Jember and Robert Clifford respectively. Clifford especially
puts it well by saying the “lack of grounding for the reader is very important to Chaucer
since as soon as readers take a perspective and try to reach an understanding, they will be
interpreting the text for their own purpose” (161). While it’d be easy to blame Amtower
for her neglect, I find it ironic because the neglect is the result of her ethic. Ever-newinterpretations by every reader means “over one hundred thousand academic journals are
in print worldwide, and over one hundred thousand books are published every year. More
information has been published in the past thirty years than in the previous five
thousand.” As such, “[t]he vast majority of scholarship vanishes without apparent
influence.” In fact, ninety-eight percent of published scholarship in the arts and
humanities will never be cited (Rhode 29)
7

The necessity to weed out also occurs because community languages can be

learned through observation and judicious application. Technically, one could pose as a
member of a community whether or not one gave a damn about Marxism, feminism, or
anything else. Why closet capitalists and chauvinists might adopt certain poses is
explained by one professor, talking about one of his undergraduates: “[S]he confided that
she could go into any classroom [. . .] and win approval for running one of a number of
well-defined interpretive routines: she could view the assigned text as an instance of the
tension between nature and culture; [. . .] she could argue that the true subject of the text
was its own composition, or that in the guise of fashioning a narrative the speaker was
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fragmenting and displacing his own anxieties and fears. She could not, however, at least
at Johns Hopkins University today, argue that the text was a prophetic message inspired
by the ghost of her Aunt Tilly.” So posing = A+, which from the perspective of
nevertheless really should be considered an achievement (Fish, Is There? 343).
8

Aunt Tilly is cited in footnote seven for those of you trying to skip things and

hurry to the end, imagining footnotes don’t matter. Regarding footnote seven, it’s ironic
that in explaining how various interpretive practices came to be popular, this particular
scholar never concedes that Aunt Tilly readings of texts might become viable at Johns
Hopkins University. He does, however, admit that Eskimo readings of “A Rose for
Emily” could become mainstream along with the “Freudian, mythological,
Christological, regional, sociological and linguistic readings” of the story if someone
discovered “a letter in which Faulkner confides that he has always believed himself to be
an Eskimo changeling.” Why would such an important scholar, at such an important
institution, assert that communities alone determine evidence, and then foreclose the
possibility of Eskimo readings by demanding evidence in advance? Why not just say that
Eskimo readings will gain credence when there is an influx of Eskimos into the academy?
Or in the case of Aunt Tilly, of clairvoyants? (Fish, Is There? 346-347).
9

Editor’s note: I believe this statement may be a sarcasm and a possible allusion

to the whipping boy of contemporary philosophy, René Descartes, who (in)famously
claimed: “I think [I am aware], therefore I am.” Thus, “lo and behold, I have returned on
my own to where I wanted to be. [. . .] I manifestly know that nothing can be perceived
more easily and more evidently than my own mind” (19, 69).
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10

The classic example of unhelpfulness is when a professor mentions you “really

ought” to read some book but never explains why. I think it’s supposed to be a sign of
your intelligence if you can read their mind. For instance, once when I was writing an
essay about Samuel Richardson’s novel, Clarissa, a professor who was “helping” me
with my argument said such-and-such 600 page book about the author Daniel Defoe
would be quite relevant to me and that I ought to consider citing it. Of course, he didn’t
mention what was particularly relevant about the book, not even what section of it was
relevant. Obviously, when I discovered the book was 600 pages, I didn’t bother trying to
find out. He might as well have told me I ought to read an encyclopedia. The only thing I
learned from this valuable interaction was not to bother asking my professor for help.
11

I pause again to cite, to repeat that followers of Derrida agree contradiction is

just the state of things as well as an achievement. And I put his followers in a footnote
because they are his derivatives and cite him as their authority. They take Derrida’s word
when he says either-or logic must be cited because we can’t avoid doing so; however, we
must cite it “using a double gesture,” “a bifurcated writing” that “simultaneously
provokes the overturning of the hierarchy” in question, “and releases the dissonance” that
is inherent to hierarchy (Positions 41, 42). Both-and logic trumps either-or. We live in
dissonance and we provoke it. Judith Butler applies this idea to gender: “I would
suggest,” she says, “that drag fully subverts the distinction between inner and outer
psychic space and effectively mocks both the expressive model of gender and the notion
of a true gender identity [. . .]. In imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative
structure of gender itself— as well as its contingency” (Gender 137). Thus, we all do
drag whether we know it or not, so claim some awareness of it and do drag. Homi
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Bhabha applies this to ethnic identities: “I want to take my stand on the shifting margins
of cultural displacement—that confounds any profound or ‘authentic’ sense of a
‘national’ culture or an ‘organic’ intellectual [. . .].” For, “[i]t s only when we understand
that all cultural statements and systems are constructed in [a] contradictory and
ambivalent space [. . .] that we begin to understand why hierarchical claims to the
inherent originality of ‘purity’ of cultures are untenable, even before we resort to
empirical historical instances that demonstrate their hybridity” (21, 37). Thus, we’re all
hybrids whether we know it or not, so be hybrid.
12

I cite to avoid justification since justification is circular. I cite to avoid the

quandary of Fundamentalist World: The New Dark Age of Dogma, in which the scholar,
Stuart Sim contrasts his beliefs with those of Christian and Islamic fundamentalists by
asserting that fundamentalists “search for security” in metanarratives whose goal is to
control others, while he is “committed [. . .] to challenging authority in its various guises”
and to “press[ing] the case for difference, diversity, scepticism, and multiculturalism”
(21,17,18). However, he confesses to being “[tied up] in knots” over whether calling for
Muslims to respect women’s rights amounts to an imposition of his Western ideas of
equality (18). Here’s his resolution to the issue:
[T]here are certain commitments that a post-Marxist socialist like myself
feels obliged to uphold regardless of cultural circumstances. Prominent
among these would have to be equality of opportunity, an end to cultural
oppression and the tyranny of tradition (religiously inspired or otherwise),
and the eradication of discrimination on the grounds of gender, ethnic
group, social position or sexual preference. No doubt these are somewhat
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predictable, and, I hope, to most of my audience entirely unexceptionable
also. (18-19)
This isn’t a resolution; it’s a hope that his readers won’t expect him to resolve the
difficulty because they share in it too. He writes to warn and to convince, but he’s just
assumed his audience needs no convincing. Admonishing his audience to adopt beliefs he
assumes they already share with him renders his book superfluous.
13

Editor’s note: Chaucer draws upon both Virgil’s and Ovid’s accounts of the

tale of Aeneas, switching back and forth between Virgil’s unsympathetic and Ovid’s
sympathetic portrayal of Dido. Likewise, in his accounts of dreams, he alludes to
Macrobius, a dream theorist who held that dreams could be valid sources of truth if all
the criteria were met, and to Salisbury who thought dreams were always suspicious.
Delany, J. Miller, and Vankeerbergen, whom the author has cited, all give accounts of
these dichotomies. As to the eagle, Geffrey, when he leaves the Temple of Venus and
steps into a wasteland, cries: “‘O Criste [ . . .] that art in blysse— / Fro fantoume and
illusion / Me save!’” (492-494). At once descends the eagle who will carry Geffrey to
the House of Fame to hear new tidings of love, and on the way gives him a lecture on the
nature of speech.
14

Commenting on the House of Fame as an anti-narrative, Clifford states that “not

only does [Chaucer] fail to retain control of his sources but he leaves his own text without
interpretation. It is as if the information is simply ‘conveyed’ to the reader without a
story-telling element to give it a perspective.” This feature of the text teases the reader to
expect “a revelation, a product,” but in frustrating this expectation, the poem “forces the
reader to focus on the process of [the] text” in order to question the nature of authority
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(158). Similarly, Ruffolo argues that “[t]hrough his lists Chaucer invites us to play the
game of literature, to join in the multiplication of authorities and works.” “The lists that
constitute a sizable proportion of the [poem] are formal arrangements that [. . .] display
the various ingredients of literature without the order of narrative” (326). Chaucer’s
“heap [of facts] is unified only by the fact that it is a heap,” and this “lack of a definitive
poetic statement encourages new poets to try to achieve definitiveness in their own work.
All authors become their own authorities, and all readers or listeners authorize a poem
through their own experiences of it.” So “Chaucer’s avoidance of responsibility goes
hand in hand with his proliferation of authorities” (327).
15

There’s no question that if it’s a matter of recording all that’s being talked about

in the House of Rumor, the list could’ve gone on forever. But that would’ve been a lot to
write, not to mention read, and should we have continued to care? Would we have been
justified in skipping ahead at greater and greater leaps? But if the list is so valuable (all
that’s valuable) then justice demands we dare not miss a word. If the infinite beyond has
been replaced by infinite data or by the infinite question so that every “sparrow and
hair”—all our contributions to the list—“must not only be noticed but must be
cherished,” then the greatest injustice would be skipping ahead (Fromm 23-24; 31).
16

The new, as I’ve already said, isn’t a form of dialectic, “a resolution of

contradiction into a third term that comes in order [. . .] to deny while raising up, while
idealizing, while sublimating,” for
[Love] is neither remedy nor poison, neither good nor evil, neither the
inside nor the outside, neither speech nor writing;
[Love] is neither a plus nor a minus, neither an outside nor the
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complement of an inside, neither accident nor essence,
[Love] is neither confusion nor distinction, neither identity nor difference,
neither consummation nor virginity, neither the veil nor unveiling,
neither the inside nor the outside,
[Love] is neither a signifier nor a signified, neither a sign nor a thing,
neither a presence nor an absence, neither a position nor a
negation,
[Love] is neither space nor time; [it] is neither the incised integrity of a
beginning, or of a simple cutting into, nor simple secondarity.
[Love is a] [n]either/nor, that is simultaneously either or [. . .]. (Derrida,
Positions 43, 46).
“You see,” the eagle says, “I can write poetry too; it’s the philosophy of nevertheless.”
17

The eagle, in his Disney way, expounds not eagle-truths but the philosophy of

nevertheless. Here is the contemporary translation: “[Fame] is not simply active (any
more than it is a subjective accomplishment); it rather indicates the middle voice, it
precedes and sets up the opposition between passivity and activity. [ . . .] [Fame] more
properly refers to what in classical language would be called the origin or production of
differences and the differences between differences, the play [jeu] of differences. Its
locus and operation will therefore be seen wherever speech appeals to difference”
(Derrida, Speech and Phenomena 130).
18

This requires that we must take a more cautious view when speaking of

“accident” or “chance.” For instance, what may seem as “something dependent and
secondary,” say, “the indefinite drift of [Fame] [ . . .] linking re-presentations [. . .] one to
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another without beginning or end,” could in fact be not just “normal,” but “prenormal;”
that is, that which makes the distinction between normal and abnormal possible. The
arbitrary is paradigmatic. “Certainly nothing has preceded this situation. Asssuredly
[anxious stutter, sic] nothing will suspend it” (Derrida, Speech 103, 104).
19

According to a philosopher of language, Ferdinand de Saussure, “‘[w]hether we

take the signified or the signifier, language has neither ideas nor sounds that existed
before the linguistic system, but only conceptual and phonic differences that have issued
from the system,’” and furthermore “[t]he difference between two phonemes, which
enables them to exist and to operate, is inaudible.” So while speech may be broken wind,
that which breaks the wind, or enables the wind to be broken is effaced or hidden, and
often, none too soon (qtd. in Derrida, Speech 140, 133, my emphasis).
20

Another way to think of this analogy would be (if we read backwards) to say

that “[t]he [stone] is not a presence but is rather the simulacrum of a presence that
dislocates, displaces, and refers beyond itself. The [stone] has, properly speaking, no
place, for [every ripple] belongs to the very structure of the [stone]. [. . .] In addition, and
from the start, [every ripple] constitutes it as a [stone]—[every ripple] establishes the
[stone] in a change of place and makes it disappear in its appearing, makes it issue forth
from itself in its very position” (Derrida, Speech 156).
21

The House of Fame where Geffrey is taken is fundamentally a house of

literature; here he sees (only the appearances of) Josephus and Statius and Homer and
Virgil and Ovid and Lucan, each standing high on their columns. They are authors he
(presumably) loves, authors he’s read, and he’s now (sort of) among them. They aren’t
really there, perhaps like his love, or perhaps, as the eagle suggests, “it is this experience
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of the nothing-ing of nothing that interests our desire under the name of literature,” for
“literature perhaps stands on the edge of everything, almost beyond everything, including
itself. It’s the most interesting thing in the world, maybe more interesting than the world
[. . .]” (Derrida, Acts of Literature 47).
22

Editor’s note: A third way to explain Geffrey’s silence, one that the author did

not consider, is that he did not understand the eagle. For though the eagle claims to have
spoken “[w]ithouten any subtilite” (855), his argument may have proven too
sophisticated. And Geffrey, though bookish, never claims to be a theorist; he may have
gotten lost in the eagle’s interstices. There is also a fourth possibility: that the eagle’s
attempt to prove scientifically the existence and nature of Fame’s palace is absurd. “From
beginning to end,” one scholar has said, “the Eagle’s speech relies on tautology, analogy,
non sequitur, reductive simplicity, abuse of the syllogism, circular argument, and ‘proofs’
that prove nothing” (Delany 75). However, I do not think we need to take this last
argument seriously, and the author was probably wise to omit it.
23

This dismissal is entirely in keeping with Amtower’s ethic: “As the only

possible ethical conclusion to his vision,” she argues, “the dreamer must therefore forego
any claim his own writing might make for establishing authority over the lives of his
readers” (288). While this claim is consistent with the overall content of her analysis, it is
inconsistent with its form: that is, it isn’t possible to undertake an analytical or creative
enterprise while at the same time being entirely disinterested in its reception. If Amtower
like Chaucer has just written “a literary statement about the unreliability of literary
statements,” then her essay like “the House of Fame tends to render itself superfluous, not
unlike the Cretan who claims all Cretans to be liars” (Delany 108-109). But scholars or
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poets don’t think of themselves as superfluous. It’s quite likely that Amtower’s decision
to write this essay is predicated on the hope that her ideas will be accepted as legitimate
and influential (i.e. authoritative) by someone else who will cite her. In this case, I’d
think it’d be more ethical to admit this hope.
24

Another scholar, Rosemarie P. McGerr, has proposed an alternative to both

forms of linear reading, backwards and forwards (61-78). Her argument is that in the
House of Fame Chaucer sets up a feedback loop in which the reader is constantly
returned through various narrative and structural clues to the beginning of the text. This is
a form of “hyper-circular structure” that works to puzzle the reader and turns the poem
into a “vehicle for questioning the authority of vision literature and, by extension,
literature in general” (62). Obviously, McGerr doesn’t disagree with Amtower and
Terrell in the ultimate subversive purpose of the poem, only in the means the purpose is
realized. Given her reading, we could understand Geffrey’s movement in the poem from
creator to scribe or scribe to creator as being not separate fixed states but as moments to
which one is always returning, or as simultaneously concurring states, each enabling the
other. Interestingly, one structural clue that has implications for understanding what
Geffrey could be credited as knowing when, is his assertion in Book III that his flight
with the eagle to Lady Fame didn’t reveal to him anything he didn’t already know:
Fo wel y wote, ever yit,
Sith that first y had wit,
That some folke han desired fame
Diversly, and loos and name. (1897-1900)
If Geffrey already possesses knowledge in Book I that he was only supposed to learn in
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Book III, this certainly complicates both backward and forward readings of the poem
because it questions the status or relevance of the eagle as enlightener.
Chapter 4
A Taste for Subversion
1

Definitions taken from Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, 1971.

2

We also learn in this decade that subversion can be hard, violent: The Tsar’s

Colonels: Professionalism, Strategy and Subversion in the Late Imperial Russia (1998)
and soft, insinuating: A Gentle Subversion: Essays on Philippine Fiction in English
(1998).
3

Editor’s note: in her generalizations about the “subversive” trend per decade,

the author did not taken into consideration the number of scholarly articles bearing either
the word “subversion” or its variants in their titles, but in the Modern Language
Association database there are six hundred, a fact which supports the author’s general
conclusions.
4

As such, subversion wouldn’t necessarily displace pragmatism as the premier

postmodern narrative—“premier” according to Jean-François Lyotard in The Postmodern
Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Rather, subversion is a mode of pragmatism, the
means by which use is determined and the practical consequence (which is always the
feeling of one’s freedom) can be known in advance
5

Capitalism is a good analogy: Terry Eagleton, remarking that “[t]he power of

capital is now so drearily familiar, so sublimely omnipotent and omnipresent” that many
academics “hardly have the heart to speak of it,” chastises postmodern theorists for their
complicity because they don’t speak of it (Illusions 23). Instead, they believe that hybrid
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and transgressive subjectivities are counter-culture rather than the very mode of
capitalism. “Neither financiers nor semioticians,” he reminds us, “are greatly enamoured
of material referents” (39). Rather, capitalism, as “the most dynamic, revolutionary,
transgressive social system known to history, one which melts away barriers,
deconstructs oppositions, pitches diverse life-forms promiscuously together and
unleashes an infinity of desire” is “certainly a progressive system, and is just as certainly
nothing of the kind” (61, 62). Transgress all you want; it’s the surest way to guarantee
you’ll buy.
6

Editor’s note: For a defense of jargon in the interests of disabling common

sense, see the collection Just Being Difficult? in which it’s argued that “charges of bad
writing take clarity and transparency as the norm,” saddling “the humanistic disciplines”
with the job “of [the] transmission of a cultural heritage” (Culler and Lamb 8). But since
the humanities are really about “the unwriting of what culture has taught us to take for
granted, then critical prose must call attention to itself as an act that cannot be seen
through” (9). We must not “express the inexpressible” but “unexpress the expressible,”
“unwrit[ing] what is already inscribed in the discourses that subtend our world” (9). It
need not be said that all the essays in this book are perfectly lucid.
7

Editor’s note: Bourdieu recorded the following interview with Duchamp, in

which the interviewer refused to “get it,” but whose interpretations represent the kind of
recuperative, status-quo narrativizing to which Duchamp unavoidably succumbed:
Interviewer: “What possible interpretation is there of the Bicycle Wheel?
Should one see it as the integration of movement into the work of
art? Or as a fundamental point of departure, like the Chinese who
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invented the wheel?”
Duchamp: “That machine has no intention, except to get rid of the
appearance of a work of art. It was a whim, I didn’t call it a work
of art.”
Interviewer: “What about the geometry book left out in the weather? Can
one say that it’s the idea of integrating time and space? With a pun
on ‘geometrie dans l’space’ (solid geometry) and ‘temps,’ the rain
and sun that transforms the book?”
Duchamp: “No, no more than the idea of integrating movement and
sculpture. It was a joke. A pure joke. To denigrate the solemnity of
a book of principles” (Cultural 110-111).
8

The literature attesting to the play’s meta-constructions which make a unitary

interpretation difficult is vast indeed. Besides Rackin’s claim that Shakespeare sought but
could not recover a lost history, other explanations for the play’s ambiguity include:
a. Ambiguity is the nature of ideology (Dollimore and Sinfield 211).
b. The theater as an institution was still being defined by the culture
(Howard 12; Holderness 59).
c. Shakespeare’s historical sources were contradictory; for instance, while
Holinshed describes Henry as a king “‘all men loved,’” he also
says he was “‘a terrour to rebels, and suppressour of sedition’”
(qtd. in Holderness 64).
d. The history play, in dramatizing kingship and holding kings up to
audiences’ judgment, inevitably challenged the authority of kings
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by diminishing the distance between authentic rulers and good
actors, between kings and subjects (Kastan 460, 464; Bulman 164).
e. Shakespeare had to negotiate a diverse audience, royal patrons and
raucous plebeians (Patterson, Shakespeare).
f. He just decided to write a satire (Jameson 75).
g. His “priority in Henry V is not with exploring character but rather in the
play’s profound consideration of the theatrical construct” (Mason
177).
h. That Shakespeare’s plays “encourage us to make of them what we will,”
and we are divided subjects (Traub 147). (my favorite.)
9

Two additional secrets Dollimore and Sinfield reveal (sort of) in the play are:

“Henry V was a powerful Elizabethan fantasy simply because it represented a single
source of power in the state,” but “the idea of a single source of power in the state was, if
not a fantasy, a rare and precarious achievement [and] is admitted in the Epilogue” (220).
And again: “[T]the very thought that the actual purpose of the war might be to distract
from troubles at home would tend to undermine the purposed effect [of the war]. The
thought is voiced twice in 2 Henry IV; it is part of the advice given to Hal by his father
(IV.v.212-15) and John of Lancaster envisages it in the final speech. It is suppressed in
Henry V – yet it twice surfaces obliquely (II. i. 90-2; IV. i. 228-9)” (217).
10

Editor’s note: Bourdieu contends that academic pursuits are especially

conducive to “the game of self-deceit,” because there is “so much institutional support,”
for it; deceit is accepted by “a milieu which authorizes and encourages all forms of
splitting the ego” in pursuit of “symbolic capital.” Since in academia, “everyone depends
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on everyone else, at once his competitor and client, his opponent and judge, for the
determination of his own truth and value, that is, of his symbolic life and death,” there
also arises an array of “collective defence mechanisms through which the agents find
ways to avoid the excessively harsh questioning that the rigorous application of their
explicit criteria [. . .] would provoke.” These mechanisms provide “a multiplicity of paths
to salvation and of forms of excellence, allowing everyone, with the complicity of
everyone else, to disguise truths known to all” (Homo Academicus 19).
11

Editor’s note: The author, so careful in her citations throughout, seems here to

proceed, in her words, a bit “willy-nilly.” I had a deuce of a time trying to locate this text
she quotes from so freely. As far as I was able to learn (for the author herself was quite
unhelpful) the page numbers sometimes listed here are the pages of the 1587 edition of
the Description which, if one is, like myself, associated with a university of some repute,
one can retrieve from the database Early English Books Online.
12

Obviously, I’m arguing for continuity: that Harrison’s maneuverings to garner

our trust in his Description aren’t different from that of the aforementioned Derridean
scholars. Edward Said’s confessions in Orientalism make the similarity even clearer:
“Much of the personal investment in this study,” Said wrote, “derives from my awareness
of being an ‘Oriental’ as a child growing up in two British colonies [Palestine and
Egypt].” But he brushed off charges of bias by claiming that “as severely and as
rationally as I have been able, I have tried to maintain a critical consciousness [. . .]. In
none of that, however, have I ever lost hold of the cultural reality of, the personal
involvement in having been constituted as, ‘an Oriental.’” As such, he declared he could
speak with “direct knowledge,” and that his own “experiences” “are in part what made
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[him] write this book.” The authority of his own life was especially brought to bear when
he contrasted it with “[t]he web of racism, cultural stereotypes, political imperialism,
[and] dehumanizing ideology” perpetrated by the “Orientalist” scholars who in the
United States have never “culturally and politically identified [themselves] wholeheartedly with the Arabs [. . .]” (25, 26, 27, 322).
13

Protesting too much can saddle one with the labels one wished to avoid. A

recent example of this circularity can be found in Antony Easthope’s criticisms of Said.
For example, Said doesn’t want to be stereotyped with “habits of inaccuracy,” “a
tendency to despotism,” and worst of all, “backwardness” (Said 205). But Easthope’s
charges against Said follow exactly along these lines: “Said sees Orientalism stretching
from Aeschylus to the present day” (41); and Said calls “every European [. . .] a racist, an
imperialist, and almost totally ethnocentric,” and he can’t overcome his humanism, but
rants with an “endless and pernicious, high-flown, self-righteous moralising, which
always offers readers a gratifying sense of their own moral superiority as they recognise
the ‘truth’ of the account” (42). In other words, Said is inaccurate, absolutist, and oldfashioned.
14

Said was confronted with the same paradox at the end of Orientalism: “[T]his

book has tried to demonstrate [that] Islam has been fundamentally misrepresented in the
West [but] the real issue is whether indeed there can be a true representation of anything,
or whether any and all representations, because they are representations, are embedded
first in the language and then in the culture, institutions, and political ambience of the
representer.” (See again Rackin, et. al.) “If,” Said continued, “the latter alternative is the
correct one [. . .] then we must be prepared to accept the fact that a representation is eo
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ipso implicated, intertwined, embedded, interwoven with a great many other things
besides the ‘truth,’ which is itself a representation” (272). To apply this wisdom, we need
only recollect that when Said admonished scholars to dispense with Orientalism by
getting in touch with real Arabs (326, 328) and learning to be more self-aware (326,
327), we shouldn’t be so uncritical as to cite Said as an authority, the wise and mysterious
Oriental who possesses secret knowledge.
15

Editor’s note: The author seems to be resorting to theatrics to make us as

readers more self-aware that “academic freedom,” as Derrida has said, is no such thing,
but is a “means of strict controls and rigorous constraints” which we only think we
“apply to [our]selves in an act of total auto-nomy” (“Otobiographies” 33). Or, it could be
that the author lacks the imagination or fortitude to transition in a clear and logical
manner, which, if true, certainly should persuade us of her virtue since she is being so
contradictory.
16

Greenblatt, twenty-five years later, is also good example of the unawareness in

one’s awareness. In his new introduction to Renaissance Self-Fashioning, he said writing
this book helped him find his “own voice,” but only sort of, for that “voice could not float
free of a powerful set of institutional, intellectual, and historical forces.” The first key
force was Michel Foucault whose “intellectual performance was thrilling” enough to
make Greenblatt “rush away filled with almost evangelical excitement” (xi, xiv). Almost!
For his excitement was mixed with pessimism because Foucault told him his inner life
wasn’t his own but was “called into being and shaped by the institution that claimed only
to police [it]” (xv). (Like “hell” for an evangelical.) The second force was the Vietnam
War: “[T]races of this profoundly disorienting time,” he wrote, “are evident in my vision
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of an immense malevolent force determined to crush all resistance” (xvi), and even
inform the anecdotes he used to illustrate sixteenth-century culture (xvi). These
confessions after the fact are remarkable because in the 1980 edition of Renaissance, he
claimed, like Rackin et. al., to have a thorough knowledge of how he was writing his
book: “[T]he questions I ask of my material and indeed the very nature of this material
are shaped by the questions I ask of myself” (5). However, in 1980, he said not a word
about Foucault or Vietnam; in fact, although his book is 300+ pages, Foucault was only
mentioned once in the main text (80). If Greenblatt’s questions were all along Foucault’s
questions (or desires), then that knowledge had to remain secret to Greenblatt for him to
assert his “own voice.”
17

Editor’s note: Absalom conspired to usurp the throne of Israel from his father,

King David. He did so by suggesting that David was not interested in settling the
people’s disputes. “Oh, that one would appoint me judge in the land, then every man who
has any suit or cause could come to me and I would give him justice,” Absalom would
sigh. In this way, he “stole away the hearts of the men of Israel” (II Samuel 15:4, 6).
18

Editor’s note: This marks the chief distinction between Henry and Derrida,

that Henry engaged egregiously in the pillaging of what he, in ignorance, could only
know as people. The author’s slippage into sensationalism at this juncture in equating
word-bending with physical violation no doubt exposes her secret desire to be cited,
citation being more likely the more radical the claim. As such, that which she would cite
of Derrida can also be cited of her: “Always the chameleon player,” the author “is
capable of a variety of roles and voices: plebeian, regal, comic, heroic, Welsh, English,
subversive, authoritative—the list is not complete.” “[A]ppropriating every possible
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subject position and every available form of authority,” she “projects as a personal
achievement [. . .] absolutist fantasies of extended monarchial power” (Howard and
Rackin 191).
Chapter 3
That Which Can Never Be Named
1

“Dear Sirs: I am” was the reply sent by G. K. Chesterton to the London Times

when they solicited writers for their thoughts on the question, “What’s Wrong with the
World?” It was the shortest answer they received (qtd. in Yancey xii).
2

Editor’s note: The author has again resorted to ironic doubling, as these

definitions were culled from two dictionaries, Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged
Dictionary of the English Language, 1994, and Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate
Dictionary, 1971.
3

Editor’s note: I have pressed the author to divulge why her arguments become

increasingly pictorial and in some cases seem almost a caricature of scholarly form. I
received no reply. However, given her antipathy toward literary scholarship, she must
have found it indispensable to interject some life into her writing so as to ward off ennui.
We are the beneficiaries, as I can attest the following chapters are of much more interest
than the former. If only the author had included pictures earlier, she might have enticed
more readers to stick with her and anticipate the end instead of closing the book to turn
on the television. In addition, although attentive to her citations throughout, here the
author was lax in detailing exactly who these pictures are of and from whence they came.
I have rectified this error, and you will find a complete listing of citations in Appendix I.
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4

Editor’s note: I confess there is nothing which sends a shiver up my leg more

than the words social construction. A search through Harvard’s and the Modern
Language Association’s holdings for texts using these words in their titles reveals from
what besides “sex” and “gender” we are achieving freedom. Based on 114 articles and
253 books for a total of 367 texts published in the last 41 years, we have a much better
sense of what original work remains to be done. See Appendix II for a listing of social
constructions.
5

In Anna’s court one of the “specifically female” activities was masquing. She

co-opted the art form to distinguish her court from that of her husband (Barroll, Anna 97,
159). Her masques featured her and her attendants in the primary roles, subverting “the
gender ideology dominant in the King’s court and on the public stage” (Lewalski,
Writing 43).
6

I cite my sisters: Linda Peck states that virtue and graciousness were near

cousins in the sixteenth and early seventeenth century. “The liberal dispensation of royal
bounty was, [. . . an] ideal espoused by monarchs and theorists alike,” including James I.
If giving was the epitome of virtue, “[d]uty and deference” was the quintessential
responsibility of “grateful recipients” (13, 15). Thus, Ann Coiro argues that Lanyer had a
right to call aristocrats to their duty, to subject the queen “throughout the poem to a
sustained critique for failing to provide the patronage to Lanyer that Elizabeth had done”
(367).
7

Susanne Woods has shown that while Lanyer deploys typical Renaissance tropes

in praise of patrons, she had to tweak the conventions to claim some authority, especially
since she lacked connections. She had first to identify the “distinctively and assertively
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female community” which would validate her authority (Lanyer 103). Her urgent need to
forge the initial link makes her more noticeably ambivalent. For instance, Kari McBride
states that Lanyer refigures the “trope of hospitality” so that it becomes a means for her to
fashion herself as the host, not the other way around (“Sacred”64). Similarly, Lisa
Schnell discovers in Lanyer’s dedications the “remarkably executed, ambivalence of a
middle-class poet aware, and [. . .] resentful, of the ways in which gender and, especially,
class determine her position—or, rather, nonposition—in the courtly world to which she
appeals” (“Breaking” 79). Proud of her abilities, Lanyer can’t quite adopt the “posture of
servitude” but offsets her humiliation by trying to “[create] a situation in which the
women are in a perpetual, even urgent, state of indebtedness to her” (94, 90, 85).
8

Jill Ingram contends that self-interest in the period wouldn’t have been thought

“in and of itself, a bad thing” since “the early modern market” had begun “to temper
convention-al vilifications of usury, prodigality, and risky enterprises”— at least for men
(2, 3). She reads Lanyer as constructing women as “viable” “economic agents,” a move
that fails (of course) because she’s “implicated in the economies that [she], at times,
deride[s]” (15).
9

Lanyer first uses the “mirror” conceit when she invites Queen Anne to “look in

this mirror of a worthy mind,” but it recurs throughout her dedicatory poems to bind the
women together in shared looking. The mirror reflects the patrons’ faces to each other as
if the mirror is being passed between them, and as such is Lanyer means of “exchanging
[. . .] one patron for another” (S. Miller 138). The women are also asked to look upon
themselves, upon the poet, her poetry, and Christ, in a “narcissis[tic]” and “circular” gaze
(Ng 442, 443). The mirror is both a “redemptive” space “in which [the readers], by

Zias 345
looking, might purify their sight,” and a means of redemption by which Lanyer might
“[bridge] for an imaginative moment the space between ideal representation and the
circumstantially ‘real’” (Wall 322; McGrath 238). So, Lanyer’s mirror is cracked.
10

Editor’s note: It’s also been whispered that Arabella Stuart and Anne Clifford,

two of Lanyer’s potential patrons, were bedmates (Goldberg 39). Likely, all in Anne’s
court were lesbians because, after all, King James was gay. Imagining these women
tumbling about in a tickle party does fend off scholarly boredom, as well as saying “hardon,” “fist-fucking,” and “fellatio” to our students while enjoying titillating pictures:

11

Editor’s note: The incident referred to here is recorded in Genesis 3:13. God

confronts Eve about her disobedience by asking, “What is this you have done?” She replies
not by saying what she has done but by accusing the serpent of committing the act through
her: “The serpent deceived me, and I ate.”
12

Editor’s note: This is line 12 from Yeats’s poem “To the Rose upon the Rood of

Time,” which the author, in fact, has quoted correctly.
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13

Editor’s note: To attract Willmore, Hellena utilized these celebrity disguises:

DD. Marilyn

Zelda
14

Cher

Betty Boop

Jackie O

Patton

The ploy works, for critics are inclined to read the almost-rapes as Florinda’s fault.

According to Boebel, Florinda as the epitome of the “sentimental construction of
womanhood,” symbolizes that “[i]nternalizing such an ideal” can only mean one is a
“victim” (64). Likewise, Copeland argues that Florinda’s “delicacy and modesty are no
protection against the commodification of her body,” and thus she’s punished for her
weakness by being “literally manhandled” and “treated with less respect than [. . .] the
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street walker Lucetta” (25). Goldberg, in a sexy twist, contends that in Florinda’s almostrape scenes, * judges Flo’s weakness via a vicarious identification with Willmore as the
agent of justice (57).
15

We should be comforted by the fact that capitalism is on the side of libertinism,

enabling the production and consumption of the same perpetual gesture of overthrow.
Taking Marx’s thesis seriously that in capitalism “‘all that is solid melts into air, all that
is holy is profaned’” by including sexuality in the all, we can better appreciate our
culture’s drive “to replace standard normative heterosexuality with a proliferation of
unstable shifting identities and/or orientations.” That Marx “underestimate[d] this ability
of the capitalist universe to incorporate the transgressive urge that seemed to threaten it”
is regrettable because it prevented him from enjoying sex as another instance of the
“compulsive consumption of merchandise” (Žižek, Fragile 13, 14, 22). Fortunately for
us, “[p]art and parcel of accepting the postmodern transnational economy we live in is the
elaboration of styles and forms of representation that are suitable to our historical
situation” (Braidotti 16). In addition, since we identify subversion as the pursuit of pure
sex, we can disregard messy questions about why a subject might be oriented to pursue
pure sex, questions which would take into account how a subject’s actions are actually
“inscribed into the subject’s symbolic universe.” In other words, we don’t have to
concede that this form of subjectivity can’t speak for itself (Žižek, Ticklish 249).
16

Editor’s note: The “some guy” here in question is the French analyst Jacques

Lacan. That the author is reluctant to use his name suggests that his prior description of
woman thwarts her experience of pure fluidity as an achievement she can be proud of, for
it suggests she’s just living as she must live. Clearly, relegating Lacan’s name to a

Zias 348
footnote is an attempt by the author to assert her autonomy and her belief that her
unwillingness to be defined marks some radical change in her life and of course, society’s
life at large.
17

Editor’s note: Alenka Zupancic relies for her analysis extensively on Lacan.

For those unfamiliar with Lacan’s work, he asserted that woman is the inability to answer
the question, “Am I a man or a woman?” and is thus a state of “unsatisfied desire.”
Building on Freud’s theories, he said woman’s discourse is “the primacy of subjective
division, the contradiction between conscious and unconscious,” which won’t “set out to
carefully cover over paradoxes and contradictions” but will “take such paradoxes and
contradictions as far as they can go” (Fink, Clinical 122, 123; Lacanian 133, 135). Both
needing to provoke the other’s desire and to desire as the other desires in order to
maintain her own being, woman manipulates situations so as to leave them open-ended,
subject to revision or questioning. Her identity must remain in the balance, for fulfilled
desire would mark the cessation of her raison d’etre, since woman wants to keep others
aware they need her— the unique one, the exception— she, who’ll throw every rule,
category, and definition into doubt. Incidentally, it was women who “led Freud to
develop psychoanalytic theory and practice, all the while proving to him in his consulting
room the inadequacy of his knowledge and know-how” (Fink, Lacanian 134).
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18

Woman:

“Faith—I have an Assignation—
with a Woman—a Woman friend!”
“[L]end me thy aid to carry off my
Woman to Night,” Willmore begs
of Beaumond (5.1.144-145, 161-162).
19

“That absence makes me think of
her so much; and all the passions
thou find’st about me, are to the
Sex alone! Give me a Woman
[. . .].” (1.1. 63-64).

The best descriptions of La Nuche always highlight her mastery of her own

desire not to “settle” “on any of her boundaries” (Mailer 56). “She is a bundle of
contradictions,” says one critic, “ironic yet sentimental, astute yet strangely obtuse about
her own inconsistencies. She needs to think of herself as a rebel, but she can also sound
like a stern guardian of propriety, particularly when she talks about money and
children” (Shannon 303). We shouldn’t forget that a career made in being everyone
and no one in particular has earned her a net worth of 613 million dollars (Dunn
40). But for all that, “she’s just like you and me,” “a woman in flux” as “part spiritualist,
part narcissist, part provocative sex symbol, part children’s book author; part artist, part
mother, and thanks to her new aerobi-disco look, she is part retro, part futuristic. She
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doesn’t even live in one place; she spends most of her time in London and has homes in
New York and Los Angeles. She is a contradiction. And she will always be one.” In sum,
she has a profound “adaptability” and “spongelike nature” (Dunn 40; Strauss 72).
Chapter 2
The Law of Inertia
1

Cover art, Ecrits. vol. 2. Editions du Seuil, 1971. Altered by HDZ, December

2008. Definitions of “law” culled from The Merriam-Webster Dictionary, New Edition,
2004 and Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary, 1994.
2
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The above cartoons of Lucy taken from Schulz, Peanuts: A Golden Celebration, p. 53.
and The Complete Peanuts, p. 226.
3

It’s much more lively reading Derrida with Rousseau in mind, especially

since Derrida confessed to being so taken with Confessions in his youth. Compare
this passage from Rousseau with my thesis on Derrida’s disturbing experience of
feminine pleasure: “I have spent my life in idle longing, without saying a word, in the
presence of those whom I loved most. Too bashful to declare my taste, I at least satisfied
it in situations which had reference to it and kept up the idea of it. To lie at the feet of an
imperious mistress, to obey her commands, to ask her forgiveness—this was for me a
sweet enjoyment; and, the more my lively imagination heated my blood, the more I
presented the appearance of a bashful lover. It may be easily imagined that this manner of
making love does not lead to very speedy results, and is not very dangerous to the virtue
of those who are its object. For this reason I have rarely possessed, but have none the less
enjoyed myself in my own way—that is to say, in imagination” (1631).
4

Editor’s note: In fact, I had suspected the author’s pleasure in writing her book

from the start, but as I so admire and respect her, I kept quiet. Orgasms splayed all about
one’s paragraphs are, however, a bit unseemly, and it is to the author’s credit that she in
due time recognized the need for moderation. From here onward, I can attest that her
work recoups much of its seriousness and progresses, if not with unfettered enthusiasm,
then with fettered—that is, with suitable circumspection and circumvention.
5

Elsewhere this has been called an “inertia principle,” though I believe “Law of

Inertia” gives it greater force, for it is “a kind of automatism,” and one “which naturally
tends toward deception and error” because it is “designed not to satisfy need, but to
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hallucinate such satisfaction” (Lacan, Ethics 27, 28).
6

Caption: “Jacques Lacan about 1960.” From Lacan, Television, p. 26. Picture

altered by HDZ, December 2008.
7

Slavoj Žižek is accurate when he says that today, the “basic tension is [. . .] the

tension of knowledge versus the disavowed belief embodied in external ritual— the
situation often described in the terms of cynical reason whose formula, the reverse of
Marx’s, was proposed decades ago by Peter Sloterdijk: ‘I know what I am doing;
nonetheless, I am doing it. . . .’ This formula,” Žižek remarks, “is not as unambiguous as
it may appear—it should be supplemented with: ‘. . . because I don’t know what I
believe.’” My proposed supplement to the supplement is: “. . . because I don’t know who
I believe” (Puppet 5).
8

Derrida’s messianic aura glows in the effusions published after his death:

“Derrida was singularly gracious—as gentle as an encouraging wind at one’s back
during a long summer run”; he was “The Antifoundational Made Flesh” said one who
knew him. He was “brilliant” and left people “breathless” said another. He “was like a
Zen teacher to whom we brought our foolish student questions and from whom we
received mysterious answers,” said another. And he had a “gaze so touching,” his eyes
“touched one as if they were fingers”; “[s]uddenly color was added to the university,”
said yet another. (Apter et. al. 467, 468, 477, 480, 489). And if you feel no such
effusions, no “unspeakable” loss? Then you are someone who just “really, really” can’t
“appreciate Coltrane,” or “love the all-inclusive spectral black light of multiplicity or
have any capacity to savor bright oranges on a summer day” (Apter, et. al. 468).
9

Žižek is correct in his observation that today it is the postmodernist who reserves
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for himself alone the prerogative not to believe. Such a pose of skeptical detachment is
accomplished by “[relying] on the figure of an Other who ‘really believes,’” the
dangerous “fundamentalist [. . .] ‘barbarians’” who “dare to take their beliefs seriously”
(Puppet 6, 7) “Was there, however, at any time in the past, an era when people directly
‘really believed”’?” Žižek asks. Of course the answer is “no,” but it is necessary for
deconstructionists to believe in Other true believers in order to hide their fear that they
are caught in fundamentalisms of their own (6, 7).
10

There is a variation of this point in The Ticklish Subject specifically regarding

the predicaments of feminists that I outlined in chapter three. There Žižek states, “The
paradox [. . .] is that the bondsman (servant) is all the more the servant, the more he
(mis)perceives his position as that of an autonomous agent; and the same goes for
woman—the ultimate form of her servitude is to (mis)perceive herself, when she acts in a
‘feminine’ submissive-compassionate way, as an autonomous agent. For that reason, the
[. . .] denigration of woman as a mere ‘symptom’ of man—as the embodiment of male
fantasy, as the hysterical imitation of true male subjectivity—is, when it is openly
admitted and fully accepted, far more subversive than the false direct assertion of
feminine autonomy— perhaps the ultimate feminist statement is to proclaim openly: ‘I do
not exist in myself, I am merely the Other’s fantasy embodied’” (258).
11

Caption: “Jacques Lacan at his desk, 1971.” From Lacan, Television, p. 12.

Picture altered by HDZ, December 2008.
12

As has been said elsewhere, “Human defense takes place by means of

something that has a name, and which is, to be precise, lying about evil. At the level of
the unconscious, the subject lies.” “In ‘Thou shalt not lie’ as law is included the
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possibility of the lie as the most fundamental desire” (Lacan, Ethics 73, 82).
13

Caption: “Jacques Lacan leaving his seminar, March 1980 (Source: Gamma

Agency. Photograph by Maurice Rougement)” From Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan, p. 11.
Picture altered by HDZ, January 2008.
Chapter 1
The Freedom to Say Shit
1

Editor’s note: Again the author neglected to cite the origins of the pictures and

graphics on the cover designs, but I have been thorough where our author was not:
Freud’s signature on the Front Cover was taken from the front cover of the 1989 Norton
edition of The Ego and the Id edited by Jay Strachey, cover art by Jay J. Smith. On the
Back Cover, the pictures of John Donne, John Bunyan, and Jacques Derrida were taken
from the 2006 Cambridge Companion to John Donne, p.15, the 1928 Oxford edition of
The Pilgrim’s Progress edited by James Blanton Wharey, p. xxivb, and from the cover
Reading Derrida/Thinking Paul by Theodore W. Jennings, Jr. and published by Stanford
UP in 2006. The quote from Freud on the Back Cover was taken from the back cover of
1996 Touchstone edition of Three Case Histories, edited by Philip Rieff. The quotations
in the blurb were culled from Rieff’s introduction to the same, p. vii.
2

Editor’s note: In this fear the patient is hardly alone; to cite one example of a

myriad, Eagleton has lamented the “peculiarly noxious brand of Christian
Evangelicalism” which has recently “swept [the United States] from end to end,” and in
light of this development, he wonders how anyone could imagine “the concept of
ideology [to be] obsolete” (Ideology xi).
3

Editor’s note: As far as I have been able to discover, all pictures of the author
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were taken by the author and altered by the author prior to the completion of this chapter,
which would put the date approximately January 2009.
4

Editor’s note: Like the author, “Freud liked to insist on this point when he said

that one always finds reasons for finding this attitude or that mood come over one [. . .]
but there is after all nothing to confirm that the true cause of their successive emergence
is given us. [. . .] There is always an abundance of reasons to make us believe in some
rational explanation for the sequentiality of our endopsychic forms. However [. . .] in the
majority of cases their true connections are to be found somewhere completely different”
(Lacan, Ethics 48).
5

I noted that in his published work, Percy’s depiction of Reformation Protestant

Christianity took no account of what the relationship between ministers and their flocks
might have been like, and explicated not one sermon by any representative of the English
Church, most notably Donne, whose love poetry Percy used rather to illustrate what he
perceived to be Protestant confusions concerning sexual conduct and marriage.
6

Because Percy’s father was something of a literary celebrity, there are a great

many critical volumes devoted to his work. I consulted a few to gain a better sense of his
father’s history and the nature of the conversion about which Percy was so cynical.
Apparently, the ministry of St. Paul’s Cathedral had been a commission by the King of
England, one that a man ought not to turn down, even with Catholicism in one’s heritage,
as Donne did have. Whether or not Donne was ever a real Protestant is the heart of
matter, and whether we can ever judge someone’s heart. One critic summed up the debate
neatly: “Depending on the point of view, Donne is either a catholic apostate racked by
guilty conscience, or a crypto-catholic cleverly hiding behind expedient Protestantism, or
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a lip-service conformist not caring either way. Or he is an all-round Church of England
good egg; even, on the fringes, a typical Jacobean puritan dean holding Arminianism [a
competing theology] at bay” (Cummings 369). Interestingly, a few other critics noted
Donne’s tendency to describe himself only as “Christian” without further qualifiers, and
hypothesized that this preference corresponded to his theology of inclusion which tried to
enlarge rather than narrow of “the grounds of conformity to the Church of England”
(Shell and Hunt 67; Shami, “Labels” 145, 151). I noted that this claim to inclusiveness
countered Percy’s story about his father, but did not put the point to Percy at this time.
7

Percy’s fascination with pairings reminded me of a former patient, a woman,

who once asked me, “Where is she?” and showed me the following list:
Activity/passivity

Father/Mother

Sun/Moon

Head/Heart

Culture/Nature
Day/Night

Intelligible/Palpable
Logos/Pathos
Form/Matter

Her complaint was that this edifice would tip to the left. Such bias privileged the
masculine in every case, she argued, for thought, organizing itself via oppositions,
subordinated the latter term to the prior, making “all conceptual organization subject to
man” and sustaining him in “his desire to be (at) the origin.” The illusion was that woman
must be subordinate “for the machinery’s functioning” (Cixous, “Sorties” 578, 579, 580).
I was fascinated that a man and a woman would each argue that the prejudice lies in
opposite directions; however, after further consideration, I concluded that both were
articulating the same prejudice, called “logocentrism” by one and “phallogocentrism” by
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the other, which lead me to wonder whether Percy might be in error in supposing his
father’s dualisms to tip to the right when they, according to his own theory, should’ve
been leaning left. But if they were, in fact, leaning right rather than left, the significance
of this was lost on Percy whose only concern were the dualisms as dualisms.
8

I’ve used another scholar’s phrase although his argument is the opposite: that the

duty of a Christian is to accept that one is “part of a larger, master narrative” and that sin
would therefore be to fail “to admit that a given event or action is a sign whose fixed
meaning is a part of the master narrative.” Given his assumptions, this scholar discovered
in Donne’s sermons anxieties over “[t]extual ambiguities [. . .] since salvation [was]
dependent upon their right interpretation” (Pendergast 121). In my consultation of the
voluminous critical work on Donne, I found this line of reasoning to be the norm: that
Christians are always wringing their hands over the capacity of paradoxes to keep
whispering in their ears, like devils. For instance, another scholar who discussed a case of
mistaken identity— that of William Franklin and Mary Gadbury who claimed to be Jesus
and the wife of Jesus— asserted that these two “quite understandably, lost track of the
fine distinctions with which theology had circumscribed the force of the doctrine of
incarnation”(Luxon 6). Fine distinctions could only be made via close attention to both
literal and figurative practices of interpretation, practices he identified as one of the many
“suppressed contradictions” of Puritanism (9). The difficulty of his account of Franklin
and Gadbury is that the hullabaloo over their claims did not reveal that the orthodox had
been made anxiously aware of a paradox. It only revealed that orthodoxy is the
acceptance of paradox. If (as Donne would say) “impossible possibilities” are at “the
heart of the Christian faith” (H. Wilcox 151), then Christian squabbles are really
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arguments about the retention of paradoxes as paradoxes. Heretics refuse paradox; they
reduce and simplify; like Franklin, they might believe that because Jesus lives “in them,”
that therefore makes them Jesus. The orthodox do not fretfully deny the paradoxes of
their faith; if there is concern, it is that the paradoxes must always be accepted as
paradoxes and nothing less.
9

In fairness to Percy, in my research into this matter of logocentrism, I discovered

that the procedure of uniting the Greek and Christian has been going on for some time,
“[s]ince the beginnings of medieval philosophy,” said one scholar. In fact, this scholar
suggested that such an “assimilation may be the best definition of European philosophy,
since it allows philosophy to obscure the Christian text,” and that furthermore this
“philosophical tradition” will never reach an end as long as there is no attempt to
distinguish “the genuine difference between the Heraclitean Logos and the Johannine
Logos” (Girard, Things Hidden 266, 267). His explanation went far in explaining Percy’s
inability to describe Christianity as anything other than the “incorporation” or
“repression” of Platonism, rather than as a break or a rupture with that tradition (Derrida,
Gift 9). The Greek has “loaned his house and his language, while the Jew and the
Christian meet in his home,” Percy said to me (Derrida, Writing 152).
10

It was symptomatic that one of Percy’s justifications for rejecting his father was

that he believed his father enjoyed condemning others. Percy’s objection wasn’t simply
that Reformation theology insisted on the freedom of God to choose, for instance, Jacob
over Esau, and that this was a great injustice to Esau, but that God took a sneaky, sinister
pleasure in not choosing Esau, that he “gladly sees the majority of souls damned to
eternal perdition” (Davies 4; my emphasis).
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11

In the view of one scholar, it was Percy’s inability “to grasp the nature of

religion [which] has served to perpetuate its effects.” By “project[ing] upon religion
alone the responsibility for a violent projection of violence” and thus turning religion into
“a sort of scapegoat for all human thought,” Percy forgot that “this act of hand-washing
has long been recognized as a purely intellectual, nonpolluting equivalent of some of the
most ancient customs of mankind.” The result can only be “a fanatical and superstitious
dismissal” of “fanaticism and superstition” (Girard, Violence 262, 317-318).
12

From another perspective, the resurrection of Christ is also indispensable to the

creation of unity-in-difference because it testifies to an incomprehensible separation
within God—that the Jesus who died and rose again is distinct from the Father—and
nevertheless they are also one. God as “plurall person” is not simply a model for
community but the possibility or power that establishes community and establishes it as
an expansion, an increase, not an enclosing in or cutting off. God’s acts of creation are
always acts that “enlarge the divine community,” and as such, “[t]he doctrine of the
Trinity is for Donne the seminal Christian belief” (J. Johnson, 32, 35, 145).

Zias 360
13

Linus’s encounter with otherness:

(Schultz, Complete Peanuts 257).
14

Editor’s note: This is the title as recorded in Freud, p. 83. which the author,

probably in her continued striving for autonomy, failed to cite.
15

My work on megalomania and persecution complexes which I have written

about elsewhere confirms the link we are making between persecution and paranoia. In
sum, when a patient “is primarily the victim of a delusion that he is being persecuted by
the most powerful influences,” “[h]e then feels the need of accounting to himself for this
persecution, and in that way hits upon the idea that he himself is a very exalted personage
and worth of such attention” (Freud 124).
17

“It will be remembered that the majority of cases of paranoia exhibit traces of

megalomania, and that megalomania can by itself constitute a paranoia. From this it may
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be concluded that in paranoia the liberated libido becomes fixed on to the ego, and is
used for the aggrandizement of the ego. A return is thus made to the stage of narcissism
[. . .], in which a person’s only sexual object is his own ego. On the basis of this clinical
evidence we can suppose that paranoiacs are endowed with a fixation at the stage of
narcissism [. . .]” (Freud 148-149).
18

The occasion for this comment was my colleague’s poo-pooing another’s

romanticizing of travel as exhibiting the shallowest disregard for the facts: “Anyone who
has had to spend more than, say, a hour at Zurich or O’Hare will concede that air travel is
hell on wings. So what desire is incited by this fantasy of being in transit? The question at
once opens up a genealogy: the Romantic wanderer . . . the spiritual exile in modernism
from Joyce to Kafka; Kerouac’s On the Road, a visionary journey now domesticated in
several hundred Hollywood road movies.” But, he continued, “as related words such as
‘refugee’ and ‘asylum seeker’ show only too vividly, these fantasies depend on not being
an actual nomad, but rather a credit-card carrying subject free to imagine being a nomad”
(Easthope 83).
19

We shouldn’t forget the patient’s quite ambiguous exclamation: “And they have

to know this!” which my colleague was unable to categorize among his other italics. The
statement might be declarative, a bare recital of fact that people who want to belong
generally know that they don’t belong; or the statement could be expressing a desire on
the part of the patient to tell all those who want to belong of the “true,” purely formal
nature of their longing, in which case “have to know” = “I will make them know.”
20

In this formulation of the “religious” and “philosophical” I follow the work of

another colleague who argues that in its inception, Christianity inaugurated a new
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discourse which acted as a foil to the two “regimes of discourse” which at the time
structured all subjective experience: that is, Jewish and Greek discourse. See Badiou,
especially 40-54.
21

We note, as a final thought on the distinctiveness of Christianity, that in

positing a willful dimension to evil, Christianity radically departs from a Greek
conception of sin as a deficiency of education. The Greek philosophers presumed that if
one knew the good one ought to do, one would do it, and therefore assumed no
disconnect between knowing and doing. Philosophy can only draw two distinctions: the
person who knows the right and does it; and the person who doesn’t know the right and
therefore does wrong. But Christianity’s conception of subjectivity is much more
complex; only through it do we arrive at the third possibility: the defiant person who
knows the right and still chooses to do wrong. See Kierkegaard, especially 367-379.
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Appendix I
Listing of Pictures Included in Chapter Three, That Which Can Never Be Named
A. Of Madonna. Super Teen: The Complete History of Madonna. Photo by Deborah
Feingold. 15 Feb. 1993: 9.
B. Of Madonna. Vogue-Paris, 2004. 18 Dec. 2008. <http://www.beautifulmadonna.com/
gallery/2004/vogue_paris/index.html>.
C. Of Madonna. Video Music Awards, 1990. 18 Dec. 2008 <http://www.beautiful
madonna.com/gallery/1990/vogue/index.html>.
D. Of Madonna. From a Helmut Newton photo session for Vanity Fair, April 1990. 18
Dec. 2008. <http://www.madonnashots.com/0-90-vanity-ot.html>.
E. Of Madonna. Video still from “Bad Girl.” Dir. David Fincher. 1993.18 Dec. 2008.
<http://www.beautifulmadonna.com/videostill/badgirl/index3.html>.
F. Of Madonna. Vanity Fair, 2002. 18 Dec. 2008. <http://madonna.com/media/
pictures.php?page=4>.
G. Of Madonna. Photo by Herb Ritts from 1993. 18 Dec. 2008. <http://www.madonna
shots.com/0-93-sailor.html>.
H. Of Madonna. Video still from “Fever.” Dir. Stephane Sednaoui.1993. 18 Dec. 2008.
<http://www.madonnashots.com/0-93-fever-vid.html>.
I. Of Madonna. From a Max Factor ad campaign. Photo by Alek Keshishian. 1999. 18
Dec. 2008. <http://www.madonnashots.com/0-99-max.html>.
J. Of Madonna. From a cover of Rolling Stone, 1989. Photo by Herb Ritts.18 Dec.
2008. < http://www.madonnashots.com/0-89-camera.html>.
K. Of Madonna. From Vanity Fair, 1992. Photo by Steven Meisel. 18 Dec. 2008.
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<http://www.beautifulmadonna.com/gallery/1992/vanitysteven/index.html>.
L. Of Madonna. From Vanity Fair, 1992. Photo by Steven Meisel. 18 Dec. 2008.
<http://www.beautifulmadonna.com/gallery/1992/vanitysteven/index.html>.
M. Of Madonna. From Harper’s Bazaar, March 2006. Photo by Solve Sundsbo. 18 Dec.
2008. <http://www.madonnashots.com/0-2006-bazaar.html>.
N. Of Madonna. Photo by Wayne Maser, for Esquire, 1994. 18 Dec. 2008.
<http://www.beautifulmadonna.com/gallery/1994/waynemaser/index.html>.
O. Of Madonna. Photo by Bettina Rheims, for FHM Magazine, 1994. 18 Dec. 2008.
<http://www.beautifulmadonna.com/gallery/1994/bettinarheims/index.html>.
P. Of Madonna (in black). The other woman in the photo is unidentified or has lost her
her identity since this photo was taken. Video Music Awards, 2003. 18 Dec. 2008.
<http://madonna.com/media/pictures.php?page=2>.
Q. Of Madonna. From Vogue, Oct. 1996. 18 Dec. 2008. <http://www.madonnashots.
com/0-96-vogue.html>.
R. Of Madonna. Video still from “Vogue.” Dir. David Fincher. 1990. 18 Dec. 2008.
<http://www.beautifulmadonna.com/gallery/1990/vogue/index.html>.
S. Of Madonna. Photo by Steven Klein for W Magazine, April 2003. 18 Dec. 2008.
<http://www.madonnashots.com/0-2003-klein.html>.
T. Of Madonna. From photo session by Jean Baptiste Mondino for Rolling Stone, 2000.
18 Dec. 2008. <http://www.madonnashots.com/0-2000-rs.html>.
U. Of Madonna. Photo by Herb Ritts for Vanity Fair, January 1997, 18 Dec. 2008.
<http://www.madonnashots.com/0-97-vanity.html>.
V. Of Madonna. Photo by Patrick Demarchelier for Harper’s Bazaar, Feb. 1999. 18 Dec.
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2008. <http://www.madonnashots.com/0-99-demarchelier.html>.
W. Of Madonna. Photo by David La Chapelle for Rolling Stone, 1998. 18 Dec. 2008.
<http://www.beautifulmadonna.com/gallery/1998/davidlc/index.html>.
X. Of Madonna. Photo by Alberto Tolot. 1986. 18 Dec. 2008. <http://www.beautiful
madonna.com/gallery/1986/albertotolot/index.html>.
Y. Of Madonna. From Sex, 1992. Photo by Steven Meisel. 18 Dec. 2008. <http://www.
beautifulmadonna.com/madonnasex/index5.html>.
Z. Of Madonna. Photo by Alberto Tolot. 1986. 18 Dec. 2008. <http://www.beautiful
madonna.com/gallery/1986/albertotolot/index.html>.
AA. Of Madonna. (and unknown man). From Sex, 1992. Photo by Steven Meisel 18 Dec.
2008. <http://www.beautifulmadonna.com/madonnasex/index23.html>.
BB. Of Madonna. Photo by Steven Maisel for Versace. 1995. 18 Dec. 2008.
<http://www.beautifulmadonna.com/gallery/1995/versace/maisel/index.html>.
CC. Of Madonna. (and now ex-husband) At the Sanderson Hotel in London, 2000. 18
Dec. 2008. <http://www.madonnashots.com/0-2000-sanderson.html>.
DD. Of Madonna.
As Marilyn: Video Still from “Material Girl.” Dir. Mary Lambert. 1985. 18 Dec.
2008. <http://www.beautifulmadonna.com/videostill/materialgirl/
index2.html>.
As Cher: From a Herb Ritts photo session for her 1989 calendar. 18 Dec. 2008.
<http://www.madonnashots.com/0-88-cal.html>.
As Jackie O: Photo by Mario Vestino, for Versace. 1995. 18 Dec. 2008.
<http://www.beautifulmadonna.com/gallery/1995/versace/testino/
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index.htm>.
As Zelda: From Bloodhounds of Broadway. Dir. Howard Brookner 1988. 18 Dec.
2008. <http://www.madonnashots.com/0-88-bloodhounds.html>.
As Betty Boop: From Harper’s Bazaar, May 1988. Photo by Francesco Scavullo.
18 Dec. 2008. <http://www.madonnashots.com/0-88-scavullo.html>.
As Patton: American Life Photo Session. Photo by McClean. 2003. 18 Dec. 2008.
<http://www.beautifulmadonna.com/gallery/2003/americanlife/
craigmcdean.html>.
EE. Of Madonna. Photo by Steven Klein for W Magazine, April 2003. 18 Dec. 2008.
<http://www.beautifulmadonna.com/gallery/2003/wm/index.html>.
FF. Of Madonna. Photo by Mario Testino, for Versace. 2005. 18 Dec. 2008.
<http://www.beautifulmadonna.com/gallery/2005/versace/index.html>.
GG. Of Madonna. Video Still from “Take a Bow.” Dir. Michael Haussman. 1994. 18
Dec. 2008. <http://www.beautifulmadonna.com/videostill/tab/index2.html>.
HH. Of Madonna. Photo of performance during Reinvention Tour, 2004. 18 Dec. 2008.
<http://www.beautifulmadonna.com/gallery/2004/reinvention/index2.html>.
II. Of Madonna. Video Still from “Express Yourself.” Dir. David Fincher. 1989. 18 Dec,
2008. <http://www.madonnashots.com/0-89-express.html>.
JJ. Of Madonna. Photo by Gary Heery. 1983. 18 Dec. 2008. <http://www.madonna
shots.com/0-83-heery.html>.
KK. Of Madonna. Ladies Home Journal, 2005. Photo by Lorenzo Agius. 18 Dec. 2008.
<http://www.beautifulmadonna.com/gallery/2005/lorenzoagius/index.html>.
LL. Of Madonna. (and misc. rabble) From Sex, 1992. Photo by Steven Meisel.18 Dec.
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2008. <http://www.beautifulmadonna.com/madonnasex/index33.html>.
MM. Of Madonna. (pink girl) From Sex, 1992. Photo by Steven Meisel.18 Dec. 2008.
<http://www.beautifulmadonna.com/madonnasex/index26.html>.
NN. Of Madonna. From Madonna by Andrew Morton. New York: St. Martin’s, 2001.
p. 192a
OO. Of Madonna. Vogue-Paris, 2004. 18 Dec. 2008. <http://www.beautifulmadonna.
com/gallery/2004/vogue_paris/index.html>.
PP. Of Madonna. From the Reinvention Tour Souvenir Book, 2004. 18 Dec. 2008.
<http://www.beautifulmadonna.com/gallery/2004/tourbook/index.html>.
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Appendix II
Aspects of Reality Already on Record as Socially Constructed
(Number of texts on each subject is 1 unless indicated in parenthesis.)
Absurd, the
American War in Vietnam, the
Academic Computing
Academic Identity of
Black Adolescents
Accidents
Admissibility of Expert Testimony
Aesthetic Achievements
Aesthetic Response
Adolescence
African Historical Identity
Agency in American and Japanese
Religion and Society
American Circus Clown, the
American Presidents
American Realism
American Southwest
Ancient Cities
Ancient West Mexican Metallurgy
Anorexia Nervosa
Archaeology of Israel
Asylum-Seekers in Britain
Biography
Black Feminist Thought
Broadcasting by Newspaper
Specialty Sections, 1922-26
Cabbage Syndrome
Catholic Women Pastors
Card Playing among the Daulo
Chemical Fiber Industry
Child Abuse
Childhood in Contemporary Japan
Childhood in Works by
Gwendolyn Brooks
Children Born Deaf and Blind
Chinese Soap Operas
Choice and Reproductive
and Genetic Technologies
Class Identities
Collective ‘Indian’ Ethno-

Globalization
Gothic, the
Guilt and Innocence
Health Care
Hierarchal Hausa Greetings
History in the Venezuelan
Amazon
Homelessness (2)
Homosexuality as Deviance
Homosexual Identities
Homosexuality in
Iris Murdoch’s fiction
Housing Form in the
Colonias of the TexasMexico Borderland
Indian Forests
Identity (4)
Identity and the Lost
Female Imaginary
in Atwood’s Surfacing
Identity in Contemporary
Sierra Leone
Identity in Creole Situations
Identity of Women of Asia,
the Caucasus, &Turkey
Illness (3)
Indigeneity in Russia
Individual, the
Inequality
Information
Intellectual Disability
Intentions in Meditation
International News
Internet, the
Jewishness
Kennedy Assassination, the
Knowledge (7)
Korean War, the
Landsat Satellite, the
Language Competence

Professional Work
Prostitutes in France,
1860-1890
Public Administration
Public Policy
Race (2)
Race and Ethnicity in
America (2)
Readers
Realism
Reality (10)
Reality in Infancy
Reality in Japan
Reform
Regional Knowledges
Rejected Knowledge
Religious Conscience
Religious Meaning
Religious Traditions
Religious Truth
Repression in El
Salvador
Rock ‘n Roll
Self, the (3)
Self in Childhood, the
Sensibility in the
18th century
Serial Homicide
Sex in Popular
Manuals, 1962-95
Sexual Assault
Sexual Harassment
Law
Sexuality (2)
Sexuality and Sexual
Risk in a Time of
AIDS
Sexuality in 3 Novels
by Rachilde
Sexual Orientation
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Religious Identity
Communities
Community Care
Conscience in Faulkner’s Fiction
Crack Cocaine Crime Problem
Crime
Crime in 19th century Ontario,
1840-81
Crisis
Cultural and Social Identity in
Zimbabwean and
Trinbagonian Literatures
Curriculum
Dead-beat Dads
Death
Democracy (2)
Deviance (2)
Difference
Disability
Disability in mid 20th Century
Southern Fiction
Diversity
Domestic Violence
Douglas McGrath’s Emma
Dress and Social Identity in
Tecpán Guatemala
Educational Leadership
Economics
Emotion in India
Emotions
Error
Ethnicity and Nationalism in
Independent Namibia
Ethnic Identity of the Miskitu
People of Nicaragua
Ethnic Pattern in Relation to
New York Jews and
Chinese Food
Ethos
Europe (2)
European Economies
Evil
Evolution
Expertise
Expressivist Pedagogy
Extraordinary Science

Lawyers’ Professionalism
Sexual Realities in
Learning Problems (2)
Heterosexuals’
Lesbianism (2)
Erotic Texts
Lesbian Sexual Health
Sex Work
Liberalism
Science (2)
Life
Scientific Fact (2)
Linguistic Regionalism
Scientific Knowledge
in Belgium
Shared Parenting
Literacy (3)
Slave Rebels and
Literary Value in America
Conspirators
Literacy and Illiteracy of
Social Boundaries of
Bangladeshi Women
Middle-class
in Birmingham
Black Suburbanites
Literature
Social Identity in
Logic of Money
Viking-age
Macroeconomic Stabilization
Scandinavia
Malcolm X
Social Orders (2)
Man, the State, and War
Social Policy
in Former Yugoslavia
Social Problems
Management
Social Uses of Texts
Marketing
Social Reality
Markets
Society (2)
Masculine Identity
Society in Rousseau
Masculinity (2)
and Nietzsche
Masculinity in Henry James Sociolinguistics
Mathematical Knowledge
Somatization in
Meaning (3)
Chinese Society
Meaning in Confrontational Southern Vowel
Discourse
Salience
Meaning in Small Group
South Korean
Literature Discussions
Capitalism
among Sixth Graders
Spirituality
and Their Teacher
Statistics
Meaning in Storybook
Street Gang Problems
Reading with Children
Subjectivity of Urban,
Medicine
Working-Class,
Men as Resistant
Portuguese Boys
Menstruation among Hmong Suburban Legal
Women in Australia
Communities
Mental Health in Nordic
Success
Psychotropic Drug
Technology (3)
Advertising
Technology Change
Mental Processes
Television in the
Mind, the
American Home
Mixed Race
Texts
Morality (2)
Therapy
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Female Cannibalism in
Papua New Guinea
Female Desire
Female Models in 19th-Century
France
Female Self in the Shorter Poems
and Designs of William Blake
Female Selves in Works by Li Ang,
Wang Anyi, and Amy Tan
Female Sexuality (2)
Feminine Sexualities in Women’s
Popular Periodicals: 1920-1996
Femininity (3)
Femininity in 19th Century
American Literature
Franco-Ontarian Interests Towards
French Language Schooling,
19th century to 1980s
Freedom in Free and Open
Source Software
Freaks
Free Trade
Gender (7)
Gender as Represented in
Popular Fiction, 1990-1997
Gender in America, 1930’s/1950’s
Gender in Byzantium
Gender in Gikuyu and Swahili
Proverbs
Gender Inequality in the Housing
Experience of Women in
Hong Kong
Gender in Postwar America
Gender in the Lancashire
Cotton Weaving Industry,
1880-1914
Gender Relations in the Canadian
Clothing Industry, 1890-1940
Gender Roles in the Education
System in Nepal
Gender Roles in Soviet Film
Gender through Women’s Private
Rituals in Traditional Finland

Narrative Reality
Thomas Carlyle’s
Nationalism
New Eng. RepNative American Criminality
utation, 1834-36
Natural Law
Time in Modern
Nature (3)
Fiction
Nature in Environmental
Topical Cohesion in
Romanticism from
Conversation with
Thoreau to Dillard
Italian-Americans
Nature in Literature
Urban Legends
New Global Norms
Urban Schooling
Normality
Value
Nostalgia
Victims
Ocean, the
Virtue
Old Age (2)
Virtue in American
Oral History
Lit., 1870-1910
Organizational Behavior
Whiteness
Participation Framework in Whiteness within
Kindergarten JournalSelected Chicana/o
Writing Activity
Discourses
Past, the
Wife Abuse
Past, Present, and Future
Women (3)
in the Written and
Women’s and Gender
Oral Texts of the
Studies Major
Old Order Amish
Women’s Freedom
Person, the
Women’s Rhetoric
Personality
before 1750
Personhood of the Rungus Written
of Sabah, Malaysia
Communication
Phys. Education in Britain
X-Rated Films
Psychiatric Reality
Psychological Subject
Total Categories:
Police Deviance and Control
274
Political Influence
Political Reality
Notable Omissions:
Postcolonial Studies
Postmodernism
Academic Publishing
Poverty
Fads
Power and Dominance
Social Construction
Among the Matsigenka
of the Peruvian Amazon
Preferred Realities
Privacy
Professional Discourse
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